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Klytaimestra is depicted as the accomplisher of great evil, in Archaic and Classical epic, lyric, 
and tragedy in ancient Greece.1  In the view of many, her characterization in ancient literature 
stands at the beginning of an enduring Western literary tradition of misogyny.  In Homer’s 
Odyssey (11.433-434) she is referred to as the woman who has permanently ruined the 
reputation of every woman in the world, including ἐσσομένῃσιν ὀπίσσω/ θηλυτέρῃσι γυναιξί, 
καὶ ἥ κ᾽ ἐυεργὸς ἔῃσιν, “those of women-kind coming hereafter, and even... she who might be 
virtuous”.  The negative characterization of this husband-murdering queen has been passed 
down, relatively unchanged, to the modern era, but more recent analysis questions this 
construction and reception.  This thesis explores the characterization of Klytaimestra, primarily 
in the fifth-century BCE tragic Oresteia of Aiskhylos and the subsequent plays of Sophokles 
and Euripides, which present and explore Klytaimestra’ character, and proposes that her 
fictional life-history be interpreted through a biopoetic analysis which acknowledges gendered 
behaviours and conflict in a context of evolutionary principles. 
 
The analysis of the literary Klytaimestra through the lens of evolutionary psychology 
contributes to the critique of the patriarchal tradition of literary misogyny, which describes 
(and often defends) reproductive inequities across a wide range of human cultures.  This thesis 
argues that the characterization of Klytaimestra in Greek literature, including tragedy, 
embodies the dynamics of genetic and gender conflict found universally across the human 
species (and across all doubly-sexed species).  Klytaimestra’s life-story reflects the struggle of 
a fictional but realistically situated woman for personal and reproductive success in the context 
of coevolutionary antagonism between male and female animals; in Greek literary works her 
dehumanization and matricide are predictable outcomes in the context of ancient Greek culture, 
which unashamedly idealizes and enshrines male mating strategies and priorities.  Greek 
tragedy is an especially overt illustration of the gene-gender struggle, perhaps because it was 
created, performed, and enjoyed by men, in a patriarchal society which embraced gender 
difference and inequity. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Spellings of terms and names in a thesis devoted to Greek literature in the original will – wherever possible – 
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ὀρεία τις ὡς λέαιν᾽ ὀργάδων 
δρύοχα νεμομένα, τάδε κατήνυσεν. 
 
“As a mountain-haunting lioness ranging through the meadowland woods,  











An Ancient Dedication, for an Evolutionary Ecosphere: 
 
“I shall sing of well-formed Earth, mother of all, 
and oldest of all, who nourishes all things living on land. 
Her beauty nurtures all creatures that walk upon the land, 
and all that move in the deep or fly in the air. 
O mighty one, you are the source of fair children and goodly fruit, 
and on you it depends to give life to, or take it away from, 
mortal men.  Blessed is the man you favor 
with willing heart, for he will have everything in abundance. 
His life-giving land teems with crops, and on his fields 
his flocks thrive while his house is filled with goods. 
Such men with just laws rule a city of lovely women, 
while much prosperity and wealth attend them. 
Their sons glory in youthful glee 
and their daughters with cheerful hearts in flower-dances 
play and frisk over soft flowers of the field. 
these are the ones you honor, O revered goddess of plenty! 
Hail, mother of the gods and wife of starry Ouranos! 
For my song do grant me livelihood that gladdens the heart, 
and I shall remember you and another song, too.”   
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INTRODUCTION: TRAGEDY’S REALISTIC IMITATION OF REPRODUCTIVE 
ANTAGONISM 
 
Scholars have long disagreed whether tragic myth offers any real information about ancient 
women’s lives.2  Some recent feminist classicists argue that myth may be used to construct at 
least a partial picture of female life in ancient Greece, even if only of how men perceived and 
portrayed women.3  Following new feminist-led interest in ancient women’s lives, women in 
tragedy are sometimes viewed as transgressive, but some tragic women are ideal conformists, 
in cautionary contrast with others resisting male control.4  Furthermore, and pertinently to the 
focus of this study, women in myth figure principally as reproductive entities in relation to men, 
as daughters, attractive nubile maidens, or married wives.5 
 
The following introductory discussion presents the background necessary to the claims of this 
argument: that evolutionary science can illuminate understanding of how characters are 
constructed and received in narrative; that Klytaimestra in Greek tragedy embodies gender 
conflict arising out of antagonistic coevolution in species with two sexes; and that Greek 
tragedy expresses the extreme concern of a highly androcentric culture with reproductive 
politics.  In doing so, the discussion further seeks to demonstrate that scholarship that denies 
and demonizes the empirical findings from evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology, 
and cognitive science is doing itself a disservice: it is both possible and desirable to be a feminist 
who incorporates evolutionary psychology into the study of ancient women because a feminist 
who incorporates scientific findings about human nature and the biosocial origins of patriarchy 
                                                          
2 On the predominance of women in tragedy (and the impossibly powerful females in Greek myth generally) in 
contrast to real-world public life, see Dowden (1995:48): Blondell et al (1999b:x); Zeitlin (1996:5); Rabinowitz 
(2004:40); Mastronarde (2010:256). 
3 On tragedy’s contribution to study of real ancient women, see Sorum (1982:204); Dowden (1995:53, 56); 
Seidensticker (1995:156-157); Zelenak (1998:29); van Wees (2005).  In Mastronarde’s (2010:246) opinion, greater 
optimism that tragedy offers evidence of ancient Greek female experience derives from academic drive toward 
gender equity.  For examples, see Foley (1981, 2001); Arthur (1984:8); Cantarella (1987:25); Loraux (1987); 
Rabinowitz (1993a, 1993b); Blundell (1995:11, 16, 19, 71); Seidensticker (1995); Zeitlin (1996); Wohl (1998); 
McClure (1999); Pelling (2000); and Griffith (2001).  Cf. Dowden and Livingstone’s (2011:11) critique of well-
intentioned feminist scholars who place too much credence in myth as a source for historical attitudes toward 
women. 
4 Examples of Sophokles’ contrast of conformist, self-controlling females with unwisely immoderate sisters 
include Elektra and Khrysothemis (S. Elektra) and Antigone and Ismene (Antigone).  On the difficulty of reading 
transgressive tragic female characters such as Antigone, Medeia, and Klytaimestra – all created by elite males – 
as reflecting real-life women’s attitudes, see Griffith (1991:135); Henderson (1991:143); Buxton (1994:114); 
Blondell et al (1999a:48); Wilson (2000:129). 
5 On the emphasis upon women’s reproductive potential in Greek literature, see Dowden (1992:161-162; 1995:55). 
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stands a better chance of imagining effective ways to remake a more equal and inclusive world.  
So-called ‘biological (or genetic) determinism’ is a commonly-used but misplaced term in 
feminist and social analysis less familiar with scientific models and findings to denigrate 
evolutionary explanation.  Reflexive rejection of science as an instrument of male hegemony 
ignores feminist female and male professional evolutionists and cognitivists who understand 
that humans are socially complex, evolved animals.6  Evolutionary literary criticism – 
biopoetics – is now an accepted (if occasionally contested) approach within literary studies, 
while the claim that evolutionary approaches to human behaviour is not incompatible with 
feminist perspectives has been made within the field of literary criticism (i.e., Easterlin, 2005, 
2013; Vandermassen, 2005, 2011; Grant, 2017), as well as outside this field (i.e., Betzig, 1986, 
1988; Hrdy, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2009; Campbell, 2002, 2006, 2013; M. Fisher, 2004; M. 
Wilson, 2005).7 
 
While some mainstream critics have noted the obvious factor of reproductive politics in their 
interpretations of ancient Greek literature, few – until recently – employ an approach informed 
by evolutionary theory.  This thesis aims to present an interpretation which incorporates and 
acknowledges traditional scholarship on the characters of Klytaimestra and her family – which 
has many apt and useful observations to make about gender conflict at the historic, political, 
and social context – but which also takes the interpretation of plot and character motivation to 
additional level, the sociobiological.  Readings based in any single analytical perspective tends 
to overlook a broader humanist understanding; the biopoetic approach seeks to integrate an 
understanding of literature in its contemporary circumstance and in the context of individual 
authorial quality and tone, but also to further explain some literary aspects in terms of evolved 
human disposition, in order to correct, expand, and integrate many of the conclusions of 
                                                          
6 On the varied feminist and humanist objections to scientific method and an evolutionary perspective on gender 
and mating behaviour, see Bleier (1984); Lewontin et al (1984); Harding (1986, 1991); Hyde (1996, 2005, 2007, 
2014); Tang-Martinez (1997); Eagly and Wood (1999, 2009, 2013); Rose and Rose (2000); Grosvenor (2002); 
Pedersen (2002, 2011); Harris (2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2011, 2013); Buller (2005a, b, c); Liesen (2007, 2011, 2013a, 
b); Harris et al (2013); Tarzia (2015); Zell et al (2015, 2016).  The responses of evolutionary humanists, scientists 
and science-commentators to feminist and humanist misuse and misrepresentations of science have been many 
and varied; see, for example: Gross and Levitt (1994); Dennett (1995); Gowaty (1992, 1997a, 2003b); Buss (1996); 
Malamuth (1996b); Waage and Gowaty (1997); Koertge (1998a, 1998b); Singer (1999); Soble (1999); Segerstråle 
(2000); Kurzban (2002); Bricmont and Sokal (2005); Chomsky (2005); Vandermassen (2005, 2011); Tybur 
(2007); Zunshine (2007b); Sokal (2008); Tanaka (2010a, 2010b); Buss and Schmitt (2011); Sokol-Chang et al 
(2013); Tate (2013). 
7 Biopoetics is a less-common term used to describe the evolutionary literary critical method; see Cooke (1990:3, 
6-8), who derives the term biopoetics from the Greek poesis to describe a literary method of analysis that 
incorporates evolutionary science. 
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previous approaches of the critical tradition, most especially feminist literary analysis within 
the Classical Studies field. 
 
All new approaches to literary analysis may make a useful contribution to literary study.  
Mainstream literary scholars have for many decades have tended to specifically reject 
sociobiological science, however, sometimes without examining the original scientific 
discussions with an impartial attitude.  In the case of ancient Greek works of fiction, constructed 
in a time and place with vastly different views of appropriate gender identities and behaviours, 
a new perspective grounded in historic universals of evolved human psychology offers another 
effective tool for analysing gender conflict.  Each of the works discussed in depth in this thesis 
assume at all times that all of the interactions between male and female characters are grounded 
in their (male) authors’ view of what is predictable gender behaviour, of what is appropriate in 
the contemporary context, and of what poses a challenge or threat to the interests of the 
characters themselves.  Specific episodes from the plays are discussed more deeply in light of 
the overall findings of evolutionary psychology research – which concludes that all behaviours 
and motivations are co-evolved and interdependent in function and expression – and of 
particular aspects of gendered behaviour, when these are strongly supported by the text.  
Chapter 1 explores individual aspects of a much wider human behavioural repertoire through 
the lens of evolutionary theory, but whenever one aspect is under discussion, it should be 
remembered that this aspect exists in necessary connection with many other psychological 
dimensions in individuals, and within and across genders.  All behaviours also exist as particular 
expressions of optional responses to environmental circumstances; the behaviour of characters 
in Greek tragedy reflects universal human tendencies as expressed within the constraints of 
ancient Greek cultural moment. 
 
Although there is some resistance within the humanities and Classical Studies disciplines to a 
scientific approach to literature, scholars do agree upon the selectively ideological nature of 
mythology in Greek tragedy; recurring narrative patterns in this genre reflect the most pressing 
contemporary concerns, and Athens utilized the publically-funded and state-controlled City 
Dionysia to protect its interests and further its democratizing and imperialist aims.8  According 
to some, the central message of Greek mythology is the natural right of male humans to possess 
                                                          
8 Lincoln (1999:207); Csapo (2005:9, 301-302).  Cf. Doherty (2001:11), who suggests that some authors’ 
ideological motivations were largely pre-conscious. 
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and control female humans.9  Women’s lives in ancient Greece – or in well-documented Athens, 
at least – were defined by the politics of reproduction, and Greek misogyny is conspicuously 
focussed on male reproductive concerns; for instance, citizenship was linked to monogamous 
marriage, and the notion of equality between male-headed households depended on increasing 
paternity-certainty in legitimately begotten offspring, and tragedy often depicts such male 
concerns about lineage perpetuation and authenticity.10  The begetting of legitimate sons in the 
oikos was an ongoing issue in the real Greek world, and the genealogies of famous mythical 
heroes often depict the resolution of this problem.11  A good deal of ancient literature is 
conspicuously concerned with matters of status, power, mating, genealogy, and kin 
relationships, no less so than contemporary fiction-plots, which, across genres, are just as 
concerned as ancient fiction with universal, innate, reproductively-driven behaviours.  In one 
sense, mythology is genealogy.12  Mythology confirmed through genealogy the right of 
aristocratic families to retain their power and influence, even in the democratic context, and so 
genealogy in fiction must be biologically plausible because a primary function of myth was the 
authentication of real-life political claims to power.13  The central premise of Greek mythology 
and culture is clear: women exist to bear men’s children, but these offspring are not socially or 
legally their own.  The Greek solution to the threat posed by uncontrolled female sexuality to 
androcentric civilization was to demonize women who subverted the legitimacy of men’s heirs.  
Western cultures may have inherited many unattractive Greek ideals, including male control of 
female sexuality, but the suppression of female reproductive autonomy to male advantage is 
ubiquitous and universal throughout the human historic and geographic world.14 
 
Whereas most modern scholars agree that Greek mythology evidences an androcentric, 
occasionally misogynistic world-view, fewer concur that conflict in the plots of tragedy arise 
out of or concern reproductive matters.15  This accords with the findings of some literary 
scholars, who see that fiction across eras and cultures is principally concerned with two basic 
                                                          
9 Dowden (1992:161-162); Powell (2002:85, 162). 
10 Burkert (1979:6); Doniger (1999:305, 308-309); Wilson (2000:130). 
11 Segal (1986:165, 170-172); Dowden (1992:166-167; 2011:50); Segal (2004:132); Clark (2012:5, 130). 
12 Dowden (1992:11); Higbie (2007:241). 
13 Buxton (1994:29); Zeitlin (1996:6-7). 
14 On the cultural transmission of militarism, imperialism, slavery, racism, classicism, sexism and misogyny 
through Greek literature; see Rogers (1966:xv-xvi); Dickison (1973-1974:81); Pomeroy (1975: xii, x, 228-230); 
Gould (1980:55-57); Foley (1981:134; 1988:1301); Arthur (1984:7-8; 1994:214, 216); Moss (1988:15); 
Gutzwiller and Michelini (1991:66); Segal (1995a:12); Hall (1997b:93); Blanshard (2007:328). 
15 On the widespread mythological conception of woman as a separate species, see Foley (1988:1306); Foxhall 
(2009:488).  Cf. Lefkowitz (2007:x-xi), who challenge the notion that tragedy depicts misogyny at all. 
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life-stories: the struggle between males for social supremacy (granting increased access to 
fertile females), and the quest of both sexes to locate and secure the optimum mate; in both 
cases, the ultimate goal is reproductive success.  Reproductive conflict is the sufficient 
condition for much mythological discord: sons struggle to attain reproductive maturity, and 
males secure access to high-value maidens (and sometimes already-married women) by any 
means possible, including violence.16  But is it possible to gain any understanding of human 
disposition from the analysis of Klytaimestra’s conflicts with husband and family, which is 
heavily constrained by the generic conventions of fifth-century tragic drama?17  According to 
our earliest and most evocative analysis of the forms and interpretation of tragedy – Aristotle’s 
fourth-century Poetics – tragedy constitutes the very best source of material for understanding 
human psychology, because poetry addresses the universals of human nature.18  Aristotle 
contrasts the universality of φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ‘philosophical and serious’ 
poetry to the particularity of history (Poet. 9.1451b5).19  Aristotle also defines καθόλου – ‘the 
universal’ – as τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, 
οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη: τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ‘those things of a type 
corresponding with that spoken and done in probability or necessity – poetry aims at this, setting 
out the creation of names afterwards’ (Poet.9.1451b8-12).20  Tragedy, then, according to 
                                                          
16 Hogan (1997, 2003a, 2003b, 2008a, 2008b); Abbott (2000, 2006, 2008).  On rape in mythology as a viable and 
even noble male strategy for the founding of a city or colony, see Hall (1993a:112). 
17 Many interpreters of the Oresteia acknowledge or insist upon the importance of certain Aristotelian generic 
constraints and conventions, particularly mīmēsis (‘imitation, representation, evocation’), katharsis (‘purgation or 
clarification’), and kathalou (‘human universals’).  On the main scholarly positions on the meaning of katharsis, 
see Golden (1975:48).  On Aristotle’s katharsis as a mechanism for ‘engaging emotional systems’, see Poes. 
1449b25f; Pol. VIII, 7; Rhet. II, 5 & 8; Nic. Eth. II, 6.  On the audience’s emotional experience of narrative leading 
to cognitive change – rather than purgation or purification, see Oatley (1994:71). 
18 Sharrock and Ash (2002:269); Nussbaum (1992:1020-1021); Stalley (1995); Halliwell (1998); Shields 
(2007:396).  Aristotle’s Poetics is highly esteemed by some as an authentic and well-informed work on tragedy; 
see Nussbaum (1986:8); Des Bouvrie (1990:61); Eden (2005:41); Belfiore (2009:628).  For a useful summary of 
Aristotle’s findings on the prototypical or ideal tragic form, see Golden (1975:47-48).  On the shortcomings of the 
Poetics as a source for understanding Greek tragedy, namely its selectivity, elitism, exclusions, and anachronisms, 
see also Vickers (1973:23, 33); Taplin (1977:25); Walton (1980:40); Vernant 1981:6); Fagles (1984:xi); Salkever 
(1986:276); Most (2000:24-26); Finkelberg (2006:61, 64, 71); Belfiore (2009:631); Woodruff (2009:614); Hall 
(2013:77). 
19 Most (2000:19). 
20 de Ste. Croix (1992:25-26); Armstrong (1998:448); Eden (2005:43).  Aristotle’s definition of καθόλου as the 
universal and the prototypical foreshadows debate in modern literary studies and linguistics about narrative and 
cognitive mechanisms for perceiving the world.  See also Woodruff (1992:88), who argues that tragedy leads the 
audience to respond emotionally to universals as if they were historical particulars.  Cf. Lear (1988:312) and 
Belfiore (1992b:359), who contend that critics should resist the view that universal poetry demonstrates anything 
about the human condition. 
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Aristotle, ‘imitates’ what is predictably typical of human life; literary niceties of setting and 
identity are simply wrapping for the plot. 
 
In light of this, some contend that mīmēsis refers to the realism of poetry’s depiction of 
characters and situations – and the evocation of intellectual pleasure through the audience’s 
recognition of these – as opposed to history’s depiction of particular persons and events.21  Is 
the scripted tragic mīmēsis of the conflict between Klytaimestra and her husband realistic 
imitation?22  Does the Klytaimestra-Agamemnon conflict imitate the gendered antagonism 
experienced by real-life men and women?  The plots and characters of tragedy in its distant 
Bronze Age setting were able to move the Athenian audience, and if the experience of tragedy 
meant nothing to audiences outside of Athens, then it would indeed have remained mired in a 
single moment of the far past, and in a single location, but ancient Greeks and contemporary 
modern audiences – across millennia – are able to find something familiar in the dynamics of 
this fictional family, and empathize with the characters of ancient tragedy.23  According to 
Aristotle, the characters of tragedy experience events likely to occur to others, and respond as 
others might; conflicts are universal because the highest and lowest of citizens might suffer 
these tragic disasters equally.  But why are the events of tragic drama – which imitates human 
life – necessarily tragic?24 
 
Aristotle argues that the kind of actions which should be imitated in tragedy are those leading 
to the unexpected revelation of enmity in friends, or of friendship in enemies; the result is a 
shift in the emotional state of the fictional tragic character, and the evocation of either pity or 
fear in the audience (Poet. 1452a1-52b1).25  The created families of the Oresteia were human 
beings with realistic conflicts of interest and shifting loyalties; their crises were those 
experienced by many fifth-century Athenian families (perhaps by all human families): illicit 
                                                          
21 On audience pleasure in recognition of realism in tragedy, see Else (1986:155); Golden (1962:54).  When the 
human mind is deceived through sufficiently realistic action, the same cognitive and emotional structures are 
triggered as when we ourselves are performing those same events; see Gottschall (2012:62).  Golden (1976:446; 
1976a:355); Armstrong (1998:455); Jones (1962:21, 24) and Heath (1987:100), however, argue that mīmēsis 
applies only to action, and not to character.  Other purposes and effects of mīmēsis are suggested by Kitto 
(1966:146-147); Lear (1988:319, 321); Halliwell (2002); Woodruff (2009:616-617). 
22 On the debate concerning Aristotle’s use of the term mīmēsis, see Goldstein (1966:569-570); Srivastava 
(1975:134); Shields (2007:382). 
23 Taplin (2007:5-6). 
24 On the misapplication of the term ‘tragic’ in modern parlance, see Most (2000:20-21). 
25 The imitation of character, according to Aristotle, should be both realistic, and yet endow the character with 
something greater, in the manner of a portrait-painter (Poet. 1454b1). 
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love affairs and unwanted pregnancies; expeditious marriages and hostile spouses; infidelities 
and illegitimate offspring; intergenerational disappointments; rivalry for power and position; 
and the real tragedies of rapes, murders, and the permanent loss of family members.26  
Reproductive conflict lies at the heart of the Oresteia family tragedy, as it does in modern 
fictional genres of all kinds.27  The typical responses of tragedy’s fictional humans to their 
unbearable life-catastrophes are the same as those of real, human people in the ancient world: 
despair, disillusionment, and sometimes death; excessive responses or irrational overreaction 
of characters to their suffering only lead to further suffering, however, as Klytaimestra and her 
family are destined to learn. 
 
To appreciate these tragic narrative scenarios, twentieth century classicists often utilize frames 
of psychologically or linguistically oriented critical interpretation developed outside of the 
classical tradition, including psychoanalysis, structuralism and narratology.28  The most 
productive interpretations of myth utilize a multi-disciplinary synthesis of methodologically 
empirical approaches identifying the psychological motivations for and cognitive constraints 
upon the creation of narrative, on how and why the mind devotes attention to story, and on the 
social benefits to the human individual and group of participation in narrative.29  Human 
psychology is now better grounded in biology, acknowledging the confluence of innate, genetic 
factors and environmental elements; converging evidence clearly confirms that evolved 
physical neurobiology underlies shared human psychological experience, including story-
sharing, and myth is the ideal cultural product to illuminate the preconscious, evolved core of 
the human mind.30 
                                                          
26 On the reality of life for women in ancient Greece (and especially married women and mothers), see Lacey 
(1968); Pomeroy (1975, 1997); Sealey (1984, 1990); Patterson (1991, 1998, 2005); Schmitt-Pantel (1992); Reeder 
(1995); Ogden (1996, 1997) Cox (1998, 2011); Brule (2003); Sansone (2004); Lefkowitz and Fant (2005); Lyons 
and Westbrook (2005); Morris and Powell (2006); Salzman-Mitchell (2012). 
27 Slater (1968:186, 162); Ormand (2009:260). 
28 On this tendency, see Kirk (1972:76); Peradotto (1997:386); Dowden and Livingstone (2011:19).  For examples 
of the application (and misapplication) of psychoanalytic literary analysis of the Oresteia within the classical 
tradition, see Rein (1954); Seidenberg (1966); Slater (1968, 1974); Rubinstein (1969); Klein (1975); Roberts 
(1975); Devereux (1976); Simon (1978, 1998); Caldwell (1989, 1990); Cixous (1994); Jacobs (2004); Lupton 
(2005); Bowlby (2006); Pollock (2006); Freud (2007).  On (the errors of) psychoanalytic interpretations of Greek 
myth, see Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1981); Scalise Sugiyama (2001c); Eisner (2007); Fromm (2007).  For 
examples of structuralist analysis of myth, see Frye (1951, 1957, 1998); Jakobson (1955); Vernant (1970); Burkert 
(1979); Sowa (2005); Lévi-Strauss (2007); Schopflin (2007). 
29 On the value of interdisciplinary analyses of myth, see Vernant (1980:206); Henrichs (1987:255); Sourvinou-
Inwood (1991:16). 
30 Onega and Landa (1996:1); Richardson and Steen (2002:1-2); Bortolussi and Dixon (2003:3, 33); Zunshine 




One analytical approach to literature closely adjacent to biopoetics (and often interacting with 
it) is the science of narratology, which seeks to explain and quantify narrative origins, structure, 
and function, and to identify the universal dynamics of cognitive process in production and 
consumption of narrative; narratology also explores how narrative answers some basic human 
psychological need.31  There is considerable debate within narratology about whether the 
evolution of human propensity to the pleasures of story is a beneficial and advantageous 
adaptation, or simply a by-product – a behaviour or invented trait such as handwriting or reading 
– with no discernible function in evolutionary history.32  Narratologists from Aristotle on agree 
on one point, however: certain features of narrative are universal.33  Patrick Holm Hogan’s 
(2003) extensive study of literature’s features proposes a large number of literary universals 
across cultures, and three universal literary genres: Poetry, Prose Fiction, and, to a lesser extent, 
Drama, and two basic conflict tales – the predominantly popular quest-for-love romance-story 
(typically male for female), and the struggle-for-power saga (typically between males).34  
Prototype narratives are products of innate biological and cognitive structures as well as socially 
and environmentally shaped relations; these prototypical genres are frequently co-opted to the 
preservation of social hierarchy, but the core of conflict in all of them is the irresolvable clash 
of obligations between family, society, and self.35 
 
                                                          
Dowden (1995:45).  Cf. Boyd et al (2010:6), who believe that scientific enquiry into real-world human psychology 
facilitates study of human psychology in literature. 
31 Martin (1986:100, 103); Darby (2001); Keen (2003:7).  See also Frye’s (1951, 1957, 1998) fundamental studies 
in story-archetypes. 
32 For examples, see Hernadi (2002:26); Nettle (2005:56); Austin (2007:216-217, 219-220).  Hogan (2008a:155-
156); Vanderbeke (2012:119, 114-115).  For a recent review of works discussing the development or evolution of 
fictional capacity in the human species, see Boyd (2018).  On the failure of evolutionary explanations of the 
creative arts – Miller’s (1998, 2000) courtship display hypothesis, for example – to take into account the extreme 
sociality in the human species, see Scalise Sugiyama (2001a:234-235); Buss (2008:422); Boyd (2009a:210).  On 
the universal urge in humans to daily, phatic-narrative conversation about others’ doings, in order to maintain 
affective, social, and political relationships with friends and associates, see Scalise Sugiyama (1996:403, 419-420; 
2001a:221; 2001b:235, 238; 2005:190; 2008:259-260); Oatley (1999:109); Mar et al (2011:821).  Tooby and 
Cosmides (2001:8-9) find that humans have specific cognitive adaptions for the processing of fictional worlds. 
33 From Aristotle to evolutionary literary scholars, cross-cultural, recurring patterns in mythological narrative, have 
been recognized but mainstream literary-studies in the humanities has long disapproved the notion of human 
cultural or literary universals.  On humanities’ resistance to models of universal patterns in literature, see Hogan 
(1997:223-224); Richardson (2000:569). 
34 Hogan (2003b:23, 65, 100).  According to Hogan (2003b:32, 99), not all literary universals appear in every 
example of narrative.  On the definitions and scientific utility of absolute and statistical literary universals, see 
Hogan (1997:228-229; 2011; 2012). 
35 Hogan (2003b:185, 251; 2008a:155, 158). 
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Narrative is a pre-literacy cognitive product of the human mind in a physical body; the ultimate 
aim of this biological brain is to survive in the material and social environment.36  Human 
audiences appear willing to give a disproportionately large amount of cognitive attention – as 
well as material resources – to the consumption of dramatic narrative in theatre or film or 
television, and especially when the story centrally concerns social interactions; the submission 
of disproportionately substantial mental resources to the seduction of imagined worlds must 
offer advantage for the eager consumer of narrative.37  The main benefit offered to humans by 
the imagination of fictional but humanly-real (or anthropomorphized) characters and events 
may be the development of the ‘theory of mind’, because the greatest environmental threat to 
individual humans was often simply other humans, while the capacity for empathy must be 
adaptive, in the sense that social groups of animals must accurately monitor the emotional states 
of their conspecifics for evidence of genuine danger and safety.38  Fiction about the complex, 
multi-level intentions of other humans gives the mind exercise and valuable practice in meta-
representation – an assumed omniscience, honed through exposure to the realistic depiction of 
fictional protagonists’ inner thoughts.39  According to a number of findings of cognitive 
research, human pleasure in literature is a specifically emotional experience.40  Story is not 
primarily intended to convey life-enhancing information about real-world environments, 
however; fiction is intended to be emotionally and physiologically stimulating, and readers and 
                                                          
36 Turner (1991:vii-viii, 19, 22); Hernadi (2001:55). 
37 Hernadi (2001:55-56, 62); Nettle (2005:57, 62, 67-68, 73); Austin (2007:222, 224-225); Argo et al (2008:621). 
38 Zillmann (1995:41); Austin (2007:226-227).  On mirror-neurons and Aristotle’s writings on imitation, namely 
the internal representation or simulation evoked in the reader or audience by the dramatic narrative, see Oatley 
(1994:53, 68-70); Mar et al (2011:284).  The consumption of fiction is directly related – through the operation of 
mirror neurons – to the emotional-cognitive facility for empathy; see Zunshine (2003:271-273); Mar et al (2006); 
Djikic et al (2009:24); Gottschall (2012:67); Gansel (2012:96, 102).  Cf. Dutton (2009:118-120), who concludes 
that literature exercises the faculty of empathy and reading the intentionality of others, and Carroll (1999a:169), 
who contends that it is the universality of plot themes in literature which explains the ability of the reader audience 
to empathize with literary protagonists.  On mirror neurons and the mediation of human capacity for mind-reading 
and the empathic response, see Gazzola et al (2006); Jabbi et al (2007); Ramachandran (2007); Iacoboni (2008:78, 
114, 119-120); Heyes (2010); Kosonogov (2012).  In Hogan’s (2003:209) opinion, literature humanizes the 
audience, and thus society.  See also Boyd (1998:13; 2009b:192; 2012b:11), who argues that repeated engagement 
with character in fiction refines our software for sociality, while the arts fine-tune the mind’s neural wiring, and 
Gottschall (2012:63-64), who further suggests that exposure to fiction rewires the brain, making it more efficient.  
For fiction as training in reading the intentions of others, see Vermeule (2004, 2010:14); Zunshine (2004); Abbott 
(2006:718). 
39 Austin (2007:228-229); Boyd (2001:200-201, 208).  For other cognitive-empathic explanations for the 
development of narrative capacity, multi-level intentionality, and causation, see Velleman (2003); Zunshine (2006; 
2007a:194-195; 2007b:295); Vermeule (2011:245-246, 250); Gottschall (2012:102). 
40 Carroll (1999a:169); Hogan (2003b:1, 89); Keen (2011:6n5). 
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authors experience real, physical reactions to character emotions in fiction.41  The audience of 
fiction feels as if the events in the fiction are happening to them personally, a hypothesis also 
backed by discoveries concerning the relation of mirror neurons to functional empathy; reader 
suspension of disbelief permits empathy or identification with fictional characters to the same 
degree as for real humans.42  Scholars, writers, and ordinary readers have argued that reading 
narrative fiction actively enhances a person’s capacity for empathy – although little evidence 
appears to support this view – but it is apparent that empathizers and readers have relatively 
accurate mind-reading capacity.43  Narrative empathy is especially high in humans with very 
active mirror neuron systems, and also in those considered better readers, while readers prefer 
characters inviting strong empathy.44  The more realistic the narrative, the more intense the 
audience’s emotional response is likely to be; from Greek theatre to modern TV serial, dramatic 
plots trace, with scrupulous attention to realistic depiction, the upheaval and disintegration of 
social and sexual relationships, and the subsequent realignment of social groups.45  According 
to some, the type of fiction most likely to evoke empathy is that which depicts another’s 
suffering, and drama is the fiction-type especially apt in evoking compassion for those who 
suffer, while audience empathy in dramatic contexts is more intense when individuals have 
personal experience of the same situation in their own life.46  Greek tragedy, then, as the first 
documented form of enacted human drama, is an excellent beginning-place for the cognitively-
grounded analysis of human disposition to narrative.47 
 
Through wild swings in literary methodology and perceived meanings, our comprehension of 
literature can become broader and deeper in equal measure, but many postmodern critics – 
psychoanalysts, poststructuralists, and gender-feminists – fail to account for the universal 
                                                          
41 Oatley (1994:53, 58, 61, 64, 72); Hogan (2003b:71); Keen (2007:xii; 2010:70; 2011:30); Mar et al (2011:822, 
824). 
42 Zillman (1995:45); Tooby and Cosmides (2001:8-9). 
43 Zillman (1995:43-44); Oatley (1999:110); Knobloch-Westerwick et al (2014:747, 762).  For critique of this 
view, see Keen (2007:vii, 37, 121). 
44 Hogan (2003b:29); Keen (2007:viii; 2010:20, 61, 70, 80); Argo et al (2008:621).  On the greater degree of 
empathy in women, especially for fictional characters, see Oatley (1999:113); Baron-Cohen (2005:478); Argo et 
al (2008:616). 
45 Nettle (2005:68, 70). 
46 Zillman (1995:40); Hogan (2003b:213).  See also Sapolsky and Zillmann (1978); Zillmann (1991, 1995:43). 
47 Aristotle insists that the capacity to evoke emotion is the first requirement of good drama is; his discussion of 
the cathartic purpose of tragedy is of considerable interest to some cognitive critics.  On Aristotle as the first 




appeal and enduring resonance of tragedy’s characters and plots.48  There is a need for a new 
paradigm for the interpretation of literary character and plot; Aristotle’s quantitative analysis 
of tragic drama – which concludes that the plots of tragedy succeed best when they resonate 
with the universals of human experience, evoking emotion through realistic plot and characters 
– is such a paradigm.  Tragedy works so well with audiences of all eras because it depicts in 
realistic imitation a timeless reproductive antagonism between men and women, and 
deliberately evokes emotional response in audiences through their unconscious recognition of 
that universal human conflict.49  Evolutionary literary criticism acknowledges the existence of 
real humans’ nature as a manifestation of innate, shared behavioural adaptations integrated with 
individual life-time experiences, and under the influence of unique environments; such an 
approach to human personality and life-experience has the potential to illuminate the life-
history of the fictional Klytaimestra of ancient Greece.  This iconic character is neither alien 
nor unknowable, but decidedly human, and her story continues to move audiences as strongly 
today as ever. 
 
The first chapter of the argument explores the evolutionary literary critical method of 
biopoetics.  Evolutionary explanations for the origins and functions of literature and the arts are 
presented, along with current criticism of sociobiological literary criticism.  The chapter 
demonstrates how literature – including Greek tragedy – may be productively interpreted 
applying the biopoetic approach, and concludes that literature commonly and consistently 
depicts gender antagonism over the misalignment of sex-specific reproductive goals: the 
ultimate cause of historic patriarchy is antagonistic coevolution.  Findings of evolutionary 
psychology on matters especially pertinent to an analysis of Klytaimestra and her family 
relationships are then summarized. 
 
Chapters two and three then offer a new interpretation of Klytaimestra’s literary life experience.  
Chapter two examines how Klytaimestra is characterized in archaic epic and lyric, and 
                                                          
48 On mainstream (i.e., postmodern and politicized) views within the literary and classical traditions of sexuality 
and gender (and critique of those views), see Rubin (1975); Dover (1978, 1987, 2002); Foucault (1980); Keuls 
(1985); Skinner (1985, 1987, 1996, 2005); Goldhill (1986:55); Eagleton (1990, 1996); Halperin (1990); Winkler 
(1990); Richlin (1991); Foxhall (1994); Culler (1997); McManus (1997); Zelenak (1998); Karras (2000); Wolfreys 
et al (2001); Mendelsohn (2002); Wolfreys (2004); Golden (2006); Blanshard (2007); Roselli (2007); Slingerland 
(2008); Winegard (2008); Foxhall (2009); Rose (2009); Smith and Konik (2011). 
49 On the cognitive-psychology model of unconscious knowledge based on mental processing of information below 
the level of consciousness, see Augusto (2010). 
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Aiskhylos’ late archaic-period dramatic trilogy, Agamemnon, Khoephori, and Eumenides.  
Chapter three progresses to classical-period tragedies which continue the Oresteia story: 
Sophokles’ Elektra and Euripides’ several tragedies featuring the Atreid family – Elektra, 
Iphigeneia among the Taurians (IT), Orestes, and Iphigeneia at Aulis (IA).  Episodes from 
Euripides’ Helen, Andromakhe, Hekabe, and Troades also contribute to the characterization of 
Klytaimestra and her family in the wider Oresteia.  The ‘wider’ Oresteia-corpus includes all 
fifth-century plays featuring Klytaimestra’s sister, father, niece, children and husband, along 
with literary allusions and references from the archaic and classical periods.  The tragedies are 
discussed in chronological order of production because characterization builds in logical 
response to chronologically previous depictions, because reader comprehension defaults to 
fabula (events in logical chronological sequence) – as opposed to sjuzhet (the events as ordered 
by the author) – in the cognitive processing of narrative: when all of these tragedies (and other 
archaic works) are known to the reader, then that reader’s mental representation of the 
Klytaimestra of Euripides’ IA naturally precedes that of Aiskhylos’ Oresteia.50  The wider 
Oresteia places Klytaimestra at Aulis – the beginning of events – at the end of the fifth-century 
narrative sequence, but human cognitive preference for discerned sjuzhet (narrative coherence) 
over the overt fabula (narrative sequence of episodes) leads readers to perceive the events of 
Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis (405 BCE) as occurring before those in Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon 
(458 BCE). 
 
                                                          
50 The Russian Formalist model distinguishes the raw, chronologically ordered materials of the story (the fabula) 
from the (sometimes non-chronological) presentation of them (the sjuzhet); for discussion of fabula, sjuzhet, and 
temporal sequence in narrative, see Martin (1986:107); Onega and Landa (1996:30-31); Keen (2003:8-9, 74); 
Sternberg (2003a:326-327; 2003b:522); Csapo (2005:197-198).  On selective story sequence, see also Oatley 
(1994:57-58).  The stuff of narrative, according to Boyd (2009b:172-173), succeeds when it is readily 
comprehensible; in his (2012b:3) view, the cognitive processing capacity of the human mind operates best in 
chronologically linear narrative sequences, which capture attention most effectively. 
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CHAPTER I: BIOPOETICS AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Cognition, Narrative, Biopoetics ~ The Application of Biopoetic Criticism ~ Evolutionary 
Psychology and Evolution ~ Sex Differences in the Human Species ~ Nature and Culture ~ 
Mating Strategy ~ What Women Want ~ What Men Want ~ Mom and Dad Investors: Parental 
Investment and Disinvestment ~ Maternal Contingency ~ Paternal Uncertainties ~ Kin but not 
Kind ~ The Costs and Benefits of Marriage ~ Civilization and Domestication ~ Cooperation, 
Competition, Compromise ~ Gender Conflict, Antagonistic Coevolution, Patriarchy 
 
Biopoetic literary criticism is an empirically-supported approach which contends that 
understanding of humankind’s evolved heritage is a vital element of appreciation and critique 
of narrative.  This chapter explains how biopoetic analysis contributes to understanding of 
literature as an expression of evolved human psychology: evolutionary explanations for the 
origins and functions of literature and the arts are presented, along with current criticism of 
sociobiological literary criticism.  Fictional narratives cross-culturally and throughout time very 
frequently explore gender conflict in social contexts of gender inequity.  The analytical 
approach of biopoetics is based upon the convergent findings of evolutionary psychology (EP); 
this chapter summarizes those findings, with an emphasis on evolved behaviours relevant to the 
life-history of Klytaimestra and her immediate family as depicted in tragedy: mating strategies, 
parental investment and disinvestment, marriage and domestic arrangements, and coevolved 
gender antagonism as the original dynamic of institutional patriarchy. 
 
Cognition, Narrative, Biopoetics 
 
The existence of literature is surprising in terms of the amount of time and energy humans 
expend upon it, and the universality of this phenomenon supports an evolutionary explanation.1  
Literature can be an ideological tool, but story-making has an original, evolutionary purpose: 
the mind depends upon a biological body for existence, and so story-making must have adaptive 
                                                          
1 For a variety of evolutionary explanations for the enormous levels of time, energy, and resources expended by 
humans on production and consumption of narrative, see Dissanayake (1982:145-146, 2008:161); Scalise 
Sugiyama (1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2008); Pinker (1997:528; 2007:171); Carroll (1999a:170-171, 2006b:41-




value.2  Evolutionary literary theory (ELT) scholars interpret literature using the findings of 
cognitive researchers concerning the evolved human mind and the grammar of narrative; 
biopoetic scholars attend to emotional pleasure in narrative more than cognitive psychologists, 
however, who are more likely to foreground story’s adaptive power to convey useful 
information.  Some ELT critics believe that the direct relationship of narrative to reality 
underlies its universal appeal.  Biopoetic criticism demonstrates that much literature historically 
is deeply concerned with interaction and conflict between the sexes, as well as gender-role 
expectations and contraventions.3  Scholars disagree, however, as to whether mating strategy – 
a principal focus of much evolutionary psychology (EP) thought to date – is the primary or 
exclusive motivation for the evolution of narrative capacity: explanations for story-making 
range from the fundamental parent-offspring relationship to cognitively-sophisticated 
aesthetics.4  Literature reflects evolutionary mechanisms, but some view the various arts simply 
as byproducts of independently advantageous adaptations.  Some traditional humanities 
scholars are sympathetic to the methodology and theory of evolutionary literary study, while 
offering various caveats on the approach.5  Others, especially those tending to a cognitive-
studies perspective, view evolutionary literary study as a credible and productive approach.6 
 
                                                          
2 On the various social, psychological, and survival benefits of story-telling, see Storey (1996:114); Tooby and 
Cosmides (2001:8-10, 21, 23, 25); Dutton (2009:105-106, 110, 126); Carroll et al (2010:213); Carroll (2012:54-
55, 59-60); Gottschall (2012:48-49, 169); Saunders (2015:29).  For a recent discussion of the evolution of story, 
see Boyd (2018). 
3 On the preferential award of attention to the anomalous in fiction and to exceptional fictional characters, see 
Carroll (2005:92); Boyd (2014:A267, A269, A275-A276); Saunders (2015:29, 50). 
4 Miller’s (1999:72, 81-82, 86; 2000; 2010:158, 165) ‘Courtship Hypothesis’ contends that artistic products are 
(and always were) created primarily by (younger) males in order to impress females; cf. Dutton (2009:140).  
Miller’s hypothesis ignores a better explanation of the origin of poetic communication: mother-offspring phatic 
communication; On the creation of narrative capacity through the evolution of ritualized action in other-child 
interactions – “making special” – see Dissanayake (1982:148-150; 1995:223; 2009:14, 148, 156-157; 2011:57).  
Dissanayake’s (1974, 1979, 1984, 2009:151; 2011:66) “artification” hypothesis argues that mothers’ conversation 
with their paralinguistic offspring employs the same phrasal structures, repetitions, and durations common to 
human poetry across cultures.  See also Boyd (2008:140-142; 2009a:204, 210-211, 214).  Scholars of aesthetic 
philosophy in basic agreement with Dissanayake’s hypothesis include Easterlin (2005:621-634); Consoli 
(2014:46); Davies (2012:187-188); Saunders (2015:50-51). 
5 For critical worries about ELT and reassuring responses to these, see Abrams (1997:117); Nagel (2005:552); 
Amigoni (2006:184); Carroll (2006:35-37, 40); Burghardt (2008:146-148); Boyd (2009b:232-233); Dutton 
(2009:100); Davies (2012:184).  On humanities’ ELT critics’ necessary familiarity with Darwinian theory and 
neuro-cognitive sciences, see Vandermassen (2005); Burghardt (2008:144); Carroll (2008:112-113; 2010:56); 
Boyd (2010b:245). 
6 On the value of ELT to humanities’ subjects, see Boyd (2005:6-7); Gottschall and Wilson (2005:xxiv, xvii); 
Salmon (2005a:244, 256); Vermeule (2009:221); Carroll (2010:62). 
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The most prolific and influential scholars in the field of evolutionary literary criticism today 
have humanities backgrounds in academic English studies: Joseph Carroll, Brian Boyd, and 
Jonathan Gottschall.  The publication of Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory (1995) 
provided a focal point around which the various evolutionary explorations of the arts began to 
converge.7  In his (1999a:163, 165) opinion, evolutionary psychology explains why literature 
so often represents what humans appear to care about most, while literature foregrounds 
reproduction as one of the central shaping forces in the evolution of the human species 
(2008:106-107).8  Carroll (1999a:166) contends that literary critics need to study real-world 
psychology because literature deals with individual organisms, in their complex social 
environment.9  Thus, his (2004:189) vision of an evolutionary literary criticism seeks to 
integrate the best aspects of empirical evolutionary analysis and the humanities’ appreciation 
of literature.  Boyd (1998:5, 9-12) – another mainstream humanities critic who has also become 
well-informed about evolutionary biology and anthropology – also argues that cultural diversity 
is underpinned by universal and innate human psychology; he believes that an evolutionary 
analysis of literature enables a more accurate comprehension of human mind and experience, 
while liberating the critic from the mistaken view that reality is simply a sociolinguistic 
construct.10  Evolutionary literary critics, according to Boyd et al (2010:16-17) share a common 
belief in science’s ability to generate real knowledge, which can in turn be successfully 
integrated with the critical expertise of the humanities.  He (1998:12-13) contends that human 
pleasure in literary fiction arises out of the prolonged human disposition to play, and the close 
relationship of story to real-world human social experience; play increases cognitive abilities 
and rewards the human mind with pleasure because it enables risk-free practice for life.11  So 
Boyd (2005:9) views the ability to perceive multiple levels of intention in others as arising out 
of the human disposition to shared attention to story, a mental faculty behind the cognitive 
development of Theory-of-Mind and an ability further honed through participation in narrative 
performance and gossip.12  Gottschall (2001, 2004, 2008) is also a well-informed biopoetic 
                                                          
7 On the contribution of Carroll (1995) to the unification of previously disparate evolutionarily oriented literary 
critics, see Cooke (2008:150). 
8 Carroll (1995:268; 1999a:164-165; 1999b:407); Boyd (2009b:163); Dutton (2009:132); Saunders (2015:29).  
Carroll (2010:54) also points out that ELT scholars are interested in many non-reproductive literary matters as 
well. 
9 Carroll (1999a:166). 
10 Boyd (1998:11-12). 
11 Boyd (1998:12-13); Boyd (2008:138-139; 2009b:14, 190; 2012a:71; 2012b:11). 
12 Boyd (2005:9).  On multi-order intentional fiction, see the Introduction, p. 9.  On the evolutionary importance 
of gossip see Boyd (2005:8-10; 2009b:164-165, 168; 2012b:10, 24; 2014:A269; 2018); Dutton (2009:118-120, 
and of human interest in sensational news, see Davis and McLeod (2003). 
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critic, who urges literature scholars to acknowledge that humans are still animals, constrained 
by biology and natural selection, albeit with complex minds in a complex social world 
(2007a:38; 2008a:13, 20, 26); consequently, the construction and reception of narrative is 
constrained by the nature of the evolved human mind.13  Thus, Gottschall’s (2005a:201) 
quantitative analysis of fictional narrative confirms cross-cultural patterns in the plots and 
characters of story.  Much biopoetic analysis of literature within the humanities tradition tends 
toward a consilient view, exploring the expression of innate dispositions within variable social 
contexts, constrained by environmental variables.  Tanaka’s (2010a, 2010b) consilient approach 
to the study of literature argues that cultural variability evokes the implementation of particular 
cognitive dispositions;14 in his view, literature is a comparatively recent “sliver” of a very long 
species history of social story-telling, and Homer, Plato and Aristotle are not distant ancients, 
but early moderns (2010a:43).  Tanaka (2010a:43) suggests that the humanities’ study of 
antiquity would undergo a “sea-change” if it took a realistic account of deep evolutionary time 
into its analysis.  Biopoetic analysis has produced some very interesting interpretations of 
literature from various works of these Greek early moderns, from selected examples from the 
canonical classics of the Western tradition, and from some of the most popular genres of 
contemporary fiction.15 
 
The Application of Biopoetic Criticism 
 
                                                          
13 See also Gottschall (2005:201, 210ff, 219; 2008a:52-53); Gottschall et al (2005:94).  On humans as evolved 
animals, see Carroll (1996:214; 2006a:19); Gottschall and Wilson (2005:xviii); Gottschall (2007a:38; 2008a:8, 13, 
20, 26, 160); Dissanayake (2009:160); Confer et al (2010a:110).  On the mainstream literary criticism’s denial 
(and ignorance) of biologically-grounded research into human nature in favour of fashions of personality-driven 
academic criticism, see Gottschall (2005:219-220; 2007a:39; 2008a:21); Gottschall and Nordlund. 
14 Carroll et al (2010:218); Tanaka (2010a:37, 44).  On consilient literary interpretation, see also Nordlund (2002).  
On postmodernism’s antagonism to Wilson’s Consilience (1998), see Carroll (1999b:397-398). 
15 For examples of evolutionary analyses of literature, see Da Soller’s (2010:95-96, 101, 107-108) evolutionary 
analysis of Latin and medieval literature; Richardson’s (2000:554-555, 564) study of Romantic-era fiction; 
McEwan’s (2005:11), discussion of English nineteenth-century novels; Easterlin’s (2013:391, 397-399, 404) study 
of Brontë’s Jane Eyre; and many studies of Austen’s novels, including Boyd (1998:23); Carroll (1999a:168; 
2004:210-211, 213); Kruger, Fisher and Jobling (2003); Kruger and Fisher (2005a; 2005b; 2008); Stasio and 
Duncan (2007); Strout et al (2010:317-319, 329-330); Easterlin (2013:393-394); Kruger et al (2014:A114, A116); 
Lyman (2016:xv); Oatley (2016:1).  Scholars also approach drama using the biopoetic method; see Stiller et al 
(2003:398-406); Nordlund (2007:5, 199); Pinker (2007:163); Nettle (2010:323, 332); Boyd (2012a:72-74; 
2014:A272-A273); Müller-Wood (2012:289).  For examples of quantitative evolutionary analysis of literature, see 
Gottschall et al (2004:103, 108; 2005:86, 91-94, 96-97; 2008:174-176, 182-183, 185-186); Gottschall 
(2007b:354); Ingalls (2010:332, 337-339, 346-349).  For examples of evolutionary approaches to romance fiction, 




Fiction is a particularly rich source of material supporting an evolutionary model of human 
attitudes and behaviour and scholars have applied the biopoetic approach to the analysis of 
extant historic literature, including Greek epic and tragedy.16  Biopoetic analysis of ancient 
literature enables non-classicist literary scholars to contribute to the understanding of archaic 
and classical Greek literature.  Fox’s (1995:135, 138-139, 143; 2005:133-134, 142-143) study 
of gender dynamics in the Greek epics, for example, finds a consistent pattern of 
intergenerational male conflict over younger, fertile-age females, a pattern mirroring that of 
human behaviour in the EEA (environment of evolutionary adaptation); the Iliad is primarily 
concerned with the centrality of the homosocial male bond in early warrior societies, while 
female-male interactions are secondary, and women pose a serious threat to the stability of male 
social interactions; marriage in ancient Greece was a duty.17 
 
Gottschall’s (2001, 2003, 2008) analysis of the Iliad and the Odyssey benefits from integration 
of evolutionary science with expertise in traditional literary criticism.  In Gottschall’s (2008:3, 
22, 25, 36, 75) view, mythological literature – including Homer’s epics, Hesiod’s extant works 
and the summaries of the Epic Cycle – offers a wealth of evidence for the unending warfare of 
the end of the Aegean Dark Age; it is hardly surprising that the Akhaians considered the best 
of men to be those who could fight well.  Homer’s characters reveal much about the human 
species, and draw attention to aspects of the story which are often downplayed in other 
approaches, in particular the endless fighting between males and male sexual predation upon 
females belonging to other men.18  In Gottschall’s (2008:49) view, selection has shaped men to 
compete for women, as well as for social and material resources to further their reproductive 
success.  He also (2008:3-4, 55) contends that Homeric men are ultimately competing for access 
to fertile-age women, and to the proximate resources that further this aim, a basic conflict 
exacerbated by the shortage of fertile women as a result of polygyny and selective female 
infanticide; according to Gottschall (2008:47-48, 120, 124-125), polygyny consigns many men 
to wifelessness and reproductive failure because high-status males in the epics monopolise large 
numbers of females, as concubines, and as sex-slaves, in addition to serial wives: men therefore 
                                                          
16 Fox (1995:137).  On the cultural origins of Greek myth, see Kirk (1970); Burkert (1979); Henrichs (1987); 
Edmunds (1990); Dowden (1992); Graf (1993); Penglase (1994); West (1997, 2007); Segal (1999, 2004); Powell 
(2002); Gantz (2004); Thompson (2004); Whitmarsh (2004); Lefkowitz (2007); Woodard (2007); Letoublon 
(2011); Lewis (2011); Clark (2012). 
17 According to Fox (2005:142-143), ancient Greek epic highlights the fact that real men’s lives also depended on 
loyal allies; marriage in ancient Greece was a duty which took a secondary place to homosexual bonds. 
18 Gottschall (2008:46, 63, 75). 
18 
 
have much to gain through the enslavement of conquered women for sexual purposes.19  
Gottschall (2001:284) argues that both the Iliad and the Odyssey depict disputes between men 
over illegitimate claims to highly-prized reproductive partners, and also allude to other famous 
tales of male competition for women; he also observes that killing other men in battle is always 
closely correlated with distribution of female captives, ranked by beauty, and thus reproductive 
success.  When the men are not competing directly, in bloody hand-to-hand combat, these 
warriors also engage in pecking-order competitions – such as athletics and funeral games – to 
assert their prowess and dominance over other men; the prizes for these mock-warfare events 
are also often captured women.20  Capture of a woman in Homer involves possession and use 
of her reproductive capacities; wartime rape in the human species as a universal behaviour 
which has always had as its ultimate purpose the sequestration of the enemies’ reproductive 
potential.21  The specifically reproductive value of captive women is shown by the lethal fury 
enacted by Odysseus upon his sexually active household female slaves, even though Odysseus 
has been absent for twenty years.  As Gottschall (2008:103) further observes, male promiscuity 
has positive value in the world of Homer, while women (even slaves) within the oikos are 
expected to confine themselves to sex with the kyrios alone.  The reality of sexual enslavement 
in the epics – despite Homer’s cosy scenes (Il. 9.663-668, 24.675-676) of Akhilleus and 
Patroklos sleeping beside their captive girls – is always rape, the theft of a woman’s 
reproductive capacity.22  Ancient real-world women, in Gottschall’s view, faced a reproductive 
predicament: the constant re-creation by men of the war-ridden environment quickly eliminated 
dispositionally non-violent males from the gene-pool, and so women had no choice but to opt 
for increasingly violent male bodyguards in order to secure protection from other men, 
including from their infanticidal urges; women are not to blame for the escalation of this 
behaviour in males, however, because they simply have no real, autonomous choices.23  
According to Gottschall, failure to gain and maintain reputation and dominance among a wide 
number of mammalian species results in significant reproductive failure to reproduce at all, and 
the human animal is no different; Homeric warriors are rapaciously greedy for material goods 
                                                          
19 Gottschall (2008:3-4, 44-45, 55, 138).  On effective polygyny in ostensibly monogamous ancient Greece and 
the enslavement of fertile-age women, see also Scheidel (2009, 2011). 
20 Gottschall (2001:287-288). 
21 Gottschall (2008:72). 
22 Gottschall (2008:76).  On the evolutionary advantage for men in wartime rape, see also Gottschall and Gottschall 
(2003); Gottschall (2008:76, 79-80). 
23 Gottschall (2003:44; 2008:108, 117-118; 2010:296, 304-305).  Gottschall (2001:292) describes the Iliad as a 




– the basileis are acutely aware of their need to garner massive surpluses of movable wealth, to 
maintain male alliance networks, and to offer significant treasures to an intended bride’s family 
– and boast about their possessions at every opportunity.24  He also contends (2003:51) that 
while sociocultural factors may have a proximate effect on the social system of the Homeric 
Greeks, their behaviour is not the result of arbitrary misogyny; the ultimate cause lies in the 
outcome of sex-selective infanticide and favouring of sons.25 
 
Gottschall (2008:63, 65) also concludes that the same thematic conflicts drive the Odyssey as 
in the Iliad: the pursuit by men of other men’s women, and their outrage when their property is 
alienated.26  He explores the depiction of Odysseus’ marriage to Penelope, the ideal woman 
from the male point of view – beautiful, loyal, persevering, sensible, and hard-working; she is 
old enough that her son Telemakhos is almost a man, yet her value on the marriage-market 
remains enormous.27  While Odysseus holds the suitors accountable for despoiling his house, 
and harassing his wife, the sexual theft of his female slaves also evokes his fury.  After twenty 
years of war and travail, alpha-male Odysseus cannot pause to enjoy his home, his wife, and 
his son: as soon as his patrimony is secure (through mutilating and slaying all those who have 
threatened it), he fully intends to embark upon more raiding of foreign peoples, to restore his 
wealth and reputation.28 
 
Boyd’s (2009b) analysis of Homer’s Odyssey explores how Homer captures and retains the 
audience’s attention.29  Boyd (2009b:252) suggests that, while the Iliad’s theme is seizure of 
young women, the Odyssey is concerned with the capture of husbands: Kalypso, Kirke, and 
even Nausikaä all desire Odysseus as the ideal mate, while Penelope is yearning to renew their 
union as well.  In his view, the Odyssey foregrounds the issues around mate retention in 
                                                          
24 Gottschall (2008: 83-85, 49, 88-89, 90-93).  On Homeric men’s violent oversensitivity to personal insult, see 
Van Wees (1992); Gottschall (2008:81-82, 133, 138).  On the relationship of material wealth and male reproductive 
success in the literary context, see also Boyd (2010b:236-237). 
25 Gottschall (2003:51).  On extreme son-preference in Homer’s epics, see Gottschall (2003:36).  On the social 
and economic advantages of son-preference in the ancient world, see Gottschall (2003:37, 41-43; 2008:36, 130-
134, 136-137). 
26 Gottschall (2008:63, 65). 
27 Gottschall (2008:64, 109-110). 
28 Gottschall (2008:148-149).  As Boyd (2009b:302, 305) observes, Odysseus’ planned raids to restock his herds 
– in practice invasion and theft – are depicted as “prudent management”. 
29 He (2009b:221-222, 238) argues that the key to the appeal of the Odyssey – even more than the Iliad – is its 
attention-grabbing and memorable characters. 
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monogamous relationships.30  Boyd also identifies another issue addressed in the Odyssey: the 
violation of xenia, or guest-friendship, and the consequences of this; disruption of social custom 
is decidedly attention-grabbing among humans and many other social primates, and invites 
severe retribution in all these species; the return of Odysseus delivers divinely ordained – and 
appropriate – retribution for the suitors’ hybris.31 
 
Classicists Deacy and McHardy’s (2013) biopoetic discussion of spousal abuse and murder in 
Greek mythology agrees with a number of evolutionary literary scholars that Greek literature 
is concerned with proximate male competition for ultimate female reproductive resources.32  
Their study includes a number of ancient narratives which reveal a thematic pattern of male 
anxiety in response to uncontrollable female reproductive powers; this contrasts with traditional 
critical views of patriarchal ideology as the cause of women’s repression in ancient Greece.  
Deacy and McHardy (2013:994) also conclude that men’s fear of female reproductive power is 
prominent in stories of violence toward and murder of pregnant women.  Deacy and McHardy 
(2013:1006) conclude that the ancient sources depict male innate impulses to sexual 
proprietariness, mate guarding, uncertainty over paternity, and paternity guarding – drives 
which are also present in modern-day human populations; they argue that specialist analysis of 
themes and characters in classical literature can positively influence the future shape of 
evolutionary perspectives and believe, therefore, that evolutionary psychology can expand 
research frontiers in the field of Classics. 
 
All of these evolutionarily-inspired interpretations of literature through the ages depend on a 
firm grasp of contemporary evolutionary science; Gottschall, Boyd, and Deacy and McHardy 
all agree on the consistent nature of aspects of gender-conflict in these ancient myths: male 
appropriation of women, in order to control and sequester female reproductive potential and to 
assuage male fears about paternity certainty.  EP theories and conclusions about evolved 
behaviours and motivations are constantly being refined, and ongoing  studies increase data and 
subsequent analysis, but there are few occasions in which current general understandings are 
overturned or completely reversed: the gendered behaviours of human males and females are 
                                                          
30 Boyd (2009b:226). 
31 Boyd (2009b:289, 306, 309).  In the light of Zahavi’s (1975, 1977, 1997) costly-signalling model of social 
interactions, xenia rituals show that by taking the approval of the gods seriously, people are also likely to take 
social expectations seriously.  On costly-signally theory, see Buss (2009:359, 361-362).  On xenia’s promise of 
good behaviour and Odysseus’ response to the suitors’ violation of xenia, see Boyd (2009b:227, 301-302, 311). 
32 Deacy and McHardy (2013:995).  See also Gottschall (2008); McHardy (2008b); Scheidel (2009). 
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simply culturally sophisticated versions of universal animal experience and response, evoked 
according to present environmental – including cultural – constraints and opportunities. 
 
Evolutionary Psychology and Evolution 
 
Evolutionary psychology argues that human motivations and behaviours – as with all other 
animal species – derive from universal, evolved, and innate dispositions, developed in perpetual 
response to ancestral, recent, and present environmental circumstances and shifts.33  Although 
evolutionary psychologists (EPs) argue that adaptive mechanisms are universal, specific evoked 
behaviours also vary between cultures and between individuals within those cultures, the result 
of interaction of genetic predisposition and environmental contexts.34  Evolutionary psychology 
– and thus evolutionary analysis of literature – firstly proceeds on the agreement that evolution 
underlies all aspects of animal biology, including the biology of humans; that evolution occurs 
by natural selection; and that evolutionary adaptation best explains the shape of human nature.35  
The second principle of evolution is natural selection: individuals with evolutionary fitness are 
those who pass their genes on more successfully relative to others of their species.36  The third 
premise of evolutionary psychology is that evolution proceeds through proximate and ultimate 
causes.37  Proximate causes reflect an individual’s environmental and historical circumstances; 
ultimate causes derive from ancestral decisions and actions, and the consequences of these.38  
Evolutionary psychologists are also very interested in how individuals compete with others of 
their species through natural selection to survive and breed, and how individuals compete 
through sexual selection with others of the same sex for access to mates.39 
 
                                                          
33 For a review of fundamental EP works, see Weber (2006:148-149).  On the many competing hypotheses within 
evolutionary psychology, see Winegard (2008:119n1); Buss and Schmitt (2011:780-781). 
34 Symons (1992:138-139); Buss (1995:5-6); Campbell (2002:9, 18); Gangestad et al (2006:91).  On universal 
adaptations, previous evolutionary environments, and environmental contingency, see Tooby and Cosmides 
(1990:23); Campbell (2002:15-16, 2006a:84); Brown (1991:5-6; 2004:48-49); Geary (2010:278-279, 281).  On 
the contribution of genetics, endocrinology, neuroscience, primatology, and environmental history to the constant 
refinement and improvement of Darwinian theory, see James (2008:3); Harper (2013:1006). 
35 Dawkins (1982:35); Symons (1992:147); Leger et al (2001:x); Wilson (2006:1481-1482). 
36 On the mechanisms of natural selection, see Daly and Martin (1996:10); Campbell (2002:8). 
37 On the distinction between proximate and ultimate (distal) goals, see Jones (1999:875-876); Campbell 
(2002:20); Winegard (2008:121-122). 
38 Symons (1979:5); Tooby and Cosmides (1997:14-15). 
39 On sexual selection in the human species, see Darwin (2006:1243-1245); Winegard (2008:120). 
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Evolutionary psychology is interested in how and why species-typical cognitive adaptations or 
mechanisms evolved, and what the specific problems they evolved to deal with actually were.40  
EPs (evolutionary psychologists) typically argue that adaptations were solutions to the 
problems our ancestors faced in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA), rather 
than to those problems of modern life.41  Due to the span of evolutionary time required for the 
evolution of adaptations, there will be an occasional mismatch of evolved adaptation to a 
suddenly changed environment; any previous adaptive behaviour might also become 
maladaptive.42 
 
Males and females across species evolved distinct yet mutually reinforcing adaptive 
behaviours; gendered differences in psychology are ultimately grounded in anisogamy – the 
significant difference between males and females in gamete production and parental investment 
strategies – which in the traditional evolutionary theory (of Bateman (1948) and his followers) 
leads to female choosiness about mates and male eagerness to attract as many mates as 
possible.43  The nourishing mother and her offspring universally constitutes the core human 
family; father(s) may or may not be a permanent member of this family, and when they are, 
confer survival advantage to the reproductive unit through social recognition of his status.44  
The belief that men and women have different natures is universal, as is a division of labour 
based on sex (or gender).45  Evolutionary analysis confirms that a number of behavioural 
complexes are cross-culturally and consistently differentiated by gender, including mating 
strategy, openness toward sexual experience and gender-appropriate behaviour, jealousy and 
infidelity behaviours, social interactions, linguistic capacity, and representations of ideal sexual 
experience, in pornography and romantic fiction. 
 
                                                          
40 Adaptations can occur with remarkable speed and phenotypes change over a relatively short period (in 
evolutionary time); see Williams (1966a).  For useful definitions and explanations of adaptation, see Cosmides 
and Tooby (1997:6-7, 13-14, 16); Winegard (2008:119, 121); Confer et al (2010a:113); McKibbin (2014:209).  
On the specificity and complexity of cognitive adaptations, see Winegard (2008:121); Brown (2010:91); Confer 
et al (2010a:111). 
41 See Cosmides and Tooby (1997:13); Barkow (2006:26); Winegard (2008:123).  The pluralized ‘EPs’ always 
refers in this work to evolutionary psychologists, not to different forms of evolutionary psychology. 
42 Barkow (2006:27); Harper (2013:991-992).  On mismatch between ancient adaptations and modern behaviours 
in the twenty-first century, see Winegard (2008:122); Confer et al (2010a:111, 119). 
43 Winegard (2008:120-121).  On Bateman (1948) and followers, see Chapter 1, pp. 43n193; 44-45; 44n198; 
45n203. 
44 Brown (2010:89-90).  On the rarity of direct fathering is rare in humans, see Barrett et al (2002:151); Campbell 
(2004:21); Buss (2009:361). 
45 Brown (2010:90-91). 
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Sex Differences in the Human Species 
 
Sex-difference in mating strategy and preferences is one of the most contentious area of 
evolutionary explanations of human psychology and behaviour; men and women both possess 
a range of environmentally-triggered sex differences in mating psychology, but these 
differences are generally cross-cultural, and highly resistant to modification.46  Evolved 
differences in mating strategy are also the cause of enduring sex differences in sexual 
orientation and degree of openness to sexual experience, differences which appear immune to 
cultural influence, and contrary to socialization theory.47  There is abundant evidence from three 
decades of study into human sexual behaviour confirming significant gender dimorphism in 
physiology, psychology, and sexuality, and biophysiology studies suggest a central role for 
hormones and genetic mechanisms in the development of gender identity.48  Men typically 
express a greater willingness to participate in more casual sexual activity – and a wider variety 
of sexual activities – than most (but not all) women do.49  Women with relatively high 
sociosexuality ratings also tend to evidence more masculine qualities in personality and 
behaviour.50  There are also differences in how the sexes promote and accept sexual encounters, 
and the degree to which these tactics and standards are successful.51  One enduring 
psychological difference creating conflict between the sexes is that of sexual manners: men and 
                                                          
46 Okami and Shackelford (2001:195-196); Schmitt (2014:13); Conroy-Beam et al (2015:1082); Schmitt (2016).  
According to Goldberg (1999:56), innate sex differences may be increased through socialization.  On innate 
gender-specific psychology and non-heterosexual mate preferences, see Lippa (2007:195-196, 207); Wood and 
Brumbaugh (2009:1241). 
47 Okami and Shackelford (2001:186-187); Stone et al (2005:271); Schmitt (2005b:262, 272); Malamuth 
(2007:1686); Lippa (2009:649-650).  On sexual orientation and differences between males and females’ mate 
preferences, see Lippa (2009:631); Norris et al (2015:1843, 1849-1850); Thornhill and Gangestad (2015:159-160).  
On heterosexual interactions as economic exchange, of males’ sexual access to the restricted and therefore high-
value commodity of female bodies, see Nordlund (2005:115-116); Geary (2010:212); Kornrich et al (2013:29).  
On the application of and limitations of Gangestad and Simpson’s (1990, 1991, 1992) SOI (i.e., Sociosexual 
Orientation Inventory), see Ostovich and Sabini (2004:1264-1265); Schmitt (2005b:247); Jackson and Kirkpatrick 
(2007:382-383). 
48 On human sexual dimorphism, see Campbell (2002:11-12, 38-39); Barkow (2006:31-32); Geary (2010:xiv, 177, 
319); Puts (2010:161); Hill et al (2017).  On hormonal influence and gender identity, see Hines et al (2002:1678; 
2011:80); Clark (2004:121); Auyeung et al (2009:144); Hare et al (2009:93, 95); Hines (2011:69); Hahn et al 
(2015:3531).  On evolution, sexual orientation, and gender-identity, see Roughgarden (2017). 
49 Schmitt et al (2003:100-101); Schmitt (2005b:248; 2014:23-24).  On men’s greater sociosexuality and male 
antisocial traits, see Yost and Zurbriggen (2006:163); Webster and Bryan (2007:917).  Clark and Hatfield’s 
(1989:39, 51) foundational study found that no woman accepted an offer of cost-free sex under any circumstances, 
while a majority of men agreed; on further studies of this topic, see Schmitt (2014:24-25). 
50 On the unrestricted sociosexuality of high-value women, see Mikach and Bailey (1999:141, 148-149); Fisher 
and Cox (2009b:59). 
51 Greer and Buss (1994:185, 197-198); Schmitt (2014:24). 
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women are frequently mismatched in terms of what causes personal offence, yet what offends 
most of all is often the other sex’s relatively typical behaviour.52  Another aspect of human 
psychology insufficiently explained by social-learning theory is gender difference in jealousy 
about sexual or emotional infidelity, whether threatened or actual.53  Men appear to be more 
jealous about female physical infidelity (which might result in a woman’s production of another 
man’s child) and women are more jealous in response to male emotional infidelity (which might 
result in a man’s withdrawal of resources from his existing relationship).54  An understanding 
of aggression – including sexual aggression – as grounded in evolved biology has obvious 
consequences for well-meaning attempts to redress sexual violence.55  One gender difference 
between the two sexes affects wider cultural dynamics: males persistently attempt to enhance 
hierarchical relationships, while females try to reduce hierarchy and increase harmony in 
important social interactions; female superiority in articulation and communication is directly 
related to female advantage in peace-making and peace-keeping.56 
 
Reproductive unions are thus always a compromise between species-typical male and female 
attitudes and behavioural norms.57  Only in private imagination or in published media tailored 
to each sex’s preferences do males and females encounter members of the opposite sex who 
behave according to hope, but there is little – if any – convergence between the two worlds, 
confirmed in the obvious differences between male and female mating-literature: pornography 
illustrates male mating preferences, while (generic) romance-fiction, consumed almost 
                                                          
52 Buss (1989a:745).  On the nature and incompatibility of differing male and female sexual attitudes, see Ellis and 
Symons (1990:549); Hyde (1996:114-116); Purnine et al (1996:386); Baumeister (2000:370); Meston and Buss 
(2007: 499-500); Schmitt (2014:23). 
53 For reviews of the EP literature on jealousy, see Schützwohl (2006b:290); Frederick and Fales (2014:13-14).  
On social dominance and openness to sexual infidelity in males, see Atkins et al (2001:736); Egan and Angus 
(2004:582-583); Wilson and Daly (2004:205).  On female adultery and escape from suboptimum relationships, 
see Egan and Angus (2004:584-585); Brand et al (2007:107); Scelza (2011:889).  On male sexual jealousy as a 
counter to female strategy of genetic-diversity, see Waage and Gowaty (1997:607); Fisher et al (2008:437). 
54 Campbell (2002:25-26); Shackelford et al (2002a:304, 306); Wilson and Daly (2004:204; 2009:275); Goetz and 
Causey (2009:261); Miller and Maner (2009:287); Weisfeld et al (2011:1165, 1171); Sagarin et al (2012:595-596, 
611). 
55 On aggression and the misplaced predictions of social role theory, see Campbell (1999:203; 2004:14, 23, 258; 
2007:365); Jones (1999:896, 899); Kempenaers and Forstmeier (2009:283). 
56 Geary (2010:252, 270).  On politics and evolution, see Kronfeldner (2017).  On gender-differences in language 
ability and negotiation skills, see McDonald et al (2012:676); Oberzaucher (2013:362); Geary et al (2014:404). 
57 Weisfeld et al (2011).  On heterosexuality in the sexually dimorphic human species, see Marcus (1966:281n1); 
Leitenberg and Henning (1995:484); Salmon (2012:155); Schmitt (2014:23-24). 
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exclusively by women, explores female mating problems and preferences.58  The study of men’s 
and women’s typically divergent erotic fantasy genres reveals important sex differences in 
human psychology; ‘pornotopia’ foregrounds a man’s repeated physical orgasms with a variety 
of women; conversely, ‘romantopia’ climaxes only once, with the moment of a couple’s mutual 
emotional bliss upon the hero’s (binding) declaration of his eternal commitment to one 
woman.59  Heroines in romance stories are never aggressively interested in sexual variety, and 
never seek out sex with impersonal strangers for its own sake.60  Some conclude that male-
centred pornography depicts optimum – i.e., short-term – male mating endeavour: low to zero-
cost copulation with multiple, fertile partners.61 
 
Conversely, romance fiction – the so-called ‘female version’ of pornography’ – is one of the 
most direct expressions of female mating psychology and preferences.62  Critical (and political) 
denigration of romance fiction downplays the phenomenal success of the genre, which is 
intensely interested in the strategic adaptive problems specifically faced by females in the 
journey to find a mate.63  Romance heroines – like real-world women – must effectively detect 
and avoid commitment pretenders and dangerous sexual opportunists.64  The ultimate goal of 
romance-fiction is the enduring union of a likeable every-woman heroine with a physically 
invincible yet simultaneously emotionally tender man.65  The initially difficult heroes of 
Romantopia all possess the qualities of a highest-value mate: he is always older than the heroine 
(and by an average of seven years), and he is always taller; adjectives describing the hero focus 
                                                          
58 On romance fiction and pornography as phenomenally successful, accurately targeted mass-market erotica, see 
Marcus (1966:195, 211-212, 216, 273); Leitenberg and Henning (1995:484, 490); Regis (2003:108-109); 
Malamuth (2007:1684-1685); Saad (2007:228, 232); Salmon (2012:152, 154-156). 
59 Salmon and Symons (2001:61, 67, 69). 
60 Salmon and Symons (2001:61-62; 2010:475); Salmon (2004:222; 2012:155); Vandermassen (2005:176); 
Malamuth (2007:1685-1686). 
61 Okami and Shackelford (2001:191); Salmon (2004:221); Malamuth (1996a; 2007:1684-1685); Schmitt 
(2014:26).  On pornography’s endless but completely unrealistic supply of young, attractive women desperate for 
impersonal, cost-free copulation, see McKee (2005:285-286, 288); Hald (2006:583); Salmon (2012:156). 
62 On romance fiction as a female counter-fantasy to male pornography, see Mussell (1984:6); Ellis and Symons 
(1990:544-546); Dixon (1999:2-3); Salmon (2004:221). 
63 For second-wave feminist views of romance fiction as dangerous, antifeminist soft-pornography, see Douglas 
(1980:26-27); Snitow (1983:246, 252-254); Assiter (1988:101, 103-106).  On feminism’s errors about romance 
fiction, see Flesch (2004:28); Thomas (2012:210, 213).  On romance fiction as empowering women and their hope 
of mutual love and respect; see Regis (2003:xviii, 14-15, 207); Flesch (2004:20); Zakreski (2012:1). 
64 Salmon (2012:157-158).  On the heroine’s virtues of integrity, loyalty, courage, intelligence, and generosity of 
spirit, see Williamson (1992:127, 130-131); Young (1992:122-123); Salmon (2012:152). 
65 Salmon (2004:221).  Romance heroes are impossible contradictions, simultaneously alpha-male men’s-men, and 




on his muscularity, handsomeness, strength and size, his masculinity and energy, his sexual 
boldness and confidence, and his intelligence; he is of exceptional height, strength, intelligence, 
competence, and a willingness to take risks on behalf of the woman and her children.66  
Romance heroines gain the good genes of bad-boy cads, who have agreed to become strongly 
attached, sexually faithful, ideal dads.67  According to the EP model, females are interested in 
short-term liaisons with men of bad character because they might conceive a promiscuous son 
with greater chances of reproductive success; Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy 
in extraverted, exploitative bad-boy males are highly heritable traits, because these males are 
also more sexually exploitative.68  Men in romantic fiction willingly temper their bad-boy 
natures because they learn that happiness in life depends on marriage to one good woman.69  
According to the genre, women only win this game when they resist premarital sexual 
intercourse, get a binding proposal, and domesticate their chosen male into the female-friendly 
environment of emotionally and sexually monogamous marriage.70  Descriptions of the 
romance hero’s emotional experience fit female expectations, however, not male reality, and 
romance fiction is a female fantasy in which men willingly subordinate their own mating 
preferences to accommodate those of the female, just as pornotopia is a world in which optimum 
female mating strategy is sacrificed to accommodate male mating goals.71  Competition 
between specific individuals within any two-sexed species to achieve their optimum strategy is 
innate, but – in the human species at least – will be exacerbated or suppressed according to 
enviro-social constraints and opportunities, not to wishfulness or ideology; according to 
evolutionary science, nature and culture are coevolving aspects of human experience and 
existence within specific environmental contexts.72 
                                                          
66 Donald (1992:82); Whissell (1996:427-428, 430ff); and Gorry (1999), as cited in Salmon and Symons (2001:63-
64); Salmon and Symons (2010:476). 
67 Williamson (1992:128-129).  On women’s interest in dads and cads in romantic fiction, see Kruger et al (2003, 
2005). 
68 Jonason et al (2009:12-15; 2010; 2011:759); Jonason and Kavanagh (2010); Carter et al (2013); Grijalva et al 
(2015:261). 
69 Donald (1992:82-83).  On romance fiction and the dangerous hero’s journey out of self-destructive darkness, 
healed by the omnipotent heroine; see Cameron (1992:143); Guntrum (1992:152); Putney (1992:101). 
70 Mussell (1984:9, 123).  On the true heart of the romance narrative: the liberation of the savage hero-beast into a 
female world of joyous love, see Cameron (1992:144); Krentz (1992a:5); Williamson (1992:127); Young 
(1992:122).  On the central plot of modern romance – the discovery of eternal love between one man and one 
woman – see Whissell (1996:440-441; 1998:105, 107); Regis (2003:14); Michaels (2007:7). 
71 On romance fiction as inaccurately – and dangerously – depicting male psychology to better fit female 
preferences, see Salmon (2004:223, 227); Malamuth (2007:1686); Salmon and Symons (2010:473-474).  On the 
distance between reality and fantasy in heterosexual mating interactions, see Ogas and Gaddam (2011). 




Nature and Culture 
 
Therefore, explanatory models of human behaviour attend to cultural universals as well as 
cultural variation; evolutionary psychology does not replace existing explanatory paradigms, 
but augments them.73  Human customs are necessarily innovative and adaptive responses to 
external, changing conditions, because nature is at the heart of culture.74  While some aspects 
of culture are undoubtedly socially constructed and constrained by individual personality, 
culture is also both constrained and enabled by evolutionary mechanisms and there is always a 
natural limit to the possible range of cultural variation, because the human genome is finite.75 
 
The evolutionary paradigm offers a variety of approaches to the issue of interactions between 
evolution, nature, and culture.76  These include Tooby and Cosmides’s (1989) model of evoked 
culture (i.e., culture in consequential response to contingent environmental stimulation); Boyd 
and Richerson’s (1985, 2001) dual inheritance theory (i.e., culture and genes in dynamic 
coevolution); and Lumsden and Wilson’s (1981) model of gene-culture co-evolution (in which 
cultural behaviours enhance an individual’s adaptation to a particular climate or 
environment).77  The evoked culture model explains why particular human behaviours occur 
cross-culturally and persist through many generations, but all of these models incorporate 
transmitted culture, in which technicalities of human custom and belief are taught through 
deliberate instruction.78  The interaction between nature and culture is best understood as gene-
culture coevolution.79  The best framework for analysing coevolved mating strategies – the 
                                                          
73 Gangestad et al (2006:75); Schmitt (2006a:116).  The best applications of an evolutionary paradigm integrate 
expert understanding of disposition to ultimate goals – human nature – with social science expertise in 
environmental, proximate expression of human culture; see Tooby and Cosmides (1992:115, 118, 122-123); 
Buunk et al (1996:362-363); Schmitt et al (2003:101); Nordlund (2005:11); Barkow (2006:29; 2010:1); Lippa 
(2007:208); Penke and Asendorpf (2008:24). 
74 On ancestral success and present-day dispositions, see Tooby and Cosmides (1990:58); Cosmides et al (1992:5). 
75 Schmitt et al (2003:101); Norenzayan et al (2006:348); Mameli (2007:22); Tidwell and Eastwick (2013:1629-
1630).  On the role of individual difference, alongside species-typical evolutionary and social factors, see Miller 
and Maner (2009:290). 
76 Gangestad et al (2006:76-79); Harper (2013:1007-1008). 
77 Lumsden and Wilson (1982); Boyd and Richerson (1985); Cosmides and Tooby (1989); Tooby and Cosmides 
(1989); Richerson and Boyd (2001, 2005).  On the effects of geography and climate on human behaviour, see 
Crook and Crook (1988); Ehrlich and Ehrlich (2008:3); Kenrick (2006a:104). 
78 On the transmission of culture, see Baumeister et al (2005; 2006:130); Confer et al (2010a:118). 
79 On the very rapid response of genetic complexes to shifting environmental pressures, including cultural 
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28 
 





Mating strategy is grounded in the identification – and exploitation – of an opposite-sex target’s 
reproductive potential, recognizing the costs of investment in offspring.81  Mating strategy is 
differentiated by sex because males and females have a significantly different potential number 
of offspring they can produce in a single lifetime; while this discussion is primarily concerned 
with heterosexual reproductive motivations and behaviours, research on same-sex mating 
dynamics often confirms innate gender differences.82  Evolutionary psychologists argue that 
humans inherited multiple mating strategies from their hominid (perhaps even primate) 
ancestors; evidence of pre-agricultural human custom comes from contemporary hunter-
gatherer societies.83  Both sexes share certain mate-preferences; men and women want an 
agreeable partner in economic, social, and parental investment endeavours, and both sexes place 
heavy emphasis (particularly in long-term mating contexts) on character, kindness, generosity 
intelligence, and emotional stability.84  Preference for goodness in a partner arises from an acute 
sense of self-interest, however, and although both sexes nominated kindness as important, it 
still ranks second overall for each sex; males’ first priority is female attractiveness, and females’ 
is male status.85  Both sexes have a highly accurate understanding of what the other sex wants, 
however, and consistently work to be seen as willing to meeting those preferences; in the 
presence of women, men exaggerate their politeness, vulnerability, and interest in children, and 
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they also exaggerate their wealth (and their ability to gain further resources), alongside display 
of liberal generosity, including heroic, risky acts on behalf of others.86 
 
Sex differences in mating strategy are widely and robustly evidenced from hunter-gatherer 
cultures to modern-day societies, and even when both sexes engage in the same mating strategy 
they do so for different reasons, and enact that same strategy in different ways.87  The interplay 
of sex difference and environmental contingency also exacerbates the complexity of mating 
relations.88  Typically, individuals of each sex have to compromise upon their ideal mating 
preferences, however.89  In some contexts, there is greater difference in preferences within each 
sex, rather than between the sexes in general.90  The most persistent gender difference in mating 
strategy is that men are more reproductively successful when they target as many fertile women 
as possible; women, when they secure exclusive access to a well-resourced man.  Males 
therefore primarily (but not exclusively) desire mate attractiveness, and, conversely, females 
are primarily attentive to the indicators of mate wealth, with education – in the Western cultural 
context, at least – a reliable proxy for earning potential.91 
 
Cultural, individual, and environmental variables affecting sex difference in choice of mating 
strategy include marriage customs, gender identity, relative age and education-level of partners, 
ecological contexts, relative sex ratios, and degree of parental choice.92  There are many reasons 
for reproductive variance between individuals, especially males; cross-culturally, more males 
than females will never marry, nor produce even one child.93  In polygynous cultures, every 
man with more than one wife deprives another man of reproductive opportunity.94  Men who 
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92 Apparently arbitrary variables in complex mating activities actually reflect logical evolutionary responses to the 
specific cultural environmental constraints; see Gangestad et al (2006:90); Buss (2007:376); Geher et al (2008:10-
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engender children do so at much higher rates than the most fertile women, even though more 
women than men tend to marry.95  Male standards of mating are almost always lower than those 
of females, yet few men realise all of their mating aspirations.96  Instead, males can improve 
their lifetime reproductive fitness by accommodating female preferences for long-term mating 
commitment, and substantial parental investment.97  Another important variable controlling 
mating strategy universally and historically is parental choice, and the relative proportions of 
males and females within a population – the operational sex ratio (OSR).98 
 
Present-day modern mating preferences differ little from traditional ones, as demonstrated by 
newspaper, magazine, and internet romantic advertisements, by specifications for mail order 
mates, in data from speed-dating events, and in forced-choice or economic-style budget ranking 
of mating preferences: the contemporary mate-market is an arena of pragmatic individual self-
interest.99  Newspaper romantic advertisements consistently show that males are looking for 
young, beautiful, light-weight short-term partners, and that these males offer resources, and that 
females are looking for long-term relationships, offering beauty and youth and asking for 
resources.100  Aging males who possess greater wealth are able to demand highest-quality 
mates, whereas aging females must lower their demands and offer casual sexual activity; despite 
this, they receive fewer responses, unless they are highly attractive, and more willing to engage 
in casual sexual activity.101  Women also experience declining reproductive returns at a higher 
level of education and income, because males tend to prefer females with less education than 
themselves, while for men the effect is an increasing one: females want males to have higher 
educational achievement as a reliable proxy for income.102  Women – generally from 
impoverished nations – also offer to be the brides of males from more prosperous societies, 
while males who seek mail-order mates are most often those who cannot secure female mates 
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in their own cultural environments; those participating in mail-order mating typically follow 
evolved motivations and evaluations to the same degree as those placing and scanning romantic 
advertisements.103  The most important factor for both sexes in speed-dating contexts is a speed-
evaluation condition of physical appearance, suggesting that the bottom line for women as well 
as men is partner’s genetic quality.104  Forced-choice mating budgets show that while both sexes 
become more demanding in terms of minimum standards as contexts shift from short- to long-
term mating, differences between the sexes are strongest in the short-term mating condition; 
males consistently attend to female attractiveness as the minimum standard, while females 
attend to male wealth and status, a difference exacerbated in conditions of extreme choice 
constraint.105 
 
Biological and cognitive mechanisms driving sex differences in mate preferences are generally 
unconscious devices; the unconscious mind impels the conscious self toward the best available 
object of reproductive interest through the process of ‘limerence’ – falling in love.106  Erotic or 
romantic idealization is a human universal, and is largely resistant to cultural efforts to control 
the process.107  Despite some cross-cultural variation in limerent expression, there is significant 
evidence that limerence is an effective adaptation.108  Limerent attachment and separation 
patterns across cultures follow a three-to-four year cycle, thought to mirror the human hunter-
gatherer round of pregnancy, lactation, and weaning, and prepares individuals for the natural 
mammalian cycle of parental investment: emotional attachment to enhance mate retention, 
conception, gestation, safe parturition, and then rearing of a child, suggesting that the most 
fundamental pattern of human mating was serial monogamy; polygyny may be a pattern 
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imposed over this original.109  Once limerence’s reproductive work is done, passionate romantic 
love often fades, or becomes sedate attachment; involuntary loss of love mid-limerence can 
have serious consequences for all parties, however.110 
 
Romantic attachment also helps couples withstand the temptation of other potential mates.111  
The most desirable romantic objects – highly attractive as potential reproductive partners – are 
very likely to be quickly snapped up, however, and mate-poaching is a widespread, 
commonplace strategy to extract the most high-value potential mates from present 
attachments.112  Despite a conscious belief that they are not influenced by a man’s relationship-
status, single women are significantly likely to be more attracted to a man who is already in a 
successful mate-ship, but males are actively interested in females whether they are attached or 
not.113  The ubiquity of mate-poaching and the problem of mate retention both fuel the ever-
present fear of partner infidelity: jealousy is the emotional force which fuels mate-guarding in 
both sexes.114  EPs argue that each sex possesses a gender-specific, evolved jealousy-adaptation 
designed to negotiate the different reproductive problems each sex faces.115  Buss and 
Haselton’s (2005:506) review of studies concludes that men are hypersensitive to cues of sexual 
infidelity; women to cues of emotional infidelity; men are distressed by resource-rich rivals of 
higher status, women by younger, more attractive rivals; men with attractive mates exhibit more 
mate-guarding, as do women with resource-rich mates; for men, sexual infidelity is less 
forgivable and leads to break-up, while for women emotional infidelity is less forgivable, and 
leads to relationship termination; and men mate-guard more intensely around the time of their 
female partner’s ovulation, because ovulating women are more likely to seek out extrapair 
sexual encounters.116  For both sexes, jealousy is the unconscious emotional warning activated 
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by rivals of an imminent threat to a relationship, and evoking particular behaviours; jealousy is 
manifested in both sexes over an overlapping range and is strongly influenced by the jealous 
partner’s perception of their own mate-value – the lower-quality mate of either sex will 
experience more jealousy.117  Male jealousy is assumed to be primarily sexual because of the 
risks of female-partner sexual infidelity to paternity certainty; female jealousy is more sensitive 
to the threat of male emotional infidelity, because this poses a risk to the continuance of existing 
relationships – and thus resource security – more than casual male sexual infidelity does.118  
Male sexual jealousy functions to protect parental investment effort, and is clearly 
evolutionarily adaptive; cross-culturally, historic laws frame adultery as the infringement of a 
married man’s ownership of his wife’s reproductive potential.119  Potentially lethal jealousy 
occurs prototypically in older males over very young (and thus more fertile) wives.120  
Relatively typical jealousy is triggered by the perception of cues to imminent or actual 
infidelity; sexual proprietariness, on the other hand, depends on men’s perceptions of male right 
of entitlement, and their belief in a moral responsibility to enforce a male’s possession of a 
woman.121  Jealous males preferentially punish the female partner, whereas females target the 
female rival; compared to men, even enraged jealous women rarely kill a partner.122  
Excessively vengeful, aggressively jealous mothers who lost their tempers easily would raise 
fewer children safely to maturity (and thus replicate their disposition); when wives do kill 
husbands, their actions are generally last-resort self-defence or defence of offspring in response 
to husbands’ maladaptive, or morbid levels of sexual proprietariness.123  An evolved sex-
difference in jealousy is present universally, but most of all in the psychology of heterosexual 
males and females.124 
 
What Women Want 
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According to evolutionary study, what women want most of all in a (male) mate is resources: 
firstly, evidence of actual or potential wealth, and secondly, a willingness to invest this wealth 
in her, and in her offspring.125  EPs conclude that female reproductive success in traditional 
(i.e., pre-industrial) societies depends as much on male-controlled wealth as it does on genetic 
quality, and this pattern persists in more gender-equal modern nations; women in gender-equal 
Western nations persist in a logically-evolved preference for wealthy men, especially those 
publically consuming high-value goods, perhaps because women’s mate-choices actually 
become increasingly limited as they improve their own socioeconomic status.126  Thus, women 
frequently conceal their own high status (and especially education) specifically in order to 
attract higher-status males, because these tend to prefer lower-status females without advanced 
education.127  The second important universal element in women’s mate criteria is male status; 
males of any age who lack both resources and social position tend to be excluded from the 
marriage-pool.128  Females benefit from mating with high-status males in at least three ways: 
her own status is elevated; she gains immediate access to greater material and nutritional 
resources; and she secures long-term access to supporting resources.129  In cultures without 
monogamy or contraception, the relationship between male social status and production of 
children is immediate; in preindustrial societies, ruling males are well aware of the reproductive 
advantages of rank, and the great men in some historic cultures have been able to achieve 
stupendous numbers of offspring through hyperpaternity, but this necessarily excludes many 
other males from the mating pool.130  Many high-status men in the modern world are in fact 
effective polygynists: they achieve more copulations, have more affairs with more partners, and 
are more likely to divorce and then remarry a succession of high-value, fertile women.131 
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Male competition for alpha-male status with its extra reproductive rights is inevitable – even in 
truly monogamous cultures with liberal attitudes toward female mate-choice – because of 
greater remarriage rates for men, and because there are always more potential husbands than 
there are potential wives of fertile age; among preliterate peoples girls are generally married off 
as soon as they are fertile and so women are a short-supply resource.132  Men’s ranking in the 
male hierarchy is determined by and maintained through the display of resources and also 
through dominance behaviours.133  The ability to dominate other males ensures a man’s priority 
access to political influence, resources, and to female mates; historically, a visible lack of 
dominance results in a man’s being deprived of his resources, and of any high-value women he 
possesses.134  Highest-status, dominant males win greater sexual access to females for two 
reasons: females prefer them over subdominant mates, and other males cannot prevent alpha-
males from poaching their mates.135  Women prefer socially dominant males with a high level 
of prestige, a form of respect freely offered by peers and subordinates in acknowledgment of 
obvious technical and social expertise.136  Males with high prestige have lower testosterone 
levels, exhibit facial femininity, are cooperative, non-violent individuals, and are more 
interested in (and are better) long-term partners and fathers – and women are well aware of this 
– while high-dominance males are associated (by others and by themselves) with short-term 
mating effort, and diminished production of offspring.137  Cross-culturally, women differentiate 
between dominant, genetically superior males for purposes of impregnation and lower-
testosterone but more prosocial males as companions and fathers; men with explicitly feminine 
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facial structures generally exhibit personal qualities of nurturance and patience.138  One 
persistent physical attribute in males which correlates with status, power, income, and 
reproductive success is height; women consistently prefer their male mates to be taller than 
themselves, and so men consistently overstate their height in a variety of contexts, while women 
– aware that men prefer shorter women – understate their height.139 
 
Female preference for status, dominance, and height derives from the females’ adaptive 
preference for good genes, especially in short-term mating contexts; women gain direct benefits 
from men with beneficial genes through increased offspring resistance to disease, and – when 
possible – the additional resources and protection, supplied by these men and indirect benefits 
in transmission of genes for health, height, and dominance to their male descendants.140  In 
short-term contexts, women lower their usual standards for male resources to mate with 
attractive, genetic high-value males, especially during ovulation, even though they are aware 
that males with the best genes are less likely to invest in offspring.141  Attractive, symmetrical 
faces predict bodily symmetry, longer lifespan, and advantages in general reproductive 
physiology.142  Physical markers indicating a prospective male partner’s possession of 
advantageous good genes include symmetry in face and body and skin-colour,143 markedly 
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masculine faces,144 and lower voice (relative to other men).145  Mate preferences for symmetry 
also respond very specifically to physical evidence of parasites and pathogens.146  While 
intelligence is typically a basic requirement in female estimation of male attractiveness, 
creativity appears to be a luxury trait: nice to have, but not essential.147  Female mate preference 
almost certainly explains the male disposition to risk-taking in certain age-groups; risk-taking 
enhances male reputation generally, increasing attractiveness to women.148  Similarly, greater 
male willingness to engage in aggression and violence responds both to female preferences and 
to the harsh realities of intra-sexual male competition.149  There are risks and costs of mating 
with aggressive males, but women and their offspring benefit from mates and fathers who are 
able to protect them from other men.150  Despite optimistic visions of a primeval, pacifist 
paradise, archaeological analysis suggests that violent inter-group warfare was a cultural 
universal, originally and primarily a form of extreme male-male competition for access to fertile 
women.151  Across cultures a majority of women endorse male violence against out-groups, 
mostly for purely pragmatic self-interest in survival, but often simply for materialistic reasons; 
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females view war-heroes as more sexually attractive, and that male war heroes sire many more 
offspring than other males (including pacifists).152 
 
Given that female mating preferences have historically been subject to social constraints 
advantaging male mating strategy, how useful is it really to address female choice in discussions 
of what women want in a male mate?153  Women consistently utilize different criteria and adjust 
their mate-standards when enacting different mating strategies; female choice is strongly 
influenced by environmental and socioecological constraints.154  Like men, very few women 
live in an ideal world in which they can have it all, and so freedom of choice is a relative 
notion.155  The present Western marriage pattern of serial monogamy is much more likely to 
permit female choice, and was perhaps the prevalent type of human mating strategy before the 
rise of polygynous elites.  In modern monogamous cultures, women establish their own 
resource-base by marrying later, working before and after marriage, and exercising control over 
the size of their families.156  What women want in men responds to external, environmentally 
contingent factors, but also to females’ internal, physiological cyclic variables.157 
 
What Men Want 
 
What men want in a sexual partner, on the other hand, is more straightforward under all 
circumstances, according to EP: males firstly want youth and secondly beauty in their female 
partners.158  What males actually get is constrained by a wide range of factors, including social 
contexts.159  Male preference for female youth is universal, because this preference correlates 
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directly with female fertility.160  While females prefer male mates who are consistently three to 
four years older relative to themselves, males throughout life prefer a fixed target age-range of 
(optimally fertile) females aged between twenty and thirty years old.161  In cultures with socially 
imposed monogamy, males will in effect be limited to that one partner only, and so prefer 
females with reliable cues of maximum life-time fertility potential.162  A preference in males 
for youthful – and therefore more fertile – females is more likely to be selected for, especially 
in contexts of strict lifetime monogamy.163  Male demand for youthful female beauty also 
correlates with physiological health and genetic quality, and not just fertility.164  The 
relationship between female attractiveness and actualized fertility success is not as 
straightforward in post-industrial contraceptive-using cultural contexts as status and dominance 
is for males, however.165 
 
Male attention to beauty in women is attuned to specific female physical characteristics 
indicating fertility and health status, including body size and shape, face, and skin; some suggest 
that although there must be some kind of beauty prototype, against which individual instances 
are measured, it may be that avoidance of ugliness – based on cues of genetic flaws – is the real 
mechanism employed in judgments of attractiveness.166  Customary elements of female 
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attractiveness are biological adaptations universally designed to signal mate-quality.167  The 
recognition of female body size and shape as a key aspect of male mating preference begins 
with Singh’s (1993) foundational study, which concludes that WHR (waist-to-hip ratio) – not 
female bust-to-waist ratio (BWR), as previously assumed – is the primary indicator of female 
estrogen levels, and thus fertility.168  Others suggest that BMI (body mass index) is a much 
more accurate predictor of male interest than WHR;169 WHR demonstrates pregnancy status, 
fertility potential, and (perhaps) ovulation, whereas BMI demonstrates female ability to gestate 
and nurture an infant, while females with low WHR (and symmetrical breasts) are judged by 
males to be the most attractive of all, especially in contexts of short-term mating effort.170  Male 
preferences for female shape also intersect with cultural and historical factors, but WHR is 
subject to strong selection pressures, and the basic preferred shape remains the same, 
however.171  Other studies also emphasize the effect of individual and socio-cultural variables 
on the basic pattern of male preferences for the female body, but the reasonable and most recent 
approach to the various findings of many studies is that male preferences for female bodies 
reflects the environmentally evoked interaction of WHR and BMI (body mass index) in 
combination.172  When given a mating budget, males often seem unwilling to trade off between 
body and facial attractiveness, especially in the short-term mating context; males give greater 
weight to female facial attractiveness when assessing a female for long-term mating suitability, 
however.173  The structure of the female face and the shade of skin offers males significant 
information about female reproductive potential.174 
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According to evolutionary analysis, then, what men want in a mate is youth and beauty, whereas 
possession of resources, status, and dominance are viewed as predominantly male features 
attracting female interest.175  Primate studies show that although females, especially mothers, 
attend to status-rankings in order to improve their position in the hierarchy, their social 
dynamics do not mirror male-male jockeying for rank.176  When women acquire more equal 
control over resources, they increase their demands for attractiveness in male mates, but men 
approve of increased dominance in females only when high-status women are dominant toward 
other females.177  Studies conclude that males consistently prefer a subordinate femininity in 
their female mates.178 
 
Males compete with males to impress (or to seize) potential female mates, but intra-sexual 
female competition – more subtle than male-male competition, but no less intense – often 
centres on a woman’s defence of her own offspring, or defence of her right to a man’s 
resources.179  Male hierarchies across species are horizontal and antagonistic between same-
age peers; female hierarchy tends to be generational, and daughters share and support their 
mothers’ status; physical and psychological intimidation determine male hierarchy, whereas 
female rank is established through the use of social weapons such as coalitionary cliques and 
outright ostracism.180  Yet there is clearly social and reproductive disadvantage in high status 
for females in contrast to the highest-ranked men in the same social domain: education, which 
enables individual women to improve their own status through career-options, also increases 
female age for first marriage (constricting lifetime reproductive capacity).  Highest-ranked 
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females are increasingly restricted in their pool of potential mates, because women across 
cultures prefer higher-status males as mates and men prefer lower-status females.181 
 
Intra-sexual female competition for mates – focussed on specific points of male mating strategy, 
namely female beauty and chastity – is inevitable, however, given the astonishing level of 
human male investment in offspring.182  Females cannot all get access to the best genetic mates, 
or to the males providing the best resources, or to the best male parental investors, and so natural 
selection will therefore favour the evolution of female-female competition – along with 
secondary sexual characteristics – to secure preferential access to the best males.183  Females’ 
most commonly preferred type of aggression is indirect verbal aggression, because attacks on 
rivals can be successfully concealed and rivals’ reputations can be destroyed at little to no cost 
to the aggressor.184  Conflict in female groups is one of the few occasions human females build 
coalitions, often as tools to suppress other females’ reproductive cycles.185  Women’s intra-
sexual derogation is the only measure in which female aggression exceeds that of males.186  
Pay-off for ostracism and the derogation (often through false rumour) of same-sex competitors’ 
appearance and sexual reputation is the destruction of a rival, and increased access to a coveted 
male.187  There are social risks for women in using malicious derogation as a tool to eliminate 
rivals, however.188  Males who attend to female derogators are presumably gathering insider 
information on the authenticity of a potential mate’s genetic quality and on the likelihood of 
her propensity to casual sex.189  Female aggression is ubiquitous, highly targeted, and usually 
non-lethal; the most common targets are female rivals – co-wives and others – while non-kin 
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husbands are the males most likely to attract physical violence from females.190  The only arena 
in which female violence is accepted and admired, however, is in the defence of children, or to 
avenge injury done to them – and only when no male is present to undertake the duty.191  The 
evolved disposition to maternal investment in women – whose infant offspring would die 
without their mother – keeps female-female competitive aggression at rates below those of 
males.192 
 
Females are evolutionarily selected, through competitive (and mostly nonlethal) conflicts over 
access to highest-quality males, so to what degree can we conclude that male choice has directly 
affected the evolved psychology of the human female?193  Males do have exacting standards 
for females under a long-term mating scenario: youthfulness and body shape indicative of high 
fertility; beauty and symmetry indicating good genes; and a disposition to fidelity ensuring 
paternity certainty.194  Most males are generally forced to settle for less than first choice, 
however; because highest-quality women are rarely available: only a few very high-quality men 
get to pick and choose, and always at the expense of other males.  Furthermore, despite EP’s 
premise concerning the men’s active maximization of reproductive opportunity, no man – no 
matter how attractive – can mate in the real world with all of the women he chooses, while 
some especially low-quality men will never be selected by any woman for even a first date. 
 
Any woman’s successful pursuit of a highest-status male might endow her offspring with 
superior genes and social advantage, but since almost all females are highly likely to be mates 
at some point, natural selection suggests that it is female capacity to keep an infant alive – 
against the depredations of competing females and infanticidal males – which most strongly 
determines female reproductive fitness.  Reproductive success requires more than finding and 
falling in love with the ideal mate; although EP research sometimes focusses upon mating 
strategy and behaviour, ultimate reproductive success depends upon successful gestation, 
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delivery, and rearing of offspring.195  For the majority of human history, this has not been easy; 
some estimate the number of children lost before puberty – for most of human prehistory and 
history – to around 50 per cent.196  The ability to maintain a working relationship with parental 
allies enables mothers and selected alloparents to supply the resource-greedy human infant in 
relative safety, ensuring the transmission of a woman’s specific genotype, and therefore 
disposition.197 
 
Mom and Dad Investors: Parental Investment and Disinvestment 
 
The science of parental investment and kinship relations begins with the altruism and kin-
investment analyses of William Hamilton (1963, 1964a, and 1964b) and Robert Trivers (1971, 
1972, 1974), following Angus Bateman’s (1948) conclusions about anisogamy and mating 
behaviours.  In the human species, successful parental investment generally requires the help 
of others, especially the kin-group.198  Parents in post-subsistence cultures with institutionalized 
inheritance of property also typically exert significant control over offspring marriages, making 
mating an intergenerational business.199  Hamilton’s (1963:354-355; 1964a:1-2) “genetical 
mathematical model” of altruism and inclusive fitness predicts that relatives offer each other 
assistance based on the relative degree of genetic relationship, because relations’ reproductive 
success advantages some of one’s own genes.200  An evolutionary paradigm foregrounds the 
inevitability of parent-child conflict over share of parental time and energy because parents and 
offspring are always related to each other genetically by fifty-percent only, yet 100% to 
themselves.201  Parents – however much they consciously attempt to be fair – ultimately tailor 
                                                          
195 Kenrick and Trost (1987:90); Campbell (2002:16, 60; 2006a:86). 
196 Campbell (2002:52); Geary (2010:146); Gray and Anderson (2010:92-93). 
197 Altmann (1997:329). 
198 On support for Bateman’s (1948) and Trivers’ (1972) contributions to evolutionary theorizing, see Buss and 
Barnes (1986:569); Buss (1992:263-264); Landolt et al (1995:3, 18); Shackelford et al (2005b:447-448, 456); 
Schmitt (2014:22).  On problems with traditional parental-investment frameworks, see Keller et al (2001:358); 
Hill et al (2011:1288); Brown et al (2009); Schlomer et al (2011:497); Geary et al (2014:394, 407); Schacht et al 
(2014:216).  On altruism and group selection, see also Sober and Wilson (1998); Wilson (2005); Wilson and 
Hölldobler (2005); Reimers and Oakley (2017).  On the evolutionary importance of non-paternal alloparenting, 
see Lancaster (1991:5). 
199 Apostolou (2010:39). 
200 On the complexities and applicability of Hamilton’s Rule and inclusive fitness, see Burnstein (2005:528); 
Kurland and Gaulin (2005:456, 476); West et al (2006:R482); Cronk and Gerkey (2007:463); Gardener et al 
(2011:1020, 1040); Schlomer et al (2011:498).  On social-science misunderstandings of the kin selection model, 
see Park (2007:860, 868-869); West et al (2011:233, 240). 
201 On parent-child and sibling-sibling conflict over family resources, see Kenrick (2006b:20); Salmon and 
Malcolm (2011:93); Schlomer et al (2011:498). 
45 
 
their investment decisions according to offspring reproductive potential, but also to ongoing 
parental advantage and opportunity.202  Trivers (1971:35, 45) applies Hamilton’s hypotheses to 
human evolution and concludes that reciprocal altruism in humans is universal across cultures, 
and arises out of extended lifespan, social stability, and prolonged parental care; in his opinion, 
altruism is really a form of self-interest.  Following Bateman’s (1948) assumption of male 
variance in reproductive success, Trivers (1972:138, 142, 174) argues that disparities in 
anisogametic investment create sex-differences in parental investment, including male mate-
abandonment (which frees the male to further mating opportunities), and male sexual 
proprietariness (in order to protect what parental investment he does offer).203  Trivers 
(1972:139; 1974:249-250) also contends that, because parental investment capacity is a finite 
resource, parents invest in each child according to that offspring’s reproductive potential; 
offspring therefore compete for parental investment, giving rise to parent-offspring conflict 
over relative degree of investment in each child.  The Trivers model of parental investment 
explains how individual children in post-industrial small-family societies receive the most time- 
and wealth-intensive parental hyperinvestment ever recorded, although all human parental 
investment is hyperinvestment in comparison with other social species.204  There are also 
constraints on parental investment behaviours, because environmental resources are always 
naturally finite, and so pragmatic decisions must be made about which children will repay 
investment.205  Trivers and Willard’s (1973:90-91) sex-ratio hypothesis contends that parents 
of all species preferentially invest – indirectly through differential nurturance, or directly by 
elimination through infanticide – in the sex which will engender the greatest number of 
grandchildren (in practice, most often male offspring). 
 
Maternal Contingency 
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Despite the entrenched but inaccurate cultural stereotypes of unconditional, selfless maternal 
love and nurturance, selective parental investment is the human norm, and mother-offspring 
conflict an inevitability.206  Pregnancy is sometimes a successful compromise between fetal 
capture of the mother’s body, and maternal survival, and sometimes a fatal struggle for either 
or both.207  The maternal body is equally self-interested and mothering is contingent, 
specifically responsive to infant viability.208  Offspring competition is also the cause of mother-
child weaning conflicts, because lactation requires significant maternal resources, which a 
mother could give to existing or potential children.209  It is often argued that ancestral women 
spent almost all of their adult life either pregnant, breast-feeding, or both; breast-feeding is more 
demanding than pregnancy itself, and lactation in most species poses a significant risk to 
maternal life and safety.210  Even in cultures with comparatively high levels of active fathering, 
lifetime maternal costs are always significantly greater for women than are the costs of paternal 
investment to men.211  Animals who have the option of becoming either sex compete – even at 
the cost of death – to avoid the costs of being the gestating sex.212  The enormous costs and 
constraints of maternal investment also give rise to coevolving counter-adaptations in each sex 
designed to maximize reproductive success.213  Even in modern Western nations, giving birth 
still poses significant lifetime risks of mortality, especially after the birth of sons or twins.214  
Because of the massively disproportionate yet lifetime-limited investment of mothers in 
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offspring, the loss of a child for women is catastrophic for lifetime reproductive success.215  The 
so-called post-maternity period of female life is a significant element in female reproductive 
performance, especially in the production of food, which evolutionists struggle to explain.216  
According to the cooperative breeding hypothesis, menopause occurs because offspring 
survival depends on more than one actively interested and nurturing (and therefore female) 
care-giver.217 
 
Hrdy (1999b:xiii, xviii, xx) makes it quite clear that a mother’s love is not unconditional; her 
debunking of the nuclear-heterosexual model of parental care argues that human males have 
little spontaneous interest in infants; it therefore seems more likely that older females with 
mothering expertise – alloparents and grandmothers – assisted with offspring care.218  
Cooperation between matrilocally resident female kin preceded male-male coalition-building 
and hominid families probably depended firstly on coresidential female kin coalitions, and only 
secondarily – if at all – on male hunting.219  The mutual provision of care and food to infants 
by female alloparents initiated a runaway evolutionary cascade in brain-size, slow development, 
lower birth-rates, longer infancy and childhood (but shorter lactation-dependency), and early 




Across species, parental investment is most often entirely maternal investment, often in 
cooperation with female kin, but – in comparison with other mammalian species – some male 
humans provide an unusual amount of paternal care.221  If parental investment is basically 
maternal investment, and alloparenting is mostly allomothering, what exactly is the exceptional 
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paternal investment in humans?  Males in constant association with a female have significantly 
suppressed testosterone, suggesting that so-called paternal investment might be little more than 
evoked suppression of aggression, resulting in less likelihood of the infanticide of a woman’s 
existing children.222  Some doubt that men have been selected to offer any truly effective 
childcare.223  Human male primary caregivers tend to ignore their own infants whenever the 
biological mother is present; in fact, males of almost all species preferentially invest the 
majority of their time and energy into mating attempts.224  The perception of difference between 
the sexes’ parental investment is a longstanding one: Aristotle for instance, observes that 
“mothers love their children more than fathers, because parenthood costs the mother more 
trouble” Nichomachean Ethics (9.7.7); in his opinion, mothers also have more love for their 
offspring because they are more certain than fathers of their biological relation to the child.225  
Across all species, specialist female investment in the matriline greatly outweighs male 
investment in offspring – even willing and enthusiastic fathering – and any female who depends 
exclusively on the assistance of fathers and paternal kin in child-rearing will soon be 
outcompeted in the reproductive landscape.  The mother-family social unit is universally the 
mammalian default, and survival of immature offspring in the human species is seriously 
compromised in the absence of the biological mother; among most species – including humans 
– following his minimum investment of sperm, a male’s active parenting is sometimes helpful, 
but not essential to infant survival.226  Father-absence is in fact the default scenario among 
hunter-gatherer peoples, and the greatest negative effect of father-absence is offspring’s 
reduced access to resources.  Single-parent families with sufficient resources tend to do as well 
as two-parent families, while families with two well-resourced female parents do best of all, 
probably as a result of having double the amount of highly-focussed and competent parental – 
i.e., maternal – care.227  Impregnating males often remain with females (and collaterally, 
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offspring) simply to ensure reproductive fidelity and future sexual access; nevertheless, in some 
father-present families, men invest as minimally as absent fathers.228  In many traditional 
peoples, males invest minimally, and often only in response to relative mother-absence.229 
 
If fathers are relatively unnecessary to infant survival, father-presence has positive effects on 
increasing numbers of a female partner’s offspring.230  In traditional cultures, the presence of 
fathers also increases child survival principally through the protection of a man’s own offspring 
from opportunistic infanticide committed by other males.231  Active fathering also predicts 
significant social advantage for older children.232  A significant positive contribution of male 
parents is simply ensuring that sons are imprinted with and display the correct forms and levels 
of masculinity, a prerequisite for successful integration into male social hierarchies.233  What 
passes for ideal fathering also differs radically between societies, and the social advantage of 
parents’ marriage to offspring may be in the infant’s access to the (designated) father’s kin: as 
a result, heterosexual pair-bonding would logically become selected for over the course of many 
generations.234  Nonetheless, there is significant variation between fathering styles, even in 
highly-investing human fathers, because paternal investment evolved in response to a range of 
ancestral environments and is flexibly expressed according to present circumstances; there are, 
however, many social pressures on modern men not to become equal (or, worse, primary) 
caregivers of their own offspring, including pressures from the female parent.235 
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Because paternal investment in the human species is most definitely a biocultural anomaly, 
many EPs conclude that paternal care is actually mating effort.236  Women express significant 
interest in images of men who appear to be interacting positively with children.237  The key to 
the reciprocal relationship of paternal investment with mating effort is marital quality within a 
context of co-residence.238  Cross-culturally, men’s confidence in paternity certainty directly 
determines the quantity and the quality of paternal investment in existing, co-resident offspring; 
males who cared little about whether the infants they were investing in were theirs or not would 
soon be eliminated from the genepool by cuckoo opportunists.239  Even in a modern post-
industrial society with ideals of gender-equity, many agree that male outrage over unjust 
cuckoldry is justified.240 
 
Paternity certainty is in practice female sexual fidelity, something women agree to exchange to 
ensure paternal investment.241  Fathers are not the only interested paternal kin making 
investment decisions based on perceptions of paternity certainty: patrilineal grandparents, 
uncles and aunts, and even cousins all have the potential to make significant contributions to 
children’s survival; the helpfulness of grand-kin depends upon the degree of paternal certainty, 
compounded through both gender and generation of the infant’s descent-line; a maternal 
grandmother is most certain of her investment, while the paternal grandfather is least likely to 
be certain of genetic relation, and least likely to invest in grandchildren.242  Human males are 
atypical in their level of investment in offspring, but they are equally remarkable in the degree 
of anxiety they express over actual or perceived infidelity, and the lengths they will go to 
enforce paternity certainty, which in an internally conceiving and gestating species can never 
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under natural circumstances be one hundred percent, in contrast to maternal confidence.243  
Male fears are real, but studies disagree on the exact degree of actual non-paternity in 
populations, with rates estimated from 1.7% to 29.8 %.244  No study of human populations has 
ever found zero rates of non-paternity of offspring, however, and the human species cannot be 
said to be strictly monogamous, because women and men are equally involved in infidelity.245 
 
Accommodating male demand for paternal confidence is an adaptive behaviour, because males 
who doubt their paternal relationship to children who are supposedly theirs are more likely to 
abuse or even kill both mother and children.  Men make fixed decisions about their paternity at 
the time they first learn of a woman’s pregnancy, based on their perceptions of the mother’s 
behaviour during the impregnation window, and, as men’s confidence in paternity declines, 
they are more likely to divorce a wife, and to steadily reduce economic investment in existing 
children; serious doubt may result in harm to those children.246  Women have developed 
behavioural counter-strategies designed to assuage male concerns about cuckoldry, but the most 
ubiquitous cross-cultural counter-strategy is attention to the faces of new infants: new mothers 
and maternal kin tend to remark upon the facial resemblance of the new-born baby to the 
putative father – especially if the child is male – and often specifically on the occasion of the 
father and paternal kin first viewing the baby; adults intensely scrutinize a baby’s face to 
identify aspects of the face which are like those of the father or his kin, even though infants 
actually resemble their mothers in the earliest months of life but there is no corresponding 
spontaneous comparison – by any kin – of the infant’s features to the mother or her kin.247  
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Evolutionists agree that the purpose of the social custom of kin-recognition is to evoke the 
designated father’s investment in the infant, and the acceptance of the infant into the wider 
social world.248 
 
Kin but not Kind 
 
Paternal recognition of their own children for purposes of investment is a specific manifestation 
of kinship affiliation, and establishment of kinship affiliations is vital to human offspring 
survival, because in the ancestral alloparental context, there is significant advantage in handing 
an infant into the care of an individual with inherent goodwill toward the shared genome.249  
Humans possess specific cognitive apparatus for the identification of kin, and for altruistic, kin-
focussed behaviours which enhance offspring survival.250 
 
According to some, early humans computed kinship through observation of who co-resided 
with the biological mother, and for how long.251  In this view, maternal care is the original basis 
of both kinship and kin-recognition, and so social relations evolved prior to the social construct 
of fatherhood.252  The relationship between investment in kin and successful reproduction is 
clear; individual humans benefit enormously from having access to close kin, and women 
benefit most from having matrilineal kin at hand, because alloparenting is most often 
allomothering, and matrilineal female kin provide the highest-quality support.253  Maternal 
grandmothers want their daughters (and their grand-children) to survive, while paternal 
grandmothers are also more likely to want a daughter-in-law to produce as many offspring as 
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possible in as little time as possible; maternal aunts and uncles invest more in offspring than 
paternal kin do, and even the mother’s father invests more than the father’s mother; women 
forced to live in patrilineal and polygynous cultures typically express a second-best preference 
for sororal or close-kin polygyny, which better supports their maternal effort.254  In contrast 
with ancestral populations, humans now socialize with a much greater proportion of non-kin 
than with kin.255  Humans cooperate to unprecedented levels with non-kin, but greater altruistic 
behaviour is still always reserved for the most genetically related, in preference to friends, and 
lastly, unrelated neighbours.256  Women in patrilocal human cultures tend to interact with 
female kin and kin-like friends, while males establish strong, hierarchical bonds with other 
males, kin and nonkin.257  Kin relations are not always unconditionally beneficial for the closely 
related, however; sibling rivalry is a universal phenomenon, and sibling loyalty is ambivalent 
at best, although siblings will unite in the face of threat from outside the family.258 
 
Adoption of children is also strongly influenced by degree of genetic relatedness between child 
and adoptive parent, and in traditional and modern societies alike occurs most often – and most 
successfully – between closely related kin.259  While adoption of orphans occurs in some animal 
species – and even between species – it is evidenced in all known human cultures; in non-kin 
adoptions, adoptees benefit economically, and adopters benefit through increased social 
standing and expansion of their own mating opportunities, as well as increased survival 
prospects for remaining children.260  Not all adopted children enjoy a successful placement in 
their adoptive families, but outcomes for offspring in stepfamilies are statistically bleak.261  
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Divorce, remarriage and step-family experience have been prevalent for a long time cross-
culturally, but optimistic views of the possible benefits of blended families – and the attribution 
of stepfamily dysfunction to post-industrial capitalism – are not backed by the ethnographic 
record.262  The stepfamily-effect is for the most part the result of mother absence, since the 
presence of biological fathers in stepfamilies does not appear to protect offspring from abuse 
by step-mothers; stepfathers pose more lethal risk to offspring than abusive stepmothers do, 
however, because – physically – men are more dangerous generally.263  The real question is 
why stepfamilies exist at all: evolutionists conclude that step-parenting is mating effort.264 
 
New mates – especially males – tend to invest as little as possible in a new partner’s previous 
offspring: stepfather investment tends to occur in the presence of the mother, and almost always 
ceases if and when the present sexual union breaks up; for many, the stepfamily life is more 
similar to being in a single-parent household.265  From an evolutionary perspective, however, 
females benefit more from securing a second male mate than they do from prioritising the 
welfare of their existing offspring; mothers who put their existing children first in a second 
union risk the dangers of marital conflict for themselves, along with the abuse of their 
children.266  Men willingly enter a relationship with an encumbered woman because a step-
fathers’ lifetime fertility is only negatively affected if there are more than two co-resident 
stepchildren; some genetically and behaviourally lowest-quality men must tolerate being 
stepfathers in order to sire any children at all.267 
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Raising offspring is an immensely costly business in the animal world.  Discriminative parental 
solicitude in humans is an aspect of kin selection and infanticide is an unpleasant but universal 
behaviour across species, which advantages parents (and would-be parents) by eliminating less 
viable offspring.268  All of the factors determining a decision to commit infanticide in animals 
are also evidenced in the human species; neglect is the least violent form of disinvestment in 
unwanted infants, and historically has not been detrimental to the reproductive success of male 
(or female) parent.269  Outright infanticide is simply the most visible and dramatic manifestation 
of parents’ differential investment in offspring, reflecting parents’ estimations of viability of an 
infant in the present environment; among humans, such disinvestment decisions are largely 
unconscious.270  In some traditional cultures – given the alternatives – infanticide is essentially 
the most humane option, and social mechanisms exist to distance the parents from the loss of a 
delivered child.271  Mothers’ assessments of the sub-optimality of the environment for infant 
survival give significant attention to their own relative wealth and opportunity.272  Women and 
men are both likely to commit infanticide because of the perceived ‘problem’ of uncertain 
paternity, and illegitimacy is also a strong predictor of pregnancy termination; the older a single 
mother is, however, the less likely she is to sacrifice this last chance at reproduction.273  Lack 
of effective paternal support is also a strong predictor of maternal disinvestment, in the form of 
abortion, infanticide, or postpartum abuse and neglect of children.274 
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There are also significant patterns of gender differences in aggressive infanticidal 
disinvestment: neonaticides and pathological filicides are mostly committed by women, while 
males predominantly commit family-homicide and retaliating filicide, as well as purely 
accidental or unintended filicide.275  Neonaticidal women share a number of characteristics: 
they are younger, less likely to be married, conceal their pregnancies (sometimes even from 
themselves), do not seek help or prenatal care, and have no real plan for parenthood.276  Filicides 
after the first week of the infant’s life tend to be committed by fathers, especially those enacted 
in later childhood.277  Filicidal fathers also demonstrate a number of common circumstantial 
factors, including low status, unemployment, financial difficulties, below-average education, 
social isolation, expectation of relationship breakdown, and actual separation.278  Many of the 
disinvesting forms of infanticide – neonaticide, unwanted-child filicide, and fatal abuse filicide, 
for example – are not accompanied by parental suicide, which tends to be associated with men’s 
murder of older children.279 
 
Parents also make selective disinvestment decisions based on an infant’s sex; females are most 
often disinvested in for reproductive-economic reasons, but the parent of a male child is more 
likely to enjoy a greater number of grandchildren.280  The popular perception of infanticide is 
that sons are favoured in parental investment while daughters are highly expendable.281  It is 
reproductively effective to invest in sons during times of prosperity, and in daughters during 
periods of socioeconomic adversity.282  In fact, the majority of infanticide victims across the 
whole world are actually male, which may be related to the greater incidence of malformations 
in male offspring.283  Institutionalized sex-selective infanticide of daughters is ultimately linked 
with hypergamy: when women marry up within a strict class system, then women in the highest 
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classes have fewer marital options, and so families disinvest in unneeded daughters; preferential 
female infanticide is most prevalent in agricultural-patrilineal societies with entrenched 
marriage-dowry customs.284  Although selective disinvestment in sons is traditionally 
associated with very adverse socio-environmental conditions, socioeconomically liberated 
women in fully developed modern cultures demonstrate a distinct, aesthetic preference for 
daughters.285  When the pressure to invest primarily in males of the patrilineal family is 
removed, women may prefer to invest in female kin – who offer more satisfying emotional 
attachments – a far cry from Freudian models of primal, sexualized opposite-gender 
relationships within the family.286 
 
Freud’s psychosexual model of kin relationships is no longer supported in a number of fields, 
and scientifically-oriented enquiry into incest is converging on Westermarck’s (1891/1921) 
hypothesis of evolved incest avoidance.  Westermarck (1891:192-193) grounded his analysis 
of kinship, sexuality, and marriage in Darwin’s theory of evolution, and was himself dismissive 
of social explanations for incest avoidance; he viewed humans as natural animals in a natural 
world, and concluded that the rules governing their sexual attractions and aversions were 
therefore likely to be the same.287  Westermarck recognised that social forms of disgust about 
incest grow out of the individual’s innate, psychological disgust, and not vice versa: sexual 
aversion to specific individuals was a kind of reverse-imprinting, the result of shared residence 
during early childhood; numerous studies support the Westermarck co-residence hypothesis.288  
Neurocognitive studies supports a view of the mind as specifically geared to detect cues of 
relatedness (i.e., knowledge of childhood co-residence (including co-residence with non-kin) 
gained through observation of maternal investment in siblings; olfactory evidence for genetic 
similarity; and early female maturation and dispersal away from male kin) to facilitate 
avoidance of potential inbreeding.289  Evolutionists agree that incest-avoidance mechanisms 
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function to enhance reproductive success, through denying the expression of bad genes.290  The 
Westermarck effect appears to be stronger in females – especially during ovulation –perhaps 
because parental investment costs are always greater for women; the rates of mortality and 
morbidity of inbred populations are twice as high as in genetically diverse groups.291  Parent-
offspring incest-avoidance mechanisms are evident in animal species, especially between 
mothers and sons, contrary to Freud’s Oedipus-Complex which posits the son’s attraction to 
the mother and envy and hatred for the father as chief competitor for her sexual favours.292  
Intergenerational male-male conflict is better explained as sexual rivalry between two grown 
men over sexual access to unrelated women, especially those controlled by the alpha-male 
father; biological mothers conflict with their husbands because – for logical, evolutionary 
reasons – mothers want their own sons to access family resources as quickly as possible in order 
to begin reproductive life.293  Ruling men’s exclusive sexual access to fertile women is often 
enshrined in marriage arrangements; women’s sexual availability (as well as the fruits of their 
labour) is also heavily determined by patriarchal marriage – the most common type of formal 
mating structure in the human species. 
 
The Costs and Benefits of Marriage 
 
Marriage is a universal human custom, but – according to the literary record – men are 
somewhat conflicted about the costs and benefits of the matter.  Darwin (1838) sets out the 
potential benefits of marriage from a male point of view: a clean, nicely-furnished house; a 
cheerful housekeeper, charming companion, and nurse in old age; the immortality of offspring; 
and a “nice soft” wife who is a recreational “object”, and – wonderfully – “better than a dog 
anyhow”.294  The benefits of remaining single are persuasive: liberty to do whatever one likes 
without compromise, and being able to socialize with clever men rather than time-wasting 
relations.  The costs of marriage, however, are unbearable: distraction from the real business of 
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life – intellectual work; financial and emotional investment in potentially ungrateful children; 
having to work rather too hard to support the family; and having to accommodate the contrary 
wishes of a wife.  In the end, the ultimate cost of not getting married is too great: “groggy & 
dingy” old age without the support of wife or children.  Having talked himself into marriage, 
Darwin then ponders his father’s advice to marry early: he himself leans toward delay, because 
marriage is no better than “slavery”, but the thought of growing old alone persuades him that 
he should trust to chance, and attempt to become a “happy slave”, while taking care to ensure 
that things are to his liking.  Six months later, Darwin married his thirty-year old first cousin, 
Emma Wedgewood; this ‘nice soft wife’ bore him ten children, the last of which was delivered 
when she was 48; she spent a good deal of her life also nursing her husband (as well some of 
their children) through illness, suggesting that his ‘slavery’ as a husband was not as demanding 
as her efforts as wife.  Darwin (1838) never discusses the benefits of mutual love – rather, he 
specifically hopes to avoid engaging in ‘terrible’ time-wasting emotional relationships with his 
family – but he is acutely aware of the wife’s drain on his financial resources.  None of Darwin’s 
(1838) lists include any social or material benefits an ‘enslaved’ husband might bestow upon 
his wife (or children), while a wife’s duties appear to involve, first and foremost, her husband’s 
comfort, especially in old age; in this model, wives are investing heaviest of all in husbands, 
not in offspring.  Evolutionists generally agree with Darwin that men view marriage as a trade-
off between freedoms and opportunities for social and reproductive benefits, but few 
evolutionary analyses examine marriage from a specifically female point of view of benefits 
and costs.295  More than 90% of humans will be married at some point in their lives, and, despite 
the potential ubiquity of polygamy, most marriages in the world involve a union between two 
genetically unrelated individuals; husband and wife do not (usually) share the loyalties forged 
in kinship ties.296  Human marriage is not tied to reproductive relationships alone, but involves 
many purely social relations between large numbers of individuals, and humans frequently 
choose to marry and remain married long after reproductive endeavour is over, or in the absence 
of any offspring; reproduction is not essential to stable and successful marriage.297 
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Marriage – in practice – gives one man secure access to at least one fertile woman, and enhances 
his ability – in theory – to avoid provisioning another man’s offspring.298  Getting married in 
many cultures also allows a male to become recognized as a true man.299  In traditional cultures, 
formalized marriage also benefits women more than mere cohabitation: their children will be 
recognized as legitimate members of the community, and as wives, they are at less risk than 
cohabiting women of suffering domestic violence or murder.300  Marriage to the right (but rare) 
sort of man is essential to reproductive success for women, and – in the female view – the right 
sort of man is one willing to commit to the exclusive nature of marriage as a sexual and financial 
institution.301  Being seen to be willing to commit also makes men more attractive to the right 
sort of women – the youngest, most beautiful ones – and offers men a number of advantages: 
increased paternity certainty; increased offspring survival; increased return on investment in 
multiple grandchildren; increased social status; and secure in-law male allies.302  The wrong 
sort of man is very unlikely to enjoy the many benefits of marriage; while unattractive males 
are less likely to marry, only the most unattractive females are likely to experience very negative 
effects on fertility, mainly through their marriage to lowest-quality males.303 
 
Reproductive behaviours in the human species have long been structured by the many forms of 
marriage; nevertheless, traditional marriage is not romance, but a political alliance and 
economic exchange between kin groups.304  Arranged marriages – the most prevalent form of 
marriage historically – enable the governing generation to ensure the future of their lineage.305  
Males make agreements about which women belong to which males for exclusive sexual 
purposes, while the married couple and their children are established within the social 
hierarchy.306  Reproduction within marriage has a higher chance of success and offspring are 
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more viable, even in gender-liberated, post-industrial nations.307  It takes a typical hunter-
gatherer three or four years to rear an infant, a period when marriages in the human species 
often spontaneously break down.308  The purposes of marriage are multiple: economic 
cooperation between role specialists; sex opportunity; and the social production of offspring.  
Popular evolutionary explanations for the origin and persistence of formalized marriage in 
human cultures include the provisioning hypothesis, the bodyguard hypothesis, the supremacy 
of male mating preferences under polygyny, monogamy, and even polyandry, and the self-
reinforcing contribution of formally contracted marriage to human civilization itself; 
hypotheses less explored by evolutionists include male exploitation of female domestic labour 
– housework – and the advantage to men provided by wives’ attention to husbands’ health.309 
 
EPs contend that ecological and social environmental contexts determine marriage 
arrangements among humans, but marriage systems are not always the same in practice as 
mating strategies.310  Monogamy (in all its various forms), appears to be the working default 
for humans across environments; polygyny may be the ideal mating strategy for males but is 
generally achieved only by a few, privileged males, in highly defined social circumstances, and 
polyandry is very rare, and occurs most often in hostile ecologies, and tends to involve the 
marriage of one woman to a set of cooperating brothers.311 
 
Monogamy may be a second-best or working compromise for both sexes, but there are benefits 
in exclusive marriage for both sexes.  The benefits for males of monogamy are many: 
improvement of relationships with other males through decrease of mating competition and 
                                                          
307 Gray and Anderson (2010:72).  On the contribution of marital stability and quality to reproductive success, see 
Bereczkei and Csanaky (1996:33); Gonzaga et al (2008:119). 
308 Campbell (2002:262); Nordlund (2005:115); Schmitt (2005a:261). 
309 Gray and Anderson (2010:61).  On the origins of human marriage in male provisioning of females, see Winking 
et al (2007:1643); Chapais (2011:33); Gavrilets (2012:9923, 9926-9927).  On women’s provision of the majority 
of foodstuffs for hunter-gatherer families, see Campbell (2002:263-264, 2004:17); Hawkes (2004:465); Hrdy 
(2005:297).  On the bodyguard hypothesis, which positions preferred males – “husbands” – as protectors of women 
and children from other males; see Mesnick (1997:243); Wilson and Mesnick (1997:509-511); Hawkes et al 
(2001); Campbell (2002:243-244); Hawkes (2004:462-463, 465); Puts (2010:164); Vandermassen (2011:740).  On 
monogamous pair-bonding among some primates and lowered rates of opportunistic infanticide by males, see 
Harcourt and Greenberg (2001:911-912); Campbell (2002:244); Borries et al (2011:685); Opie et al (2013:13328). 
310 Quinlan (2008:227, 236); Henrich et al (2012:658-659). 
311 According to Hrdy (2000:75), evolutionary theory typically assumes that the one male-one female model of 
mating is a mutually beneficial system, but there greater benefits to men of polygyny, and to women of partible 
paternity, or polyandry.  See also Haddix (2001:47, 58); Schmitt (2005a:263); Kenrick (2006b:29); Starkweather 
and Hames (2012:163).  On the unexpected ubiquity of polyandry in the human species, see Price et al (2010:471); 
Starkweather and Hames (2012:149); Gowaty (2013:877). 
62 
 
increase of cooperation in alliances; the opportunity for even lower-rank males to achieve at 
least some mating success; institutionalized access to sexual activity; increased paternity 
certainty; exclusive possession of one female’s lifetime reproductive potential; and perhaps 
most importantly, the improved survival of offspring; the costs of cuckoldry for men within the 
context of monogamous marriage are enormous, however, because the price paid in mistaken 
investment by men can never be recouped.  Women gain in monogamy through access to 
additional resources (including, perhaps, food) for herself and her children; through guaranteed 
protection of herself and offspring from other males; and through having to provide sexual 
access to only one male.  Women also lose, however, because the genetic diversity and thus 
quality of her offspring is restricted; because she is exposed to sometimes lethal male sexual 
proprietariness; and because she must constantly guard her only mate from female competitors, 
who prefer to poach currently-married men.312 
 
Evolutionary analysis divides monogamy into two types: ecologically imposed monogamy 
(EIM), which occurs when offspring would not survive without the intensive nurturance of two 
parents, and socially imposed monogamy (SIM), in which men agree to restrict themselves to 
one woman and her offspring in return for the social benefits of citizenship and inheritance 
laws.313  In modern societies, so-called ‘serial monogamy’ is in practice lifetime polygyny, most 
often practiced by males.314  Polygyny – cross-culturally the most popular form of marriage 
because it requires less compromise of male sexual inclinations – does not always result in 
increased numbers of offspring.315  Some draw attention to the intrinsic relationship between 
economic development, personal property, patrilineal inheritance, and a man’s need to ensure 
he leaves at least one male heir.316  Polygyny compounds socioeconomic inequity, however, 
and is also associated with social dysfunction; the tendency for one man to sequester and 
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impregnate as many high-quality females as he can support – in contemporary and traditional 
cultures alike – means that some men produce a greater lifetime proportion of offspring, while 
a subset of men never marry and reproduce and more men than women individually have a 
greater number of offspring.317  Polygyny offers some benefits to women (especially if the co-
wife is close kin): the support of other women within the heterosexual marriage spreads the 
load of constant pregnancies (albeit at the cost of the ever-increasing division of the husband’s 
patrimony).318  On the other hand, the three principal reasons for verbal and physical violence 
between co-wives are sexual jealousy, unequal distribution by the husband of resources among 
wives and children, and a husband’s subsequent marriage; a polygynous husband may also be 
devoting much of his time to adulterous affairs, in the hope of securing more wives.319  
Polygyny is rarely women’s best first-choice, because costs greatly outweigh benefits – second 
wives’ fertility is often actively suppressed by first wives, through psychological impairment, 
or through infanticide of offspring – but in an androcentric culture the advantage to the 
reproductive fitness of males is sufficient justification for the persistence of the marriage 
custom.320 
 
Wherever there is marriage, there is almost always divorce, but historically divorce has been 
more available for men than for women.321  Traditional justifications for divorce are very likely 
to include failure of female fertility – including the apparent failure of female old age – rather 
than lack of love or happiness; in traditional societies, failure of female fidelity also predicts 
divorce.322  Many individuals, especially men, divorce as a necessary prelude to remarriage to 
a more desirable partner; women tend to divorce while they are still young, men as they age, 
because both are seeking to re-enter the marriage market with maximum resources – female 
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fertility and male wealth.323  The more children a woman has, the less likely it is that she will 
remarry, and the presence of co-resident children belonging to the woman makes the remarriage 
more likely to fail, because males are averse to other men’s offspring.324  Marriage is a contract 
of compromise between conflicting male and female reproductive strategies, but in patriarchal 
contexts divorce renegotiates that treaty in favour of the maximum reproductive fitness of the 
husband.325  In modern cultures female dissatisfaction with male contribution to marital 
happiness now accounts for increasing numbers of divorces, but – although women with more 
economic power in modern cultures are able to initiate divorce more readily – women married 
to extremely wealthy males are still least likely to initiate divorce.326 
 
Civilization and Domestication 
 
According to some evolutionists, the greatest adaptive advantage of marriage in human culture 
– especially monogamy – lies in its enhancement of prosocial behaviour, and thus upon the 
development of civilization.327  In this view, society benefits through reduction in crime because 
more males are stabilized in monogamous marital units; through increased paternal investment 
in children; through decreased physical and emotional claustration of females because males 
are competing less intensively for them; and in greater assortative mating, with subsequently 
better domestic relations.328  Others dispute the effect of marriage upon more prosocial 
behaviour.329  If the historic institutionalization of monogamy represented potential 
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326 On greater female economic independence and greater female options for divorce, see Buss (2003:213); Jackson 
et al (2014:118).  On women’s reluctance to divorce wealthy husbands, even in gender-equal nations, see Campbell 
(2002:258, 266). 
327 Sampson et al (2006:465); Walker et al (2011:4); De la Croix and Mariani (2012:9); Henrich et al (2012:657, 
659-660, 666); Lundberg and Pollak (2015).  Polygyny is sometimes viewed as the predecessor to the more 
civilized full realization of marriage – monogamy; see Lagerlöf (2005; 2010); Gould et al (2008); De la Croix and 
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328 Sampson et al (2006:465) Burt et al (2010:1309); Geary (2010:373); Gray and Anderson (2010:232); Campbell 
(2013:180); Chapais (2013). 
329 Bereczkei and Csanaky (1996:21, 31-32); Fortunato and Archetti (2010:149). 
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reproductive victory for lower-ranked males, ruling-class men still enjoyed reproductive 
advantage because intragroup competitiveness (over women) is diverted outward into 
intergroup competition (over territory and resources), and so rulers’ access to many fertile 
females.330  More probably, the primary social purpose of all types of marriage is the legitimate 
transmission of property, wealth, and social obligations between families.331 
 
Marriage in complex civilizations clearly benefits individuals’ reproductive success, and 
possibly contributes to successful civilization of group-living, but few evolutionists are 
interested in how the apparently natural division of labour within the heterosexual pair-bond 
household actually benefits one sex to the cost of the other.  The benefits reaped by men’s 
foisting of domestic work onto wives is better addressed in discussion of gendered behavior by 
sociologists and historians.332  Contemporary sociologists view sex differences in housework 
as a problem, but studies of hunter-gatherer, and (presumably) Paleolithic daily life suggest that 
gender divisions in domestic labour originated in an ancient context to the benefit of both sexes; 
social science studies ignore the obvious correlation of division of labour to better reproductive 
outcomes.333  In traditional (and many modern) marriages the wife simply replaces the mother 
in providing food; in the production and care of status-appropriate clothing; and in the 
maintenance of a healthy and harmonious domestic habitat.  Housework is work that almost all 
women automatically undertake for the benefit of their dependent offspring, but in homes with 
or without children the wife – even when employed outside of the home – is traditionally 
expected to provide, without payment, domestic services to at least a minimally sufficient 
standard for the benefit of an unrelated adult male – her husband; in this sense, co-residing 
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husbands are opportunistic freeloaders on female domestic effort.334  Furthermore, the 
formalization of marriage and the production of children increases the unequal gendering of 
housework.335  There is no country where males do much more than about one third of domestic 
labour, and in any country, women always do more than men.336  Women’s reproduction of the 
domestic environment, as Darwin’s personal journal observed, is one of the primary benefits of 
marriage for men, freeing them to attend to more important tasks such as the economic creation 
of wealth, and social interaction with other men.337  In some traditional cultures, women’s 
reproductive success is tied to their status within the community as a good home-maker; the 
threat to women’s peer-evaluated ranking may be more than some women will stand – even 
among egalitarian societies – and they are reluctant to give up supervisory rights over standards 
of domestic order, and actively resist male participation in child-care.338  Men in the present era 
devote greater effort to interacting with children, but childcare within the home is still viewed 
as a relatively low-status feminine occupation – compared to masculine engagement in the 
competitive workplace with its substantial financial rewards.339 
 
The second great contribution of marriage to civilization is the gain in health status of married 
men, because women are still also primarily responsible for family health.340  Darwin was 
correct in his view of marriage as a benefit to men’s health, especially in old age; males 
experience more benefit from marriage (and remarriage) than women in terms of health 
outcomes.  Wives do significantly more emotional healthcare of their husband, and men are 
very likely to divorce sick wives who need care, whereas sick wives sometimes seek divorce 
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because husbands continue to expect greater participation in household duties by such wives.341  
The health benefits of reduced testosterone in husbands living with women (and children) 
disappear upon divorce.342  The quality of a marriage also has a significant influence on health 
outcomes, although marital quality is assessed, by both older men and older women, on how 
well the husband is cared for by the wife, while marital functionality is gauged by the benefits 
to the husband.343  The wife’s marital happiness is a chief determinant of health for both 
spouses, however, because when the wife is happy, she devotes more time to a husband’s health 
(and doing so contents her); when a husband is unhappy with his marriage, he may still receive 
benefits to his own well-being as long as his wife is still happy – the converse is not true, 
possibly because – whether they are happy or not – men on average provide much less active 
nurturance to wives under all conditions, including when a wife is unwell.344 
 
Cooperation, Competition, Compromise 
 
Raising a viable offspring to reproductive maturity requires prosocial cooperation between 
individuals within the wider kinship group, and – at a wider level – within civilized human 
society, but all evolved organisms are also self-interested, and in constant competition.  Males 
and females compete with others of the same sex for the best available mates; siblings compete 
for maximum parental investment; and males and females likewise compete with each other to 
optimize their own reproductive success.  Despite the romantic pull between the sexes, what is 
reproductively optimal for one is necessarily detrimental to the other: compromise is the usual 
result.345  Gender differences between the various forms of strategic interference, including 
hypervigilance, jealousy, and sexual proprietariness in both sexes; battering of wives and 
girlfriends by males; sexual coercion and rape of females, and male overperception of female 
sexual interest; females’ counter-skepticism about male commitment, the evolution of 
concealed ovulation, and the female counter-strategy of infidelity; and mate guarding in both 
sexes.  EPs agree with many feminists that all of these behaviours are strategic male control of 
females, to male advantage and significant female cost; the evolutionary explanation of marital 
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assault contends that domestic violence aims to control female sexuality, because of the 
reproductive consequences of sexual behaviour.  The ‘battle of the sexes’ is a well-entrenched 
truism, but the real victory in the compromise between the sexes lies substantially in many if 
not most cultures with the reproductive strategy of males, facilitated by greater male strength, 
and by greater male capacity to alliance-building.346  Patriarchy is the institutionalized 
advantage of males at the expense of females, but much of the conflict between sexes in the 
human species at the proximate, social level is directly attributable to the ultimate-level arms-
race of antagonistic coevolution.347 
 
In order to achieve their own reproductive goals males and females engage in various forms of 
strategic interference through sabotaging the self-interested behaviour of their partner.348  Both 
sexes are distressed and angered by behaviours which limit their own respective reproductive 
aims: women when males aggressively pursue sexual intimacy, either with themselves or 
outside of the relationship, and men when women withhold or delay sexual consummation, or 
demand reward in exchange for sex.349  Males and females do not want their mates (or even 
their potential mates) to be engaged in sexual activity outside of an existing relationship – even 
when they themselves exploit the benefits of infidelity.  Human, androcentric culture is 
traditionally lenient toward male infidelity, and averse to female sexual freedoms outside of 
marriage, because the primary function of marriage in most human societies is the production 
of legitimate (male) heirs in a property-transmitting context, and so men tend to behave in ways 
to protect their investments: sexual proprietariness, mate-guarding, mate-battering, and rape of 
women within marriage are all behavioural reflexes of males’ desire to ensure, enhance, and 
retain paternity certainty, and males control their female kin in the same way as they do wives 
because their fertility is a valuable, exchangeable commodity which can enrich a man’s own 
mating opportunities.350 
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Sexual proprietariness is predominantly a male emotional response to the possibility of 
unsanctioned or autonomous female sexual activity and the universality of sexual 
proprietariness in males demonstrates that a female disposition to infidelity existed as a 
plausible threat to paternity certainty in ancestral populations: a threat to men’s inherited belief 
in their property right over their wives and female blood-kin triggers a very real sense of 
trespass and outrage.351  Uxoricide is more often committed by men in response to wives leaving 
that union; murder of husbands by wives is not sexual proprietariness, but a last resort to defend 
themselves or their children.352  The reasonable man and outraged husband (or father) 
traditionally enjoys a special license-to-kill in the event of illicit intercourse with a woman; but 
in no historic legal code did women ever have recourse to such natural justice in the event of a 
husband’s adultery.353  Males enjoy legal and social sympathy for murders committed after 
catching a wife in flagrante delicto, but men do not belong to women in a parallel way, and 
husband-killing wives receive little if any sympathy.354  Mate-guarding – overtly physical, or 
more subtle, and covert – is the behavioural component of sexual proprietariness in both sexes; 
males risk severe reproductive penalties in failing to retain their mate, but females who fail to 
guard their mates also face significant costs, through loss of resources, protection, and status 
derived from the male’s social position; females are alert to the threat of female rivals to the 
security of resources, and enact a variety of mate-guarding behaviours as much as males, albeit 
with less overt or lethal consequences.355 
 
Mate-guarding is a common and adaptive behaviour across many species and is in humans  
largely pre-consciously triggered by gender-specific potential threats: strategies include 
preventing competitor access to mates, preventing competitors from stealing mates, and the 
active prevention of female defection through material inducements and also confinement; 
mate-guarding strategies in the human species include concealment through social 
sequestration; monopolization through extreme supervision; threat of break-up; derogation of 
competitors and potential rivals; display of wealth (gifts); appearance enhancement; sexual 
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favours; visible signs of affection and commitment in public to deter others; and possessive 
ornamentation (i.e., rings, and sometimes tattoos); more extreme behaviours include vigilant 
checking by self or deputies at unexpected moments, and physical violence toward interlopers 
and potential poachers.356  The two most prevalent mate-retention tactics are resource display 
(for males), and appearance enhancement (for females) and both sexes when they are in long-
term, stable relationships engage in commitment-manipulation tactics, including discussion of 
marriage, pregnancy, resource display, and love and care behaviours.357 
 
Such tactics are necessary because mate-poaching is a prevalent and serious threat, given that 
more than half of all males and females admit to attempting to poach a mate away from another 
committed relationship.358  Enforced claustration of females to forestall such poaching is an 
ancient practice intended to protect a man’s valuable investment in his marriage, and is strongly 
correlated with social status and inheritable wealth.359  Jealous male violence toward women 
has been viewed with leniency and sometimes approval by almost all known cultures, but the 
physical intimidation of misbehaving or departing women by jealous male mates is often the 
preliminary step to the murder of women.360  Human men who kill female partners tend to do 
so under one of two conditions: perception of infidelity, and threat of relationship termination, 
especially if the female is relatively young, and most especially if the husband is considerably 
older.361  Cross-culturally, the wives most at risk of marital violence are those who are young 
and thus maximally fertile; domestic violence aims to deter fertile females over whom males 
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have the most legitimate and incontestable entitlement – wives – from jeopardizing the 
husband’s paternal certainty.362 
 
Popular perceptions of partner abuse have altered substantially in the last hundred years, 
however: from a widespread tendency to respectful non-interference in men’s private matters 
mainstream cultures in many nations have shifted to intense disapproval and vilification of 
violent men, and state support for battered women and their children.363  A record of persistent 
and escalating previous abuse by a husband – of wives or of children – is the most common 
reason for a wife’s eventual resort to spousal murder.364  When women do commit murder in 
self-defence, however, they have to use weapons to compensate for greater male physical 
advantage, and so male targets are more likely to die.365  Although men’s battering of women 
is the most common (and socially excused) crime committed in modern Western cultures, 
female resistance to male violence is considered the greater social crime.366  Women who 
attempt to resist and survive threats to their lives by husbands are traditionally viewed as 
horrible figures who undermine civilized values, however; it is almost impossible for any 
husband-killing woman – no matter how much provocation she faces – to win public 
sympathy.367  Walker (1989, 2006, and 2009) developed a model of cyclic battering to explain 
women’s return to abusive relationships, but her Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) has 
attracted as much criticism as support, and does not explain women’s recourse to murder of 
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abusing husbands as a final and permanent escape.368  Despite societal support for battered 
wives and children, and a mixed level of acceptance of BWS defences in legal systems, well 
into the twenty-first century there is still general disapproval and a lack of forgiveness for 
battered women who actively fight back against male violence, especially if only on their own 
behalf.369 
 
In the past fifty years there has also been a recognition that rape is a form of abuse, an offence 
against the autonomy of the concerned woman, not against the rights of her male owner; no 
man – even the husband – is now viewed as possessing an automatic right to rape.370  The 
human species demonstrates a number of unique cultural features pertinent to the analysis of 
rape: male-male alliances upholding male control of women; non-sexual economic pair-
bonding, giving males additional reasons to control females; the use of rape as penalty for 
female noncompliance; the use of rape as a reward for male assistance; rape as a focus of male 
bonding rituals; the greater tendency of males to engage in opportunistic rape during the 
breakdown of civil society; and rape of the enemy’s women as a method of punishing enemy 
males in the context of civil and gang warfare.371  In the human species rape also occurs when 
male partners are excessively jealous in disposition; when women engage in more actual 
infidelity; when women repeatedly refuse to consent to intercourse with the existing partner; 
and when couples are breaking up.372  Until very recently, men possessed the legal (and social) 
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permission to force sexual intercourse within marriage, and also to prevent a wife from leaving 
an unhappy marriage.373  Despite a multiplicity of obvious cultural contexts for male sexual 
coercion, rape demonstrates the inherent conflict between optimal male and female mating 
strategies; the original evolutionary benefit to males was probably reproductive opportunity, 
and effective success.374  The act of rape is outright theft of (female) reproductive capacity, 
which advantages male reproductive success at severe cost to females.  The serious costs to 
females of sexual aggression include the potential loss of her current mate, permanent damage 
to her sexual reputation and future mate-value, and strategic interference with her mate-choice 
– meaning she may have to bear a child sired by a man she has not chosen – and the rejection 
(and sometimes punishment) of the woman by her existing male partner, especially within 
marriage, and most particularly when the women is of fertile age.375  The agreement of many 
evolutionists that rape constitutes one of many adaptive and viable strategies in the male 
repertoire has not endeared the evolutionary perspective to social constructivists and 
feminists.376  The feminist view of rape specifically downplays or denies physical sexual desire, 
and excludes reproductive motivation and outcomes in favour of rape as an exclusively social 
act of misogyny by which all men exercise control over all women; biology, behaviour, and 
environment are never divorced in reality, however, and the position of feminism and social 
constructivism on rape hinders the eradication of rape-behaviour.377  According to Jones 
(1992:832, 902-903, 907), unhelpful socialization “meta-myths” of rape disproved by a wealth 
of empirical studies include the notions that only humans rape, that sexual desire is irrelevant 
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to rape, that sexual attack does not discriminate between women, that experience of harm is 
equal across all women, that fear of rape is socially conditioned and dependent on social 
contexts, and that rape behaviours are socially learned.  The best analyses of rape acknowledge 
the complex interaction of biological factors – such as the inevitable conflict of interests 
between the sexes based on parental investment – with social behaviours which have 
historically increased male control over resources.378 
 
The male disposition to sexual aggression against females is also exacerbated by the male 
cognitive overperception of female sexual interest, explained by error management theory 
(EMT).379  Different gender thresholds exist for perceiving sexual interest – most often the male 
overperception of active female receptivity to sexual engagement – resulting in much 
misunderstanding and ill-feeling between the sexes.380  Men’s thresholds for reading sexual 
interest are unrealistically low because the benefits to men (when in doubt) of always inferring 
female sexual interest include the very occasional success in opportunistic sexual encounter, 
even though the costs of misperception are very often substantial.381  Men’s tendency to over-
read sexual opportunity results often enough in actual sexual encounters for the error to be 
adaptively selected for.382  Study suggests that women also experience an over-perception 
response to men’s attempts to seduce them: commitment skepticism protects women from the 
reproductive consequences of mistaken faith in an opportunist male’s declarations of sincere 
personal attachment.383  Women who carefully appraised and then secured a male mate’s 
emotional commitment would have borne and raised more children to reproductive maturity.384  
                                                          
378 Wilson et al (2003:676-677); Thompson (2009:368); Vandermassen (2011:741, 744-745). 
379 For a review of overperception hypotheses, see Koenig et al (2007:414-416).  For various overperception 
models, see Abbey (1982:830; 1987:173, 190-191); Shotland and Craig (1988:66); Greer and Buss (1994:186); 
Lalumière et al (1996:313); Haselton and Buss (2000:81); Buss (2001a:220-221; 2003:145); Haselton (2003:34-
35); Farris et al (2008b:61, 58); Perilloux (2014:119-123); Schmitt (2014:24). 
380 According to Farris et al (2008b:48, 56, 60), there is a very real relationship between men’s disposition to sexual 
coercion and cognitive deficits in perception generally in many men.  See also Greer and Buss (1994:199); 
Haselton and Buss (2000:82, 88-89); Perilloux (2014:120, 127-128).  On the general human bias to overperception 
and positive self-delusion in a variety of domains, see Hill (2007:118, 121); Haselton and Buss (2009:522); La 
France et al (2009:281); McKay and Dennett (2009:493); Stillman and Maner (2009:124); Vandello et al 
(2009:1209-1210); Johnson et al (2013:476-477). 
381 Buss (2003:145). 
382 Buss (2001a:221); Geher et al (2008:15). 
383 Haselton and Buss (2000:88); Buss (2001a:221; 2003:145; 2007:377; 2008:328); Geher et al (2008:15; 
2009:343, 345); Perilloux (2014:126). 




Overperception and skepticism lock women and men into a spiral of suspicion and reassurance, 
and have shaped the mating strategies of both sexes.385 
 
Concealed ovulation in human females is another form of strategic interference, and males 
correspondingly possess evolved mechanisms to detect peak fertility; women report greater 
interest in extra-pair sexual activity (or fantasy) around ovulation, and males engage in more 
vigilant, proprietary monitoring and counter-infidelity strategies in the days preceding 
ovulation: the suppression of physiological signals of ovulation in females almost certainly 
provoked an escalation in evolved capacities for deception and detection; males would become 
hypersensitive to the visible and olfactory cues of female fertility; male mate-guarding also 
increases under three conditions: when partners are young, fertile, and not already pregnant.386  
Deceiving existing mates about extra-pair sex partners is a highly effective strategy to maximize 
mating success for both sexes, but male desire for variety and quantity of sexual experience – 
whether concealed or not – is at odds with female strategy of awarding targeted sexual access 
to a few, discreetly chosen high-quality males; sexual coercion of primarily fertile-age female 
mates enables males to bypass the natural constraints placed on male reproductive ambitions 
by women seeking better-quality inseminators, but is one of the persistent causes of conflict 
between the genders.387  Although evolutionists disagree on explanations for why and how 
human women – uniquely – lost the external display and internal awareness of estrous, the 
strategic concealment of ovulation in females may be a response to males’ proprietary 
coercion.388  In Thornhill and Gangestad’s (2015:170-171) opinion, concealment of ovulation 
in females and mate-guarding by male pair-bond mates is the result of selection under 
antagonistic coevolution. 
 
                                                          
385 Geher et al (2008:15-16).  Males also regard their persistence in sexual suggestion as flattering to women, and 
are confused when women are offended by it; see Abbey (1987:191).  Men may view all interactions with women 
as sexualized to some degree, even in contexts that are clearly professional rather than social; see Abbey 
(1987:192); Haselton and Buss (2000); Farris et al (2008a:348; 2008b:50-51, 59). 
386 Thornhill and Gangestad (2003:349; 2008:319, 328). 
387 Lindstedt and Mokkonen (2014:1, 3).  Tooke and Camire (1991:345, 354, 359-361) observe that males’ active 
deceptive strategies of feigned kindness, commitment, sincerity, and resource acquisition ability are highly 
effective in securing copulations, whereas female manipulation of appearance is better classed as ‘passive 
deception’. 
388 On the evolutionary logic of partial or selective concealment of ovulation, see Symons (1979:139); Buss 
(1995:19); Welling and Puts (2014:245, 253); Chapman (2015:9); Thornhill and Gangestad (2015:149).  For a 
critical review of various evolutionary explanations of concealed ovulation, including Hrdy’s (1979:34; 1997:18) 
paternity confusion hypothesis, see also Wilson and Daly (1992:299). 
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Ovulation, in fact, is only selectively concealed, primarily from existing male partners, 
suggesting that the harvesting of good genes in the restrictive context of resource-driven pair-
bonding is the ultimate evolutionary cause of the so-called ‘loss’ of visible cues of ovulation; 
women exhibit a preference – through physical cues, vocal pitch, and provocative dress – while 
ovulating in a natural fertility cycle for handsome and strongly dimorphic men with masculine 
facial structure, facial symmetry, distinctive symmetrical-male smell, lower-pitched voices.389  
The preferences of ovulating women for masculine males outside of a long-term union suggest 
that good genes are the primary motivating interest for women most likely to conceive.390  
Women wish to attract the sexual interest of the best genetically-endowed males available, but 
avoid conceiving to less-endowed long-term mates during ovulation, so they tend to resist their 
present mate’s restricting behaviours, and refuse him sexual access.391  Selective concealment 
of ovulation in the human species is really an infidelity or cuckoldry mechanism enabling 
women to conceive offspring with the best genes, and then raise them in a safe, secure, and 
sufficiently-resourced home.392  Concealed ovulation and shifting or cyclic female preferences 
suggest that – like some other species – human females pursue a mixed strategy, seeking out 
good-genes and greater resources as well as competent co-parenting.393 
 
Almost every EP discussion of female infidelity employs language that privileges the male 
point of view – that female infidelity is a breaking of faith and a compromise of male well-
being – but genetic diversity is good for a species, including males, and so female infidelity 
should be referred to with a term acknowledging the benefit.  Although reproductively 
advantageous to women, female infidelity posed a real problem for males in developing human 
societies; androcentric laws and social attitudes aim to protect the property rights of the married 
male, but must necessarily deny the material and genetic benefits to women of multiple mating 
behaviour; even the possibility that a woman might be gestating a child sired by another man is 
sufficient social and legal reason in many cultures for a husband to terminate a marriage – and 
                                                          
389 Penton-Voak et al (1999:741); Gangestad et al (2002:975, 981); Koehler et al (2002:233); Roberts et al 
(2004:S270); Puts (2005:388); Feinberg et al (2006:215); Gangestad et al (2006:78); Little et al (2007:633); Miller 
et al (2007:375); Schwarz and Hassebrauck (2008:282); Bryant and Haselton (2009:12); Anderson et al 
(2010:804); Roney et al (2010:742); Haselton and Gildersleeve (2011:87). 
390 Penton-Voak and Perrett (2000:39); Gangestad et al (2006:78). 
391 Thornhill and Gangestad (2008:314; 2015:174); Welling and Puts (2014:248-249). 
392 Thornhill and Gangestad (2008:327-328; 2015:171); Starratt and Alesia (2014:203-204).  On the vexed question 
of whether ancestral women themselves were aware of their ovulatory status, see Bröder and Hohmann (2003:391); 
Welling and Puts (2014:244-245). 
393 Penton-Voak et al (1999:741-742). 
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sometimes the woman – but the converse is rarely true.394  The male drive to ensure paternity 
appears to influence almost every society’s attitudes to female sexuality: disapproval of female 
infidelity, marital rape of fertile-status women, and the strange social category of bastardy are 
all traditionally legally-sanctioned responses to the strategic evolution of concealment of 
ovulation by females; universally, males are expected to express rage at their discovery of a 
wife’s adultery, and legal systems have long held provocation by infidelity to murder to be 
equivalent to provocation to murder in response to physical assault on self or close kin.395  EPs 
disagree about the actual prevalence of infidelity in male and female humans, with wildly 
different rates.396  Nor do researchers agree on how infidelity affects rates of non-paternity for 
offspring even within stable relationships: some estimates place the rate of ‘cuckoo-babies’ as 
high as 30%, others as low as 3%, but the existence of male sexual jealousy indicates that the 
cuckoldry rate is not and never has been zero.397  Differences in parental investment are based 
in the inconvenient reality of internal fertilization in one sex only: women invest under 
conditions of 100% certainty in their genetic relationship to their children, but – barring 
absolute claustration – men are necessarily asked to believe they are fathers, and paternal 
certainty is always a matter of faith. 
 
There are distinct gender and age differences in the practice of infidelity, with men being more 
open to casual infidelities for themselves, not for their wives, while women turn to infidelity 
primarily to escape an unsatisfactory union.398  Ovulating women committing infidelity are also 
primarily seeking good genes from highly masculine males (and experience greater rates of 
orgasms with them), despite their preference for affairs and marriage with less aggressive, 
                                                          
394 The term ‘adultery’ clearly focalizes the dilution and diminishment of men’s paternal certainty within marriage; 
see Symons (1979:141); Campbell (2006a:72).  The benefit to women of short-term mating with multiple partners 
includes economic and material resources, good genes, opportunities for mate-upgrading, long-term goals, and 
emotional manipulation of current mates; see Greiling and Buss (2000:929); Buss (2008:195-196). 
395 Wilson and Daly (1998:203; 2004:208); Thornhill and Gangestad (2008:317). 
396 Thompson (1983:18); Hansen (1987:388); Buss (1989a:736); Bellis et al (2005:750); Stone et al (2005:270). 
397 Citing Bellis and Baker (1990) and (1995), Campbell (2002:44) argues that blood-tests prove a cuckoldry rate 
of 5-30%.  Geary (2010:158) nominates a 3-10% cuckoldry rate, with rates as high as 20% in lower socioeconomic 
and first-world settings.  Puts (2010163) suggests that – based on low 10% rates of non-paternity among some 
hunter-gatherers – early humans were relatively faithful, but ten percent is a relatively low number (given the 
typical infidelity rate of 50% among humans), unless you are aiming for a wife-infidelity rate of zero percent; see 
Symons (1979:306).  According to Symons (1979:244), male preference for female faithfulness is a human 
universal. 
398 Schmitt’s (2014:26) review of the literature contends that male rates of physical infidelity are consistently 
higher than female rates, across all cultures.  Wiederman (1997:173); Buss (2003:90); Stone et al (2005:269); 
Brand et al (2007:106-108); Schmitt (2014:22, 26). 
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slightly feminine-faced males.399  The decision to commit adultery – even for women – may 
also involve some degree of conscious or unconscious disinvestment in existing offspring.400  
Infidelity occurs for a variety of proximate reasons, but is ultimately an adaptive reproductive 
strategy for both sexes: in the ancestral environment, infidelity was always a successful strategy 
for men, while women frequently benefitted from covert extra-pair affairs.401  Both sexes are 
expert in concealing their infidelities, and the so-called ‘accidental discovery’ of an affair is 
often in fact an engineered, strategic revelation.402  Men’s perception of female infidelity – even 
in the absence of material evidence – is the primary cause of spousal homicide: the benefits for 
women of extramarital sex must therefore outweigh the possible costs, even of potential death.  
The advantages to women of infidelity (as a form of polyandry) include having a backup 
protector and provider during the absence (or in the death) of an existing mate through illness, 
injury, or intra-sexual violence; increasing a woman’s own social status and self-esteem; 
additional access to meat; access to especially healthy genes and genetic diversity as a hedge 
against environmental shifts; having the opportunity to trial-run and up-trade mates; greater 
fertility and more robust offspring; and producing sons of sexier males, who in turn would 
attract more mates: all of these enhance an individual women’s overall reproductive success.403  
Discovery of infidelity has significantly negative social and personal consequences for both 
sexes, however; discovery of infidelity often leads to thoughts of suicide or of murder, and 
eventual recovery from the discovery has been likened to experience of posttraumatic shock; 
few if any who have been betrayed in this way ever recover real trust in their infidelitous 
partner, and men and women are equally likely to inflict punishment upon discovery of sexual 
betrayal, and also to force their mates to withdraw from extra-marital sexual activity.404 
 
Gender Conflict, Antagonistic Coevolution, Patriarchy 
 
                                                          
399 Thornhill and Gangestad (2003:355, 359); Kruger (2006:460). 
400 Buss (2008:185); Wilson and Daly (1998:211-212); Tsapelas et al (2010:27). 
401 On the physical and psychological evidence for universality of sperm competition and extra-pair copulation as 
a very widespread female reproductive strategy, see Wilson and Daly (1992:29); Baker (1997:163); Buss 
(2000:18); Greiling and Buss (2000:962); Shackelford et al (2002b:125); Thornhill and Gangestad (2003:345-346, 
352, 358); Shackelford et al (2005a:377-378); Goetz et al (2008:486); Goetz and Shackelford (2009:452); Puts 
(2010:165); Paul and Kobach (2014:59-60); Welling and Puts (2014:248); Pham and Shackelford (2015:269). 
402 Brand et al (2007:103). 
403 Hrdy (1997:15; 2000:78); Wilson and Daly (1998:211-212); Buss (2000:19-20); Greiling and Buss (2000:929, 
954); McLain et al (2000:22); Buss (2003:87-88, 90-91, 213-214, 221); Gray and Anderson (2010:78); Tsapelas 
et al (2010:28-29). 
404 Jankowiak et al (2002:91, 98); Bellis et al (2005:752); Lusterman (2005:72); Buunk and Dijkstra (2006:111). 
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Human women are psychologically and physiologically adapted for extra-pair copulations 
because women and men do not share a prefect alignment of genetic interests; females and 
males are in a perpetual, sexually antagonistic, coevolutionary “arms-race” of gendered 
conflict.405  The arms-race of deception and detection is one of the most dynamic areas of gender 
conflict between the sexes: for example, men know women are seeking commitment in a mate 
and so their willingness to play up this intention is a logical male strategy.406 
 
Gender conflict exists at all stages of mating interaction between men and women: falling in 
love rarely occurs simultaneously (despite the stuff of story), and persuasion – sometimes 
unwelcome – is an inevitable element of romantic engagement; couples in love clash over when 
to initiate first intercourse and over subsequent frequency of sexual activity; long-mated pairs 
argue perpetually over distribution of marital resources between the partners and to close kin 
(including children and step-children); and few if any couples experience a simultaneous falling 
out of love, so that termination of a romantic relationship is almost always traumatic; once 
married, wives find that husbands spend too much time and resources outside of the family 
(because the men are seeking to maintain or increase their social status), while husbands 
consider their wives make unreasonable demands on their time and energy (which women 
generally seek as support for child-rearing): each view the other as selfish and self-centred.407  
The use of evolutionary psychology to explain gender conflict is better informed by 
understanding antagonistic coevolution; in general, escalating sexually antagonistic 
coevolution is the biological norm for all doubly-sexed reproductive behaviour.408  Williams 
                                                          
405 On the asymmetry of evolutionary interests and the inevitable arms-race conflict between optimum adaptations 
in the two sexes across species, see Trivers (1972:174); Smuts (1995:5-6); Cashdan (1998:144); Borgerhoff 
Mulder (2000:404); Campbell (2002:35); Gangestad et al (2002:981); Gangestad (2003:224); Thornhill and 
Gangestad (2003:363-364; 2008:306, 314); Haselton et al (2005:3); Buss (2006b:73; 2008:322); Haselton and 
Miller (2006:64-65); Goetz and Shackelford (2009:449-450, 453); Härdling and Karlsson (2009); Klasios (2014:7-
8).  For a review of the literature on sexual conflict, see also Goetz and Shackelford (2009:454); Buss and Schmitt 
(2011:769-770); Shackelford et al (2012:3); Thornhill and Gangestad (2015:163-164).  On Parker’s (1979, 2006) 
sexual conflict theory as the great challenge to traditional views of gendered adaptations and manipulations in 
evolutionary biology, see Buss and Duntley (2011:412). 
406 On the escalating coevolution of females’ desire for commitment and males’ feigning of commitment, see 
Haselton et al (2005:19); Buss and Duntley (2011:412). 
407 Betzig (1986:6); Dobash et al (1992:84); Käär et al (1998:139-140, 148-149); Jokela et al (2010:911); Buss 
(2002:23; 2003:150-151); Buss and Duntley (2011:412). 
408 Arnqvist and Rowe’s (2005) Sexual Conflict is an accessible and exemplary entry-level work on antagonistic 
coevolution; see Brooks (2005:294).  On the inevitability of sexual conflict at all levels of biology, see Gavrilets 
et al (2001:531); Hosken and Stockley (2005:R535); Andersson and Simmons (2006:298); Chapman (2006:R744).  
On EPs’ understanding of sexually antagonistic coevolution, see Gavrilets et al (2001:531); Buss (2007:377); 
Shackelford et al (2012:11); Thornhill and Gangestad (2015:174).  For examples of antagonistically coevolved 
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(1966a:184) first mentions an evolutionary battle of the sexes, yet evolutionary science long 
viewed reproduction as a necessarily co-operative endeavour, and sexually antagonistic 
coevolution remains peripheral to most analyses of gender interactions, including that of 
evolutionary psychologists: although Trivers (1972) and Dawkins (1976) did address the issue 
of sexual conflict, it was Parker (1979, 2006) who first gave central attention to the topic of 
conflict between the evolutionary interests of the two sexes.409  Recent discussion in the field 
suggests that it is not so much the ubiquity of sexual conflict that requires explanation, but the 
successful coexistence of two separate sexes at all.410  In species with two sexes, sexually 
antagonistic coevolution is inevitable because both sexes cannot achieve their respective 
optimum reproductive outcomes except at the expense of the opposite sex; coevolution never 
truly resolves reproductive conflict, and, despite the utility of compromise between the sexes, 
the evolutionary arms race never achieves a dynamic of stable equilibria.411  Bluntly stated, 
humans are selected for effective genetic reproduction rather than domestic harmony.412 
 
The co-evolutionary arms-race between men and women has much in common with the endless 
battle between speed and pursuit between predator and prey.413  Furthermore, the so-called 
‘complementarity’ of the sexes is a pleasant fiction, because in the natural world there is 
significant lifetime disadvantage in being born female, carrying the major load of reproduction 
                                                          
arms race adaptations in males and females – many of which are coincidentally lethal (almost always for females) 
– see Gavrilets et al (2001:532); Gangestad (2003:225-226; 2007:324-325); Gage (2004:R378); Hosken and 
Stockley (2005:R535-R536); Lessells (2006:305); Chapman (2015:2).  On the collateral costs to females and 
offspring of male traits evolved to maximize male success, see Packer and Pusey (1983:719); Van Schaik and 
Janson (2000); Van Schaik et al (2004:149); Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:45, 49-50, 53, 107); Hosken and Stockley 
(2005:R535); Balme and Hunter (2013:791); Chapman (2015:1-2, 10).  On feminist discussion of antagonistic 
coevolution which draws attention to aspects of female life often simply ignored, see Hrdy (1997:23); Bird 
(1999:72-73); Borgerhoff Mulder and Rauch (2009:202). 
409 Tregenza et al (2006:229); Chapman (2015:1). 
410 Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:2, 7, 226); Chapman (2006:R744); Tregenza et al (2006:230). 
411 Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:16); Haselton et al (2005:3, 17); Thornhill and Gangestad (2008:291, 293).  On 
antagonistic coevolution and evolutionary equilibrium; see Hosken et al (2001:489).  On the compromise of 
reproductive interests in formalized human mating systems – marriage – see Gray and Anderson (2010:75); cf. 
Low (2007:456-457), who observes that marriage is universally pre-geared to male advantage.  On anisogamy as 
the ultimate cause of sexual conflict, see Gage (2004:R378); Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:7); Chapman (2006:R744; 
2015:1); Lessells (2006:307); Wedell et al (2006:999); Borgerhoff Mulder and Rauch (2009:204, 211); Fromhage 
and Jennions (2016:1). 
412 Symons (1979:123-127); Buss (2003:13, 152); Buss and Duntley (2011:418). 
413 Buss and Duntley (2011:412).  On antagonistic sexual coevolution – and thus gender conflict – as the leading 
evolutionary force in rapid speciation and thus genetic diversity in species, see Chapman et al (2003:46); Hosken 
and Stockley (2005:R536); Tregenza et al (2006:233). 
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as well as being subject to sometimes lethal male sexual persistence.414  Males of all species 
have a range of adaptations which exploit the captive commitment of the gestating sex – females 
– to their greater investment in offspring.415  Males frequently establish reproductive advantage 
by ensuring they engender as many offspring as possible upon each of their females, whereas 
females are seeking to maximize quality of offspring over quantity.416  Male and patrilineal 
pressures on wives to produce multiple offspring beyond their natural carrying capacity result 
in earlier death for women, who in patriarchal contexts are easily replaced.417  Female resistance 
strategies to male adaptations can include favouring preferred males, while avoiding or actively 
resisting others.418  Another female strategy for coping with persistent male sexual harassment 
is voluntary polygyny; females in many mammal species prefer to be part of a large harem – 
despite the dilution of resources and paternal investment this entails – as they will be protected 
from sexual harassment and sometimes coincidental death by persistent but non-dominant 
males.419  Although dominant harem-owning males themselves pose a significant risk to 
females, many of the male traits that decrease female fitness – social dominance and sexual 
aggressiveness, for example – are the same traits that females actively seek out, leading to a 
competitive escalation in male aggressive behaviour.420  The gender mismatch of evolved 
human reproductive strategies is obvious in traditional cultures, but remains integral – to some 
degree – in all human cultures.421  The ethnographic record provides a wealth of evidence for 
the wholesale exclusion of women from the centre of culture, and the stringent control of 
                                                          
414 On the non-complementarity of the sexes’ reproductive adaptations, see Lancaster (1991:2); Moore et al 
(2001:520); Chapman et al (2003:41).  On the unresolvable arms-race of sexual conflict between males and 
females, see Buss (2003:167); Thornhill and Gangestad (2003:348-349); Haselton et al (2005:3-4).  On males’ 
mating-persistence as a form of sexual harassment which can inflict severe costs on females, see Gavrilets et al 
(2001:535); Gage (2004:R378); Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:48, 56, 77); Darden and Watts (2012:186).  On the 
potential lethality of monogamy for females, see Holland and Rice (1999); Rice (1992; 1996); Chapman et al 
(2003:44; 2015:5).  On genomic imprinting in the tug-of-war between maternal and paternal genes as the fetus 
attempts to harvest as many resources as possible from the maternal environment, see Campbell (2013:179-180). 
415 On intra- and inter-locus conflict, see Chapman et al (2003:42-43; 2015:5); Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:10); 
Rowe and Day (2006:277); Borgerhoff Mulder and Rauch (2009:203); Goetz and Shackelford (2009:450). 
416 Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:96); Huber et al (2010:582). 
417 Sear et al (2003:38-39); Borgerhoff Mulder and Rauch (2009:208); Chapman (2015:12). 
418 Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:47). 
419 Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:57-58). 
420 According to Lessells (2006:306, 311), males rarely inflict lethal damage upon the mothers of their own 
offspring. 
421 Cf. Hannagan (2008:469), who notes that among hunter-gatherer groups, females exercise considerably more 
control over their own reproductive goals; in her view, civilization actively disadvantages women.  Chapman 
(2015:16-17) suggests that reproductive exploitation in humans is a universal male disposition, however. 
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women by men, who fear female sexual power and fertility.422  Control of female reproductive 
capacity is without question a cultural universal, and males have long been permitted to kill 
their women for infidelity, even in contexts of little to no evidence.423  In the endless round of 
antagonistic coevolution the successful social restriction of women represents the absolute 
triumph of male reproductive advantage, but male success also has serious and negative 
consequences for women and children struggling to survive in a world geared to adult male 
demands.424 
 
Evolutionists view political, social, and personal forms of patriarchal oppression as the 
proximate cultural expression of ultimate male reproductive goals; patriarchy is the political 
expression of male social dominance over women but the roots of men’s attempts to control 
women lie firmly in the antagonism intrinsic to all species with two sexes.425  Patriarchy is also 
universally motivated by males’ greater need to establish social dominance over other men, and 
the institutionalization of female subjugation is incidental to this: male pursuit of power for 
paternity opportunities has negative consequences for all lower-status males as well as for 
females, who by definition can never gain – in the eyes of men – the same status as publically 
esteemed males.426  Feminists who are also evolutionists make connections between proximate 
behaviours and ultimate causation in their analyses of patriarchy.427  Evolutionists – including 
                                                          
422 Rodseth and Novak (2009:301).  According to Rodseth and Novak (2009:303), inter-sexual hostilities in 
traditional cultures provides public evidence of a man’s prioritization of his male alliances over marital relations. 
423 Puts (2010:167). 
424 Gowaty (1992:235); Hrdy (1997:1-2, 24, 26).  Ultimately, females must accept whichever cultural strategy that 
permits the survival of at least some of their children; see Arnqvist and Rowe (2005:35, 79); Borgerhoff Mulder 
and Rauch (2009:201).  Part of this strategy involves the selection of mates able to protect and supply a mate and 
offspring; see Buss and Duntley (1999:219; 2011:412); Buss (2003:212, 214); Vandermassen (2005:188).  In 
Hrdy’s (1997:27-29) view, when human patrilines compete to monopolize material resources, females are left with 
no alternatives but to support the prevailing patriarchal regime, and power becomes exponentially concentrated in 
the leading male lineages with each generation.  See also Buss (1989b); Buss and Duntley (1999:219); Smuts 
(1995:18); Campbell (2006a:72). 
425 On the origins of patriarchy in the transition to sedentary agriculture and the transmission of men’s property – 
including female humans – to legitimate male children, see Lerner (1986:212-213, 217); Lancaster (1991:7-8).  
While Hrdy (1997:5) agrees with Lerner (1986) that patriarchy precedes the historic period, she believes 
patriarchy’s ancient origin lie further back than the Neolithic, in the pre-hominid era, as males began to control 
the material resources essential to reproduction. 
426 Okami and Shackelford (2001:189); Aarssen (2007:1770). 
427 For feminist evolutionists’ attempts to correct scholarly male bias and mistake in evolutionary analysis of 
gender conflict, see Smuts (1995); Gowaty (1992); Wilson and Mesnick (1997); and Vandermassen (2010).  See 
also Fedigan (1986); Gowaty (2003a, 2003b); Fehr (2012); Fisher et al (2013); Meredith (2013); Hamblin (2014).  
For discussion, see Buss and Schmitt (2011:779). 
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women, and feminists – also conclude that women as well as men perpetuate patriarchy.428  
Hrdy (1997), for example, identifies the origins of modern patriarchy in the behaviour of 
primates and prehominids.429  In her (1997:13, 22-23, 25) view, hominid female sexual 
assertiveness and male violence as a response to this is under-examined in evolutionist 
discussion; just as primate males seek to enforce paternity through testis size, competitive 
sperm, exclusion of rivals, and the guarding of females, so human males cooperatively police 
female behaviour through confinement, supervision and gossip, subversion of female 
compliance, and socio-legal constructs such as inheritance custom and laws.430  Hrdy (2000) 
also challenges traditional assumptions about the relationship of ancestral polygyny and 
patrilocality, with the development of patriarchy; in her opinion, patrilocality and polygyny are 
not inflexible outcomes of human evolution, but are associated with the rise of post-Neolithic 
agriculture and pastoralism.431  Campbell’s (1999) analysis of female competition, evolution, 
and patriarchy agrees that anthropologists have too easily accepted the patrilocal model of 
human patriarchy, assuming the compliant dispersal of wives away from natal kin.432  Campbell 
(1999) also challenges the myth of the subordinate, pacifist human female – which does not 
accord with evolutionary reality – contending that refusal to acknowledge the existence of 
female violence assists in the perpetuation of male control through a reputation for physical 
superiority.433  Gowaty (1992) points out that males are not indiscriminately proprietary; their 
                                                          
428 Low (1989); Buss (1996); Lopreato and Crippen (1999); Campbell (2002); Vandermassen (2005:184-185, 188-
189). 
429 In Smuts’ (1995:1-3) view, an evolutionary background helps explains how culturally sophisticated and 
elaborated patriarchy arose from a relatively simple form of primate gender conflict, predating the rise of the 
present human species. 
430 Smuts (1995:6-7) agrees with most other evolutionists (and feminists) that sexual coercion in a variety of 
primate species (including humans) has two aims: to increase mating opportunities for the aggressor, and to 
dissuade the female from pursuing mating with other males, but primate females evolved distinct strategies to 
resist aggressive vigilance and control by larger, stronger males, including female coalition with other females, 
and female friendships with other, lower-ranking males. 
431 For example, Hrdy (2000:88-89) contends that chimpanzee females who remain at their residence of genetic 
relatedness enjoy higher rates of reproductive success, and the daughters of dominant females are only forced to 
emigrate in resource-poor environments. 
432 Campbell’s (2002:242, 246-247) analysis of the factors predicting the so-called ‘transition to patriarchy’ 
follows and expands upon Gowaty (1997a, b) and Smuts (1995), and observes that female dispersal among 
primates is a prime predictor of male tactical success in controlling females.  Official marital residence also 
determines women’s experience of reproduction and family life; on the effects of patrilocal, matrilocal, and flexible 
marital residence, see Wilson and Daly (1995:114); Rodseth and Wrangham (2004:392-393); Yanca and Low 
(2004:9, 20); Hrdy (2005:300, 305-306); Low (2007:456). 
433 Campbell (1999:214). 
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interest in control of female sexuality is highly selective and focussed primarily on high mate-
quality females belonging to them.434 
 
Smuts (1995) agrees that women do not experience patriarchal oppression to an equal degree: 
in her view, humans share many evolved strategies and counter-strategies with other primates, 
and – like some primates – human females have historically exchanged their first choice of 
promiscuity for pair-bonding, despite the high costs to themselves of male protection from other 
males, in this model, sexually exclusive marriage is the foundational institution of human 
patriarchy: males respect each other’s rights to particular females, and in return gain the right 
to coerce their own females at will; domestication also restricts female movement, making it 
easier for males to monitor their mates, and increasing female dependence on male-distributed 
resources.435  Smuts (1995:12ff) argues that the human species exhibits a high degree of gender 
inequity for a number of reasons: reduced kin support for females through patrilocality; male-
male alliances directed against female resistance; male control of essential resources; increased 
variance in male wealth and power, and a corresponding vulnerability of females to particular 
males; female complicity to perpetuate patriarchal inequity; and the enhancement of linguistic 
ability across genders, which enables males to institutionalize their control through customary 
and religious ideologies of male dominance and superiority.436  Low’s (2005) discussion of the 
ecological and demographic constraints upon women similarly contends that although conflict 
between the sexes is biologically inevitable, marriage systems which restrict female choice to 
one man only invite infidelity, and the historic slide of sedentary humans into serial, socially 
imposed monogamy only functions best for both sexes when they are able to exercise the option 
to extra-pair sexual activity.437 
 
                                                          
434 Gowaty (1992:244). 
435 Smuts (1992:11).  She (1995:18) follows Buss’s (1989, 1994) view that women willingly comply with a variety 
of self-restrictions and mutilations to enhance paternity certainty because males control essential resources.  On 
women’s self-claustrating behaviours – including debilitating beautification practices – as reassurance to males 
that females are willing to sacrifice personal freedoms in exchange for continued access to resources, see Gowaty 
(1992:242). 
436 Smuts (1995:12ff).  Smuts (1995:11, 18-19, 22) concludes that patriarchy – founded in the desire of males to 
control female fertility, and the normalization of violence to achieve this control – arose through several 
mechanisms: female dispersal and the fracture of female-female alliance; strengthening of male-male alliance; 
increasing control of resources by men; increasing hierarchical and repressive social networks among men; and 
the support of patriarchy by women themselves. 
437 Low (2005:68-69, 71, 75, 80).  Cf. Geary (2010:270-271), who contends that feminism itself is an evolved 
female counter-strategy, a behavioural complex developed to disable institutional male control of female sexuality. 
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Klytaimestra’s tragic life-time experience is depicted across a variety of ancient texts and 
clearly demonstrates the evolved motivations and behaviours discussed in this chapter: mating 
strategies, parental investment and disinvestment, marriage and domestic arrangements, and 
coevolved gender antagonism.  Modern responses to her character and to her immediate family 
are determined by our contemporary values concerning right and appropriate relationships 
between spouses, parents and children, and reproductive family and political state.  In the 
ancient world, institutionalized patriarchy was the normal and desirable social arrangement; 
Klytaimestra is a species-typical woman in an extreme androcentric environment.  Perceptions 
of her as an iconic battler against battering may suit modern political sensibilities but cannot be 
presumed to reflect the intentions and interpretations of actual fifth-century male poets, 
tragedians, and audiences, who all benefitted from institutionalized male reproductive 
advantage.  The increasingly sympathetic representation of the mother bereft of daughter, 
dignity, and life is better explained by the late fifth-century war-weariness of Euripides, who 
owed much of his popularity to his skilled depiction of women generally, and of women as 
unpredictably dangerous agents in a hostile, patriarchal environment specifically.  As the 
following chapters will show, Klytaimestra in archaic poetry was initially the seduced (and 
seductive) tool of revenge in an intra-sexual male competition for power; in classical poetry she 
represents the importance in monogamous society of the wife and mother, and how such a 
woman might respond to the ambitious (male) warmongery which threatens the continuance of 
family and the stability of organized human life. 
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CHAPTER II: THE ARCHAIC KLYTAIMESTRA 
 
This chapter illustrates the underlying contribution of biology to narrative theme and 
characterization, through exploring the ways in which men and women are typically portrayed 
in archaic-era literature, and in which Klytaimestra and her family are depicted specifically.  
While ancient Greece may be understood as a culture which enshrined male reproductive 
advantage in many of its customs, stories, and laws, there was considerable anxiety in fictional 
narratives over female compliance with male expectations.  Mythological narratives foreground 
the dangers of infidelity to paternity certainty, and the conflict that wives face in balancing 
loyalties to blood-kin with new attachments to a husband and his oikos.  The following section 
explores the relative importance of reproductive biology to theme and characterization in 
popular archaic works leading up to Aiskhylos’ Oresteia, exploring the influence of these works 
on later fictional representations of Klytaimestra’s life-history.1  Attention is increasingly given 
in archaic-period fiction to Klytaimestra as the villainous murderer of her husband just as the 
legally-recognized wife was becoming more important as the reproductive vessel for men’s re-
creation of the recently-invented legal (and exclusively male) citizen.  By the time of the 
Oresteia, the dangers of female sexuality for paternal certainty and legitimate offspring are 
resolved through the designation of women as a necessary but potentially destructive means to 
human – androcentric – civilization.  Ancient stories frequently attribute unacceptable but 
persistent behaviour to a family curse working itself out through a moral offender’s 
descendants.  While this offers an early explanation for inheritable, sociopathic disposition, in 
the case of Klytaimestra and Agamemnon and their troubled family, what has been inherited 
by their respective lineages is clearly differentiated by gendered mating strategy: the bad 
behaviour of the daughters of Tyndareos is almost exclusively seeking sexual partners outside 
of their formalized marriages, while the sons of Tantalid steal each other’s wives, seize each 
other’s thrones, and murder closely-related children – including their own children.  
Descriptions of women and the feminine in many archaic works explain Klytaimestra’s 
persistent characterization in literature as an exemplar of female ‘evil’; the ‘accursed’ 
Klytaimestra is exceptional in that, in addition to infidelity, she seeks to defend her reproductive 
rights – against overwhelming cultural odds – and succeeds in eliminating one of the males who 
poses a persistent threat to her offspring. 
                                                          
1 On the influence of the Epic Cycle, Homeric and Hesiodic narrative on Aiskhylean tragedy, see Lloyd-Jones 




The Accursed Klytaimestra 
 
The so-called ‘crimes’ of women against men in ancient narrative can be explained by 
evolutionary psychology’s findings about women’s typical strategic interference with optimum 
male reproductive behaviours; Klytaimestra’s responses to her husband’s bad behaviour are 
predictable in the context of gender-conflict as a manifestation of coevolved antagonism, but 
are culturally extraordinary in the sense that androcentric Greek culture massively privileged 
male reproductive advantage.  The story of Klytaimestra’s dysfunctional family in fifth-century 
tragedy responds in a range of previous archaic narratives to consistent aspects of her life-story: 
the murder of Agamemnon by his wife and her lover; the return of Klytaimestra and 
Agamemnon’s child Orestes, with his male cousin Pylades as companion; and the revenge-
killing of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos.  Homer’s earlier epic – a pervasive influence on later 
works – introduces the Atreid household to audiences; his poems idealize men as loyal to allies 
in battle, and as rightful controllers of their household; the ideal wife in his work is chaste, 
dwelling quietly inside the home, guarding her husband’s possessions, and producing his heirs, 
while bad wives disrupt men’s households.2  Klytaimestra in the Homeric Iliad and Odyssey is 
depicted generically as the sexually treacherous, cunning wife pitted against her husband, the 
returning war-hero.  Critics debate whether Agamemnon’s faults are outweighed by his heroic 
‘magnificence’; some conclude that critics too often forgive his ‘disagreeable’ nature.3  Yet 
Agamemnon’s murder and Orestes’ heroic vengeance against Aigisthos and Klytaimestra are 
repeatedly alluded to in the Odyssey in order to provoke Telemakhos to proper manly 
behaviour.4  Although the poem never directly refers to the manner of Klytaimestra’s death, 
Nestor’s cautionary tale of Klytaimestra’s initial resistance to seduction suggests that Penelope 
will yield to infidelity, because it is assumed that all women lack self-control; it is implied that 
an adulterous Penelope would suffer her cousin Klytaimestra’s fate: matricide. 
 
                                                          
2 On Homer’s ideal paradigm of masculinity, see Zeitlin (1996:29-30); Graziosi and Haubold (2003:60, 68-71, 
74).  On ideal women in epic, see Easterling (1988:15); Seaford (1994:12); Graziosi and Haubold (2003:75); Foley 
(2005:105-106, 111, 116-118). 
3 On the war-hero’s “disagreeable” actions redeemed by “magnificence”, see Lloyd-Jones (1962:195).  
Agamemnon’s willingness to slay unborn children is more than disagreeable.  On Homer’s Agamemnon as utterly 
repellent, a failure as a leader and as undermining all notions of nobility, see Gantz (1966:582, 664); Garner 
(1990:173); Taplin (1990:62, 65, 67, 71, 78-81); Greenberg (1993:194, 198, 203); Castleden (2005:247). 
4 References to the Oresteia story occur in the Odyssey at 1.32-47, 298-300; 3.193-198, 232-235, 248-275, 303-
310; 4.90-92, 517-537, 11.385-456, 13.383-384, 24.19-22, 96-97, 191-202. 
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Nevertheless, the early books of the Odyssey foreground the schemes of Agamemnon’s 
ambitious cousin – Aigisthos son of Thyestes – as primary regicide; according to Nestor, only 
Aigisthos’ charming seduction of Klytaimestra transformed the honest-natured wife into an 
adulterous co-conspirator (Od. 3.262-272), ignoring Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his and 
Klytaimestra’s eldest child (in Homer’s Iliad, her name is Iphianassa, in later tragedy, the 
murdered daughter is called Iphigeneia).  This Klytaimestra appears to bear her husband no 
resentment for her daughter’s sacrifice.  Aigisthos’ corruption of the originally ‘honest’ (Od. 
3.266) wife into a woman who ruins the reputation of all women thereafter (Od. 24.201-202), 
making the murder of Agamemnon by Aigisthos the cause of Orestes’ urge to revenge (Od. 
1.29-30, 35-40, 46-47, 296-302; 3.232-235).5  Yet a little later Telemakhos obscures the fact 
that Agamemnon was easily killed by describing Aigisthos as ‘cowardly and inferior’ (Od. 
3.248-252), while Nestor’s praise to Telemakhos of the ‘avenging’ Orestes ignores the bloody 
death of a woman at the hands of her own son (Od. 3.301-312).6  The Odyssey is not interested 
in how Orestes committed matricide, or even why Aigisthos and Klytaimestra respectively had 
individual cause to kill Agamemnon, but becomes more and more interested in the outrageous 
crimes of Klytaimestra while she was alive; Agamemnon’s death in the traditional Atreid 
narrative begins as the murder of one powerful Tantalid by another, but now the focus becomes 
a wife’s sexual betrayal of her husband. 
 
Accepting this new focus, some critics read the Odyssey as contrasting bad wife Klytaimestra 
and good wife Penelope, juxtaposing good and bad marriage; Odysseus declares that nothing is 
better than a harmonious household, in which the successful partnership of a man and his wife 
confound their enemies and delight their friends (Od. 6.182-185).7  Nevertheless, the real 
climax of the tale is not the restoration of household harmony, but of manly honour through the 
bloody destruction of sexual rivals and cruel punishment of his sexually insubordinate slaves; 
Aristotle (Poet. 34 55b18-23) summary of the Odyssey is cursory, but identifies one man’s 
struggle to secure his household wealth: there is no mention of Penelope or any other woman 
at all.  The inharmonious marriage of Klytaimestra and Agamemnon is one to dismay friends 
                                                          
5 According to some, the Odyssey actually argues for Klytaimestra’s innocence because the plot was Aigisthos’, 
and her complicity was also part of the gods’ plan.  See Wolfe (2009:694); Roisman and Luschnig (2011:8).  Note 
the early confirmation (Od. 1. 36) by Zeus – the all-knowing judge of men – that Aigisthos was the murderer of 
Agamemnon. 
6 The Odyssey also ignores the failure of Menelaos to avenge his brother’s murder.  Menelaos is careful to deflect 
blame for his brother’s death onto others (Od. 4.90-93). 
7 Wohl (1993:19); Zeitlin (1996:20); Edmunds (1997:423); Felson and Slatkin (2004:92, 103-104, 113). 
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and delight enemies; however, it is Klytaimestra’s reputation which will to be forever tarnished, 
beginning in the Odyssey with the hostile testimony of the embittered ghost of Agamemnon 
(Od. 11.409-453).  Klytaimestra is to be the wickedest woman ever, Agamemnon insists; her 
evil is so powerful as to infect all women yet to be born, even those who are good (Od. 11.427-
434).  Immediately after the ghostly Agamemnon’s attribution of Klytaimestra’s evil nature to 
all females, Odysseus suggests that all of the seed of Atreus is in fact afflicted by the schemes 
of women because the Atreids bear the hatred of Zeus (Od. 11.436-438); Agamemnon (Od. 
11.451-453) immediately begins to attribute to Klytaimestra alone the treacherous murder, 
redirecting blame away from Aigisthos.  By the end of the poem he gives witness that 
Klytaimestra was the primary killer, and his cousin and enemy Aigisthos the secondary 
conspirator (Od. 24.96-97).8  Others – including gods – have always told a different story about 
who is responsible for Agamemnon’s death: Aigisthos.9  In Book 11 it was Aigisthos who 
deceived Agamemnon, feasting him and slaughtering him like an ox, but ultimately he is side-
lined and disappears completely; Klytaimestra’s singular culpability is now fully established 
(Od. 24.199-202).  In the shade-world of Hades the slain suitor Amphimedon relates to 
Agamemnon all that has occurred since Odysseus’ visit to the underworld (24.121-190); 
Agamemnon then delivers an address – ostensibly to Odysseus, far away in the world of the 
living (although there is no suggestion Odysseus can hear this) – praising the virtues of the good 
Penelope, whose immortal fame the gods will honour with song; Klytaimestra will suffer a song 
of hatred for murdering her husband, however, and all women will share her reputation (Od. 
24.192-202).  No logical reason is ever given as to why all women should not share the 
reputation of the poem’s good woman Penelope, whose personal virtue is at least as great as 
Klytaimestra’s evil.10 
 
Homer’s extant works have strongly influenced critical appraisals of Klytaimestra, but other 
literary representation of the Trojan War characters seem to reference works from the Epic 
Cycle – now lost – more often than Homer’s poems do.11  The story of Klytaimestra is 
                                                          
8 On the transferral of guilt to Klytaimestra through the Odyssey as excusing later misogyny toward women 
generally, see Wohl (1993:36); Felson-Rubin (1994:100, 106). 
9 See 1.29, 35-39 (Zeus); 3.196-198, 3.263-275, 3.309-310 (Nestor); 4.90-92; 4.529-535 (Menelaos); and 3.235 
(Athena, who identifies Klytaimestra’s role in the plot, if not actual murder).  Even Agamemnon assigns principal 
blame for the actual murder to Aigisthos (Od. 11.409-412). 
10 Thouk. (2.45) describes the desirability of social invisibility for women. 
11 The Epic Cycle includes Titanomachy, Oedipodia, Thebais, Epigoni, Alcmaeonis, Kypria, Iliad, Aithiopis, Little 




mentioned in Proklos’ extant summary of the eleven-book Kypria, which helps to reconstruct 
the natures of the protagonists in the Atreid family conflict.12  According to Proklos, 
Agamemnon was irrationally infatuated with Briseis – which angered Akhilleus – as a 
mechanism of Zeus’s intentional obstruction of the Greek cause in the Trojan War; 
Agamemnon was also unwise in boasting that he is a better archer than Artemis, causing 
Artemis to demand the sacrifice of Agamemnon’s daughter, Iphigeneia; through the lie of an 
arranged marriage to Akhilleus Agamemnon brought the girl to Aulis, but Artemis set a deer in 
her place as sacrificial victim, and sent Iphigeneia to Tauris (Kypria 43-50).13  Proklos’ 
summary of the Kypria never mentions the feelings of either Iphigeneia (or her mother 
Klytaimestra) or the pathos of the sacrifice;14 rather, it makes it clear – as does Hesiod’s 
Catalogue of Women (fr. 19, 17-18) – that the intended sacrifice of Iphigeneia was not the act 
of Agamemnon alone (as in tragedy or Hesiod), but of the Akhaians.  Proklos rounds off the 
family saga by observing that at the time of Agamemnon’s death, Orestes was still a child, and 
so Menelaos by default was the obligatory Atreid avenger; Menelaos’ failure to avenge his 
brother thus compelled Orestes to become his own mother’s killer.  The lost epics of the Cycle 
clearly pick up on many details omitted in Homeric works: Agamemnon is an unappealing 
figure in this summary, while Klytaimestra – and her lover Aigisthos – are entirely absent. 
 
Following archaic epic, Klytaimestra appears in Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and Days, 
which makes human women members of a baneful tribe created to be a grievance for men, 
instruments of Zeus’s revenge upon the human-friendly Prometheus; in the Hesiodic Catalogue 
of Women, the adulterous Klytaimestra (and her sisters) are simply tools of Aphrodite’s 
vengeance upon their father Tyndareos.15  Critics differ on whether Hesiod’s invention of the 
‘tribe of women, an evil for men’ is evidence of deliberate misogyny, however.16  Hesiod is 
                                                          
12 Burgess (1996:80-81, 87; 2002:234-237; 2005:345-346).  The Kypria was attributed to either Stasinos of Cyprus, 
or a Kyprias of Halikarnassos; the identity of Proklos is also in doubt, as a number of ancient scholars shared that 
name; see Burgess (1996:81n19). 
13 On the Kypria as we have it, see Griffin (1990:141); Burgess (1996:82); Castleden (2005:244). 
14 Lubeck (1993:27).  Klytaimestra appears in the epitome of the Nostoi, where she shares the killing of her husband 
with Aigisthos; see Gantz (1966:667). 
15 Critical discussion of negative depiction of women in archaic works often centres on Hesiod’s Theogony and 
Works and Days, but the lost epics and Hesiod’s Catalogue of Women were very influential on later tragedy and 
lyric; see Most (2006:lxv). 
16 For the debate on Hesiod’s profound and exceptional misogyny, and its perpetuation in Western culture to the 
modern day, see Brenk (1972); Marquardt (1982:283, 288n9); Sussman (1984:64-65, 79); DuBois (1992:108, 
113); Zeitlin (1995b:51); Aguirre Castro (2005:23).  On the mythological message about Pandora’s influence upon 
men’s experience of life, see McLaughlin (1981); Marquardt (1982:291); DuBois (1992:103, 112); Zarecki 
(2007:27-29).  On Pandora as an artefact and tool of deception (WD 67-68), see Zeitlin (1995b:68-70).  On 
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clearly preoccupied in WD and Catalogue with the threat of female reproductive capacity to 
paternal power and patrilineality, in both divine and mortal realms.17  His depiction of conflict 
among gods and humans demonstrates the collision of strategic interests in a doubly-sexed 
species: in Theogony, Gaia is the reproductively autonomous parent of her son (and future 
husband) Ouranos (Theog. 126-127), and then of the great sea Pontos, again without male input 
(Theog. 131-132); once reproductive endeavour in the divine lineage becomes heterosexual, the 
first great gender-conflict is the agōn between the earth-mother and the male who desires to 
control her reproductive capacity.18  Gaia enlists her sons’ support against her husband who, 
after siring a vast number of offspring upon her, will not permit these children independent 
maturity; however, there is no suggestion that the first mother might ally with her daughters, 
perhaps because Ouranos’ daughters have no interest in replacing the father as chief 
inseminators of any available females.  Gaia reveals to her sons the sickle of grey adamant, 
telling them that their father is ἀτάσθαλος, ‘reckless, presumptuous, wicked’ (Theog. 164), 
because he has worked κακὴν λώβην, ‘an evil outrage’ (Theog. 166); in his desire to interfere 
with their emergence into the world he is πρότερος γὰρ ἀεικέα μήσατο ἔργα, ‘the first to have 
in mind shameful deeds’ (Theog. 163-166).  The first great wrong in the world may be the 
male’s interference with his female mate’s reproductive success: the second evil (Theog. 160) 
is the female’s attempt to resist her male mate’s control. 
 
Hesiod’s primeval conflict sets the pattern for subsequent male-female antagonism in Greek 
myth: a cunning female disempowers the ruling male, leaving the way open for her preferred 
favourite to replace him.  This leads some to argue that the gods’ constrain the “procreative 
power” of the female deities because this threatens the stability of male rule; but the real issue 
is that the reproductive maturity of a son benefits the mother’s genotype, whereas immortal, 
reproductively active husbands who sequester the majority of breeding-age females deny their 
sons’ reproductive opportunity.19  Gaia’s son Kronos is enthusiastic about his mother’s plan to 
                                                          
Hesiod’s dehumanization of Pandora through denial of her reproductive ability, see Sussman (1984:89); Loraux 
(1993, 2000). 
17 Rose (1992:126).  On the Catalogue’s enshrinement of certain patrilines for political purposes, see Rose 
(1992:97); Aguirre (1998: 462, 467); Aguirre Castro (2005:20, 20n8); Most (2006:xx, xxx). 
18 The often unnoticed but striking structural feature of the narrative is the separation of the two divine lineages of 
Chasm (Chaos) and Earth (Gaia), and the lack of intermarriage between them.  On the heterosexualization of the 
gods, see Sussman (1978:61, 73); Marquardt (1982:284); Most (2006:xxxi). 
19 See Clay (2005:31), for example.  Cf. Sussman (1978:62), a mainstream classicist writing before the 
development of an evolutionary literary perspective, who argues that the male gods who try to prevent the birth of 
their own children do not do so out of conscious antagonism against the female, but in fear of their male offspring’s 
natural and predictable desire for maturity and power. 
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castrate the oppressor Ouranos (Theog. 173-182), but as soon as he is enthroned, this son also 
suppresses female reproductive capacity, raping his sister Rhea (Theog. 453), and cannibalizing 
Rhea’s new-born infants, to pre-emptively neutralize a son’s threat to paternal power (Theog. 
463-465).  Mother Rhea repeats the pattern of female insubordination through superior thinking 
– this time enlisting the support of her parents – in undermining her husband’s control of her 
fertility (Theog. 459-474).  Young son Zeus, liberated from paternal repression through 
maternal cunning, grows to maturity; he liberates and enlists the support of his uncles, 
previously bound by their brother Kronos (Theog. 501-506).  Zeus gains the upper hand in the 
cosmic gender conflict by appropriating female cunning: after securing his throne, he consumes 
Metis the goddess of intelligence, derailing the prophesy of Earth and Sky that Zeus will one 
day be replaced by a son sired upon her.  Before settling into official marriage with his royal 
sister Hera, Zeus proceeds to engender as many children as possible on many other goddesses 
(Theog. 886-920).  The last lines of Hesiod’s Theogony bring to a close the origins of the 
immortals, and introduce the seemingly endless descent-lines of mortals (Theog. 1019-1022).20 
 
Hesiod’s Works and Days picks up after the fall of flawed humankind: the Trojan heroes 
destroyed through warfare (WD 156-168) were the fourth race created by Zeus: Klytaimestra 
and her kin belong to this lost era, immediately prior to Hesiod’s own time.  Hesiod contrasts 
the ‘hard-working’ husband’s virtues with the wife’s natural vices of indolence and 
talkativeness (WD 174-175).  The WD is also obsessive about the dangers of women’s insatiable 
and unconstrained hunger for food, for sex, and for procreation (WD 694-705); for instance, 
Hesiod fears the over-sexed wife, because, left to their own desires, women drain male energy 
through wanting too much sex (WD 586), exposing their husband to premature old-age due to 
sexual heat (WD 694-705).  In fact, there is good evidence that women universally consistently 
supply the family with more calories, and contribute more to the maintenance of the family and 
the household generally; in regard to sexual appetite, female partners of males also desire much 
less sex than males, while husbands (and husbands’ families) are much more likely to pressure 
women to bear additional offspring.21  The later depictions of Klytaimestra return to this over-
                                                          
20 The opening of the now fragmentary Catalogue of Women (1.1-5), repeats almost exactly the last words of 
Theogony, (1019-1022).  On the dating and authorship of the Hesiodic Catalogue, and its status as a direct sequel 
to the Theogony, see Janko (1982:86-87, 198); West (1985a:1-2, 127-128, 136-137); Aguirre Castro (2005:24-25); 
Hunter (2005:1-2); Osborne (2005:16); Most (2006:lv). 
21 On women’s greater contribution cross-culturally to household management and the production of calories, see 
Chapter 1, pp. 28; 46-47; 46n212; 47n216; 49n230; 65-66; 65n332; 65n333; 66n334; 66n336.  On women’s 
comparatively massive contribution to the production of offspring (with subsequent danger of maternal depletion, 
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sexed wife motif, making Klytaimestra’s unconquerable lust for Aigisthos – in the absence of 
her husband – the real reason for her treachery.  Hesiod’s energy-draining, gluttonous females 
contrast with Homer’s beautiful, skilled women busily increasing their aristocratic husband’s 
wealth; yet neither Hesiod nor Semonides ever mention the hardship to women of childbearing 
and rearing in a subsistence economy.  Hesiod’s advice (WD 403-407) on how to stave off 
famine suggests that lack of food was an ongoing reality in his time, making the worst kind of 
wife is the one who ambushes her husband’s dinner: this would hardly be surprising if she is 
pregnant or lactating during famine (WD 694-705). 
 
One male child is all that is required of the fertile female (WD 375),22 as long as women increase 
the man’s house by producing offspring of appropriate paternity; Hesiod’s fable for princes 
(WD 225-247) insists that the just man is rewarded with a child who resembles him, while the 
punishment of the unjust is female infertility.  Hesiod’s representation of women as necessary 
but costly – even dangerous – vessels for the production of men’s heirs is echoed in some of 
the fifth-century tragedies that follow him, suggesting that Homer’s ideal of harmonious 
marriage between like-minded men and women has somehow broken down, while Hesiod’s 
anxieties in WD about paternity certainty are certainly not specific to archaic Greece.23 
 
The Catalogue of Women – generally attributed to Hesiod, but now only extant in fragments – 
was very well-known to ancient readership, especially to later mythographers.24  The telos of 
the Catalogue is the formulaic founding of the genealogy of rulers, the Trojan War, and the end 
of the Heroic Age, and this poem has little to say about the mundanities of household matters.25  
Such genealogical mythologies are frequently viewed by traditional peoples as indisputable, 
                                                          
see Chapter 1, pp. 46; 46n207; 46n209; 46n210.  On the universality of a normally greater sexual drive in males – 
compared with females – see Chapter 1, pp. 22-23; 23n49; 24n53; 25; 25n61.  On patrilineal pressures on women 
to produce greater numbers of offspring (usually more sons), see Chapter 1, pp. 49n230; 81.  On women’s 
uncontrollable and excessive hunger for food, sex, and society, see also Semonides (Poem 7: 84-94). 
22 On the ambivalence of ancient Greeks (in male-authored sources, at least) to the burden of potentially 
disappointing offspring, see Zeitlin (1995b:52); cf. the chorus of Euripides’ Medeia, who definitely have strong 
opinions on the obvious pros and cons of parental investment (Med. 1081-1115). 
23 On the importance of infant facial resemblance to the father to infant survival, see discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 
51-52; 51n246; 51n247.  On lenient attitudes toward concubinage and illegitimacy in the archaic period and less 
emphasis on adultery and female sexuality in Homeric epic than in later tragedy, see Foley (1981:150). 
24 Cohen (1986, 1989); Fowler (1998:2); Most (2006:lxv-lxvi).  On the Bibliothēkē’s use of the Catalogue as 
primary source, see Most (2006:li).  On Merkelbach and West’s (1967) orthodox ordering of the Catalogue’s 
fragments, see Fowler (1998:2); Osborne (2005:5). 
25 On the CW as genealogy, see West (1985a: 8-9, 11, 27); Rose (1992:97-98); Fowler (1998:1, 3-4, 18); Hunter 
(2005:3); Irwin (2005:39, 60); Scodel (2005b:181); Doherty (2008:73). 
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sacred truth, but often distort the real process of procreation, obscuring the common reality of 
lineage extinction in favour of present political requirements.  Women are frequently described 
in CW as θαλερήν, from θάλλω, ‘blooming, fresh youth’: the obvious implication is blooming 
nubility, in common with real-world male human standards of female attractiveness, and the 
Catalogue’s real, persistent plot is male desire for females’ physical beauty, beginning with 
Pandora and ending with Helen.26  The CW outlines through many generations the desirability 
of named women, how they are impregnated by particular men, and the subsequent birth of 
offspring.  In the Hesiodic Catalogue, female fertility is no unwelcome drain on resources but 
results in the creation of heroes, and great families; the adulterous siring of some women’s 
children by gods (rather than husbands) simply serves to establish and elevate particular 
descent-lines.  While some scholars contend that the Catalogue reveres female ancestors and 
female fertility, these female protagonists are defined solely by their fertility potential, and its 
successful capture; all of the apparently strong and independent females of the Catalogue – 
Mestra (Cat. fr. 69-71) and Atalanta (frs. 47-51), for example – are properly subdued through 
marriage by the end of their episode, emphasized by the frequent reflexes of the verb δαμάζω 
‘overpower, break in, make subject to a husband’.27  This narrative pattern highlights the finding 
that marriage universally is the exchange between males of proprietary rights to a female’s 
fertility: the narrative episodes of the CW demonstrate the need to domesticate women because 
contemporary sixth-century Greeks were intensely worried about whether a married woman’s 
first allegiance belonged to the husband or to the father.  Fifth-century democratic Athenian 
citizenship laws insisted that all married women still belonged to their natal families, because 
the daughter as epikleros might be reclaimed to produce an heir to her patrilineal oikos.28  The 
production of a husband’s child mitigated this problem, supporting the cross-cultural view of 
marriage as an institution validated through the creation of offspring.29 
 
                                                          
26 Cf. Osborne (2005:5, 21).  On male criteria for female beauty based on physical indicators of youth as a proxy 
for peak fertility, see Chapter 1, pp. 30-31; 38-41; 39n160; 39n164; 39n165; 39n166. 
27 For discussion, see McLeod (1991:13); Ormand (2004:303, 313-314, 325, 332-333); Aguirre Castro (2005:22-
23); Clay (2005:26-27); Irwin (2005:49); Osborne (2005:13, 19); Doherty (2008:73). 
28 On the epikleros, see Patterson (1998:65); Ormand (2004:329-330, 334, 334n87); Foxhall (2005).  See also 
Isaeus (On the Estate of Pyrrhus) 3.64.  Fifth-century tragedies such as Aiskhylos’ Suppliants and Sophokles’ 
Elektra and Antigone foreground the problem of divided female loyalties.  Euripides’ Medeia demonstrates the 
potential outcome when women abandon natal family and foolishly transfer their loyalty to a husband. 
29 On traditional marriage as a legal transaction (or purchase of fertility) between a woman’s father and husband 
with the production of the husband’s heir as the true fulfilment of that contract, see Chapter 1, pp. 48; 60-63; 
60n304; 62n313; 68. 
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The Catalogue introduces the reader very early to the three beautiful Tyndarides (the daughters 
of Tyndareos) – Timandra, ‘cow-eyed’ Klytaimestra, and Phylonoe, as beautiful as the 
goddesses (Cat. fr. 19) – and only later turns to the descent of their Atreid husbands, 
Agamemnon and Menelaos.  Klytaimestra is married to Agamemnon on account of her beauty; 
their children are Iphimede, Elektra, and Orestes (Cat. fr. 19).  The matrilineal descent of 
Klytaimestra runs back through the famous Leda (Cat. fr. 19), to grandmother Demodike, who 
once rejected the largest number of marriage offers ever known (Cat. fr. 18-19).  In the CW 
Iphimede is the Tyndarid who is sacrificed but saved and made immortal by Artemis; Orestes, 
on reaching puberty, takes vengeance on his own mother as his father’s murderer (Cat. fr. 19).  
Klytaimestra’s father is cited elsewhere as the pitiable sire of three unfaithful daughters 
(Bibliothēkē 3.10.7), but the Catalogue shows that their unfaithfulness is Aphrodite’s 
punishment upon their father for forgetting her honours (Cat. frs. 19, 247).30 
 
These accursed Tyndarides are described by Hesiod in CW as ideal wives and mothers, the 
better, perhaps, to emphasize the inhumane cruelty of Aphrodite’s subsequent vengeance.31  
Timandra, the fertile wife of Echemos, bears him a son, Laodokos (Cat. 19, Paus. 8.44.1); 
Helen, like her ancestress Demodike, is a prize sought by many suitors, who come themselves 
or send agents, and offer rich gifts (precious metal objects, livestock, and skilled female slaves) 
for her hand in marriage (Cat. 154a, b, c, d, e-155); she bears her husband ἄελπτον ‘beyond 
hope’, a female child, Hermione (Cat. 155).32  The Catalogue’s Klytaimestra is as beautiful and 
desirable as every other famous ancestress; she is also a fertile wife, bearing two daughters (the 
sacrificed daughter is here called Iphimede), and one son to her husband Agamemnon (Cat. fr. 
19).  Elektra, who will figure so importantly in tragedy, also appears here for the first time in 
literature (Cat. fr. 19), but does not yet play a part in the killing of Klytaimestra.33  All three 
daughters of Tyndareos exemplify the fears of men over wifely insubordination – they commit 
                                                          
30 Demodike’s father is Agenor (Cat. fr. 10), also the ancestor of the Atreid lineage.  Demodike’s ancestress Kalyke 
is the daughter of Aeolus (Cat. fr. 10), the grandson (through Hellen, Cat. frs. 5, 9) of either Deukalion (Cat. fr. 
4), the son of Pandora and Prometheus (Cat. fr. 3), and the first male progenitor of the Greeks, or of Zeus, the king 
of gods (fr. 5).  Tyndareos’ genealogy, if it appeared in the Catalogue (which seems likely), has not survived; other 
sources, such as Apollodoros’ Bibliothēkē fill the gaps in the Tyndarid lineage.  On the Tyndarides as instruments 
of Aphrodite’s curse upon a man, see Osborne (2005:20); Stesikhoros PMG 223. 
31 Brothers Tyndareos and Ikarios produce the worst and best wives in the mythic tradition: Klytaimestra and 
Penelope; see West (1985a:157). 
32 According to one scholion on Euripides’ Elektra, Hesiod’s Helen also bears a son – Nikostratos – to Ares (Cat. 
248). 
33 There is no sign in the Catalogue of Sophokles’ compliant Khrysothemis, or any of the four daughters of 
Agamemnon found in Homer (Il. 9.144-147). 
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adultery and abandon their husbands – but only Klytaimestra adds mariticide to infidelity, and 
only her infidelity is distinguished as immoral through the description of it as παρέλεκτο; 
nevertheless, being afflicted by Aphrodite’s curse is the only reason offered in this work for her 
coming to lie down beside Aigisthos (Cat. 247).34  The Catalogue specifically attributes 
Iphimede’s death to the Akhaians – not to her father Agamemnon – and answers the apparent 
problem of Iphigeneia’s death – suggesting that there might have been earlier questions about 
this – by insisting that the slaughter happened by the will of Artemis, and that Agamemnon’s 
slain daughter is now Hekate, immortal goddess (Cat. fr. 19, 20a, b). 
 
Klytaimestra’s heritage is relatively unburdened by self-destructive tendencies, but the 
Catalogue reminds its audience that kin-killing is rife among the Atreid clan (Cat. fr. 133).  The 
descent-line of Atreid Agamemnon begins with Aeolus’ daughter, Kalyke, whose descendant 
Porthaon sires three daughters upon Laothoe: Eurythemiste and Stratonike and Sterope (Cat. 
fr. 23).  Sterope’s granddaughter Hippodameia marries Pelops and produces sons Atreus and 
Thyestes, and three daughters; Lysidike, Nikippe, and Astydamea (Cat. fr. 133).35  The CW 
points out that ἀρήϊος ‘warlike’ Atreid Menelaos does not woo Helen himself, relying on the 
more persuasive influence of his brother Agamemnon (Cat. frs. 154, 155).36  The threat to 
Agamemnon’s personal reputation as a successful marriage-maker on behalf of his brother may 
explain why he is so personally offended by the unilateral dissolution of Menelaos’ marriage 
by the absconding Tyndarid Helen. 
 
This is also the unhappy family tree of the unhappy Tantalid Aigisthos – cousin to the 
magnificent Agamemnon, just as evil Klytaimestra is cousin to the circumspect Penelope; 
Atlas’ daughter Sterope was the mother of Oinomaos by Ares, the contentious god of war; 
Oinomaos then fathered Hippodameia, who betrayed her father for love, and married Tantalid 
Pelops, paternal grandfather to the Atreids and Thyestids.  Hippodameia’s husband Pelops was 
                                                          
34 According to Irwin (2005), παραλέγω, ‘to pluck superfluous hair, to lie beside’ is usually applied to contexts of 
passionate or secret sex, and deception.  Instances of this verb may also be found at Il. 2.515, 6.198, 14.237, 16.185, 
20.224; 24.676; Od. 11.242; HHAph. 167; Hes. Theog. 278.  One of these (Il. 14.237) refers to Hera’s plan to 
seduce her husband. 
35 The Catalogue makes Pleisthenes – the son of Atreus and Aerope – and Kleolla the parents of Agamemnon, 
Menelaos, and Anaxibia: the children are raised by their grandfather Atreus only because of Pleisthenes’ early 
death (Cat. 137b).  Cf. Cat. fr. 138, which makes Aerope the wife of Pleisthenes, and mother to Agamemnon and 
Menelaos. 
36 Despite his dubious reputation in tragedy for bravery, Atreid Menelaos is twice described in this work as ἀρήϊος 
‘warlike’ (Cat. 155). 
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fathered by the child-murdering Tantalos, who persistently offended many gods by exploiting 
and abusing his privileged relationship with them; Hippodameia and Pelops created Thyestes, 
who mounted the bed of his brother Atreus, and later impiously sired – upon his own daughter 
– the adulterous and kin-killing Aigisthos.  Brothers Thyestes and Atreus competed for the rule 
of the kingdom, and Atreus forced his brother to unwittingly eat his own children.  Thyestes’ 
son Aigisthos triumphed over Atreus’ son Agamemnon and took the throne; Agamemnon’s son 
Orestes later retook that throne, and is said to have slain Aigisthos’ son Aletes.  The Catalogue’s 
extant fragments demonstrate that the whole Tantalid genealogy is riddled with intra-familial 
disputes in a manner not attested in the Tyndarid line: fights over women; theft of other men’s 
wives; competition for power between brothers; conflict between kin; and habitual offence 
against the gods.  Other works show that these crimes provoke many curses upon and within 
the Tantalid family, yet it is the one curse of infidelity borne by the innocent daughters of 
Tyndareos which receives marked notice in Hesiod: the manifold sins and ensuing curses of the 
kin-killing Tantalids receive no mention whatsoever.  Hesiod’s CW may appear to be kinder to 
its female protagonists, but the author’s (and perhaps the audience’s) anxieties about female 
fidelity are the same as those of Theogony and WD: nothing – even slaughter of existing 
children, and forcing the gods to consume human flesh – outweighs the catastrophe of 
illegitimate offspring, making husbands into cuckolds. 
 
These two accursed households also feature in celebratory archaic epinikia by Xanthos, 
Stesikhoros, Simonides, Semonides, and, most notably, Pindar, contemporary with the 
continued performance of Homeric epic and Hesiodic poetry: these lyric poems strongly 
influence depictions of Klytaimestra and her family in fifth-century tragedy.37  Xanthos, 
according to Aelian (Varia Historia 4.26:fr.2P), wrote an Oresteia, and introduced for the first 
time the idea of Elektra’s unwilling virginity (e-lektra, ‘bed-less’); before Agamemnon’s death, 
it seems, she had simply been called Laodike.38  According to Athenaios’ account (Deip. 513A: 
fr. 1P), Stesikhoros of Himera subsequently borrowed from Xanthos in his Oresteia.39  
Stesikhoros’ lost two-book Oresteia is thought to be much more influential (especially on 
Simonides, Pindar, and the later Aiskhylos); in comparison with Homer, Stesikhoros highlights 
                                                          
37 On the influence of archaic epinikia upon later literary forms, including tragedy, see Bowra (1964:197); Podlecki 
(1984:251-252); Nagy (1990:385, 404-405, 409-410, 433; 2007:22-23); Race (1997:31); (Segal 1998:2-3); Kurke 
(2000:60, 85-87); Greenwood (2006:313). 
38 See Baldry (1971:111); Garvie (1986:xvii); Campbell (1989:5, 42); Bakogianni (2011:19).  Homer refers to 
Agamemnon’s daughter Laodike (Il. 9.145), and her sisters Khrysothemis and Iphianassa. 
39 Garvie (1986:xvii); Ewans (2000b:xxvii-xxviii). 
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the moral wrongdoing of Klytaimestra, and he increases the prominence of her children in the 
events.40  His version is also thought to depict Aigisthos’ threat of violence toward Orestes, 
who – as in the later tragedies – is spirited away on the same day as Agamemnon’s murder.41  
Stesikhoros’ Oresteia may be the first work to make Klytaimestra the sole killer of 
Agamemnon, and the Erinyes make their first known appearance here (PMG 217).42  While 
Stesikhoros did not invent the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (first seen in the Catalogue and the 
Kypria), his Oresteia seems to agree with their version: Iphigeneia is saved and then 
immortalized by Artemis.43  Stesikhoros’ retelling of the story does not address how 
Aphrodite’s curse caused the infidelity of the three Tyndarides. 
 
At some point after the production of Stesikhoros’ Oresteia, Simonides of Keos (sch. E. Or. 46 
[fr. 44P]; P. Oxy. 2434 fr. 1 a [fr. 103P]) turned to the story; his work – now lost – is thought 
to follow Stesikhoros in some details, as does Pindar’s later work.44  While Semonides of 
Amorgos did not produce an Oresteia, his Poem 7, On Women does allude to another errant 
Tyndarid, Klytaimestra’s sister Helen; this satirical poem has undoubtedly contributed to the 
tradition of Western misogyny, perhaps even as much as Hesiod’s Pandora-narrative.  In this 
work Semonides begins by agreeing the women are different from men, because the gods made 
them that way; he then likens women to a number of animals in character and behaviour, almost 
always in a denigrating manner.45  According to Semonides, women are lazy, greedy, and 
unkempt to the point of ugliness, defiant, demanding, meddlesome, untameable, shrewd, 
deceptive, and sexually repulsive.46  The redeeming (and only) good qualities of Semonides’ 
bee-woman (84-94) – industry and submissive fertility – are atypical, and rarely found; 
Semonides undercuts his praise of her, warning his audience that even the good wife exploits 
her husband’s approval and trust all the better to betray him, so that his neighbours laugh at him 
(111-114).  Like Hesiod, Semonides positions women as instruments of Zeus, insatiable for 
food and sex, and work-shy, created to be a bane for men; marriage is the ‘greatest pain of all’, 
                                                          
40 Prag (1985:74, 76); Garvie (1986:xviii); Scodel (2005b:184).  The Stesikhoros fragment concerning 
Klytaimestra’s dream featuring the snake with blood-stained crest, and the king, a son of Pleisthenes clearly 
precedes Aiskhylos’ later scene in Khoephoroi, discussed below. 
41 Pontani (2007:210). 
42 Arthur (1984:49).  According to Graf (1993:157) it was from Hesiod’s Catalogue that Stesikhoros took the 
depiction of Klytaimestra as primary murderer of Agamemnon. 
43 Gantz (1966:582-84). 
44 Garvie (1986:xxiv); Podlecki (1987:3). 
45 Lloyd-Jones (1975).  On the similarities between Semonides’ and Hesiod’s hypersexualized women as banes 
for men, see Osborne (2005:22-23). 
46 Cf. Hesiod’s juxtaposition of the naturally virtuous husband with the wife’s natural vices (WD 174-175). 
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and ‘Helen’s War’ – the culmination of the woes which women inflict upon men – led to the 
death of many (118-122).  Semonides’ poem highlights the dangerous evil of all women, 
whereas epinician poems – a genre primarily celebrating male success in cultural and sporting 
competition – is little interested in Klytaimestra’s moral offences; nevertheless, she makes a 
small but significance appearance in two of Pindar’s epinikia. 
 
Pindar lived and composed well into the century of Athenian tragedy, and is considered the 
most accomplished of many archaic (and classical) lyric poets.47  Incidental textual survival 
makes Pindar’s lyric the most accessible to analysis.  The idealization of excellence as an 
inherited virtue is one of the central aims of the Pindaric odes, and inherited excellence in the 
Pindaric ode is demonstrated in an individual’s strength, courage, and good looks, as well as 
moral qualities, and noble character.48  Transmission of excellence through the patriline from 
father to son demands rigid control of female sexuality and fertility to ensure paternal certainty, 
and Pindar’s depiction of Klytaimestra in the Pythian 11 highlights the dangers of adultery.49  
His epinikion for Thrasydaios of Thebes, dated at either 474 or 454 BCE, makes a somewhat 
tenuous connection between the place where Thrasydaios gained a victory – Kirrha at Phokis – 
and Pylades of Phokis, who had once hosted Orestes (Pyth. 11.12-16); the ode then lurches into 
Orestes’ family history (12-16), and the exploits of Klytaimestra, from whose ‘heavy hands’ 
the infant Orestes is rescued (17-18).50 
 
Pindar’s Pythian 11 is not especially kind to Klytaimestra, but this ode is no kinder to her 
husband Agamemnon.  The latter part of an epinikion sometimes offers a reflective moral 
commentary that resonates with the ode’s focal myth; here it muses on the value of moderation, 
humility, and good reputation, in contrast to the arrogance of the excessively wealthy and 
powerful (51-58).  Agamemnon is not specifically identified, but the ode earlier refers to 
Atreus’ heroic and ambitious son, who stole from the Trojans their opulent treasures (29-34); 
                                                          
47 On Pindar’s excellence, see Podlecki (1984:208); Race (1997:2); Kurke (2000:82); Sharrock and Ash (2002:44).  
Gerber (1997:253) gives Pindar’s likely birth as 522/518 BCE, making him at least a contemporary of Aiskhylos.  
Our earliest datable Pindaric ode is the Pythian 10, from 498 BCE. 
48 On the themes of Pindaric ode, see Bowra (1964:316); Podlecki (1984:238-239); Walsh (1984:45-46); Rose 
(1992:150-151, 160-161); Sharrock and Ash (2002:46-47). 
49 On female sexuality in early Greek literature sexuality as a potentially uncontrollable magical force, and 
stringent patriarchal control as the only solution, see Bowra (1964:279, 287); Podlecki (1984:213); Segal (1986:52, 
165, 170; 1998:107); Race (1997:19); Greenwood (2006:315). 
50 On the dating of this ode, see Race (1997:366).  Garvie (1986) prefers a pre-Oresteia (Aiskhylos’ version) date 
of 474 BCE for Pythian 11, as does Bakogianni (2011). 
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he burned their houses and caused the death of the Trojan prophetess (Kassandra) – even though 
it is Klytaimestra who dealt the death-stroke (19-21).  Most importantly, Pindar raises the 
question of the treacherous Klytaimestra’s motivation (22-25): was it the death of Iphigeneia?  
Or was it Klytaimestra’s seduction by another man?  Pindar slyly implies it could have been 
both; while Homer refers only to Klytaimestra’s funeral and the feast given her by Orestes, 
Pindar does not deny by omission the death of Iphigeneia, nor does he refrain from describing 
Orestes’ slaughter of his mother (37). 
 
We cannot know exactly how Klytaimestra’s killing of Kassandra and Agamemnon played out 
in the original Kypria – which influenced so many later works – but Pindar’s eleventh Pythian 
may be the first extant work to associate Iphigeneia’s sacrificial death with Klytaimestra’s 
sexual treachery, and the first to position the mother as a distinct danger to the son and the 
primary murderer of her husband.51  While the blame is shared between Klytaimestra and 
Aigisthos in some pre-Aiskhylean fragments, Pythian 11 seems to follow Stesikhoros in 
centralizing Klytaimestra’s desire for vengeance and her guilt for the act so that some scholars 
conclude that Pindar’s lyric poem in turn directly inspired and informed Aiskhylos’ 
characterization of the tragic Klytaimestra, whose hand alone wields the blade that slew Atreid 
Agamemnon.52 
 
This section illustrated the increasing narrative interest in Klytaimestra as a greater danger to 
her husband’s lineage than his traditional enemy Aigisthos.  The ancient struggle between the 
two patrilineages of Atreids and Thyestids for control of the kingdom becomes less important 
than the possibility that the husband Agamemnon is being cuckolded in his absence; 
Klytaimestra’s illicit sexual relationship with his political rival replaces her grief for her 
expeditiously slain child as reason for hatred of Agamemnon and her culpability for her 
husband’s murder is magnified. 
 
The next section on the three tragedies of Aiskhylos now known as the Oresteia explores the 
way in which both Klytaimestra and Agamemnon are redrawn in the fifth-century context: the 
                                                          
51 Pindar’s Agamemnon and Orestes are as heroic as they are in Homer’s telling; see Gantz (1966:672); Robbins 
(1986:4). 
52 Prag (1985:77-78); Lesky (1966a:256); Garvie (1986:xxv); Wolfe (2009:697-698); Bakogianni (2011:20).  Cf. 
Prag (1985:79, 86), who maintains that iconographic evidence demonstrates that Klytaimestra’s centrality in 
Agamemnon’s murder was not the innovation of either Pindar or Stesikhoros; rather, Aiskhylos’ tragedy made the 
definitive change in the depiction of Klytaimestra and her experience. 
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greedy, belligerent general of earlier narratives becomes the beloved father and master of the 
household, and the originally well-behaved guardian of the house seduced by her husband’s 
political rival is now a strong, fully focussed enemy of the Atreid patriline.  This change in 
characterization leads some to contend that the Oresteia becomes the most important source for 
the depiction of Klytaimestra in all later literature.53  The treacherous Aigisthos of earlier epic 
becomes a sword-shy accessory to the fact of Agamemnon’s assassination.  Klytaimestra’s 
avenging children attract a lot of audience sympathy; their allegiance is conspicuously and 
absolutely to their male parent; her own speeches throughout Aiskhylos’ trilogy tend to be 
interpreted according to critics’ liking or dislike of her.  Any possibility of children supporting 
the mother against the reproductively oppressive father is now just ancient mythological fancy, 
and the narrative systematically eliminates all the motive force of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice through 
ignoring it once the mother’s vengeance is accomplished.  References made by many of the 
characters – including Klytaimestra – to reproductive aspects of human life indicate how much 
of a threat the female power of fertility can be to male rule in a patriarchal world, and how 
central women’s potential misuse of this power was to their social being. 
 
Aiskhylos: The Oresteia 
 
Aiskhylos was born into a late archaic-era aristocratic family, probably around 525/524 BCE.54  
Ancient lists of victories at the City Dionysia demonstrate the supreme excellence of Aiskhylos 
as playwright, and the enormous contemporary popularity of his work; the Oresteia – his final 
production and the pinnacle of his creative success – won first prize in 458 BCE.55  According 
to Aiskhylos’ self-composed epitaph, however, the most important facts of his life are his 
citizenship of Athens, his patrilineal descent, his participation as a soldier in the battle of 
Marathon, and his fame – among his enemies – as an intimidating adversary; there is no mention 
whatsoever of his success as playwright.56  Aiskhylos’ hope for eternal glory as a warrior – not 
                                                          
53 Goldhill (1992:51); Rutherford (2012:307). 
54 Cf. Lattimore (1953:1-2), who argues that the later date of 513/ 512 BCE is more probable.  Aiskhylos famously 
died in 456 BCE visiting Gela, Sicily.  Sommerstein (1996:16-17); Sommerstein (2002:33); Storey and Allan 
(2005:93).  Cf. also the Marmor Parium (FGrH. 239, ep. 48).  On Aiskhylos’ aristocratic background, see Storey 
and Allan (2005:93). 
55 On Aiskhylos’ numerous Dionysia victories, see Sommerstein (1996:20-21; 2002:33-34; 2008:ix); Saïd 
(2005:218); Storey and Allan (2005:93).  On the supreme dramatic excellence of the Oresteia see Norwood 
(1948:102); Gagarin (1976:57); Trypanis (1981:143); Macleod (1982:144); Lesky (1983b:70); Goldhill (1986:5); 
Sommerstein (1996:65); Zeitlin (1965:463; 1996:12, 87, 119; 2005:199); Anderson (2005:213). 
56 Aiskhylos fought at Marathon 490, and at Salamis and Plataia in 480/479; see Lattimore (1953:1); Spatz 
(1982:1); Sommerstein (1996:24, 2002:33); Storey and Allan (2005:93). 
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as playwright – is important for understanding his depiction of war and warriors in the 
Oresteia.57  Critical attitudes toward the playwright’s warmongering generally influence 
interpretations of Klytaimestra as a woman who challenges her husband’s commitment to 
military victory at all costs.58 
 
Many scholars from the nineteen-seventies on began to view gender dynamics and conflict as 
the primary concern of the Oresteia.59  Marriage is the bloodiest ground of gender-conflict in 
many Aiskhylean tragedies; the Oresteia and the Danaïdes both address the problem for (male) 
civilization of women who refuse to submit to husbands.60  Some believe that the Oresteia 
resolves the irreconcilable collision of women and men through the divine endorsement of 
patriarchal marriage.61  Husband-murder becomes an evil equivalent to the murder of a father, 
and both of these crimes outweigh the sin of matricide, and the mother-murderer Orestes 
becomes the idealized defender of gender hierarchy.62  Others argue that the trilogy’s central 
problem is family conflict and that conflict between oikos and polis is the focus of the trilogy, 
leading to the family problem of female sexuality in the political context of male citizenship; 
in modern social-conflict theory, family issues are inseparable from gender issues.63  The 
Athenians enjoyed the agōn of court-room debate, and many of the Klytaimestra-tragedies 
demonstrate the ambience of a legal trial; it is no surprise that a cultural love of competition 
and conflict in the legal context imbues the arguments of the main characters in the Oresteia 
corpus, and this thesis reads them in this mode. 
 
                                                          
57 On pro-militaristic imperialism in Aiskhylos’ works, see Blundell (1989:13); Schaps (1993:515); Zelenak 
(1998:61).  On Aiskhylos as anti-militarist and critic of overt nationalism, see Lattimore (1954:3); Gagarin 
(1976:93); Rosenmeyer (1982:171); Sommerstein (1996:424); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:14). 
58 On changing interpretations of Aiskhylos’ intentions and political shifts in modern critics, see Bowie (1993:10-
11); Goldhill (1986); MacEwen (1990a:11). 
59 On the Oresteia’s concern with gender relations, see Beye (1975:322); Gagarin (1976:88); Fagles and Stanford 
(1977:87); Carne-Ross (1981:53-54); Winnington-Ingram (1983a:84, 1983b:101); Konishi (1990:13); Zeitlin 
(1990:103-104, 1996:123); Goldhill (1992:37, 42); Sommerstein (1996:255-256); Zelenak (1998:47); Foley 
(2001:203); Harris and Platzner (2008:10); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:116); Sommerstein (2008:xi). 
60 On female rejection of marriage in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia (and Danaïdes) see Garner (1990:131); Zeitlin 
(1996:91).  For further discussion of gender matters in Aiskhylos’ Danaïdes trilogy, see Burian (1974:9); Spatz 
(1982:73); Winnington-Ingram (1983b:70); Herington (1986:98); Ewans (1996:1); Zeitlin (1996:123); Zelenak 
(1998:47); Storey and Allan (2005:245). 
61 Garner (1990:37, 40, 46, 100); Zeitlin (1996:123-124); Bakogianni (2011:4). 
62 Burnett (1998:103). 
63 Goldhill (1986:153, 249; 1992:51); Conacher (1987:5); Blondell et al (1999a:49); Collard (2002:xlii). 
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Not all female characters are in conflict with all male characters, but gendered family conflict 
is foregrounded in the Oresteia through the juxtaposition of particular character types.  The 
hyper-sexualized Klytaimestra’s transgression of a traditional femininity is enhanced by the 
uncertainty of Aigisthos’ masculinity; any man mated to an overtly sexual, dominant woman is 
viewed with scorn (and not only in an ancient, overtly androcentric context) but Klytaimestra 
and Aigisthos in the Khoephoroi (The Libation-Bearers) may be the only romantic couple in 
the Oresteia – in any tragedy, perhaps – who live together without discord.64  The Oresteia 
differs from epic tradition in making the unnaturally autonomous Klytaimestra (almost) 
exclusively responsible for her husband’s death, and – where pre-tragic representations of the 
murder make Orestes enact his revenge firstly on Aigisthos, the primary murderer of his father 
– in Aiskhylos’ trilogy Klytaimestra’s murder is now the central climax.65  The elevation of 
Klytaimestra as chief homicide side-lines Aigisthos as Agamemnon’s personal and political 
ekthros, but Aigisthos makes it clear that he is ἐχθρὸς ἦ παλαιγενής, ‘a long-time enemy’ of 
Agamemnon (Aga. 1637-1638), and this Thyestid has as much cause as Klytaimestra against 
the heirs of Atreus, and he also has as good a claim to the throne of Argos as his deposed Atreid 
cousin.66 
 
Understanding Aiskhylos’ reinvention of Klytaimestra as a desperate woman in an 
uncompassionate man’s world also depends on the various witness-statements of those who 
interact with her: her husband, her children, and the trilogy’s supporting characters.67  
Character-witnesses are a common means to sway a jury’s perception of acts committed by a 
defendant; when a person’s own children are willing to testify against them, observers tend to 
conclude that the defendant is seriously unlikable.  For instance, the Watchman’s attitude to 
Klytaimestra, discussed below, is one of fearful compliance, and his dark hints imply that 
                                                          
64 On the contrast between the inverted gender-behaviours of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos, see Vickers (1973:348, 
396); Zeitlin (1996:92); Sommerstein (1996:267); Wohl (1998:103); Zelenak (1998:66).  For disparaging critical 
descriptions of Aiskhylos’ Aigisthos, see Kitto (1968:64); Rosenmeyer (1982:218); Rehm (1992:94). 
65 On Aigisthos as primary homicide in early iconography see Prag (1985: 1-2, 5, 10, 19).  On the shift of 
iconographic depictions of the story across the archaic period reflecting Aiskhylos’ invention of Klytaimestra’s 
ambivalence and hostility toward her son, see Gantz (1966:673-674); Vermeule (1966:6, 10-11); Garvie 
(1986:xxiii); Sommerstein (1996:200).  On the side-lining of Aigisthos and the expansion of Klytaimestra’s role 
in order to shift focus onto gender-conflict in marriage, see Gantz (1966:674-675); Winnington-Ingram 
(1983a:91). 
66 Foley (2001:206) is one of the few to acknowledge Aigisthos’ right to vengeance.  Tantalid Aigisthos also shares 
the right to suffer the family curse; see Norwood (1948:106); Belfiore (2000:10). 
67 On Aiskhylos’ characterization of Klytaimestra, see Anderson (1932:313); Norwood (1948:104, 106); Lattimore 
(1953:9); Vickers (1973:58, 382); Betensky (1978:12); Baldock (1989:37).Des Bouvrie (1990:319); Van Erp 
Taalman Kip (1996:126); McClure (1997:130); Wolfe (2009:699). 
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something is not right in this palace ruled by a woman.68  Klytaimestra also conflicts with the 
Agamemnon’s chorus of elderly citizens, whose overt attitude toward the queen is of grudging 
respect; they view women in general with contempt, however.69  Although Orestes and Elektra 
do not appear in the first play, Agamemnon, the Oresteia expands the traditional narrative’s 
characterization of Klytaimestra’s hostile daughter and returning son, who replace Klytaimestra 
as central protagonists of the second play Khoephoroi; after this Elektra disappears completely, 
while Orestes in Eumenides is peripheral to the play’s agōn between ancient female and new 
patriarchalist gods.  Critics disagree on whether the Oresteia is one unified three-act dramatic 
unit or is three quite individual plays focussing on different characters, but more important is 
the relationship between the three tragedies and the trilogy’s concluding satyr-play Proteus 
(now lost); this work points out that if Orestes had only waited a few days longer, the returning 
Menelaos would have righteously avenged Agamemnon’s assassination, saving his nephew 
from the terrible sin of mother-murder.70 
 
Some scholars recognize the central importance of reproductive biology in the trilogy: the 
female capacity to mother children is challenged and then disproven in the Oresteia; father-
right now underpins the ideal civilization of the trilogy’s triumphant conclusion.71  In 
Agamemnon Klytaimestra’s right to avenge her own child is challenged; in Khoephoroi her 
claim to be the real mother of Orestes is undermined; and in Eumenides her capacity as a woman 
to be a biological mother at all is adjudged invalid.  The sacrifice of Iphigeneia symbolizes the 
destruction of the natural (and reproductively certain) mother-daughter bond in favour of the 
socially central – but less biologically certain – father-son alliance.  Everyone who matters 
chooses for the male, and the Oresteia celebrates the formal restructuring of society to 
accommodate male reproductive supremacy; maternal right is set aside forever for the sake of 
(male) civilization.72  Only Klytaimestra and her Furies choose for the female, and their protests 
are nullified. 
                                                          
68 Some view the watchman as an unsympathetic character; Vickers (1973:349); Rosenmeyer (1982:217); Heath 
(1987:1). 
69 On Klytaimestra’s conflict with the chorus, see Winnington-Ingram (1983b:73); Ley (2007:196). 
70 On the unity of the trilogy, see Jones (1962:70); Winnington-Ingram (1983b:73); Garvie (1986:xxxv-xxxvi); 
Zelenak (1998:66); Rosslyn (2000:11); Sommerstein (2002:37); McLeish (2003:39); Buxton (2007:178); Sewell 
(2007:118).  Proteus is thought to depict a spoof of Menelaos’ journey back to Argos, and mentions the murder of 
Agamemnon by Aigisthos; see Halleran (2005:200); Sommerstein (2010b:79). 
71 Zeitlin (1996:170); Zelenak (1998:69); Murnaghan (2005:239-140); Wohl (2005:150); Goldhill (2007:147). 
72 On the victory of male political-marriage systems over biological, female-centric kin structures in the Oresteia, 
see Gagarin (1976:89, 101); Goldhill (1986:152).  On the Oresteia as the founding document of the shift from 




The victory of Olympian deities over the Erinyes comes at a very high cost: the divine denial 
of Klytaimestra’s motherhood acquits a mother-killer and disempowers the traditional 
guardians of moral virtue.  The Oresteia’s richly explicit yet unambiguously repugnant mother-
murder starkly contrasts with Homer’s ambivalent references to Agamemnon’s death, and the 
epic tradition in which Klytaimestra’s offstage death is discreetly matter-of-fact.  Aiskhylos’ 
trilogy is mostly concerned with the moral question of whether Agamemnon ‘deserved’ his 
death or if Orestes is morally justified through duty or obligation to seek revenge; thus, some 
conclude that the Oresteia aims to justify and exonerate the traditionally immoral matricide as 
an appropriate remedy to the unthinkable sin of husbandicide.73  Every action undertaken in the 
trilogy only seems to result in horrific consequences, and the real message of the trilogy may 
be that humans will always make unjust moral decisions, but most especially when exposed to 
the persuasive speeches of others.  Indeed, each play of the Oresteia contains a single crucial 
moment of persuasion: Agamemnon is persuaded to tread on the tapestries; Orestes is persuaded 
to murder his mother; and the Erinyes are persuaded to forgo their pursuit of the matricide. 
 
The preceding section has raised the question of how the Oresteia has been received and 
interpreted by ancient and modern audiences.  The trilogy has long been read as an illustration 
of gender conflict at the social and political level, but much less as a parable of reproductive 
antagonism within a two-sexed species.  Each play focusses on a different aspect of the struggle 
of males and females to exert greater control over the production of offspring: the Agamemnon 
addresses the unforeseen but entirely predictable consequences of one man’s unilateral disposal 
of his child in support of war; the Khoephoroi responds to the events of the first play – after an 
amazing narrative interval of ten years – with the story of how children in a patrilineal culture 
are compelled by social circumstances to persecute their mother for her act; the Eumenides 
weighs the respective moral sin of the murders of father and mother, and resolves the question 
in favour of the father, through the denial of the obviously biological fact of motherhood.  The 
suppression, subversion, and subordination of ancient female powers – mortal and divine – is 
the origin of human civilization, and patriarchal Athens is the most civilized nation of all.  
                                                          
73 On the Oresteia – and Orestes’ acquittal – as a justification of the cultural shift from dikē-vengeance among 
individual families to state-controlled administration of justice, see Murray (1940:196); Solmsen (1949:188); 
Zeitlin (1965:487n44, 494-495); Kitto (1968:91); Ferguson (1972:108); Gagarin (1976:79); Carne-Ross (1981:48-
49); Winnington-Ingram (1983b:75); Schaps (1993:508); McDonald (2003:13); Clark (2012:144).  Others contend 
that the trilogy’s resolution only perpetuates the original form of bloody justice-seeking; see Lloyd-Jones 
(1962:187, 1983b:57); Gagarin (1976:66, 68). 
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Klytaimestra’s noncompliance with her husband’s primary allegiance to his military allies over 
his blood-kin is utterly negated, and the path to Greek predominance over the known world 
receives divine approval to wage war as widely as possible. 
 
The Agamemnon is concerned with how a mother deprived of her child might plot against her 
husband; Klytaimestra’s adultery in his absence is an open secret, but he somehow arrives home 
oblivious, in company with his new war-captive concubine or second wife, and falls to her 
scheme.  Despite all evidence, modern critics (like some ancient authors) have long failed to 
grasp the profound effect on women of losing a child, and so work very hard to construe her 
motivation as sexual; as the following discussion of the first play in the trilogy will reveal, 
Klytaimestra dares to kill her husband not because she is jealous over her husband’s new lover, 
or because she is in love with Aigisthos, but because she is driven by grief for Agamemnon’s 




Some scholars view the first play of the Oresteia – Agamemnon – as the epitome of Greek 
tragedy.74  Critical responses to Aiskhylos’ characterization of Klytaimestra and her husband 
range from awestruck admiration to disgusted revulsion, but critical sympathy toward either 
Klytaimestra or her husband in Agamemnon often reflects attitudes to gender-conflict, and 
admiring one seems to require disparaging the other.75  According to some, the Agamemnon 
explores retribution and vengeance; others contend that the play is simply concerned with 
Agamemnon’s return and fall.76  However, an inherited disposition among the Pelopids to child 
abuse and catastrophic misfortune is clearly an issue in this play.77  The chorus’ impartial 
                                                          
74 Tucker (1935:5); McLeish (2003:43). 
75 On the Agamemnon’s Klytaimestra as “a superb, gorgeous, dauntless figure… complex in emotions [and] direct 
in action”, see Anderson (1929:150).  See also Zelenak (1998:60), who argues that the contrast between the 
“indecisive” Agamemnon and the “strong-willed” Klytaimestra is the play’s “dramatic axis”.  On Agamemnon as 
disappointing, “conceited, heavy-witted, pompous”, see Norwood (1948:103).  On Klytaimestra and Aigisthos as 
repulsive and shadowy villains, see Denniston and Page (1957:xxxvi); Mastronarde (2010:68). 
76 On retributive vengeance in the play, see Lattimore (1972:74); Gantz (1983:68-69); Lloyd-Jones (1983b:58); 
Ireland (1986:23).  On Agamemnon’s return, see Heath (1987:19); Garner (1990:36); Dihle (1994:102); Sharrock 
and Ash (2002:39). 
77 On inherited family vengeance and violence and the Atreid family curse, see Lloyd-Jones (1970a:7); Conacher 
(1987:4); Goldhill (1992:29); Sharrock and Ash (2002:39).  On the record of child abuse in the Atreid house, see 
Jones (1962:93) and Knox (1979:36).  On the essential difference between the curse and inherited guilt – curses 
are public proclamations, while inherited guilt behaves more like an irresistible force of nature, and so the Erinyes 
act even when not formally evoked – see Sewell-Rutter (2007:59, 79). 
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witness-description of the Greek general’s decision-making process in the Agamemnon’s 
lengthy opening scene, Klytaimestra’s cross-examination of her husband in the pivotal carpet-
scene, and Kassandra’s summing-up later in the play – an omniscient oracular vision as reliable 
for ancient audiences as any modern surveillance footage is for modern juries – all offer 
judgement on the direct causes of Agamemnon’s assassination (or execution): his ancestors’ 
evil and his own error in choosing to sacrifice Klytaimestra’s child.78  The chorus also verifies 
Agamemnon’s complicity in his own demise in a number of testimonials: in their recitation of 
the story of the omen of the hare and eagles (Aga. 105-159); in their discussion of learning-
through-suffering (160-183); in their account of the pitiable sacrifice of Iphigeneia (198-249); 
and in the parable of the treacherous lion-cub (716-781). 
 
Aiskhylos sets aside the Kypria’s traditional episode of Agamemnon’s personal hybris toward 
Artemis from the choral parados, however; instead, he locates Artemis’ anger in the omen of 
the hare and eagles (105-159), an episode many critics consider damning evidence for 
Agamemnon’s guilt.79  The identification of the Atreid brothers as the cruel pair of eagles in 
the choral ode occurs early in the play (42-44, 48-61, 109-110, 114-125), demonstrating that 
these twinned kings are equally guilty of impious violence.  The imagery of the eagles deprived 
of their offspring (48-61) is frequently interpreted to refer to Menelaos’ loss of a wife; but the 
metaphor of parental grief and fury over the loss of young more obviously points to the rage of 
Klytaimestra, deprived of her young.  The feasting eagles visible to all are settled on the right 
side of the house, and thus the omen is interpreted as favourable, but the repeated refrain of the 
chorus – ‘cry woe, woe, but let the good prevail’ (121) – is an automatic touch-wood to avert 
ill-fortune, revealing the covert, sinister possibilities of the omen.  Artemis – out of pity for the 
mother deprived of her offspring – conceives a hatred for the eagles, and the chorus immediately 
repeats their apotropaic plea (134-138).  Ultimately the omen revisits the horrendous fates of 
all of the unfortunate offspring of the accursed house, however: Artemis loves the δρόσοισι 
λεπτοῖς ‘vulnerable young’ of μαλερῶν λεόντων, ‘fiery lions’ (139-145), and this is but one of 
the references to the Atreids as lions.80  Kalkhas is forced to conclude that the omen is 
paradoxically δεξιὰ μέν, κατάμομφα δὲ ‘fortunate, but inauspicious’ (145), calling upon Apollo 
                                                          
78 Vickers (1973:357) describes the long choral parodos as “a miniature tragedy” in itself; Kitto (1968:67) contends 
that the twenty-minute ode is the intellectual foundation for the entire Oresteia. 
79 On the centrality of this ode to understanding the theme of (male-inflicted) suffering in whole trilogy, and the 
moral problem of Agamemnon’s guilt, see Ferguson (1972:77); Vellacott (1984:64); Peradotto (2007:212, 219). 
80 Cf. Euripides’ Klytaimestra as a mountain lion roaming the meadow (E. El. 1163-1164); was this Aiskhylos’ 
fiery lioness simply seeking her unfledged, stolen cub, removed to the human (or male) world of civilization? 
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to prevent Artemis from hindering the Akhaians’ mission (146-150); he also warns that further 
sacrificial slaughter will evoke φοβερὰ παλίνορτος/ οἰκονόμος δολία μνάμων μῆνις 
τεκνόποινος, ‘a frightening, recurring and treacherous household-keeper and avenger of 
children, never forgetting wrath’ (154-155). 
 
Many critics, agreeing with Kalkhas that the eagles of the omen stand for the Atreides, conclude 
that Agamemnon is fully responsible for Iphigeneia’s death; Agamemnon – through ἀνάγκη, 
‘necessity’ (218) – willingly takes up the yoke-strap, and so cannot escape the inevitable 
reaction to his action.  This yokestrap of necessity is not put upon him – the verb is ἔδυ (from 
δύω, ‘cause to plunge in’ or ‘get into’ in the indicative); Agamemnon does it to himself and, in 
consequence, his change of heart is self-induced.  But Artemis does not demand the sacrifice: 
she merely offers Agamemnon the choice to kill his child or cancel the war.  Artemis’ angry 
response to the eagles’ feast is also inspired by Agamemnon’s declaration to his brother 
Menelaos in the Iliad (6.57-60) that not even the unborn of Troy will escape, an association that 
Aiskhylos could reasonably expect his audience to make through his allusion to the hare’s 
unborn.81  Many critics correctly identify Iphigeneia, the child of the accursed Atreid clan, as 
the hare’s offspring in the omen.82  If Iphigeneia is the offspring slain before her time, then the 
bereaved hare must be Klytaimestra, whose child was torn from the oikos and murdered by the 
need of the Atreids.83  Research indicates that the loss of a child can have extreme effects on 
the biological mother; if the manner of that loss is irrational filicide, the mother’s desire to 
protect further offspring can also result in extreme action, as it does in Aiskhylos’ retelling of 
the story.84  The omen’s true reference could not be clearer: an unweaned child of lions will be 
                                                          
81 Artemis’ hares were traditionally spared by wise hunters (according to Xenophon, Cyn. 5.14).  Artemis’ cultural 
associations with the hare in the context of the omen are also evoked by archaeological evidence at her Brauron 
shrine of statues of young girls each holding a hare; female initiates at Brauron also wore a distinctive saffron-
robe like the one worn by the sacrificed Iphigeneia.  See Peradotto (2007:220-221); Suda, ‘arktos e Brauroniois’; 
Aristoph. Lys. 641-647. 
82 On the eagles’ unnatural feast, Thyestes unholy meal (Aga. 1242), and the ancestral crime of filicide and 
cannibalism, see Zeitlin (1965:483); Vickers (1973:354); Carne-Ross (1981:43-44, 46); Whallon (1981:81-82); 
Vellacott (1984a:145); Seaford (1989:89-90); Heath (1999a:27-28; 1999b:403); McLeish (2003:43); Hall 
(2010:217).  Cf. Lebeck (1971:35).  According to Seaford (1989:91), αὐτότοκον πρὸ λόχου μογερὰν πτάκα 
θυομένοισιν (137) can mean either ‘sacrificing the poor trembling hare with her young before birth’ or ‘sacrificing 
a poor trembling female, his own child, on behalf of the army’. 
83 Garner (1990:29) views the abducted Helen as the eagle’s lost child; however, the grieving eagle deprived of its 
young more credibly evokes Klytaimestra robbed of her child, rather than the men of the Atreid oikos, deprived of 
a wife.  See also Zeitlin (1965:482); Knox (1979:28); Saxonhouse (1984:21); Heath (1999a:19). 
84 On maternal response to loss of a child, see Chapter 1, pp. 46-47; 47n215; 55n272; on mothers’ proactive 
elimination of child-killing males, see Chapter 1, pp. 69; 71-72. 
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destroyed by the Atreid eagles; this act – which Artemis deplores – will enable the army to 
achieve their terrible aim, but at the price of misfortune, since the guardian of the house will, 
through treachery, bring vengeance for the death of that vulnerable child, just as other murders 
of children have been avenged in the past.  The chorus also understands that Kalkhas’s words 
predict the fate of the royal family, and they repeat their apotropaic incantation, (156-159).  The 
audience also knows – even if the Akhaians at Aulis did not – that Iphigeneia will not be the 
only price to be paid for the successful military expedition. 
 
The chorus follows the omen episode with a discussion of πάθει μάθος (pathei mathos) 
‘learning through suffering’ (160-183, 250-253).  The choral passage states that ‘he who put 
mortals on the right path to understanding, he who, holding power, set up the state of suffering 
as law, and so the memory of pain trickles into consciousness and into the heart, and good sense 
comes to the unwilling, a favour which comes with force from the gods seated on the august 
seats of power’ (176-184).  The chorus is unhelpfully unclear as to who precisely is suffering, 
and who is learning, and critical discussions offer a variety of possible referents.85  Although 
suffering is experienced by numerous individuals in this tragedy, the suffering in this so-called 
‘Hymn to Zeus’ is often thought to refer to men’s – human – experience generally and to 
Agamemnon’s in particular.86  The chorus’ observation on learning-through-suffering is 
followed directly by the account of the fleet stranding at Aulis, however, and the announcement 
of the remedy for the delay – the polluting sacrifice of Agamemnon’s child; good sense, they 
say, will eventually come to someone through the suffering resulting from this sacrifice, while 
men’s lengthy reflection upon their errors will be a deeply unpleasant memory.  But most of 
the characters in the Oresteia, even after suffering as a direct (or indirect) result of Iphigeneia’s 
sacrifice, do not find any good sense, and the only character reflecting in unpleasant memory 
upon her death appears to be her mother. 
 
                                                          
85 Cf. Smith (1980:ix), who argues that pathei mathos in fact refers to “learning through bitter experience”, and 
Gagarin (1976:149-150), who argues that the critical problem of who learns and why confuses Aiskhylean Zeus 
and the Judaeo-Christian God; pathei mathos, in his opinion, refers to learning about the certainty of divine 
retribution, not to receiving any higher wisdom.  Cf. Sommerstein (2010b:178), who rightly suggests that the 
phrase pathei mathos does not require the sufferer to be the one who learns.  See also Booth (1976). 
86 Smith (1980:vii, ix, 25). 
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Unsurprisingly, some critics also conclude that, despite the divine gift of suffering, no one 
learns anything to redeem all the misery of the sacrifice.87  Agamemnon certainly refuses to 
‘learn’ that the costs of war are too great for either the demos or his own family to bear – he 
later implies that he would do it all over again, if required (934) – while those witnessing the 
suffering from a distance – the wilfully oblivious chorus – also fail to learn anything remotely 
useful about life.88  Only the suffering Klytaimestra changes, through discovering that the 
primary loyalty of Agamemnon is to political power, rather than to his philoi.  The chorus now 
turn their full attention to the beginnings of suffering for the mother deprived of her young: 
Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigeneia.  This was no typical infanticide, or even filicide: 
Iphigeneia was a healthy young female, and did not represent a drain on parental investment.89 
 
Aiskhylos deliberately draws Iphigenia’s sacrifice in the worst possible light in the 
Agamemnon’s first ode.  As soon as the Atreids hear the prophet’s interpretation of the omen, 
they accept the unholy – and thus potentially perilous – sacrifice of Iphigeneia as inevitable: 
the chorus foreground the suffering of the Atreid kings, who are greatly aggrieved by Kalkhas’ 
interpretation of the omen, striking the ground with their staffs, and being unable to restrain 
their tears (195-248).  Sacrificers traditionally induce in the sacrificial animal a token assent to 
its impending death, but the Atreids know that there can be no assent to this impious act, and 
together with their allies silence Iphigeneia’s resistance through bridling her mouth, averting 
the curse she would certainly utter if she could (235-237).  The chorus – who were not present 
– reports her silent, heart-rending plea for mercy, clear to see in her pitiful glance (240-241).  
Yet, although they have reported every detail of the lead-up to the awful killing, they then 
declare that they cannot describe the killing because they themselves ‘did not see it’ (248).  The 
chorus have received a detailed account of events, and we should assume that Klytaimestra was 
also informed of her daughter’s enforced suffering at Aulis.  Despite the chorus’ hope that all 
‘will turn out well’, as the closest ‘guardian of the land’ also wishes (255-257), nothing good 
could come of such a sacrifice: the welcome given by guardian Klytaimestra to her husband 
                                                          
87 Some conclude that critical discussion of the Oresteia massively overinterpret the matter of learning-through-
suffering, because no one in the trilogy learns anything useful, and the expression never occurs elsewhere; see 
Vickers (1973:65); Smith (1980:23).  On the failure of the play’s characters to learn from their own suffering, see 
Dodds (1960:29-30); Guepin (1968:222-223); Smith (1973:7); Vellacott (1977:113-114); Ireland (1986:25). 
88 On the chorus’ lack of understanding of events, see Smith (1980:41); Gantz (1983:76-77); Fletcher (1999:45, 
47). 




Agamemnon is certainly not going to turn out well, because Agamemnon’s deed in Aulis did 
not turn out well for Klytaimestra and her daughter.  Much is made of the covert treachery of 
Klytaimestra in response to Agamemnon’s pitiless sacrifice of Iphigeneia, but the chorus’ next 
testimonial about the pet who betrays its master shows that bloody treachery in some 
circumstances is entirely predictable. 
 
The ode’s so-called ‘parable’ of the lion-cub episode – like the earlier omen of the hare and 
eagles – is critically interpreted to refer to a variety of real persons within the play – Helen, 
Agamemnon, Klytaimestra, Aigisthos, Menelaos, Orestes – and even the Trojans Paris and 
Kassandra; some argue that this multiplicity is intentional, others struggle with the idea of 
Klytaimestra’s lover – and Agamemnon’s cousin – Aigisthos as a house-destroying lion, even 
a craven one 90  A more obvious candidate is Helen, the Atreid wife who unexpectedly brought 
catastrophe upon the Greeks, and the lion-cub parable does follow closely upon the chorus’s 
diatribe on the evils of Helen (681-716): as the charming lion-cub matures and becomes 
destructive, betraying its human family (though with divine approval and assistance) (735-736), 
so Helen initially comes to Troy as a calm and gentle spirit of love (737-749), but was really 
sent by Zeus as νυμφόκλαυτος Ἐρινύς, ‘a Fury, a bride bringing woe’ (749), a punishment for 
Paris’ contravention of xenia.  The delightful orphan-cub is reared by the whole family, but the 
parent most betrayed is the kyrios, head of the household (717-726).  Yet, as the chorus imply 
(727-736), this story is all about ancestral ethos: the first sin of the lion-cub is the δαῖτ᾽ 
ἀκέλευστος ‘unbidden feast’ (731) of the oikos’ sheep-flock: the grief of the oikos befouled in 
sheep’s blood resonates with Kassandra’s later descriptions of the sin of Atreus’ impious feast 
(1089-1091, 1096-1097, 1214-1222).91  The chorus are also at pains to point out that, while 
                                                          
90 On the parable’s lion-cub as a symbol of the Atreid household, see Zeitlin (1965:483); Knox (1979:34); Carne-
Ross (1981:29); Saxonhouse (1984:21); Vellacott (1984a:147); Heath (1999a:24-25, 38); and Rose (1992:200).  
Knox (1979:31) points out that the house of Pelops also bore the heraldic device of the lion.  On the ethos of the 
lion-cub as referring to the inherited disposition to evil of the Tantalids – including Aigisthos – see Vickers 
(1973:362-363); Knox (1979:28); Rose (1992:201).  In Jones’ (1962:123) view, the real problem of Aigisthos as 
the lion-cub is the incompatibility of the parable’s treacherous lion with critical fixations with “leonine noble 
courage”.  While the Atreid house is associated with lions (enhanced in popular consciousness by the imagery of 
the Lion-gate of Mycenae), this alludes to bloodthirsty dangerousness, not nobility; real lions are not noble and 
compassionate protectors, and both male and female lions are savage and dangerous, especially to other lions’ (or 
lionesses’) cubs, and in their wild state, lions can also be ruthless consumers of humans.  On the Atreid killing-
lions, see also Orestes and Pylades as twin lions in Orestes (1400-1424, 1554-1555), and Klytaimestra as the 
lioness roaming through the meadow in Elektra (1163-1164). 
91 Cf. Vickers (1973:362-363), who notes that the fondness of the lion-cub for “playing” with children – 




some believe a household’s misfortune derives from excessive prosperity, real catastrophe 
arises because of a man’s impiety, which creates a never-ending cycle of offence within the 
family; only the oikos who follows a straight path of justice can avoid inheriting a disposition 
to misfortune (750-762).92 
 
Every Tantalid murderer was hand-reared within this befouled oikos, generation after 
generation maturing to betray their own kin in bloody butchery.  It is often thought that the lion 
is an appropriate symbol for rulers due to its noble and brave nature, but Agamemnon’s 
description of his campaign in Troy boasts frankly that he is ὑπερθορὼν δὲ πύργον ὠμηστὴς 
λέων/ ἄδην ἔλειξεν αἵματος τυραννικοῦ, ‘a lion eating raw flesh, leaping over the tower, licking 
up its fill of royal blood’ (827-828).  Much is made of this family’s innocent surprise at the 
treachery of the growing lion-cub – as if an apex predator should be grateful for captivity, and 
suppress its natural behaviour around domesticated prey-species – but events in the Tantalid 
history also show evidence of entirely predictable, evolved or natural mammalian reproductive 
strategy: just like lions, the Tantalid males steal other males’ females and murder existing 
offspring in order to assert dominance and enhance their reproductive success, while at least 
one female seeks to defend further offspring from being killed, risking her own demise.  
Klytaimestra – like many females across many species – seeks to eliminate a male known to 
pose a genuine danger to her young; in human women, however, this kind of violence is 
approved only under the strictest of contexts.93 
 
Following the ode’s final episode of bloody death within the house, there are further references 
throughout the play to the self-destructive effect of Agamemnon’s own ethos.  Aiskhylos 
portrays, through the eye-witness accounts of those around Agamemnon in Aulis, the man who 
provoked Klytaimestra’s revenge for the sacrifice of her daughter.  Some scholars deplore the 
king’s shortcomings; some admire the character enormously; others insist that estimations of 
Agamemnon’s ethos must simply acknowledge normative ancient Greek standards of gender, 
kingship, and marriage.94  Some insist that Agamemnon is exonerated from all guilt for his 
                                                          
92 On the negative divine response to human prosperity, see Hdt. 1.32.1, 3.40, 7.10. 
93 On approval of females’ violence under limited conditions – even when enacted to protect children – see Chapter 
1, pp. 33; 41; 41n179; 43; 43n191. 
94 On Agamemnon’s bloodthirsty, arrogant, evil nature, see Sturgeon (1914:105); Stanford (1942:115-116); 
Vellacott (1984a:145; 1984b:64).  For more favourable views of Agamemnon, see Fraenkel (1950:374, 388, 429); 
Lloyd-Jones (1970a:7; 1983b:67); Dover (1973b:66); Otis (1981:8-10, 13); Pope (1986:13, 20, 23); Crane 
(1993:117), and Whallon (1980:51), who interprets Iphigeneia’s sacrifice as evidence of Agamemnon’s piety. 
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actions by reason of his success as a military general.95  Yet, following a damning discussion 
of evil and unjust men who get their punishment from ‘Ruin’ (782-783), the chorus address 
Agamemnon directly as βασιλεῦ, Τροίας πτολίπορθ᾽/ Ἀτρέως γένεθλον, ‘king, sacker of Troy, 
offspring of Atreus’ (782-783), the same three aspects of Agamemnon’s identity that lead to 
his self-selection as the sacrificer of Iphigeneia. 
 
Agamemnon has very little to say in the trilogy’s first play, but upon appearance his kingly 
hybris fills the stage.96  In his opinion, he and the gods are equally responsible for the 
punishment of Troy for Helen’s abduction, which gives him full bragging rights (810-813); the 
chorus earlier confirmed that the gods enabled this general to subjugate Troy and enslave its 
occupants (355-361).  Agamemnon only falls prey to Klytaimestra’s persuasion because he 
truly believes that the mighty foot that trampled Troy has become too good to touch the earth 
of his native land (905-907).  But while Agamemnon is still alive, the chorus express 
reservations about his brutal – and impious – military ventures; only once he is dead do they 
euphemize his city-sacking and greatly regret the fall of this ‘most gracious guardian’, 
destroyed by a mere woman, (1451-1453). 
 
All the characters in this and following plays in the Oresteia – have good reason to fear and 
hate the city-sacking general – yet, in this fictional account, they increasingly idolize and adore 
him.  Prestige is a form of respect freely-given in recognition of expertise, but as we will see, 
Agamemnon’s rather inept rule depends more on bluster and threat of violence.97  Athena’s 
blessing in Eumenides of ‘plenty of warfare’ (Eum. 864) for the city-sacking Athenians is a 
curse for the survivors of war, however, and Euripides’ Troades portrays the warmongering 
Agamemnon – before the events of the Oresteia – as a much less sympathetic man and general.  
Similarly, Euripides’ Hekabe of 425 BCE – the immediate prequel to Agamemnon’s home-
coming – exposes the war-leader as a liar, quite ready to expediently contravene religious 
scruples (Hek. 749-753, 798-806, 852-860, 1122-1123).  Euripides’ Hekabe was produced 
decades after the Agamemnon, but the history of this fictional family was a matter of tradition 
through the fifth century, and earlier: Euripides uses the closing scene of the Hekabe to highlight 
                                                          
95 On Agamemnon as an ideal Bronze Age king from the imperialist Athenian point of view, see Smith (1973:4-
5); Rosenmeyer (1982:220-222); Hogan (1984:72); Sommerstein (1996:365); Zelenak (1998:61). 
96 On Agamemnon’s vain pride, see Lattimore (1954:12; 1972:74); Ferguson (1972:85); Lawrence (1976:103); 
Winnington-Ingram (1983a:86); Baldock (1989:37); Rabinowitz (2008:95). 
97 On prestige and dominance, see Chapter 1, pp. 35-36; 35n136. 
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how this stupid and morally ambivalent man proceeds directly to his demise in Aiskhylos’ 
Agamemnon.  The prophet Polymestor proclaims that both Agamemnon and Kassandra will die 
by the hand of Klytaimestra, the οἰκουρὸς πικρά, ‘bitter mistress of his house’ (1277), but 
Agamemnon’s response ignores all warning of his destined death by his wife; instead, his 
foolish reference to the ‘travel-controlling breezes’ returns the audience to the beginning of the 
expedition at Aulis and Iphigeneia’s death to appease Artemis, and – like the chorus of 
Agamemnon – this self-deluded man hopes ‘all will be well at home’ on his arrival (1289-1292).  
All will not be well at home, however, as an earlier exchange between the defeated Trojan 
queen and the arrogant, foolish Agamemnon suggests (883-885).  This depiction of 
Agamemnon as a self-serving, lying fool was not an invention of Euripides; the allusions in this 
text are intertextual in-jokes for an audience who had full access to versions of the Atreid 
history, extant or now lost, and who knew that a woman’s strength would one day demand his 
respect.  The 425 BCE audience of the Hekabe knows that Agamemnon will be slain by the 
same female strength he dismisses, and by the single woman whom he ought to have expected 
– having been warned by Polymestor – would be his appointed killer.  As Aiskhylos’ embittered 
Klytaimestra welcomes her husband into the palace in 458 BCE, every member of the audience 
knew from their reading of Homer that all would go very badly at home for this hubristic king; 
Euripides’ later work simply makes explicit the true cause, persistently evidenced in all 
mythological literature, of the foolish king’s downfall – his own persistent self-delusion and 
lack of judgement.98 
 
Nonetheless, some critics maintain that Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon sensibly sacrifices his 
daughter out of duty to his allies, but Agamemnon is only too aware of the hypocrisy of these 
military alliances.99  Upon his return to Argos (Aga. 838-840), he declares that loyalty between 
friends is εἴδωλον σκιᾶς ‘a shadowy phantom’ (839); furthermore, the other leaders of the army 
only appear friendly, but are in truth his enemies (840).  Yet, according to the chorus, 
Agamemnon worries that, if he refuses to sacrifice Iphigeneia, he will become a ‘deserter of the 
fleet, failing his allies’ (212-213).  In this context, ‘failing’ is not about betrayal of friendship 
or trust, but of self-interest, and what his allies represent to him.  Either he slays his own child, 
                                                          
98 On the evolutionary function of self-delusion, see Chapter 1, p. 74n380. 
99 On Agamemnon as the dutiful leader, see Dover (1973:66); Vickers (1973:352).  In Sommerstein’s (1996:363-
365) opinion, Agamemnon acts not from a sense of duty to his people, but for simple political expediency; 
furthermore, the issue is not failing his allies, but losing them: see also Winnington-Ingram (1983:83); 
Sommerstein (2010b:167).  According to Gantz (1983:77n39), Agamemnon cannot abandon his own expedition. 
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or he ‘fails his alliance’ (213), and thus forgoes all power and prestige.100  He sees immediately 
that the pollution of kin-murder does not outweigh the evil of losing his military alliance, and 
so – according to the chorus – he makes himself believe that what this awful thing the army 
wants is not wrong: 
 
παυσανέμου γὰρ θυσίας 
παρθενίου θ᾽ αἵματος ὀρ- 
γᾷ περιόργῳ σφ᾽ ἐπιθυ- 
μεῖν θέμις, 
 
‘to madly desire the sacrifice of a maiden’s blood to still the winds is customary and 
right’ (214-217).101 
 
He rounds off his careful consideration with the ubiquitous, optimistic hope that all will turn 
out well (217).102  Aiskhylos’ fifth-century Greek army purportedly mad for war foreshadows 
the end of the Oresteia, when Athena’s gift of external warfare (the conquest of many cities) 
becomes a blessing for the expanding Athenian empire.103  The chorus’ testimony concerning 
Agamemnon in this play is suspect, however, because the events are ten years gone, and are 
being retold by men who were not even at Aulis. 
 
Some disagree that Agamemnon panders to the army’s desires only for the sake of his 
alliances.104  Others insist that the army possess no real power to prevent Agamemnon deciding 
                                                          
100 While ἁμαρτών is often translated as ‘failing’ or ‘offending against’, I opt here for ‘lose’; other critics have 
also chosen this meaning, a possible referent which would also have been understood by original audiences, 
presumably.  Even if Agamemnon offends against his allies, the immediate result will almost certainly be that he 
loses them. 
101 The LSJ, however, glosses περιόργως (suggested here as ‘madly’), as ‘very angry’, or ‘wrathful’, and cites 
Agamemnon (216) as an example of this.  The army have no reason to be angry, because their wives were not taken 
by Trojans; to desire the blood of a maiden is the initiating act of their madness. 
102 Whatever Agamemnon chooses, all will never be well; this blind and impossible optimism is something tragedy 
returns to time and again. 
103 Gagarin (1976:91-92) observes that Agamemnon’s difficult decision is logical and coherent, and that Aiskhylos 
by no means condemns Agamemnon’s allegiance to the male, militaristic values-system.  Aiskhylos – whom the 
long-haired Persian remembers – is no pacifist; he wanted the world to remember that he was, first and foremost, 
a successful soldier.  On Agamemnon’s actions as entirely admirable within his competitive, success-oriented 
culture, see Gagarin (1976:12); Winnington-Ingram (1983b:98). 
104 On Agamemnon’s fear for the loss of his prestige, see Sommerstein (2008:25n47). 
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in favour of his child.105  Some conclude that Agamemnon’s so-called ‘dilemma’ expresses the 
central gender conflict between militaristic-male and domestic-female worlds.106  In many 
cultures – including ancient Greece – hyper-masculinity and military success are mutually 
reinforcing, and this war-leader’s easy decision is predetermined by the inescapable demands 
of the warrior ethos of his time and place; the potential loss of military opportunity is hard to 
remedy, and the loss of reputation for lack of andreia is often permanent.107  As Agamemnon’s 
situation very clearly indicates, ruling males in traditional (and arguably, modern) cultures 
depend upon the maintenance of coalitions with other powerful males and male-led groups.108  
In a results-culture context, Agamemnon’s support of this particular human sacrifice only 
confirms his andreia, making him even more fit to rule; there is after all established remedy for 
pollution, even that resulting from the murder of one’s own children.  Similarly, the ubiquity of 
honour-killing cultures in the human record suggest that the maintenance of males’ status in 
patriarchal contexts is generally more important than preserving the lives of women or extant 
offspring.109  Agamemnon is persuaded by the much greater cost of what would be lost, if he 
chose for his daughter’s life: the command of many thousands of respectful men is an 
unmatchable benefit, and this Tantalid kyrios, after all, has three (or perhaps four) expendable 
daughters, after all.110  Agamemnon’s decision, in Aiskhylos’ retelling, reflects EP findings that 
in evolved, opportunistic, androcentric mating systems, public status always outweighs private 
attachment for males.  In fact, the choice between male glory and death of innocents is faced 
by every war-leader ever known, and a man who is prepared to kill other people’s children can 
always be persuaded to kill his own when circumstances necessitate.111  The ultimate result for 
                                                          
105 Smith (1973:7); Gantz (1982:12-13, 75-76); Sommerstein (1996:365; 2008:24n46).  On Agamemnon’s and 
Menelaos’ debate in Euripides’ IA as confirming Agamemnon’s power to choose either way, see Lesky (1966b:81). 
106 Wohl (1998:70); Zelenak (1998:132). 
107 On andreia as a social force in ancient Greece, see Strauss (1993); Cartledge (1998); Fisher (1998, 2009); Fox 
(1998); Foxhall (1998); Bassi (2003); Cohen (2003); Deslauriers (2003); Graziosi and Haubold (2003); Clarke 
(2004); Roisman (2005); van Nortwick (2008). 
108 On male coalitions and hierarchies, see Chapter 1, pp. 24; 35; 35n133; 41; 41n180; 49; 53; 84n436. 
109 On honour-cultures, male reputations, and murder of women, see Chapter 1, pp. 18; 33; 33n118; 35n134; 37; 
54n266; 56n275; 62; 68-69; 70n360; 83-84. 
110 On Agamemnon’s ‘loss of allies’ (Aga. 213) as an unparalleled catastrophe which is all it takes to tip the scales 
of decision, see Lesky (1983a:17-18).  Cf. Agamemnon’s justifications to Klytaimestra in Euripides’ IA (1255-
1275), which review all the points raised in his self-debate in Aiskhylos: it would be more terrible if he did not 
commit the sacrifice; the army is large and desperate to wage war; the war cannot proceed without Iphigeneia’s 
death.  In addition, the army will kill him, his wife, and all their children if thwarted, and the real purpose of the 
war is to prevent the abduction of wives: he has no choice but to (unwillingly) obey his real master, Hellas.  If his 
reasoning is flawed in Aiskhylos, it is ridiculous in Euripides. 
111 On the benefits and costs to men of being an alpha-male, see Chapter 1, pp. 25n66; 34-36; 34n130; 35; 37; 
37n151; 41; 41n180; 48; 61-63; 67; 81-82. 
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Agamemnon in return for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia is not greater wealth, glory, and power, 
however, but the permanent loss of kingship, life, and honour, slain by the hand of a single 
woman. 
 
Furthermore, winning the position of alpha-male in an intensely competitive culture is a mixed 
blessing across species; males may sire more offspring, but tend to live shorter lives, and die 
though violence.112  Agamemnon himself is under no illusions about the negative social 
consequences of success: as he observes, the less fortunate loathe to see another’s prosperity, 
even close friends (832-837).  Critics often assume that the Argive commoners are genuinely 
loyal to Agamemnon, but the King is not loved as much as the Watchman’s opening lines imply 
(32-35).  The chorus of Argive elders may proclaim that their Atreid king deserves to be richly 
honoured above all mortals for his victories (529-532), but less than one hundred lines earlier 
they are muttering darkly that the ultimate reward for the excessively-praised, overly 
prosperous man is to be struck down by Zeus’s thunderbolt (468-471).  As the chorus in this 
play observe, the possession of wealth is no guarantee that a man will finish life without 
attracting divine disapproval, especially when an oikos has more than is necessary (369-378); 
furthermore, when a rich man is also impious, he has no chance against the displeasure of the 
gods (381-384).  The chorus also anticipate that Agamemnon – the target of gods and black 
Furies – will face assassination because he is responsible for many deaths, including many 
young men of his own people (32-474, 451-466).  Klytaimestra and her lover actually rule with 
the tacit support of the demos, and the chorus leave us in no doubt that the threat of citizen 
rebellion against the returning king is genuine.113  The chorus of elders eagerly inform on their 
fellow-citizens, pouring forth tales of potential treachery to Agamemnon (807-809), yet they 
fail to warn him of the actual and more dangerous treason committed by his wife and cousin; 
Agamemnon’s response to any threat from the demos is simply that he will cure any 
misbehaviour through violence (848-850).  The chorus liken the angry talk of the demos to a 
curse upon the house (456-457), and Klytaimestra’s later observation that Agamemnon is 
ἐράσμιον πόλει, ‘desired by the city’ (605) is doubly ironic: the people want him back just as 
much as she does, and for exactly the same reason: his slaughter of their innocent offspring.  
According to Agamemnon, the army ἐπιθυμεῖν ‘set their hearts upon’ (or ‘greatly desired’) the 
                                                          
112 On the negative health-effects of being an alpha-male, see Chapter 1, pp. 35; 37; 37n151; 61-62. 
113 On disaffected citizens’ support of Aigisthos in the absence of this king, see Lattimore (1972:74).  Denniston 
and Page (1957:xii) draw a parallel between the returning Agamemnon and the successful but corrupted Spartan 
general Pausanias, who was killed in 470 BCE by his own, dissatisfied people, after returning home after war. 
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bloody sacrifice of Iphigeneia (216), yet, as the herald observes, those who survived the war-
venture do not think their gains outweighed their pains (573-574).  Nor will Agamemnon’s 
victory counterbalance his own eventual pain.  The anger of the demos is aimed solely at the 
Atreids (447-451), and the chorus agree that the Atreids’ military venture demonstrated poor 
judgement and was θράσος ἐκ θυσιῶν ‘voluntarily reckless’ (799-804). 
 
Agamemnon the General has dishonoured his office in the hope of personal gain, and 
Agamemnon the King returns to rule through blatantly brute force; the demos do not love him, 
although their loyalty may be enforced through fear.114  The upholding of reputation for a ruler’s 
willingness to respond rapidly to dissidence is essential to a male’s continued power.115  The 
chorus expects that Agamemnon will root out all citizenly dissention (807-809), but he quite 
unabashedly plans to set the demos ‘right’ through use of fire or knife (848-850.  The chorus 
accept his policy declaration without comment, yet when Aigisthos threatens them with mere 
arrest and confinement in darkness (1621-1623, 1639-1642), they describe him as an aspiring 
tyrant (1628-1632).116  Agamemnon the home-coming Husband also has little to recommend 
him: those familiar with Homer (Il. 1.112-115) know that, in front of all his allies, Agamemnon 
preferred Khryseis (his captive slave) to his royal-born wife Klytaimestra.  For all 
Klytaimestra’s protestations of joy as he arrives at the palace, Agamemnon’s first words to her 
(Aga. 914-919) identify her as her mother’s child, rather than as his own wife; he disapproves 
her actions and declarations of love; and he commands her to stop doing what she is doing; 
there is no mention in his greeting of love, or of the pain of their separation, as there is in her 
speech to him.117  In the context of the ancient Greek (literary) world, however, real men felt 
no discomfort in expressing positive emotion about masculine honour, duty to nation, or 
willingness to war.118 
                                                          
114 On Agamemnon’s inheritance of power, which he retained through fear rather than goodwill, see also Hdt. 
1.9.3. 
115 On the alpha-male’s necessary willingness to enforce authority through brutal violence, see Chapter 1, pp. 18; 
33; 33n118; 35n134; 36n138; 37; 37n149; 56n275; 62; 69; 70n360; 82-83; 83n430. 
116 Cf. Agamemnon’s tyrannical threats against dissenters – burning and the knife – and the traditional, oozing-
pitch torture of the Greeks, which the chorus hope will be the fate of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos (Khoe. 267-268).  
See also Sommerstein (2008:247n58). 
117 On Agamemnon’s homecoming speech to his wife as “cold, impersonal, and unsympathetic”, see Stanford 
(1942:116). 
118 For the positive, emotional experience of dying for one’s country in real-world Athens, see Thoukydides’ report 
of Perikles’ patriotic praise of the war-dead in his Funeral Oration (Thouk. 2.36-2.43).  On Greek warfare and 





Agamemnon is the archetypal Greek real man and war-hero, willing to sacrifice everything –
including members of his own oikos – for the glory of his house and of his nation.  In a shame-
culture, he has little choice if he wishes to retain his status and position.119  Upholding of one’s 
reputation is the primary motivator of action among mortals, nations, and gods alike; the 
potential loss of public reputation in ancient Greece is the greater crime than filicide: the Atreids 
had no choice in a shame-culture but to muster an army against the great city of Troy to remedy 
the “gross insult” to their masculine honour through warfare.  Individually, Agamemnon’s 
reputation as man and leader depends upon convincing the public that he is personally willing 
to risk impossible costs, and his escalating commitment to a protracted, increasingly disastrous 
war is a typical reaction to the sunk-costs experience of those investing in impossibly risky 
endeavours; consequently, he works hard to shift perceptions of the costs of war into 
appreciation of the benefits.120  The glory-seeking Agamemnon yields to Klytaimestra’s 
persuasion only because Klytaimestra cleverly frames acquiescence to her suggestions as yet 
another personal victory for him, and thus as further evidence of his superiority; Agamemnon 
cannot escape his need to win, a masculine ‘necessity’ which will lead to his inevitable ruin. 
 
Agamemnon places all the blame for his change of heart over Iphigeneia’s sacrifice upon 
ἀνάγκας ‘necessity’ (218), and insists that this necessity is the avoidance – at all costs – of 
ξυμμαχίας ἁμαρτών ‘losing his allies’ (212).121  But Agamemnon’s real error is that – instead 
of carrying out the culturally-required murder of his child with public display of patriotic duty 
as well as reluctant dismay – he willingly embraces the sacrifice with an excessive passion 
utterly inappropriate to the action, and so the act becomes one of atē, ‘ruin’ or ‘madness’.122  
Some identify the παρακοπά ‘frenzy’ sent by Zeus (223) as the cause of Agamemnon’s 
                                                          
119 On the evolutionary selection of men’s disposition to uphold status and power, see Chapter 1, pp. 17; 22; 28; 
29n91; 31-32; 34-36; 34n126; 34n130; 35n133; 35n134; 37; 39; 41-43; 49n230; 49n232; 56; 69; 70n360; 83. 
120 On irrational escalation of commitment or sunk-cost fallacy, see Sleesman et al (2012); Kelly and Milkman 
(2013).  On the impossible costs of Agamemnon’s victory, see Lattimore (1953:10); Saxonhouse (1984:19-20); 
Sommerstein (1996:427). 
121 Some scholars view this so-called necessity as sufficient excuse for his decision; see Lesky (1966b:81; 
1983a:17); Dover (1973:65); Heath (1987:18); Buxton (2007:184), but others do not: Conacher (1987:14); 
Rabinowitz (2008:102). 
122 On Agamemnon’s unseemly enthusiasm for the sacrifice of his child, see Edwards (1977:30); Lesky (1983a:18, 
22; 1983b:114); Seaford (1989:91-92n27); Nussbaum (1985:249-250; 1986:33, 35-36).  Others dispute the 
importance of atē in Agamemnon’s decision-making process in the Agamemnon: Gantz (1982:11); Hammond 
(1972:97); Seaford (1989:91-92).  On hamartia ‘mistakes’, atē ‘temporary insanity’, and divine displeasure at 
individual hybris in Aiskhylos’ work, see Dawe (1967:109); Bremer (1969:133); Ferguson (1972:33); Stinton 
(1975); Østerud (1976); Sherman (1992); Saïd (2005:220). 
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madness.123  But Klytaimestra’s trap to catch the king’s conscience proves irrefutably that this 
‘madness’ is actually just Agamemnon’s habitual ethos: Agamemnon is perfectly well-suited, 
through inherited disposition and individual character, to his role of child-killer; he is a man 
willing to forgo sound-mindedness, at Aulis, solely on the say-so of some person with authority 
(933-934), and he continues to behave just as unsoundly in the present moment before the doors 
of his own palace in Argos.124  Although some critics contend that Agamemnon is just another 
victim of the family ethos, unable to extricate himself from his terrible situation, others argue 
that Agamemnon’s moral crimes were so extensive as to preclude any appeal to the family curse 
alone as inspiring his crimes.125 
 
The question of whether Agamemnon had any real choice and therefore any moral culpability 
in the matter of his daughter’s sacrifice has also been enthusiastically debated.126  While in 
Homeric epic there is no moral offence in rightful killing, there is also no difference in 
consequences created by accidental or intentional murder, and no mitigating factors; murderers 
can cleanse themselves of pollution for any kind of killing through appropriate ritual and are 
able to compensate their victim’s family with sufficient payment.127  Yet Agamemnon does not 
seem to view his divinely ordained filicide as requiring any purification, although – according 
to the chorus’ report – his internal debate about the imminent sacrifice shows that he 
understands that this killing is somehow wrong, musing that ‘overboldness’ leads men to 
‘unholy, shameful behaviour’, with the result of ‘suffering’ (205-224); despite this awareness, 
as the chorus further testify (224-227), Agamemnon is brought to his decision by no one else 
but himself.  To search for evidence of free will in Aiskhylos’ rewriting of a well-known 
                                                          
123 Dawe (1967:110); Beck (1975:72); Lloyd-Jones (1962:192; 1983b:71); Peradotto (2007:237). 
124 On Agamemnon’s off-stage “capture” by Ate as repeated in this play’s carpet-scene, see Edwards (1977:29). 
125 On Agamemnon as an unwilling victim, caught up in the consequences of his father’s ancient crimes, see 
Denniston and Page (1957:xxiii-xxix); Lloyd-Jones (1962:190, 197, 199; 1970a:10-11; 1971:87; 1979:23; 
1983b:69, 71); Nussbaum (1985:247; 1986:34).  On Agamemnon’s inheritance of the evil Atreid disposition, see 
Murray (1940:193-195); Sommerstein (1996:366-7); Peradotto (2007:235-236, 242); Sewell-Rutter (2007:66, 75-
76); Hall (2010:212-214); Fletcher (2012:38, 42).  On Pelops’ curse upon Atreus and Thyestes for their murder of 
their half-brother Khrysippus, see Hellanikos (FrGrHist 4 F 157); Thoukydides (1.9.2). 
126 On divine intention in the play as deliberately relieving Agamemnon of moral culpability, see Whallon 
(1961:84); Fontenrose (1971:83); Goldhill (1986:197); Nussbaum (1986:33); Pope (1986:21); Saïd (2005:226).  
On Agamemnon’s immoral act, and the great price he must pay, see Murray (1940:192-193); Vickers (1973:354-
355); Gagarin (1976:9); Knox (1979:32); Gantz (1982:10-12); Lesky (1983b:16). 
127 On Greek views of murder, see Gagarin (1976:8-9).  On Aiskhylos’ tragedy and ancient Greek views of guilt 
as transferable, contaminating, and inheritable, see MacNeice (1936:7); Ferguson (1972:33); Gantz (1982:1); 
Lesky (1983b:112); Parker (1983:201n65); Sommerstein (2002:39); Storey and Allan (2005:244); Sewell-Rutter 
(2007:18, 59, 79). 
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narrative is a mistake, however: Iphigeneia is destined to be sacrificed; Agamemnon is destined 
to kill his daughter; and Klytaimestra is destined to kill her husband.  The better question is 
why Agamemnon’s immoral crime of impious sacrifice and Orestes’ immoral crime of impious 
matricide should be equated – as it is by so many of the commentators within (and outside of) 
the Oresteia – with Klytaimestra’s crime of mariticide.128 
 
Whereas Agamemnon’s and Orestes’ actions are often viewed by critics as being evoked by 
external forces, and therefore open to debate about culpability, Klytaimestra’s willingness to be 
the alastōr of the oikos on behalf of her daughter is viewed as the desire of no one but herself, 
leading to discussion about how Aiskhylos shapes audience perceptions of her true inner nature, 
motivation and behaviour.  In fact, Klytaimestra’s ethos shifts in response to external, previous, 
and off-stage events all outside of her control, transforming her from compliant wife and mother 
to avenging Fury; after her on-stage aristeia she changes once again, her grandeur diminishes 
and she is a proper, humbly deferential gyne as she once was for Agamemnon, her superior 
intelligence now subverted to soothing her husband Aigisthos’ bluster.129  Aiskhylos introduces 
her by degrees to the audience in the opening speech of the Watchman’s opening speech: the 
first mention of her states that she possesses ‘a heart like a man’s’ (7-11); then she is 
‘Agamemnon’s wife’ (26-29); thirdly – in her presence and by direct address – she is 
‘Tyndareos’ daughter’ (83-84); and only lastly is she ‘queen Klytaimestra’ (84).  Klytaimestra 
is presented as a woman with man-like cunning, a man’s wife, and a man’s daughter: only lastly 
she is a named, female individual, with her own social status.  She identifies herself, however, 
as mother and avenger of a daughter (1521-1529), roles conceptually at odds with Greek 
expectations of proper female being – she also specifically denies she is Agamemnon’s wife 
(Aga. 1499).  Kalkhas also (obliquely) predicts that she will be the avenger of a child (150-
155).  Only after the murder of her existing husband does she willingly embrace the proper 
ethos of wifehood. 
 
The chorus’ interactions with the queen also demonstrate an ambivalence toward this 
anomalously intelligent, powerful woman.130  Education and status are both qualities in women 
                                                          
128 Dodds (1960:26-27).  On the trilogy’s repeated thematic emphasis on corrupted sacrifice, including Iphigeneia’s 
unlawful murder (Aga. 151), see Zeitlin (1965:464, 472-473, 480, 489); Heath (1999a:29). 
129 On Klytaimestra’s return to conventional femininity after the murder of Agamemnon, see Vickers (1973:387, 
424); Michelini (1979:155); Rosenmeyer (1982:239); Schenker (1999:655); Rutherford (2012:305). 
130 On the original audience’s inability to reconcile female mental capacity with social constraints on female 
activity, see Rose (1992:229). 
122 
 
that are tolerated rather than sought by males seeking mates across cultures; women seeking 
male mates are careful to conceal or downplay these qualities.131  Klytaimestra appears from 
within the palace, and the chorus immediately offer their respects to ‘her power’, exercised 
when the ‘male throne’ is empty (258-260).  They make no claim that Klytaimestra has 
attempted to usurp direct rulership; her ‘power’ derives solely from her continued position as 
Agamemnon’s wife.  Furthermore, if the male throne was occupied – properly – by a male, 
there would be no need for them to offer reverence to a woman; obviously, Aigisthos has not – 
as so many critics assume – taken possession of the throne.  Despite the Watchman’s 
acknowledgement of her ‘man-like intelligence’ – and the chorus’ own claims about the 
reverence due a queen – they refuse to accept her news about the beacon; rather, they instantly 
presume that her knowledge must come from persuasive dream or foolish rumour (264-273).  
At this, Klytaimestra protests their likening of her ‘wits’ to those of a young child (274-277).  
Just once the chorus acknowledge her intelligence, but – like the Watchman – they cannot 
accept that a woman could be wise in her own right; her εὐφρόνως ‘gracious’ speech is therefore 
like that of ἄνδρα σώφρον᾽, ‘a sensible man’ (351).  Despite their lip-service belief in her man-
like πιστά τεκμήρια ‘trustworthy evidence’ (351-352), as soon as she leaves the stage the chorus 
revert to their distrust of female intellect, criticizing women’s disposition to ‘precipitous and 
fruitless credulity’ (483-487). 
 
Even when Klytaimestra stands over the indisputable reality of Agamemnon’s bloody corpse, 
the chorus still cannot accept her claims to autonomous capacity, responding to her declaration 
that this deed is her own with incredulous amazement (1399-1400).  Like Agamemnon, 
suffering has taught these old men nothing.  Klytaimestra’s contemptuous reply to their wilful 
blindness warns them that she is fearless, and does not care whether they accept her or not 
(1401-1404).  Too late, the chorus perceive the possibility of female power, but even now they 
view this as exceptional; Klytaimestra’s great cunning and enormous pride must be the result 
of her exposure to φονολιβεῖ ‘flowing blood’, which has φρὴν ἐπιμαίνεται ‘driven her mad’ 
(1426-1428); the chorus believe that Klytaimestra’s deranged mind is responsible for her 
arrogant words, and their reference to ‘flowing blood’ may refer to menses, the monthly event 
that helps distinguish females from males, and which – according to traditional belief – 
incapacitates female mentation.132  In fact, Klytaimestra is motivated – not maddened – by the 
                                                          
131 On males’ preference for female mates with less intelligence, education, and status than themselves, see Chapter 
1, pp. 29-30; 29n91; 34; 34n130; 41-42; 56. 
132 On this allusion to blood and female menses, see Sommerstein (2008:174-175n303). 
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flowing blood of a daughter, and her hands will soon become red with the flowing blood of a 
husband.  No one in this play exhibits genuine respect for Klytaimestra, or compassion for her 
long-grieved loss; the Watchman, the chorus, Agamemnon – even Aigisthos – all treat her as 
uninformed, unimportant, or peripheral and instrumental.  As some observe, in the subsequent 
Oresteia plays, almost every character is aggressively antagonistic toward her, and seeks to 
present the worst possible picture of her nature.133  Even her beloved Aigisthos never directly 
addresses Klytaimestra in the Agamemnon, being primarily concerned with his own ancient 
enmity against the Atreids. 
 
Scholarship on Klytaimestra’s ethos, motivation, and culpability is abundant and enthusiastic; 
critics argue that she is one of the most impressive, complex, and fully realized characters in 
tragedy.134  Critical interpretations of Klytaimestra range from horror to positive delight in her 
magnificence.135  Some critics draw attention to Klytaimestra’s purported impiety, others to the 
transgressive quality of Klytaimestra’s persuasive utterances: some conclude that there is truth 
in her statements, others that her speeches are ambiguous.136  One aspect of Klytaimestra’s 
ethos which always attracts interest is the integrity of her maternal disposition.137  Another is 
Klytaimestra’s female μῆτις ‘cunning intelligence’, so often the focus of male anxiety in Greek 
                                                          
133 Zelenak (1998:62-63); Hall (2010:212). 
134 Tucker (1935:9); Stanford (1942:116-117); Ferguson (1972:79); Gould (1980:56); Otis (1981:57); Rosenmeyer 
(1982:255); Pool (1983:114-115); Bell (1991:133); Easterling (1993:18).  On the complex Klytaimestra who 
attracts both critical admiration and revulsion, see also Rosenmeyer (1982:235); Foley (2001:205); Sharrock and 
Ash (2002:41); Fletcher (2012:44).  Ancient sources with information on Klytaimestra’s fictional life and character 
include: Apollodoros 3.10.6; Homer Il. 9.145, 287, 13.365, 24.299; Od. 1.28, 30, 298, 3.263, 4.365, 518, 524, 
11.400, 422, 24.96; Dictys Cretensis 1.20; Pausanias 2.16.5, 18.5, 22.4; Aiskh. Aga. 1260, 1492, Khoe. 732, 931; 
Eur. Or. 26, 162, 804, El. 1245; Soph. El. 11, 35, 296, 530, 1346, 1405; Tzetzes on Lykophron 1099; Hyginus Fab 
77. 
135 For extreme dislike of Klytaimestra, see Whallon (1980:139); Otis (1981:57); Pope (1986:18-19); Heath 
(1987:21); Zeitlin (1996:650); Wilson (2000:131-132).  On Aiskhylos’ depiction of a magnificent Klytaimestra as 
intentionally sympathetic, see Saxonhouse (1984:11, 30); Vellacott (1984:72); Storey and Allan (2005:247).  For 
positive views of Klytaimestra, see Norwood (1948:103-104); Lattimore (1954:13; 1972:75); Foley (1981:133); 
Vellacott (1984:105); Ferguson (1987:18). 
136 On Klytaimestra’s “impious transgression” of the code of xenia, see Roth (1993:5).  On the transgressive 
Klytaimestra’s, impiety toward the dead, see Hame (2004:513).  On Klytaimestra’s rhetorical, persuasive power, 
see Stanford (1942:119-120); Goldhill (1986:4); Rosenmeyer’s (1982:237-238).  On Klytaimestra’s duplicity, see 
McClure (1999:27); Rabinowitz (2008:98); Rutherford (2012:299); Fletcher (2012:48).  Vellacott (1984:69) warns 
that while critics often accuse Klytaimestra of deceptive lies, Agamemnon’s lies to facilitate Iphigeneia’s death 
are often ignored, as are the accomplished lies of Orestes in Khoephoroi.  On Klytaimestra’s utterances as truthful 
for those willing to hear her, see Lattimore (1954:14); Saxonhouse (1984:16).  On the authenticity of 
Klytaimestra’s claims, see also McClure (1997:113); Bushnell (2007:49). 
137 On Klytaimestra’s dematernalization in the Oresteia, see Hame (2004:535); McClure (2006:82). 
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literature.138  While the forceful ethos of the queen is clearly the heart of the Agamemnon, some 
scholars argue that the queen’s characteristic τόλμα – ‘recklessness, overboldness, daring’ – 
proves that she is a dangerous villain.139  Such criticism reflects the EP finding that dominant 
behaviours in women are widely disapproved, except in defence of children, or when enacted 
against other women.140  Critical discussion of Klytaimestra’s transgressive behaviour is often 
far from dispassionate or impartial, however; some insist that Klytaimestra rightly deserves her 
literary reputation for wicked evil; others that an innately admirable Klytaimestra is forced to 
husband-murder only through the evil behaviour of others.141  The most heated question in 
scholarship on Klytaimestra is her moral culpability in killing Agamemnon: is she sincere in 
attributing Iphigeneia’s murder as the cause of his death?142  If anything, motives for 
Klytaimestra’s murder of her husband are over-numerous, and over-determined; every possible 
explanation for his death is suggested in turn throughout the play, including Aigisthos’ 
independent desire for vengeance against the Atreid patriline.143 
 
Klytaimestra’s apparently cryptic speech of welcome as Agamemnon crosses over the red fabric 
is an anguished but elaborately coded affidavit offering a personal account of her experience 
and motivation:  
 
ἔστιν θάλασσα, τίς δέ νιν κατασβέσει; 
τρέφουσα πολλῆς πορφύρας ἰσάργυρον 
κηκῖδα παγκαίνιστον, εἱμάτων βαφάς· 
οἶκος δ᾽ ὑπάρχει τῶνδε σὺν θεοῖς, ἅναξ, 
                                                          
138 On Klytaimestra’s – and Greek women’s – dangerous intelligence, see Vickers (1973:358); Winnington-Ingram 
(1983a:102); Saxonhouse (1984:15); Rose (1992:229); Lefkowitz (2007:175); Carson (2009:3).  For the possible 
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139 Zeitlin (1965:651); Lesky (1983b:106); Rosenmeyer (1982:236); Pool (1983:106); Sommerstein (1996:202); 
Komar (2003:32); Rutherford (2012:299).  On τόλμα as alluding to ‘transgressive villainy’, see Jones (1962:121); 
Carne-Ross (1981:21). 
140 On dominance in women, see Chapter 1, pp. 41; 41n178; 81. 
141 On the distinctive metaphorical imagery of the Oresteia and perceptions of Klytaimestra’s evil nature, see 
Stanford (1942:89-90, 94); Peradotto (1964:379, 381, 383, 387, 388, 390); Vickers (1973:360); Rabinowitz 
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142 On Iphigeneia’s murder as the genuine reason for Agamemnon’s death, see Garvie (1996:140); van Erp 
Taalman Kip (1996:119).  Cf. Rosenmeyer (1982:236-237), who contends that Klytaimestra’s actions are the result 
of her rage against her restriction as a domesticated woman in the very male world of Greek society. 




ἔχειν: πένεσθαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίσταται δόμος. 
πολλῶν πατησμὸν δ᾽ εἱμάτων ἂν ηὐξάμην, 
δόμοισι προυνεχθέντος ἐν χρηστηρίοις, 
ψυχῆς κόμιστρα τῆσδε μηχανωμένῃ. 
ῥίζης γὰρ οὔσης φυλλὰς ἵκετ᾽ ἐς δόμους, 
σκιὰν ὑπερτείνασα σειρίου κυνός· 
καὶ σοῦ μολόντος δωματῖτιν ἑστίαν, 
θάλπος μὲν ἐν χειμῶνι σημαίνεις μολόν· 
ὅταν δὲ τεύχῃ Ζεὺς ἀπ᾽ ὄμφακος πικρᾶς 
οἶνον, τότ᾽ ἤδη ψῦχος ἐν δόμοις πέλει, 
ἀνδρὸς τελείου δῶμ᾽ ἐπιστρωφωμένου. 
 
‘There is a sea – who will ever staunch it? – which nourishes an enormous, endlessly-
renewed flood of purple dye, worth its weight in silver, for the drenching of fabric.  Of 
this, through the support of the gods, the household already holds plenty, lord; yet the 
house does not know painful labours.  Many tramplings upon the household’s garments 
would I have vowed, if it had been so commanded by an oracle, as the price for the 
governance of this life.  For while there is a root, foliage comes into the house, stretching 
to cast shade to the hound of Sirius [i.e. the hottest time of the year].  And you have 
come to the very hearth of our home, as the signal of warmth in winter; whenever Zeus 
makes wine from bitter, unripe grapes, then already the winter-chill enters into the 
house, when the all-ruling man frequents the home’ (958-972).144 
 
Who indeed will staunch the endless sea of bloody misery which Agamemnon has unleashed 
upon the world?  The fabric he steps upon as she speaks is the sea of crimson blood he poured 
out as he trampled his way from Aulis to Ilium.  That flood of precious purple provides the dye 
to drench the garments of the Atreid household, unoppressed by material poverty, but this house 
remains ignorant of the painful labours required to produce the real wealth of the house – 
children – who can never be replaced.145  Agamemnon behaves as if his children – the true 
wealth of his household – are an endless resource; in theory this may be true for men, but it can 
never be the case for women, whose average optimum lifetime potential appears to be five 
                                                          
144 On the association of the star Sirius and the hottest time of the year, see Sommerstein (2008:113n205). 
145 Morell (1996-1997:158) argues that the implied abundance of fabric in the never-poor oikos (Aga. 964) alludes 
to “excessive wealth”. 
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offspring (with perhaps seven as an upper-limit).  Is Klytaimestra suggesting (963-964) that she 
also would act impiously in order to bring Agamemnon home to his reckoning?  Or is she 
mocking Agamemnon’s flimsy excuse for trampling upon the house’s wealth – Iphigeneia – at 
the command of an oracle?  The last part of Klytaimestra’s complex speech is specific to the 
environment and agriculture of ancient Greece, but where on earth would anyone ‘harvest’ 
immature grapes in winter?  All of the seasons here are out of joint, she implies, and the 
tyrannical man jeopardizes the home, like unnatural warmth in the midst of winter when fruit-
bearing branches require a sufficient period of frost.  And Zeus is not the proper god appointed 
to oversee the creation of good wine!  The unripe grape of the house, a tender treasure worth 
its weight in silver, has been harvested out of season, and by the very lord of the oikos who 
ought to protect the wealth of the house from the hostile environment outside.  Klytaimestra’s 
painful labours go unhonoured and her precious child made into bitter wine; the unnatural wine 
might be made according to the will of Zeus, but Agamemnon was his vintner, and Klytaimestra 
is going to prune this household’s root deep at its foundation.  There is no warmth here for the 
man who wanted to conquer the world, through the murder of a philos. 
 
Despite this cryptic confession, critics persistently query Klytaimestra’s motivation: is it really 
revenge for Iphigeneia, or love of Aigisthos, or jealousy of Kassandra; is she evil or just the 
unwitting instrument of divine plan or of the Atreid family curse?146  Pindar in his Pythian 11 
offers a choice between motives for Klytaimestra’s plan – the murder of Iphigenia, the love of 
Aigisthos, and the jealousy over Kassandra – but Aiskhylos incorporates and expands on all 
three.  Some suggest that Klytaimestra simply aims to seize power in her own right.147  Some 
draw attention to the astonishing omission in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia of Agamemnon’s killing of 
her first husband and son, a feature of the story reintroduced in Euripides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis.148  
Klytaimestra’s own account of her motivation ignores the Trojan campaign, her affair with 
Aigisthos, or the obsessive sexual jealousy so often attributed to her: she only desires vengeance 
upon Agamemnon’s for the murder of her child, and it is Agamemnon’s infidelities in general 
                                                          
146 Hammond (1972:94); Bell (1991:135); Sommerstein (1996:202); Rutherford (2012:306).  On the obvious 
validity of Klytaimestra’s primary motive of Iphigeneia, see Gagarin (1976:64); Saxonhouse (1984:17-18); 
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147 Lattimore (1972:75); Foley (1981:151); Sommerstein (1996:192); Storey and Allan (2005:98); Fletcher 
(2012:41). 
148 Gantz (1966:550).  According to Euripides’ IA, Agamemnon killed her first husband in the course of his taking 
power in Argos. 
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which offend her as a secondary motive; Kassandra is merely the latest instance of this, and her 
arrival simply serves – as Klytaimestra testifies – as a παροψώνημα, ‘side-dish’ to the greater 
pleasure in the accomplished vengeance (1446).149 
 
Other critics do concede that Iphigeneia’s murder – and her mother’s subsequent pain – were 
serious and sufficient motives for Klytaimestra’s acts.150  Klytaimestra’s own statements 
highlight the hypocrisy of a community which turns a blind eye to the expeditious killing of a 
child; in the closing scenes of the Agamemnon she admits to now being the object of savage 
hatred, but points out that no one has ever suggested that Agamemnon should be reviled for his 
hideous act (1412-1421).  Her freely-confessed motivation for the murder could not be more 
explicit: in later response to the chorus’ complaint that their king’s death is ἀνελεύθερον, 
‘shameful’ (1518), Klytaimestra replies that Agamemnon has received the rightful price of 
treacherous sin against the oikos, for his victim was her body’s own ἔρνος ‘scion’ (1521-1529).  
Klytaimestra’s confession also reminds her audience that she slew Agamemnon with the 
assistance of the divine powers, ‘Ate and the Erinys’ (1433).  The biased chorus cannot respond 
to Klytaimestra’s truthful testimony, but must resort instead to personal invective, accusing 
Klytaimestra of being mad, proud, and cunning.  Nevertheless, and despite all of Klytaimestra’s 
clear references to the impious killing of Iphigeneia as the reason for Agamemnon’s death, 
some persistently deny that the slaughter of Iphigeneia was motivation for Klytaimestra’s 
revenge, and that her adulterous love for Aigisthos outweighs all other factors.151 
 
Still others maintain that Klytaimestra’s principal motive is love for Aigisthos – apparently the 
play’s ‘romantic object’ – insisting that only a woman’s love for a man could inspire the killing 
of a husband.152  However, in accord with EP findings, battered or abused women are most 
                                                          
149 On the death of Thyestes’ children at the hand of Atreus as the motivation for Aigisthos’ participation in the 
murder (something too many critics conveniently forget), see Schaps (1993:508).  On the murder of Agamemnon 
as the result of many “male abuses”, such as the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and the feast upon Thyestes’ sons, as well 
as the slaughter of the innocents of Troy, see Murnaghan (2005:235-236). 
150 On the unthinkable cruelty of Agamemnon’s murder of Klytaimestra’s child, see Sturgeon (1914:104-105); 
Bell (1991:264); Loraux (1998:49).  For sources on Iphigeneia’s death with and without rescue, see Aiskh. Aga. 
184 ff., 1412 ff., 1521 ff., Soph. El. 563 ff.  Cf. Pind. Pyth. 11, 32 ff.  For details of the death in Latin poets, see 
Lucr. 1 84 ff., Prop. 3, 7, 24, Virg. Aen. 2, 116; contrast Ov. Met. 12, 27 ff., Ep. Pont. 3, 2, 59 ft., Juv. 12, 119. 
151 Tucker (1935:5); Hammond (1972:92); Lloyd-Jones (1979:22); Whallon (1980:138); Winnington-Ingram 
(1983a:91); Lefkowitz (2007:175). 
152 On Klytaimestra’s adultery as the motive for Agamemnon’s’ murder, see Vickers (1973:361); Griffith 




likely to kill a husband or partner as a last-resort measure to defend children or their own lives.  
The adultery explanation also overlooks how the death of a child affects a mother at the socio-
biological, emotional, and physiological level; mothering is not the same as fathering, and it is 
perhaps difficult for some critics to appreciate quite how sufficient the motivation of her 
daughter’s death would have been to Klytaimestra.153  On the other hand, there is undoubtedly 
real love between Klytaimestra and her paramour: she diffuses the tensions between her lover 
Aigisthos – ‘dearest of men’ – and the chorus of elders, pleading with him to avoid doing evil 
– and he obeys (1654-1666).  Such harmonious heterosexual, monogamous coupledom is an 
atypical behaviour in male-authored Greek literature: Agamemnon’s scornful denigration of 
Klytaimestra as his wife in the Iliad (1.113-115) contrasts with Klytaimestra’s sincere 
declarations of attachment to Aigisthos in Agamemnon (1435-1437).  Klytaimestra’s chosen 
union with Aigisthos is clearly an improvement – for her – upon her forced marriage to 
Agamemnon, however; presumably, Klytaimestra and Aigisthos dwell together happily as 
husband and wife for many years.  Klytaimestra earlier confirms that Aigisthos is ‘well-
intentioned’ toward her (1436); she describes him as the man who αἴθῃ πῦρ ἐφ᾽ ἑστίας ἐμῆς 
‘kindles my hearth’ (1435).154  Klytaimestra’s final words to Aigisthos are ones every Greek 
husband would approve from the appointed guardian of his oikos: ‘I, and you, prevailing, we 
will set the affairs of the house in order’ (1672-1673).155  Finally, a few others – bizarrely – 
contend that the disgruntled wife’s sexual jealousy of Kassandra’s relationship with 
Agamemnon motivates Klytaimestra’s unnatural rage.156  Married women’s difficulty with the 
custom of concubinage was (and is) a genuine concern, but this view of jealousy as motive 
assumes that Klytaimestra is still in some way emotionally attached to Agamemnon.157  The 
war-captive Kassandra is not the target of a jealous woman who fears she will be side-lined by 
                                                          
153 Some conclude that the Agamemnon’s characters also fail to grasp the reality of a bereaved mother’s grief, see 
Saxonhouse (1984:20); Sommerstein (1996:263).  On the increased mortality of mothers due to loss of a child, see 
Chapter 1, pp. 46-47; 47n215; 55, 64n264. 
154 It hardly matters whether ‘kindling my hearth’ is or is not an allusion to sexual activity: they are, after all, 
explicitly lovers; the allusion reveals no new information to the audience, and is one of the play’s cheaper 
throwaway-entendres. 
155 Aigisthos’ own declaration that, ἐκ τῶν δὲ τοῦδε χρημάτων πειράσομαι/ ἄρχειν πολιτῶν, ‘Out of the property 
of this man I will endeavour to rule the citizens’ (Aga. 1638-1639), suggests that the wealth of the Tantalid estate 
will be used for favours, and also perhaps for mercenaries. 
156 Sturgeon (1914:106); Denniston (1939:xvi); Lattimore (1972:75); Rabinowitz (2008:102).  No original version 
of the myth suggests that there was ever ‘love’ between Agamemnon and Klytaimestra (as there was ‘love’ 
between Paris and Helen). 
157 On the Agamemnon as depicting wifely reaction to culturally-typical concubinage, see Wilson (2000:132). 
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the husband she loves, but incidental, collateral damage in a war waged by a woman who has 
become the ekthros of the man she happens to be married to. 
 
That this Klytaimestra is the divinely-appointed – and personally eager – alastōr tasked to 
avenge the murder of a child within the house is something signalled early in this play.158  
Kalkhas’ interpretation of the omen at Aulis warns that the sacrifice of Iphigeneia – the 
‘unfledged’ offspring of the lion Agamemnon – will bring about the vengeance of a cunning 
housekeeper, the Wrath which remembers and avenges a child (154-155).159  The chorus later 
identify the same daimon bestriding the slain king (1468-1474).  Klytaimestra herself agrees 
that she is become τὸν τριπάχυντον/ δαίμονα γέννης ‘the thrice-fattened daimon of this family’ 
(1475-1479).160  Zeus himself has approved Klytaimestra’s earnest prayer for successful 
vengeance (973-975), earlier uttered after she outlined Agamemnon’s wasting of the wealth of 
the house in an endless sea of blood, and the chorus agree that, in her role as alastōr of the 
oikos, Klytaimestra has been the instrument of παναιτίου πανεργέτα ‘all-causing, all-powerful’ 
Zeus (1481; 1485).161  Agamemnon’s death is in part divine justice for the terrible costs of war: 
the uncountable dead at Troy, including the deaths of many Greeks (62-63, 406-408).  She is 
Zeus’ appointed agent of vengeance on behalf of ‘the young’ for the ancient sins of Atreus 
χαλεποῦ θοινατῆρος, ‘the appalling feast-giver’ (1502-1504).162  Aigisthos – as everyone 
knows – is Agamemnon’s ἐχθρὸς ἦ παλαιγενής ‘ancient-born enemy’, but in response to the 
chorus’s accusations of cowardice, Aigisthos explains that Klytaimestra was better-placed to 
be an effective avenger (1636-1637).  If Aigisthos was known to be Agamemnon’s enemy, he 
would not have been admitted to the king’s presence, however brave and ready to commit 
violence Thyestes’ son might have been.  It also suggests, if nothing else, that Aigisthos was 
                                                          
158 On the power of avenging spirits, see also Euripides’ Hekabe (Hek. 685-686, 946-949). 
159 Goward (2005:55) translates these lines as ‘there awaits a fearful resurgent crafty housekeeper, mindful Anger, 
avenger of her children’; in her opinion, this person might be either Klytaimestra or the daimon, but the translation 
as it stands clearly identifies a female housekeeper and her children, offspring an alastōr cannot be said to have. 
160 In Klytaimestra’s oath – μὰ τὴν τέλειον τῆς ἐμῆς παιδὸς Δίκην,/ Ἄτην Ἐρινύν θ᾽, αἷσι τόνδ᾽ ἔσφαξ᾽ ἐγώ, ‘by 
this slaughter, accomplished on behalf of my child, by Justice, by Ruin (Ate), by the Fury, and by me’ (Aga. 1432-
1433) – she and the Fury are separate entities.  On her embodiment as the family alastōr, see Neuberg (1991:45-
46).  Although Klytaimestra identifies herself as the currently incarnated alastōr of the house, some critics argue 
to the contrary; see Bremer (1969:127); Lloyd-Jones (1983b:61); Neuberg (1991:50-51); Fletcher (2012:42).  Cf. 
Sewell-Rutter (2007:84), who observes that the alastōr is a single identity-less entity who identifies itself with one 
particular mortal at a time. 
161 On Klytaimestra is the divinely-appointed agent of retribution against the death-mongering Pelopids, see 
Anderson (1929:154); Kitto (1968:69); Lloyd-Jones (1983a:102); De Romilly (1985:51); Saïd (2005:225). 




not present in the palace at the time of the murder.  Klytaimestra has been the most effective – 
and willing – instrument of Zeus and must suffer the inevitable consequences, but now hopes 
that she can now negotiate with the family alastōr, announcing her intention to forgo any further 
quest for vengeance and the wish that the spirit of ἀλληλοφόνους, ‘mutual slaughter’ will depart 
forever to plague some other house; she will also give up a significant part of the house’s wealth 
to buy freedom from the μανίας ‘frenzy’ of kin-killing within the oikos (1568-1576).  After the 
murder, she declares that the deed was not her own; more important, however, is her statement 
that she is also no longer the wife of Agamemnon (1497-1499).163  Klytaimestra’s references 
to herself as a wife – before the murder – are excessively saccharine, dripping with ironic, 
antagonistic intent (600-604, 606-612); after the murder, she also calls Agamemnon ἐμὸς/ 
πόσις, νεκρὸς δέ, ‘my husband, a corpse’ (1404-1405). 
 
Disavowing her status as Agamemnon’s wife was the only way for Klytaimestra to reconcile 
the irreconcilable: a husband should be dear, but her husband had become her ekthros ‘mortal 
enemy’ (1637), giving her the moral authority and social obligation to murder him (and a good 
reason to ally with Agamemnon’s other ekthros, Aigisthos).  The dilemma represented in 
Agamemnon demonstrates the insoluble divide between the androcentric ideal of the wife as the 
upholder of a husband’s social and reproductive advantage and the biological necessity of the 
mother as producer and preserver of one’s own children.  Receiving the beacon’s message, 
Klytaimestra yearns for a happy outcome, likening the event to εὐάγγελος μέν… / ἕως γένοιτο 
μητρὸς εὐφρόνης πάρα, ‘good news… born from a mother in the kindly time of night’ (264-
265).  Alluding to childbirth reminds us that she is herself a mother, but one who has been 
deprived of her own night-born offspring; the happy event she hopes for is the death of her 
child’s killer.  Klytaimestra later discloses that, while waiting at home for his return, she 
received πολλὰς… κληδόνων παλιγκότων ‘many awful reports’, of Agamemnon’s death by 
another’s hand; these rumours caused her to attempt suicide (861-876).  The chorus, of course, 
assumes that any right-minded woman would not want to go on living after the death of a 
beloved husband, but Klytaimestra is enduring life only for the opportunity to accomplish by 
her own hand the yearned-for assassination of Agamemnon.  Sleepless nights were once filled 
                                                          
163 On Klytaimestra’s disavowal of herself as wife, see Neuberg (1991:62).  Roth (1993:3) argues that Klytaimestra 
is an “outsider with the status of guest” in the Atreid household.  Once she is unmarried from Agamemnon, 
Klytaimestra is no longer of his oikos at all (assuming she ever was).  In Lattimore’s (1954:9; 1972:73) opinion, 
Klytaimestra is simply “estranged” from her husband.  Cf. Holst-Warhaft (1992:155), who observes that from the 
very beginning of the Agamemnon, Klytaimestra “behaves like a widow”. 
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with tears, but that fountain eventually dried, and long mourning for Iphigeneia has hardened 
her; now she simply abides until his return is certain, and her vengeance may be accomplished 
in full (887-891).164 
 
She rejoices at Agamemnon’s arrival: everything is long-prepared over sleepless nights of 
planning, in accordance with justice and with the help of the gods (911-913).  Tormented nights 
of scheming will result not in the homecoming the strutting general imagines he is due, but in 
divinely-approved justice which she herself will dispense.  Afterwards, Klytaimestra confesses 
that the present events all proceed from πάλαι/ νείκης παλαιᾶς ἦλθε ‘an ancient quarrel from 
long ago’ (1377-1379).  Agamemnon returned is no husband and philos: he is ekthros, the 
murderer of her child, and worse, he has frankly admitted that he would be quite happy – under 
certain circumstances – to once again do whatever he is told, which invites the question of 
whether his violence will ever cease.  Battered women with prolonged experience of male 
violence – and an expectation of further harm – sometimes resort to the pre-emptive removal 
of the threat to surviving offspring.  From a sociobiological perspective, the absence of an older 
child’s father typically results in life-time disadvantage – except when that father is a habitual 
filicide. 
 
Agamemnon is such an established filicide, who – assuming Euripides’ and Hyginus’ later 
accounts drew upon traditional material – has already killed two of her children.165  This 
marriage is irretrievably voided through his sacrifice of the child she bore him: as the ritual 
words of the marriage-enguē – ‘I hand over this woman to you for the purpose of ploughing 
children’ (Menander, Frag. 720) – suggest, ancient Greek marriage was sealed by the 
production of offspring; marriage could also be dissolved by the removal of children.166  This 
aspect of the narrative storyline is not mere fiction: the dissolution of marriage following the 
extinction (or nonproduction) of offspring is a universal practice in many if not most cultures 
                                                          
164 Cf. Klytaimestra’s evocation of the sea, and her question about who could possibly dry it up (958). 
165 On Klytaimestra’s previous marriage to Tantalos (son of either Thyestes or Broteas), see Paus. 2.22.3; on 
Agamemnon’s murder of Klytaimestra’s first child and husband, see Euripides’ IA (1146ff); cf. also Lyons 
(2003:125). 
166 On the foundation of ancient Greek marriage in the production of children, see Sturgeon (1914:110); Visser 
(2000:152; Roth (1993:4-5); Visser (2000:152); Hame (2004:528).  On the murder of Iphigeneia and the 
“severance” of Klytaimestra’s union with Agamemnon, see Mitchell-Boyask (2006:277).  On the destruction of 




throughout recorded history.167  Filicidal fathers acting outside of law and convention forfeit 
their membership within the family, and this is why Klytaimestra is no longer bound to 
Agamemnon.  Dissent in the Atreid household over the murder of Iphigeneia embodies the 
primal gender conflict between the sexes’ respective reproductive strategies: Agamemnon’s 
sacrifice of Iphigeneia compromised Klytaimestra’s role as wife, mother, and woman, and not 
only because women at that time were so defined by their reproductive capacity; Klytaimestra’s 
fury at his politically-motivated child-killing is a natural – not monstrous – behaviour across 
species.168  A human woman in ancient Greece dishonoured in marriage – her motherhood 
trampled – could not take vengeance on her own account, however, and did not have the support 
of her society to do so, whereas a male who murders a female in the pursuit of honour is a 
hero.169 
 
Archaic Greeks agreed that vengeance should be a male-only pursuit, but nowhere in the many 
versions of the myth does any man close to her step up to avenge the murder of Iphigeneia, or 
even to discuss the possibility: Aigisthos cares only for his own vendetta against the house of 
Atreus; Iphigeneia’s maternal grandfather Tyndareos, presumably, is perhaps too old to act; 
nothing is said of her uncles, Kastor and Polydeukes.170  Orestes agonizes over whether killing 
his mother to avenge his father is the right thing to do, but he never once acknowledges the 
obvious insult to his mother’s honour, or that Klytaimestra was acting to avenge the offence 
against his sister; the Hesiodic narrative pattern of son’s support of the oppressed mother no 
longer pertains.171  If Klytaimestra transgresses gender boundaries, it is because she has no 
choice; this is problematic for ancient audiences and modern scholars alike, who cannot agree 
on whether the character of Klytaimestra – who exhibits more andreia than any other male in 
the play – is intentionally ‘masculinized’ in this play.172  But Klytaimestra does not want to be 
                                                          
167 On divorce due to the ‘failure’ of female fertility, see Chapter 1, pp. 60n304; 63. 
168 According to Sharrock and Ash (2002:67-68), any woman who attempts and succeeds in addressing insult to 
her honour must be depicted in Greek literature as a monster. 
169 Blondell et al (1999a:51).  Cf. Vernant (1981:22), who argues that Iphigeneia’s sacrifice was the result of 
Agamemnon’s political ambition, not of piety. 
170 On vengeance as a male prerogative, see Vickers (1973:30). 
171 Kronos and Zeus in Hesiod’s Theogony (173-182, 494-496) both act against their own fathers upon their 
respective mothers’ behalf. 
172 On the disturbing superiority of Klytaimestra to the men around her, see Gagarin (1976:93); Rutherford 
(2012:297).  On Aiskhylos’ deliberate masculinization of Klytaimestra, see Winnington-Ingram (1983a:84; 
1983b:101); Gill (1986:270); Baldock (1989:34); McClure (1999:260); Visser (2000:151); Fletcher (2012:47).  Cf. 
Lefkowitz (2007:175), who rightly contends that Klytaimestra is only viewed as masculine because characters 
cannot conceive of a naturally intelligent woman.  Others point out that Klytaimestra flexibly incorporates aspects 
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a man; despite what some critics suggest, she clearly wants to be a woman with a man, just not 
the dangerous one who habitually kills her children.  As soon as she has dispatched her personal 
ekthros, she willingly defers to her present husband.  Some read Klytaimestra as some kind of 
proto-feminist, whose real motive is to acquire for herself – and thus for all women – the same 
social autonomy as men.173  In the real, human world, however, women are more likely to 
compete with other women, and remove them from the field in socially aggressive, but non-
violent ways; direct inter-sexual competition occurs rarely, if ever.174  Her willing deference to 
Aigisthos suggests that what she really insists upon exercising is reproductive autonomy – the 
right to bear and raise her offspring without men’s lethal interference.  Others conclude that 
Klytaimestra’s subversion of conventional femininity is simply a narrative device for thematic 
purpose, and some suggest that – rather than being actively masculinized – she is progressively 
de-feminized through the Oresteia.175  In the natural world, however, seeking to eliminate 
filicidal males is not an unfeminine wish, but a profoundly typical, maternal – and thus female 
– inclination. 
 
Other questions concerning the gendering of her motivation to revenge remain unaddressed, 
however: nobody in the Oresteia – except for Klytaimestra – accuses the kin-killing father 
Agamemnon of unacceptable evil, and mother Klytaimestra is the only person (and only woman 
in all extant tragedies) significantly and specifically affected by her Iphigeneia’s death.176  It is 
also often assumed that the report that Agamemnon’s Erinyes have the duty to pursue Orestes 
if he fails to kill Klytaimestra is correct, but no one worries about whether Iphigeneia’s Erinyes 
pressured Klytaimestra to kill Iphigeneia’s murderer, or threatened to punish her for failing in 
this.  The escalating but law-abiding progression of murder and then vengeance for murder 
grinds to a halt in Oresteia, because no one – neither human nor deity – is allowed to punish 
                                                          
of both genders in her character, sometimes for deceptive purposes; see Michelini (1979:156); McClure (1999:70-
71, 79). 
173 Responding to Winnington-Ingram’s (1983b:105) view that Klytaimestra acts to “strike a blow for her personal 
liberty”, in reaction to her husband’s “abhorrent dominance”, Saxonhouse (1984:14) points out that reading 
Klytaimestra as politically envious and ambitious frames all human social relations as driven by (masculine) desire 
for dominance: cf. Vickers (1973:1973:423n33).  Lattimore (1954:12), Winnington-Ingram (1983a:87; 1985:286), 
and Fletcher (2012:47) all suggest that Klytaimestra’s real aim is to become her own kyrios.  Cf. Goldhill 
(1986:152); Zeitlin (1996:1). 
174 On intrasexual competition, see Chapter 1, pp. 29; 37; 41-42; 42n185; 63; 78; 81n415; 85.  On other women as 
the most typical targets of female competitive behaviour, see Chapter 1, pp. 41-43; 41n175; 42n182; 42n185; 
42n189; 43n193; 63; 70. 
175 Beck (1975:87); Visser (2000:155, 157). 
176 Only Iphigeneia and Orestes in Euripides’ Iphigeneia among the Taurians veer dangerously close to actual 
criticism of the filicidal Agamemnon (IT 924-928), and Orestes quickly deflects the conversation. 
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Orestes, making his matricide an exempted category of killing.177  Critics and gods alike cannot 
agree on the relative moral weighting of Agamemnon’s filicide, Klytaimestra’s mariticide, and 
Orestes’ matricide.  Some critics conclude that an ‘evil’ Klytaimestra’s ‘guilt’ is definitively 
‘proven’ in Agamemnon.178  Others maintain that Klytaimestra has little, if any, reason to feel 
guilt.179  And some admire her prosecution of the immoral, evil behaviour of others.180 
 
Klytaimestra in this first play of a trilogy steeped in court-room flavour stands as chief 
prosecutor and judge of Agamemnon’s moral culpability; the Agamemnon’s so-called ‘carpet-
scene’ is a ‘cross-examination’ of the king concerning his part in Iphigeneia’s murder (Aga. 
931-957).  Agamemnon’s commission of the sacrifice is never in question; the questioning of 
the man who tramples on the wealth of the house examines his mental state at the time of the 
offence.  Klytaimestra leads the accused through a sequence of questions into conviction by 
self-incrimination.181  The core question of the carpet-scene’s interrogation is: Are you the kind 
of man to trample the wealth of the house again at the urging of an expert?  The culmination of 
the response (or confession) is: Yes, I am a man who would do that.  In response to 
Klytaimestra’s re-enactment of his impious trampling upon the beautiful treasure of the house, 
Agamemnon himself is chief witness that such a shameless act should strike fear into the 
mortal’s heart (923-924), because the likely fate for such a mortal is to be struck down with 
malice (946-949).  The chorus’ earlier testimony that his submission at Aulis to the yoke of 
necessity was voluntary is the point of moral law on which he is – rightfully – convicted.182  
Agamemnon’s admission that he is a man who would willingly act this way again is swiftly 
followed by Klytaimestra summing-up (958-974), and then the delivery of justice in the form 
                                                          
177 Cf. Euripides’ Orestes, in which Tyndareos and the Argive demos both wish Orestes to suffer the consequences 
of his mother-murder. 
178 On Klytaimestra’s guilt, see Solmsen (1949:193); Hammond (1972:99); and O’Daly (1985:1).  On her guilt, 
even for a justified act, see Fontenrose (1971:83); Spatz (1982:103); Sommerstein (1996:257).  Garvie (1996:143) 
claims that it is necessary to Orestes’ success that we forget Klytaimestra’s real justification for her act, while 
Wolfe (2009:692-693, 702) maintains that an incontestably evil Klytaimestra was a useful example of woman-
gone-bad in the Greek social context. 
179 On the murder of her husband as fully justified, see Neuberg (1991:64); van Erp Taalman Kip (1996:130).  In 
Bell’s (1991:136) opinion, for example, Agamemnon was publically obsessed with Klytaimestra’s sister; he then 
killed his own daughter; and later he brought a concubine into her home (along with Kassandra’s illegitimate 
twins), all of which made Klytaimestra a victim of male mating strategy in conflict with female optimum strategy. 
180 On the modern view of Klytaimestra as a complex and primarily positive female character – who bravely and 
righteously murdered an unlikable, failed general who committed a morally unacceptable filicide – and who has 
nothing to regret, or feel guilty about, see Loraux (1987:8); Thompson (2004:204-205). 
181 Morrell (1996-1997:153) also views the carpet-scene as a test of Agamemnon’s character. 
182 For a summary of critical readings of this complex scene, see Morrell (1996-1997:141-142n4). 
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of immediate, off-stage execution (1343-1345).  Klytaimestra is the complainant in this case; 
her loss is a significant one and she has the moral right to prosecute the slayer of her child; with 
every response Agamemnon confirms the rightness of her indictment. 
 
Some scholars view Agamemnon’s line-by-line capitulation to Klytaimestra’s persuasion to 
walk upon the fabric unfurled before him as the most important aspect of the scene, and even 
of the play.183  Critical sympathies for characters are often aligned according to how this generic 
agōn is read.184  Some conclude that Agamemnon yields in full consciousness of his disposition 
– and culpability – for evil.185  Some suggest that this scene eliminates audience sympathy for 
Agamemnon the compulsive winner, who loses this agōn – and to a woman.186  Still others 
conclude that the scene represents the universal [sic] fear of the female’s corrupting power of 
persuasion.187  Scholars also take different positions on Klytaimestra’s ‘masculine’ intellect and 
persuasive power in this traditional rhetorical agōn.  Some contend that her points are logical – 
and therefore persuasive in their own right; others conclude that Agamemnon yields to her 
persuasion either because he is too polite to refuse, or because it is his destiny; some suggest 
that she wins this particular battle between the sexes out of strength, while he is bound by the 
singular weakness of men – the desire for a glorious reputation.188  Agamemnon has been acting 
out of the typical strategic motivations for males in a culture which indulges their mating 
preferences: the increase of his reputation is always his primary goal, and he fails to see the 
price in this case – his own human life – is too high, just as the price he paid at Aulis to hasten 
his glory was too high. 
 
The εἵμασι ‘fabrics’ (921) is variously interpreted as carpet, garments or robes, and also as 
sacred tapestry.189  But however it is conceived, critics and characters alike all agree that this 
                                                          
183 On Agamemnon’s capitulation to Klytaimestra’s masterful demand as the play’s climax, see Denniston and 
Page (1957:151).  Cf. Dodds (1960:28); Vernant (1970:287; 1992:39); Peradotto (2007:237). 
184 For examples, see Fraenkel (1950:429, 426, 441-442); Denniston and Page (1957:151); Simpson (1977:94); 
Lloyd-Jones (1979:17-18); Ireland (1986:25); Flintoff (1987:124-125). 
185 Hammond (1972:92); Easterling (1993:22).  Cf. Crane (199:121-122). 
186 Tucker (1935:6); Thomson (1966:259); Otis (1981:38); Vellacott (1984a:145); Dover (1987:158). 
187 Taplin (1978:82, 142) in particular notes the struggle for power between the sexes in the scene; cf. Winnington-
Ingram (1983a:87-88); Heath (1987:21). 
188 On various reasons why Agamemnon yields to her rhetoric, see Lloyd-Jones (1970a:11); Simpson (1977:101); 
Goldhill (1986:12, 1992:54-56; 2007:111); Dover (1987:151); Meridor (1987:39); Konishi (1989:217, 220); 
Martin (2007:40); Hall (2010:68). Hammond (1972:98); Simpson (1977:98-99); McClure (1997:120-121). 
189 For a summary of the long debate about the εἷμασι ‘fabrics’, see Morrell (1996-1997:155-156nn20-21). 
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fabric should not ordinarily be trampled upon.190  Many critics prefer a reading of red – with 
obvious connotations of blood – for the πορφυρόστρωτος ‘purple’ fabric (910), but this 
downplays the importance of purple as a marker of extreme social and material value.191  This 
scene refers repeatedly to trampling, alluding to the impious waste of material wealth, but some 
contend that Agamemnon is reluctant to step onto the fabric because he simply does not wish 
to risk accusations of public hybris.192  Others conclude that a vain and ambitious Agamemnon 
simply cannot resist any opportunity – even if impious – to outshine other powerful males.193  
This depiction of the returning victorious hero-king accords with studies that find, across many 
social species, no male is likely to resist a public challenge to his authority and status; to back 
away from the opportunity to demonstrate dominance results in an immediate loss of position 
in the male hierarchy, and this is true for humans as well.194  Agamemnon’s rapid collapse 
before Klytaimestra’s urgings shows that both husband and wife know what’s truly important 
to male aristocrats: victory, prestige, dominance, and demonstrable status.  Klytaimestra uses 
his predictable response – and his blindness to this– to achieve her goal. 
 
The pivotal carpet-scene clearly has an important narrative function, although scholars debate 
its purposes.  Agamemnon’s necessary acceptance of Klytaimestra’s request mirrors the ritual 
                                                          
190 Critics agree that the unmatchable material or monetary value of the laboriously finished, expensively dyed 
fabric is the real point of the episode: see Flintoff (1987:120-121); Crane (1993:125, 131); Rabinowitz (2008:98).  
On the fabrics as women’s work – perhaps marital robes – wantonly destroyed by a man, see Rabinowitz 
(1981:174); Morrell (1996-1997:146, 157); Scheid and Svenbro (1996:85n5); Lyons (2003:93); McNeil (2005:1-
2, 8n16).  On the sacrilegious act of πατεῖν, ‘trampling’ in this scene (and long ago at Aulis), see Jones (1962:87, 
89); Fagles and Stanford (1977:32); Taplin (1977:311, 313; 1978:79); Rosenmeyer (1982:61-62, 288); Vellacott 
(1984:71, 79); Crane (1993:118, 121); Wohl (1998:88); Sewell (2007:99). 
191 On the fabrics as red to allude to the blood-letting throughout the narrative, see Ferguson (1972:86); Goheen 
(1972:108, 111); Vickers (1973:367); Taplin (1978:81); Segal (1981:55); Carson (2009:6).  On the scene’s 
reference to dipping fabric in dye and Klytaimestra’s earlier allusion to dipping bronze in blood (612), see Lyons 
(2003:116); Sommerstein (2008:72n126).  In Rosenmeyer’s (1982:61-62) opinion, no modern staging offers the 
same impact as the allusion to the immeasurably precious porphyra-dye, but Mitchell’s (2000) staging of the play 
unfurled a sewn patchwork of little girls’ dresses – all dyed red – for the king to strut upon, provoking enormous 
emotional response in the audience. 
192 On the destruction of excessive wealth as an apotropaic assertion of power, see Crane (1993:119, 128-129).  
On the jettison of goods to save a ship during a storm see also Aristotle (Nic. Eth. 3.11 10a8-1 1).  On the political 
ramifications of the aristocratic (or ‘Eastern’) habit of deliberate wastage of opulent wealth, see Fagles (1984:x); 
Rose (1992:206, 208); Crane (1993:123-124, 135); Easterling (1993:20). 
193 On the egotistic and hubristic Agamemnon’s eager acceptance of an honour usually reserved for the gods, see 
Vickers (1973:366); Lawrence (1976:100); Lloyd-Jones (1983b:68); Winnington-Ingram (1983a:88); Konishi 
(1989:219).  Cf. Pope (1986:22-23), who argues that Agamemnon is a “true democrat”, who ‘steadfastly attempts 
to decline the honour due to him’.  On Agamemnon’s need for prestige, see Peradotto (2007:237). 
194 For discussion of how male status is central to male reproductive success, see Chapter 1, pp. 17; 22; 28; 29n91; 
31-32; 34-36; 34n126; 34n130; 35n133; 35n134; 37; 39; 41-43; 49n230; 49n232; 56; 69; 70n360; 83.  On the 
importance of being seen as willing to defend status, see Chapter 1, pp. 18-19; 35n134; 70n360. 
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nodding of the bull’s head at the altar, alluding to that previous sacrifice of Iphigeneia ‘like a 
beast’ at Aulis; Klytaimestra plans to kill him whether he accepts her invitation to the altar or 
not, however.195  The scene is an important lie-detecting test of Agamemnon’s ethos, and of his 
disposition to impious filicide: Klytaimestra is attempting to establish – as sufficient 
justification for her intention to murder – whether Agamemnon was and still is the kind of man 
to willingly trample the house’s precious thing, and so she specifically asks him ηὔξω θεοῖς 
δείσας ἂν ὧδ᾽ ἔρδειν τάδε, ‘would you, being in fear, have vowed to the gods, do such a thing?’ 
(933).196  The significance of the question and answer explains the two previous exchanges, in 
which Klytaimestra requests that he answers her next question honestly, and he assures her that 
he will do so (931-932).  She is simply trying to ascertain if her remaining offspring are at risk 
– he has, after all, already dispatched her first and second children, and was able to reconcile 
himself to murder with some enthusiasm.  Without hesitation Agamemnon affirms that he has 
already trampled – with very little persuasion – upon the precious wealth of the house, and he 
would do so again, εἴπερ τις, εἰδώς γ᾽ εὖ τόδ᾽ ἐξεῖπον τέλος, ‘if someone, knowing well such 
matters, had ordained it as an end’ (934).  His admission confirms that killing of Iphigeneia was 
‘ordained’ by just such an expert, and thus he nods his head to Klytaimestra’s hand.197  The 
trampled embroideries under his feet bear silent witness to his willingness, upon the urging of 
others, to destroy women’s careful, patterned work of both children and embroideries; 
trampling the hours and hours of female creative effort and love.198  Klytaimestra knows well 
that her investment in her treasured child was disproportionately greater than that of 
Iphigeneia’s father, but traditional critical commentary overlooks the significant difference in 
                                                          
195 On the correlation between Agamemnon’s symbolic consent and the actual consent of the animal to its own 
sacrifice, see Thomson (1966:259); McDonald (2003:15).  Cf. Lattimore (1964:39), who reads the scene as 
“curious”, because Agamemnon will die whether he “chooses” or not. 
196 On Klytaimestra’s enquiry is an invitation to an admission of guilt, see Fraenkel (1950:422-423), and 
Winnington-Ingram (1983b:92), who argues that the self-incrimination in the carpet-scene has been in the air since 
the earliest choral ode, in which Agamemnon was willing to sacrifice δόμων ἄγαλμα ‘a treasure of the house’ 
(208), on ‘the unquestioned authority of a religious expert’ (186). 
197 On the first step upon the fabric as a sign and confirmation that Agamemnon is now condemned to die, see 
Vellacott (1975:133); Fagles and Stanford (1977:32); Simpson (1977:95); Taplin (1978:82-3); Conacher 
(1987:38); Easterling (1993:24); Macintosh (1994:82).  On the capitulation as a confession of guilt for the unholy 
trampling upon the sacred at Aulis, see Fontenrose (1971:106); Lebeck (1971:76-77); Vickers (1973:367-368); 
Fagles and Stanford (1977:32); Conacher (1987:37-38); Konishi (1989:218); Rehm (1992:80); Rutherford 
(2012:316). 
198 An unspecified but large number of beloved sons of the demos were lost in the war: Macintosh (1994:82) who 
argues that the tapestries allude to the sea ‘flowering’ with corpses (659).  Cf. Aiskhylos’ reference to the sea filled 
with corpses in his earlier Persai (419-421), an image of an endless sea of death not unknown to the war-wise 
audience of the Oresteia. 
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mothers’ and fathers’ parental care and investment; EP research points to the importance of this 
aspect of parental investment in the events of the play.199 
 
Klytaimestra now has all the confession she requires to justify his execution; all that remains is 
her summing-up and declaration of sentence, and this follows at once.  The lines of 
Klytaimestra’s speech as Agamemnon is proceeding slowly over the tapestries are as ponderous 
and obscure as any black-capped judge’s pronouncement.200  As she muses on who would dry 
up the sea with its ‘ever renewed’ precious purple (959-960), the audience is fully focussed 
upon the slow tread of the one person who has already dared to drain it dry: Agamemnon.201  
According to most scholars, the carpet-scene ends with Agamemnon’s disappearance into the 
house, but Klytaimestra’s cryptic soliloquy (958-975), her exit, and the subsequent death-cries 
of Agamemnon (1343, 1345) are essential elements in this unified scene of trial, conviction, 
and execution.  Klytaimestra is the appointed agent of the gods’ continuing displeasure over 
Tantalid crimes, and, in her own right, is the proper prosecutor of her daughter’s murderer; 
having dispatched her ekthros, she now has a further target – the foreign princess who poses a 
previously unanticipated but significant threat to her own children’s future reproductive 
prospects. 
 
Critics differ on the purpose of Kassandra in the Agamemnon, but, in agreement with 
evolutionary findings about innate male models of female perfection, Kassandra is objectified 
as the beautiful, young, sexually-compliant geras who is immediately loyal to her new owner 
– juxtaposed in stark contrast to the play’s sexually treacherous wife.202  The Greeks – like 
                                                          
199 On the much greater reproductive work done by women – in gestation, labour, lactation, and domestic 
maintenance – see Chapter 1, pp. 46-49; 46n207; 46n209; 46n210; 46n212; 61; 65-66; 65n333; 66n334; 66n336; 
81; 81n414; 81n421. 
200 Cf. Morrell (1996-1997:163), who agrees that the ironic ‘root and leaves’ imagery of the second half of the 
speech frames Agamemnon’s murder in terms of his crime against her reproductive success. 
201 Cf. the earlier mention of ἀνθοῦν πέλαγος Αἰγαῖον νεκροῖς/ ἀνδρῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ‘the Aegean Sea carpeted with the 
bodies of Akhaian men’ (Aga. 659-660), and the parallel between the purple-red dye of the Aegean Sea’s murex 
and the blood of the slain, and the reference to wine made from the ‘unripe grape’, in the presence of the ‘man of 
power’ in the house (970-972).  The cultured members of Aiskhylos’ audience would have been aware of Homer’s 
‘wine-coloured sea’ (Il. 2.613, 5.771, 7.88, 23.143, 23.317; Od. 1.183, 2.421, 3.286, 4.474, 5.132, 5.221, 5.349, 
6.170, 7.250, 12.388, 19.172, 19.274).  Lattimore translates this as ‘wine-blue’, but since Homer also uses the term 
to describe the colour of cattle (Il. 13.703; Od. 13.32), a deep browny-red seems appropriate, making a connection 
between a blood-coloured sea and wine made with the blood of an ‘unripe’ daughter. 
202 On Kassandra’s traditional depiction as geras in the Kypria, see Goward (2005:46).  On female youth and 
beauty as indicators of maximal fertility, see discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 38-39; 39n160; 43.  In Kassandra’s case, 
she adds a royal lineage to the mix.  On male fantasy, see Chapter 1, pp. 25-26; 25n58; 25n61; 25n62; 26n71; on 
male expectation of female sexual loyalty, see Chapter 1, pp. 33; 33n118; 50; 69-70; 77; 77n392; 77n397; 84n435.  
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many Bronze and Iron Age cultures – knew the realities of life for enslaved war-prizes, but 
Aiskhylos makes the royal Kassandra of Troy distinctly approving of her captor in her 
descriptions of him – λέοντος εὐγενοῦς, ‘the noble lion’, and hostile to her captor’s wife and 
her secret paramour – δίπους λέαινα, ‘a two-footed lioness’, who is συγκοιμωμένη/ λύκῳ, 
‘sleeping with a wolf’ (1258-1260).  Despite having good political reason to loathe Agamemnon 
as an ekthros, Kassandra offers no criticism of her own enslavement, nor of Iphigeneia’s 
murder.  Kassandra’s compassion toward the city-sacking Agamemnon is incongruous with her 
enmity for the Greeks in general, and her view of herself as Agamemnon’s doom, but the 
enslaved princess’s forgiveness of her rapist – and the man responsible for the death of everyone 
she loved – prepares the audience for the increasing dehumanization of Klytaimestra throughout 
the Oresteia: many view the death of this apparently compassionate girl as the beginning of the 
slide of a wronged mother’s righteous vengeance into callous and gratuitous violence.203  Yet 
this apparently senseless act also invites an evolutionarily-oriented analysis.204  The hatred 
between wife and concubine – in the Agamemnon at least – is mutual, and an important part of 
the mythical construction of the evil Klytaimestra comes to us in the testimony of the one 
woman who could potentially benefit most from the primary wife’s displacement: Kassandra. 
 
The death of the so-called ‘innocent’ Kassandra at the hands of Klytaimestra is often cited by 
modern scholars as being one of Klytaimestra’s unambiguously evil acts, but Kassandra’s death 
in the Oresteia is narratively unimportant to the disintegration of this family, and no character 
ever suggests that it requires vengeance.205  None of Kassandra’s kin are able to avenge her 
(almost all of them are dead), and no Greek has any social or personal obligation to uphold her 
honour.  But, as outlined below, Kassandra fulfils two specific and important roles in this 
tragedy.  Firstly, Agamemnon is the specific quarry of Klytaimestra – for his murder of 
Iphigeneia – and of Aigisthos – for Atreus’ murder of Thyestes’ children – but, quite plausibly, 
his death must also be sought by this captive Trojan, and her enslavement is the means to her 
                                                          
Cf. Missing White Woman Syndrome as the reflexive emphasis in popular media (especially visual media) upon 
young, nubile, high-status and paler-skinned women as more interesting victims of abduction, violence, rape, and 
murder; see Moody et al (2008); Wanzo (2008); Liebler (2010).  On Kassandra as a “fantasy” of female self-
sacrifice to the will of men, see Wohl (1998:113).  On Kassandra is a “corrective” for Klytaimestra, the bad wife 
and murderess, see Doyle (2008:57). 
203 On the singular emphasis on Kassandra in the iconographic record as rape victim, rather than in her role as 
truth-seeing prophetess, see Prag (1985:59-60). 
204 On wifely rage at concubines in tragedy, see Murnaghan (2005:236).  Murnaghan (2005:241-242) rightly 
observes that tragic women – but not men – view marriage as an exclusive relationship, and act to secure their 
union. 
205 On Klytaimestra’s evil murder of Kassandra, see Mossman (2005:355). 
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own vengeance against him.  Kassandra’s appearances and utterances show that Agamemnon’s 
destined death – or destiny itself – is manifestly overdetermined: Klytaimestra’s hand wields 
the blade that kills her husband, but (at least) two others have his death as a dedicated goal. 
 
Secondly, Kassandra’s vision of the terrors of the house of the Atreids offers divinely-inspired 
expert-testimony on Atreid evil and the inevitability of Agamemnon’s death;206 she attests that 
the family home is 
 
μισόθεον μὲν οὖν, πολλὰ συνίστορα 
αὐτόφονα κακὰ καρτάναι, 
ἀνδροσφαγεῖον καὶ πέδον ῥαντήριον, 
 
‘an utterly god-hating one, privy to many evil kin-murders and decapitation, a house of 
butchery, and a place of defilement’ (1090-1092). 
 
Every detail in her account is historically correct, and the chorus can make no denial of these 
words; they merely comment blithely on this stranger’s ability to unearth murder (1092-1093).  
Kassandra accurately identifies the pitiful victims of Atreus – slaughtered, screaming babies – 
and simultaneously sees their roasted flesh being consumed by their own father (1096-1097).  
Kassandra foresees how Agamemnon will die at Klytaimestra’s hand (1107-1110, 1114-1117) 
but the chorus now rejects her vision (1105-1106, 1112-1113).  Kassandra confirms that the 
historic crimes demand a tremendous remedy: the sacrifice of Agamemnon: whether or not 
Klytaimestra is guilty because she delivers the killing blow, his death is destined to occur. 
 
Despite the argument of some critics that Kassandra never criticizes Agamemnon, she rejoices 
at his imminent murder, crying στάσις δ᾽ ἀκόρετος γένει/ κατολολυξάτω θύματος λευσίμου, 
‘let the insatiate tribe shriek over the accursed victim doomed to death!’ (1117-1118).  The 
chorus castigates her for inciting a Fury (1119-1120), but never disputes that Agamemnon is 
accursed and thus doomed to die.  Following the vision of her own death (1172), Kassandra 
                                                          
206 According to McClure (1999:25), the Greeks associated virginity with truth-speaking; Kassandra’s frenzied 
allusions are imbued with mystical, oracular authority by the chorus, who attempt to establish the authenticity of 
her virgin status.  Her descriptions of Agamemnon as both the net, and the bull caught in the net (Aga. 115, 1126-
1127) draw upon the cultural imagery of the ancient Mycenaean bull-hunt, which is likely to have a significance 




confirms that the house is full of Furies, as a result of the family’s ancestral evil-doing (1184-
1190).  Kassandra refers to Aigisthos as the cowardly lion who presently occupies the lord’s 
bed, even though he has his own, quite serious plans for vengeance upon the house of Atreus 
(1217-1225).207  However, Klytaimestra is in fact the only member of this oikos able to kill 
Agamemnon without adding to the endless family woe, for she alone is not related to her victim 
by blood. 
 
As she crosses the threshold to the death she has foreseen, Kassandra bears witness that all the 
members of the house – both edifice and bloodline – φόνον… πνέουσιν αἱματοσταγῆ, ‘breathe 
blood-dripping murder!’ (1309).  Her account of revenges across time is possibly the world’s 
first narrative montage, pertinent flash-backs and flash-forwards centred upon one outcome: 
Klytaimestra is going to be Agamemnon’s mortal judge and executioner.  Kassandra’s divinely-
inspired expert testimony falls upon the ears of a selectively disbelieving audience, however.208  
Because of Apollo’s curse, all of the Trojan princess’s oracles are traditionally doubted, yet 
when she prophesies her own death, the Argive elders remark that even a new-born could 
understand her (1162-1163); they also fully comprehend her vision of slaughtered children 
(1242-1243).209  But as soon as they hear about Agamemnon’s coming fate, their perceptive 
capacity collapses (1245).210  Perhaps an ox is standing upon the chorus’ ears, as it earlier 
stepped upon the Watchman’s tongue, and a god is misdirecting their understanding in order to 
facilitate Klytaimestra’s purpose, because Trojan Kassandra’s gleeful warnings are very 
specific: ‘Troy’s destroyer’, unaware of Klytaimestra’s true intent, is ‘about to suffer an evil 
fate’ (1226-1230).  Kassandra desperately declares that the Elders are about to behold ‘the doom 
                                                          
207 The expression λέοντ᾽ ἄναλκιν actually means ‘impotent lion’, but Sommerstein (2008:147n263) – like many 
others impressed with leonine character – prefers ‘wolf’, in order to contrast Aigisthos with the ‘noble lion’ 
Agamemnon.  Aigisthos, as a descendant of the royal lineage of Tantalos and Pelops, is a ‘blood-licking lion’ just 
as much as Agamemnon (827-828), with just as much right to rule in Argos.  The LSJ glosses ἄναλκις as ‘without 
strength, impotent, feeble, of unwarlike men’: Aigisthos, often described as cowardly, may simply be that horror 
of fifth-century manhood – a pacifist. 
208 Kassandra’s enumeration of Atreid sins also prepares the audience to accept that real Furies – which they cannot 
yet behold – are infesting the Atreid oikos; see Zeitlin (1966:645); Vickers (1973:374-375, 377-378); Heath 
(1987:22).  On Kassandra’s revelation confirming Kalkhas’ earlier (unheeded) warning about the treacherous 
housekeeper who will avenge children (Aga. 152-155), see Schein (1982:14); Roth (1993:7). 
209 On Kassandra’s acceptance of death by Klytaimestra as an essential aspect of Kassandra’s own revenge upon 
Agamemnon, see Papadopoulou (2000:526). 
210 Sommerstein (2008:150n270) points out that the literal meaning of their declaration at 1445 is ‘I am running, 




of Agamemnon’ (1246).211  They affirmed this woman’s oracular powers (1213), but now they 
deny this particular warning, and insist she hold her tongue (1247).  But not all of her visions 
are so infallibly accurate. 
 
Kassandra’s final prophecy concerns the return of Orestes and the death of Klytaimestra (1280-
1282), and is utterly wrong about one aspect of his arrival: the exile is not coming to exact 
vengeance for this Trojan princess’s death, but for his father alone.  Kassandra’s lengthy ‘eye-
witness’ testimony concerning the wrongful killing of children in this house is also flawed in 
one obvious respect: she completely omits any mention of Agamemnon’s sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia.212  The grieving queen’s pain for a slain daughter is of no interest to this foreign 
princess – who has enough of her own philoi to avenge, and good reason to delight in the death 
of Agamemnon’s dear ones – and Klytaimestra herself is a tool of Kassandra’s own vengeance-
scheme; perhaps because of this, critics differ as to whether Aiskhylos’ characterization of the 
vulnerable but self-interested Kassandra serves to waylay audience sympathy for 
Klytaimestra.213  The presence and speeches of Kassandra in the Agamemnon proves that there 
are at least three avengers independently seeking to murder Agamemnon for the crimes of the 
house: Aigisthos, for the slaughter of Thyestes’ children, Klytaimestra for the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia, and Kassandra herself for the annihilation of Troy.214 
 
All of the tragedians likely drew on previous, thoroughly intertextual traditions for aspects of 
Kassandra’s character; in Euripides’ later Troades (415 BCE), Kassandra reveals (Tro. 363-
364) that her marital relationship with Agamemnon will also result in her enemy Klytaimestra’s 
death.215  Euripides likely drew upon many of the same sources as Aiskhylos – although these 
may now be lost – and his virgin oracle Kassandra is certainly no innocent; a royal princess 
with barely-contained supernatural powers, she curses Agamemnon and prays to be the 
instrument of his death, delighting in the foreknowledge that she will be personally responsible 
                                                          
211 μόρος can refer to ‘fate, destiny, or doom’, as well as ‘death’, especially death through violence.  The chorus 
ought to be alerted by her words. 
212 On Kassandra’s omission of the death of Iphigeneia, see Vickers (1973:377); Vellacott (1984:105); Wohl 
(1998:112). 
213 On the demonic and monstrous Klytaimestra’s sadistic murder of the innocent and sympathetic Kassandra, and 
the alienation of audiences, see Macleod (1982:142); Schein (1982:15); Rehm (1992:90-91); Wohl (1998:107); 
Zelenak (1998:64). 
214 On the enmity of the princess for the wife of Agamemnon, see Croally (1994:130); Seaford (2005:35); Mitchell-
Boyask (2006:272). 
215 Critical sympathy toward the innocent Kassandra emphasizes that she is a war-captive, whose whole world has 
been destroyed; see Dué (2006:151). 
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for Agamemnon’s demise and the destruction of the Atreid house (356-60, 404ff, 461).216  
Scholars rarely acknowledge Kassandra’s aspiration to vengeance in discussions of who is 
culpable for the murder of Agamemnon.217  Kassandra is not the only character in extant tragedy 
claiming (or confessing) to be the doom of Agamemnon: Aiskhylos’ Aigisthos rejoices that, he, 
the third child of a wretched father – along with the Furies – has schemed for Agamemnon’s 
death (1577-1582, 1604-1611).218  Critical interpretations of the Oresteia make much of 
Klytaimestra’s sexual jealousy of the incoming concubine as a cause – sometimes the prime 
cause – of Klytaimestra’s murder of her husband but the Kassandras of Aiskhylos and Euripides 
are equally eager for the blood of Troy’s enemies, and to be chosen as Agamemnon’s concubine 
is clearly very convenient to Kassandra’s aim.219  Euripides’ Trojan princess also embraces her 
ordained death at the hands of Agamemnon’s wife, because it is the price to be paid for the 
success of her quest to destroy Greece.  Euripides makes Kassandra keen to serve 
Agamemnon’s bed in her role as Fury and avenger of Troy’s destruction (356-360), but 
Aiskhylos reveals little to nothing about Kassandra’s own feelings about her desire for political 
vengeance upon the house of Atreus through concubinage or marriage to Agamemnon, and 
almost all of her speeches are focussed on the evils of the house she is about to enter.  Like 
Aiskhylos, scholars ignore Kassandra’s politically-motivated, quite natural desire for the death 
of the Greeks’ leader (and his household), and – like the Agamemnon’s chorus – are primarily 
interested in whether this Kassandra is or is not a virgin.220 
 
Kassandra’s sexual innocence is pivotal to traditional interpretations of the Oresteia’s 
Klytaimestra, whose wicked killing of an innocent virgin-victim is the one crime most 
                                                          
216 Aiskhylos may never have viewed Euripides’ Troades, but many alternative versions may have been available 
to both tragedians.  Cf. Garner (1990:165), who insists that Euripides’ Kassandra is also Aiskhylos’ Kassandra.   
217 Croally (1994:131) views Kassandra’s desires for vengeance as “somewhat disquieting”, but from the Greek 
point of view, to seek the destruction of an enemy is not disquieting, but natural and good.  On Kassandra’s 
“peculiar happiness” in Troades, see Lloyd-Jones (1992:64). 
218 Sophokles’ Ajax also calls upon Furies to kill the Atreids along with the whole Greek army; see Moss 
(1985:121). 
219 On Kassandra as Erinys and instrument of vengeance upon Agamemnon through either marriage or 
concubinage, see Gregory (1991:164); Davie (1998:181); Kovacs (1999:5-6); Papadopoulou (2000:523); Burian 
(2009:15-16, 19). 
220 If modern critics are intensely interested to establish whether Kassandra slept with Ajax, or with Apollo, or 
with Agamemnon, or even with the whole crew of Agamemnon’s ship, the ancient Greeks were no less concerned, 
according to Debnar (2010:129).  On Kassandra’s sexual status, see Vermeule (1966:6); Vickers (1973:374); 
Gagarin (1976:95); Lee (1976:xvi); Rehm (1994:47); Scodel (1998:147); Wohl (1998:107, 114-115); Mossman 
(2005:355); Mitchell-Boyask (2006:269, 273); Doyle (2008:57); Debnar (2010: n9:9, 129-130, 132-133, 135). 
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frustrating to sympathetic modern interpretations of her character.221  Aiskhylos’ chorus are 
also curious as to whether she and Apollo coupled in the procreative sense (Aga. 1207), to 
which she replies that ξυναινέσασα Λοξίαν ἐψευσάμην, ‘having consented, I cheated Apollo 
by lying’ (1208).  It is not clear whether the cheating refers to whether she still had any virginity 
to give Apollo, or if she cheated Apollo by sleeping with him, but then refusing to conceive or 
bear his child,222 but the Agamemnon’s allusion to Apollo cheated of this chance of fatherhood 
suggests that this same god’s defining pronouncements concerning reproduction and gender in 
this trilogy’s third play (Eumenides) should be read with a certain degree of caution, to say the 
least: nevertheless, Apollo’s pronouncements on the nonexistence of motherhood in that third 
play directly influence audience and critical perceptions of the trilogy’s matricide, and 
Klytaimestra’s reputation for evil.223  According to Kassandra herself (1080-1081), however, 
her impending destruction at Klytaimestra’s hands is the result of Apollo’s animosity, because 
Apollo – to whom she had falsely promised her maidenhead – has brought her to Argos to die 
alongside Agamemnon (1138-1139). 
 
The reneging Kassandra and the thwarted Apollo are clearly parties to a ruined marital 
arrangement, but the nature of Kassandra’s marriage to Agamemnon – a central element in 
negative discussion of Klytaimestra’s motivation to murder – is less clear.  The Oresteia is full 
of reproductive politics in the most fundamental sense, but those who argue that Klytaimestra’s 
murder of the innocent Kassandra exceeds the necessities of vengeance overlook the Oresteia’s 
deliberate omission of three traditional narrative elements related to succession issues: the 
possible existence of Kassandra’s unborn offspring; Kassandra’s potential to produce further 
rivals to Klytaimestra’s son Orestes, and Aigisthos’ need to eliminate all of his enemy’s 
Agamemnon’s sons, including any by concubines.  The marriage of Agamemnon and 
Kassandra occurred long before their arrival at Argos – evidenced in the arrival of their living 
children in Argos in some myths – an inconvenient element of the traditional tale many Oresteia 
critics neglect.224  According to Poseidon in Troades, Agamemnon will – at some point after 
                                                          
221 On feminist dismay at Klytaimestra’s murder of Kassandra, see McEwan (1990); Rehm (1992:90); McCoskey 
(1998:51-52); Komar (2003:24); Mitchell-Boyask (2006:280). 
222 In Schein’s (1982:12) opinion, the fruitless prophecies of Kassandra are her punishment for denying Apollo the 
fruit of her womb. 
223 For discussion of Apollo as a failed husband, a rapist, and a father of forcibly engendered children, see Kitto 
(1958:43); Ferguson (1972:87); Scafuro (1990:150); Sommerstein (1996:261, 367); Mitchell-Boyask (2006:276, 
295); Doyle (2008:62). 
224 On Agamemnon’s sexual activity with Kassandra in Troy, evidenced in Euripides’ Hekabe, see Debnar 
(2010:133-134).  See Hek. 120-122, 127-129, 826-829.  On Kassandra’s twin sons with Agamemnon, see Gantz 
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leaving the shores of Troy – γαμεῖ βιαίως ‘forcibly marry’ his captured Trojan princess (Tro. 
41-44); furthermore, his use of λέχος (noun sg fem dat epic poetic, of λεχώ), ‘woman in 
childbed’, suggests a very real intention to breed from his geras Kassandra.  Kassandra herself 
has foreseen in Troades that consummation with the already-married Agamemnon is a necessity 
(357-358), because it will incite Klytaimestra to murder her husband.225  That the fact of their 
marriage was widely accepted in the mythic corpus is also suggested in Euripides’ Hekabe, 
when Agamemnon does not contest Hekabe’s assertion that his sexual marriage with Kassandra 
entails moral obligation to Kassandra’s family (Hek. 834, 852-860).  The proper purpose of 
concubines in ancient Athens was to provide legitimate sons in the oikos lacking an heir, but 
Klytaimestra has already provided Agamemnon with a fine son.226  Aiskhylos’ audience would 
have appreciated this as they watched Agamemnon ordering his long-suffering Tyndarid wife 
to make a concubine of royal blood welcome in the house, recognizing that Agamemnon 
directly contributes to Kassandra’s death (and his own), because any man arrogantly bringing 
home a concubine could not expect his wife to approve a rival within the oikos.227 
 
Concubines in real-world marriages across cultures and periods are always a threat to a wife’s 
enjoyment of family resources, including the husband’s time and loyalty; conflict between wife 
and concubine is a natural consequence of this competition.  Occasionally, such competition 
results in death, most often of the newly-introduced concubine.228  Thus, once in Argos, 
Kassandra’s immediate focus is on discrediting the legitimate wife.  Klytaimestra correctly 
views Kassandra as her personal ekthros not because of sexual jealousy but because this 
concubine might potentially replace her, a very reasonable response of any woman striving to 
survive the patriarchal conditions which advantage male reproductive strategy.229  Some 
mainstream critics read the relationship between Klytaimestra and Kassandra through a 
feminist-tinted lens: Wohl’s (1998) discussion, for example, assumes a natural commonality 
between Kassandra and Klytaimestra because they are both women, when they are in fact geo-
political enemies, now in direct competition for the apex alpha-male’s favour; any of their 
                                                          
(1966:675); Bell (1991:135).  Pausanias (2.16.6) identifies these sons as Teledmos and Pelops; the scholium to 
Odyssey 11.420 also refers to Teledmos the son of Kassandra and Agamemnon.  The mythic corpus also insists 
that Kassandra’s children were killed not by Klytaimestra – as one might predict – but by Aigisthos.  See Paus. 
(2.16.7); Bell (1991:110); Debnar (2010:133). 
225 Scodel (1998:147). 
226 See Foley’s (2003:87-105) chapter on concubines in ancient Greece, especially p. 94. 
227 Sommerstein (1996:374); McCoskey (1998:45). 
228 On lethal competition between co-wives, see Chapter 1, pp. 42-43; 42n185; 63. 
229 Cf. Vellacott (1984:89-90), who argues that Kassandra is determined to become Agamemnon’s only wife. 
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surviving children will one day be in conflict for the power and resources of the kingdom.  So, 
Kassandra’s hatred of the Greek Klytaimestra is politically motivated but the captive also has 
good cause for personal animosity toward the queen, because the second wives of polygynous 
marriages face a difficult life, and their children are more likely to suffer a violent death.230  
Studies show that first-wives benefit from the death of their competitors’ infants.231  Despite 
this, the enslavement of women (despite euphemisms likening the slavery to marriage) was a 
fact of life for the ancient Greeks, and the original reception of Kassandra and Klytaimestra’s 
hostile interactions probably reflected audience experience and expectations; what has the royal 
Klytaimestra to gain from friendship with a conquered barbarian princess in a world where all 
women – royal or enslaved – are to all intents and purposes owned by their male kyrios?  
Aristocratic Greek women were generally not interested in feminine solidarity to counter males’ 
rule; Hekabe in Troades, for example, willingly encourages and then exploits Agamemnon’s 
sexual use of her living daughter in order to get vengeance for her slain son.232  The threat to 
reproductive resources alone is a parsimonious and plausible explanation for Klytaimestra and 
Kassandra’s animosity, and while Agamemnon’s twin sons by his captive are absent in this 
play, from the first wife’s point of view, Kassandra might already be carrying a son of 
Agamemnon to rival Klytaimestra’s own descent-line.  Klytaimestra has every evolutionarily 
logical reason to eliminate the threat Kassandra’s potential sons might pose to her own 
offspring. 
 
Kassandra’s loyalty to the man who has enslaved her sometimes bewilders mainstream critics, 
as does Klytaimestra’s animosity toward the exiled orphan.  Kassandra does everything in her 
power to alert the chorus to the wife’s impending betrayal of her husband, as her warning about 
the danger of the cow to the bull demonstrates (Aga. 1125-1129).  There is, of course, one 
circumstance in which a cow would be rightly expected to attack, and possibly even overcome 
a bull – in defence of her threatened calf; Agamemnon has killed two of Klytaimestra’s children, 
which suggests he may do so again if he thinks it necessary.  Females across species will defend 
their offspring, and murder of husbands is most likely to occur in conditions of threat to 
                                                          
230 See discussion in Chapter 1 about the compromised fertility of second wives, pp. 42n185; 63. 
231 On the infanticide of second-wives’ offspring, see Chapter 1, pp. 41n175; 41n179; 42n185. 
232 In McCoskey’s (1998:39-40, 45) opinion, Klytaimestra is not forced to make Kassandra her enemy, but chooses 
to ignore their similarities, distancing herself from the concubine in order to retain her position in the male-
dominated hierarchy.  McCoskey (1998:51) also argues that Klytaimestra’s denial of solidarity with Kassandra 
mirrors Athene’s later denial in Eumenides of solidarity with Klytaimestra, but Athena has little to gain from 
affiliation with other females in a world in which her timē depends upon allegiance to the father alone. 
147 
 
offspring from their own father.233  Fired by her vision of Agamemnon’s death, Kassandra is 
horrified at the thought of a woman able to betray the man with whom she shares a bed (1107-
1109), and she highlights the wife’s betrayal of the sexual relationship (1115-1118); if the 
marital bed is viewed as endowing both reproductive partners with equal rights – which in a 
patriarchal sexual-slavery culture is never the case – then Kassandra as a potential reproductive 
rival is hypocritically offended, because the security of Klytaimestra’s bed in terms of parental 
investment has been betrayed by her husband with Kassandra herself.  Klytaimestra takes just 
as much delight in denigrating her rival, aiming her bitter insults squarely – as predicted by 
evolutionary findings concerning intrasexual female competition – at her rival’s sexuality 
(1437-1443), following species-typical denigration between female sexual rivals.234  Standing 
over the corpses of her husband and his concubine, Klytaimestra accuses them both of having 
had sex with ‘many’ others (1438-1442).235  Kassandra’s murder brings Klytaimestra almost as 
much pleasure as Agamemnon’s brutal death (1446-1447), and this bloodthirsty antipathy 
toward the captive concubine provokes much critical dislike for the queen; but – apart from 
living to ensure Agamemnon’s death – Kassandra and Klytaimestra have nothing in common.  
Once the three are brought together in Mycenae, the destiny of Agamemnon is assured, and so 
the princess willingly enters the palace dripping with evil to embrace her own terrible fate; 
ultimately all of the royals in this unfortunate triangle will die in this ‘house of butchery and 
defilement’. 
 
Following the successful assassination her husband and his concubine, the so-called 
‘exultation-scene’ presents Klytaimestra triumphant in her quest: but – according to some – this 
moment of glory signals her fall as a sympathetic character.  She boasts of her husband’s murder 
to the chorus,  
 
παίω δέ νιν δίς: κἀν δυοῖν οἰμωγμάτοιν 
                                                          
233 On women’s aggressive defence of offspring, even from larger, stronger husbands, see Chapter 1, pp. 33; 41; 
41n179; 43; 43n191; 69; 71-72. 
234 See discussion of derogation and female-female competition in Chapter 1, pp. 41-43; 69; 83. 
235 On Klytaimestra’s use of the ‘obscenity’ ἰσοτριβής, lit. ‘mast-rubber’ (Aga. 1443) to describe Kassandra, see 
Young (1964); Koniaris (1980); Tyrrell (1980); Borthwick (1981); Sommerstein (2008:175n306); Debnar 
(2010:137n60).  It is hard to imagine alpha-male Agamemnon allowing his valuable geras to be the sexual toy of 
his entire crew.  Cf. Whallon (1980:56), who argues that Kassandra could not be Agamemnon’s geras if Ajax had 
raped her, but married women (and mothers) could certainly still be gerai: examples include Andromakhe, Helen, 
and even Hekabe.  See also Mitchell-Boyask (2006:269, 271, 274-275).  Cf. Debnar (2010:131), who points out 
that reference to Ajax’ rape of Kassandra is not evidenced until the 3rd century BCE. 
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μεθῆκεν αὑτοῦ κῶλα: καὶ πεπτωκότι 
τρίτην ἐπενδίδωμι, τοῦ κατὰ χθονὸς 
Διὸς νεκρῶν σωτῆρος εὐκταίαν χάριν,  
 
‘I struck him then, two times, and although he gave two cries, his limbs collapsed, and, 
his having fallen, I delivered a third blow!  This was a gift of Zeus of the Underworld, 
saviour of the dead, to whom I prayed.’ (1382-1387). 
 
All subterfuge is over – and all subtlety set aside.  She then launches into her famously self-
condemning speech;  
 
οὕτω τὸν αὑτοῦ θυμὸν ὁρμαίνει πεσών: 
κἀκφυσιῶν ὀξεῖαν αἵματος σφαγὴν 
βάλλει μ᾽ ἐρεμνῇ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσου, 
χαίρουσαν οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἢ διοσδότῳ 
γάνει σπορητὸς κάλυκος ἐν λοχεύμασιν. 
ὡς ὧδ᾽ ἐχόντων, πρέσβος Ἀργείων τόδε, 
χαίροιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ χαίροιτ᾽, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐπεύχομαι. 
εἰ δ᾽ ἦν πρεπόντων ὥστ᾽ ἐπισπένδειν νεκρῷ, 
τῷδ᾽ ἂν δικαίως ἦν, ὑπερδίκως μὲν οὖν. 
τοσῶνδε κρατῆρ᾽ ἐν δόμοις κακῶν ὅδε 
πλήσας ἀραίων αὐτὸς ἐκπίνει μολών, 
 
‘In this way, having fallen, he choked out his own soul, and snorted up a blast of 
sacrificial blood; he hit me with a dark drop of bloody dew – I rejoiced no less than 
when the refreshment sent by heaven, covers the germinating sown wheat-seed.  This is 
how it is, elders of Argos, rejoice if you will, but I myself glory in it!  If it were fitting 
to make a libation to the dead, this would be just; nay, more than just.  So many are the 
accursed evils of the house; this man has filled a mixing bowl which he himself has 
come to drink up’ (1389-1394). 
 
Here, at last, is the answer to her earlier query: the endless Atreid ‘sea of evils’ requires a great 





Only something truly disturbing could alienate the Oresteia’s audience from the bereaved 
mother with a definite axe to grind (or sword to swing); this exultation-speech – the cryptic 
resolution to her previously cryptic soliloquy – gives critics unsympathetic to Klytaimestra 
much material, and in the view of some, the exultation is strongly sexualized.236  Even 
sympathetic, feminist critics struggle with Klytaimestra’s characterization in this scene, and 
some find the imagery of the spurting ‘rain’ of the king’s blood (1390-1392) especially 
unnerving.237  Others counter that Klytaimestra’s exultations express an injured mother’s 
natural feeling of justified satisfaction.238  Moreover, in ancient Greece, the killing of one’s 
ekthros in vengeance for an injury to one’s timē (honour) properly inspired righteous 
exhilaration.239  Klytaimestra’s exultation may discomfort some unused to intense public 
displays of emotion – especially female display of unfeminine delight in bloody vengeance – 
but her joy in the accomplishment of her purpose is something – perhaps – that ancient Greek 
audiences would appreciate better than many moderns, who can only conclude that her 
exultation is evidence that this female character has been masculinized. 
 
The Agamemnon is the great tragic aristeia of Klytaimestra the Avenger.  In this play she 
demonstrates the natural female capacity of maternal protectiveness, dangerous to any person 
or thing threatening her offspring, including those children’s violent father.  EP study suggests 
that aggressive violence in women is cross-culturally disapproved, with the one exception of 
their having to defend children; yet Klytaimestra’s ability to remove a proven and ongoing 
threat to her family’s well-being often offends some modern sensibilities, generally because 
they view the trilogy as progressively dematernalizing and victimizing Klytaimestra – a view 
which negates the explicit maternality of her ‘violent’ action.  Aiskhylos’ Klytaimestra is not 
an unnaturally violent individual; she murders only the man who slew one (or two, as we later 
learn) of her children (and the concubine who might successfully displace her and her 
                                                          
236 In O’Daly’s (1985:1, 5) opinion, scholars attribute the “moral deterioration” in Klytaimestra’s character to this 
very moment, the Agamemnon’s “emotional climax”.  For examples, see Stanford (1942:25); Vickers (1973:381-
382); Otis (1981:48); Baldock (1989:35); (1990:97-98).  On critics’ sexualization of the exultation-speech, see 
Pulleyn (1997:565-567); Zelenak (1998:65). 
237 Rabinowitz (1981:173-174); Wohl (1998:108).  O’Daly (1985:10) views the imagery of the “fertilizing rain of 
blood” more positively, evocative of the painful yet joyful process of giving birth; cf. Raber (2000:310). 
238 Vellacott (1977:114; 1984:69-70); Heath (1987:23). 
239 The death of one’s enemy was the quintessential deed inspiring “inexpressible joy”, according to Dover 




offspring).  And yet, Khoephoroi and Eumenides, the next two plays in the Oresteia, show that, 
in a world where paternal status determines offspring viability and life-time success, her offence 
is now also viewed as a crime against her children’s social well-being.240  As a biological 
woman and mother, Klytaimestra acted to preserve her reproductive honour, but ultimately she 
fades from view, finally seen on stage as a ghost, fighting for any kind of honour at all.  The 
trilogy concludes with father-right enshrined by the gods as the entirety of a child’s parental 
heritage; mothers no longer have any kind of right to their own children, legally, emotionally, 
or even biologically. 
 
Aiskhylos: Khoephoroi and Eumenides 
 
The glorious, exultant Klytaimestra of the Agamemnon’s final scene is not to be found in the 
Khoephoroi; she appears very little in the trilogy’s second play, and when she does, the 
imposing grandeur of the Agamemnon’s queen is nowhere to be found.  The Khoephoroi’s 
fading Klytaimestra is the locus of her remaining children’s full attention, even before she 
appears.  The real subject of this tragedy, however, is her children’s plan for vengeance, and 
the pivotal moment of the play is the fixing of Orestes’ resolve to kill his own mother. 
 
The play’s action takes place ten years after the assassination of Agamemnon, and the shift in 
the queen’s nature, or ethos, will have profound effects on all subsequent literary manifestations 
of the character.  Modern critics often interpret Aiskhylos’ Khoephoroi in relation to later 
Elektras, but the original audience experienced the Khoephoroi only in relation to the preceding 
Agamemnon and the following Eumenides.241  But in all of the ‘Elektra’ plays (Khoephoroi, 
Sophokles’ Elektra, and Euripides’ Elektra, and – perhaps – Orestes), Klytaimestra is evaluated 
according to the audience’s degree of sympathy for her miserable daughter and son; Aiskhylos’ 
characterization of the Atreid siblings in Khoephoroi – and how in turn they portray their 
mother – therefore encourages audience acceptance of Klytaimestra’s matricide as necessary 
and justified. 
 
                                                          
240 On fathers’ contribution to children’s social position, see Chapter 1, pp. 49; 49n232. 
241 Our modern understanding of the trilogy and its effect in original performance would certainly be altered if we 




Orestes’s opening words paint the queen as scheming and villainous.242  But Klytaimestra in 
Khoephoroi is no villain: from her very first speech, she is the proper lady of the oikos, greeting 
honoured guests with welcoming words, and the promise of warm baths and soothing bedding 
(Khoe. 668-673).243  She is also a genuinely loving wife to Aigisthos, distraught upon hearing 
from Orestes that he has killed her ‘beloved’ husband (893).244  Yet – according to Orestes – 
this is the same woman whose viperish daring would infect anyone who touched her, causing 
their flesh to rot (994-996).  This attack upon her character is followed by his wish that he might 
never share his house with such a wife, even though he be destroyed by the gods through 
childlessness (1005-1006).  If nothing else, this comment shows how central marriage to a wife 
was in the fifth-century to the production of a man’s legitimate heirs – but Orestes’ declaration 
also demonstrates just how great a sacrifice he is prepared to make to avoid the evil of an 
adulterous woman: a refusal to engender offspring is a conscious decision that strains against 
the default, evolved disposition of all typical individuals in a reproducing species, as well as 
the prevailing contemporary cultural ideals of patriliny. 
 
Some critics agree with Orestes’s report of Klytaimestra’s deceptive and dangerous female 
nature; others insist that the Khoephoroi’s Klytaimestra is distinctly unfeminine, even 
dangerous; the characterization of her daughter supports this.245  Aiskhylos presents Elektra as 
a better example of the race of women, and the first speeches of this feminine exemplar have 
much to say about the evils of Klytaimestra.  She stands at the tomb of Agamemnon full of 
complaint, elaborating her grievances against her mother: chief of these is her conviction that 
she has been demoted to the status of a slave, while the rightful heir Orestes has been exiled 
and deprived of his rightful possessions; Klytaimestra and Aigisthos are ὑπερκόπως… χλίουσιν 
‘arrogantly luxuriating’ in wealth which Agamemnon ‘worked’ to get, and which is now rightly 
Orestes’ (124-151), although Elektra has also been deprived of her rightful family dowry – 
typically gifted to girls ten years younger than Elektra is at the time of Khoephoroi.246  
Aristocratic Agamemnon’s ‘working for wealth’ involved raiding, warfare, and the slaughter 
                                                          
242 Likewise, Sommerstein (2008b:295n140) interprets the meaning of Klytaimestra’s name as meaning Κλυται-
μήστρα – ‘famous plotter’. 
243 Klytaimestra’s hospitable sentiments are only ambiguous if one chooses to read them so; for Lloyd-Jones 
(1970c:6), they are “sinister and ambiguous”, but for Anderson (1932:305), Klytaimestra’s “dignity” in her first 
appearance is “flawless”.  Klytaimestra’s third speech (Khoe. 707-718) is also graciously hospitable.  Cf. the 
chorus’ comments (629-630), on the incompatibility of female audacity and the domestic hearth. 
244 On Klytaimestra’s genuine love for Aigisthos, see Anderson (1932:305). 
245 Whallon (1958:272); Lloyd-Jones (1970c:6); Ferguson (1972:93); Zelenak (1998:67); Sewell (2007:104). 
246 On the gift of dowry to girls, see Sommerstein (2008:229n26). 
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and enslavement of many, including the chorus of slave-women standing at her side, but 
Elektra’s grievance is simply that Orestes should be luxuriating in their slavery instead of 
Klytaimestra and Aigisthos.247  Elektra uses her forced absence at the moment of 
Agamemnon’s’ death – she claims to have been locked up within the house – to justify her 
inability to prevent the murder and the desecration of the corpse afterwards; but her exclusion 
as mourner is also an offence against her honour (444-449).  She is also furious that 
Agamemnon’s burial occurred without mourning and without the participation of the citizenry, 
offending against his status as a king; in her eyes, Klytaimestra is a δαΐα/ πάντολμε μᾶτερ, 
‘dreadful, all-daring mother’ (429-433).  Orestes may be destined to be the patrilineal ‘hero’ 
whose hand will dispose of Klytaimestra, but Aiskhylos’ Elektra wants only to return to an 
oikos properly ruled by males and is no less her mother’s ekthros. 
 
Both children on first appearances take all opportunity to demonstrate the depth of their enmity 
toward Klytaimestra, but the play’s emotionally-charged recognition-scene sees the children 
escalate their antipathy for their mother.248  At no time in Elektra’s and Orestes’ cataloguing of 
Klytaimestra’s crimes in their prayer to the gods do they make any reference to parent 
Agamemnon’s dreadful all-daring crimes against his own family; Elektra tells Orestes that since 
she cannot love her mother she gives Orestes that share of love, along with that she owes to a 
sacrificed sister, but the agent of this sister’s sacrifice is not named (240-241).  Instead, 
Elektra’s outraged reference to ἢ τάπερ/ πάθομεν ἄχεα πρός γε τῶν τεκομένων ‘the pains which 
we have suffered, and, indeed, from our own parent’ (418-419), highlights Klytaimestra’s 
exceptional cruelty to the children of the house (and is a casual confirmation of Klytaimestra’s 
natural maternality worth noting in light of Apollo’s later insistence that the mother is no 
parent); at this point it seems to be accepted that parents should act to support the lifetime 
success of their offspring, an expectation audiences of all eras would understand. 
 
Aiskhylos’ characterization of Elektra as a victim requires agreement that those who have 
oppressed her are villains; audience sympathy for the miserable daughter therefore inspires 
                                                          
247 On economic opportunism for goods and slaves as a normal aspect of aristocratic male life in Homeric epic, 
see Jackson (1993); Rihll (1993); Thalmann (1998). 
248 The Khoephoroi’s recognition-scene attracts considerable critical responses, in part because of its reappearance 
with ‘variation’ in Sophokles’ and Euripides’ later plays; see Kitto (1968:81); Ferguson (1972:92), who contends 
that the recognition-scene – recycled from Stesikhoros’ work – is simply “fatuous”; and Davidson (1988:52-53). 
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dislike of the apparently abusive mother.249  Audience identification with Elektra’s beloved 
brother Orestes also encourages support of his hatred for his mother.  The play’s first lines make 
it clear that Orestes’ mother – who he insists inflicted an ignoble death upon his father through 
hidden treachery – is now his implacable ekthros (1-3b).250  Orestes’s later exultation over the 
bloodied corpse of his mother also describes Klytaimestra as having ‘carried’ the once-dear 
children of her husband, offspring who are now her mortal enemies (991-994); Klytaimestra’s 
physical maternality will be thoroughly undermined in the next play.  Elektra earlier resented 
the bad behaviour of her ‘parent’ (418-419), but the Khoephoroi’s chorus now declare that the 
ties of blood between Orestes and Klytaimestra are of no importance compared to the 
relationship between son and father (828-830), preparing the audience for Apollo’s later 
assertion in Eumenides that the mother is no kin of the child whatsoever.  Whereas critics are 
often shocked by the blatant irrationality of his ‘sudden’ proposition, in fact the audience’s 
‘naïve physics’ of biology is being progressively triggered in order to be more effectively 
undermined by the ‘prosecution’s closing-address’ in the trilogy’s climax.251 
 
Orestes ignores his father’s failings but foregrounds Klytaimestra’s dishonourable rejection – 
through adultery – of her husband Agamemnon.  The son’s anger over his mother’s sexual 
disloyalty toward his father clearly goads Orestes to commit matricide: 
 
πρὸς αὐτὸν τόνδε σὲ σφάξαι θέλω, 
καὶ ζῶντα γάρ νιν κρείσσον᾽ ἡγήσω πατρός: 
τούτῳ θανοῦσα ξυγκάθευδ᾽, ἐπεὶ φιλεῖς 
τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, ὃν δ᾽ ἐχρῆν φιλεῖν στυγεῖς, 
 
‘I want to slaughter you beside that man, for while living, you held him superior to my 
father.  Dying, you will lie with this man, since this man you love, while hating him 
whom you ought to love!’ (904-907). 
 
                                                          
249 On Aiskhylos’ narratively irrelevant Elektra, see Lloyd-Jones (1970c:5); Ferguson (1972:97); Hogan 
(1984:109); Baldock (1989:110).  Cf. Auer (2006:250), who contends that the secret collaboration between Elektra 
and the chorus is pivotal in persuading the irresolute Orestes to act (in fact, it is Pylades’ ruthless insistence that 
really clinches his decision). 
250 On this reconstruction of the prologue, which diverges from the Oxford text, see West (1985b); Griffith (1987). 
251 On naïve physics – the innate principles and expectations about how the natural, physical world operates – see 
Smith and Casati (1994); Butterfield and Ngondi (2016). 
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Those familiar with the Iliad may think back to Agamemnon’s disloyal boast (Il. 1.113-115) 
that he considers a captive woman not inferior to the wife who has given him four children and 
carefully managed his prosperous household.  Orestes may be righteously insulted by the fact 
that that Klytaimestra did not love his father, but the audience knows Agamemnon did not love 
her any better than his captured slave, and – according to other versions of the story – he has 
slain not one but two of her children.252  Sent away from home as a baby, he now has no personal 
emotional attachment to the woman who bore him, but sees every social and material reason to 
uphold his patrimonial aspirations.253 
 
Critical sympathy for Orestes also provokes reflexive dislike of his ekthros Klytaimestra; critics 
disagree, however, on the positivity or negativity of Orestes’ characterization.254  Tormented 
by doubts over the authenticity of the oracle – although apparently not by doubts over the 
rightness of killing a mother – Orestes justifies the planned matricide for a variety of reasons: 
he is overwhelmed by grief for his father; he is infuriated by the misappropriation of his 
household wealth; and he desires to liberate his city from the tyrannical rule of δυοῖν γυναικοῖν 
‘a pair of women’ (Khoe. 297-304).  Orestes’ hesitancy contrasts strongly with Elektra’s resolve 
and the boldness of Pylades; ultimately, Orestes is persuaded by Pylades’ argument that respect 
for the Delphic oracle and upholding sworn oaths is more important than respect for one’s 
parents, and that it is better to have humans than gods as enemies (900-903). 
 
Simple affection and grief for a father, on the other hand, are incidental to or even absent from 
Orestes’s urge to vengeance and even his concern for his father’s reputation centres on family 
patrimony, not on personal affection: standing at his father’s grave, Orestes wishes that 
Agamemnon had been killed violently in battle, rather than at the hand of a woman, so that his 
descendants could have borne his death in foreign war much more easily, because they would 
have shared in their father’s glory (345-353).  Orestes’ view – that dying gloriously in war 
overseas and being buried on foreign soil is preferable to ignoble death at home – is also in 
contrast with the chorus of elders’ complaint in Agamemnon that their sons were wasted in war, 
                                                          
252 Cf. the Aigisthos of Euripides’ Elektra, a man who – despite the views of some critics – is as hospitable and 
gracious as Klytaimestra of Aiskhylos’ Khoephoroi. 
253 Rutherford (2012:2) argues that Orestes has inherited his mother’s “monstrous character”, but Orestes’ 
disposition to impious murder need not have come from his maternal parent. 
254 On Aiskhylos’ Orestes as a poor example of a hero, see Jones (1962:96, 152); Dyer (1967:175-176); Vellacott 




and their bodies never returned home for proper burial.  His attempts to attract Zeus’s support 
are entirely pragmatic, reminding the father of gods that, if not ‘rescued’, the house of 
Agamemnon – θυτῆρος… μέγα ‘the great sacrificer’ – will perish, and Zeus’ altar will no longer 
receive offerings of oxen (255-261).255  There is no moral shame in their ‘buying’ the assistance 
of the divine and the dead; Orestes reminds the spirit of his deceased father that it is in 
Agamemnon’s own interest to support them, not out of love but because he will be dishonoured 
among others in Hades if his children cannot provide feasts for his spirit (483-485).  Orestes’ 
promise – to behave with filial piety – is conditional on receipt of Agamemnon’s help, 
however.256  The chorus also focus on material motives for the matricide, observing that either 
the house of Agamemnon will perish forever, or θεῖος Ὀρέστης, ‘godlike Orestes’ (867) will 
liberate the city and regain his power and wealth (859-865). 
 
Both of Klytaimestra’s children in this play are acting out of material self-interest of equal force 
to their moral imperatives, entreating the deceased Agamemnon to assist them in returning 
Orestes to control of the oikos, and both will benefit according to gendered reproductive 
strategies, opportunities denied to them while Klytaimestra and her new husband control the 
kingdom.  Once Aigisthos is eliminated, Orestes will become king in his own right, but he will 
also be able to get (buy) a husband for the ‘stranded virgin’ Elektra (480-482).257  Elektra 
willingly agrees to bargain her future share of material goods as an offering to Agamemnon’s 
tomb in return for his assistance in her quest to be a wife (486-488).  Both of the children are 
also at pains to identify themselves – ignoring Menelaos and his children – as the last living 
members of the house of Atreus (405-409); unless Orestes receives his help, Agamemnon’s 
own chance at immortality will be lost, because the Pelopid seed will be wiped out forever (503-
504).258  In the absence of a happy childhood spent in the company of either parent, Orestes is 
                                                          
255 Cf. Athene’s similar bribe of the Erinyes in Eumenides.  Reference to the great sacrifices(s) made by 
Agamemnon is not coincidental. 
256 According to Auer (2006:272), both children expect that the impending improvement in their own status will 
in turn be of benefit to the deceased Agamemnon, with future sacrifices from Orestes, and offerings out of Elektra’s 
marriage-portion. 
257 In Sommerstein’s (2008b:273n104) opinion, μόρος ‘fate, destiny’ presumably refers to the proper life Elektra 
ought to be leading, as a married woman. 
258 On Orestes and Elektra as the so-called last “sperma” of the Pelopid house, see Saxonhouse (1984:22).  Orestes 
and Elektra may believe they are the only living members of the house, but the gods prevented the returning Atreid 
Menelaos from avenging his brother.  In a number of other texts (i.e., the Odyssey, 3.309-312, Euripides’ Elektra, 
1278-81, and Orestes, 52-56), Menelaos – another Atreid and living seed of Pelops – is permitted to arrive home 
only after Klytaimestra’s death.  Menelaos also has one living, legitimate child, and is (according to Pausanias 
2.18.6) the father of illegitimate sons – Megapenthes and Nicostratos. 
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fully focussed on what he can salvage from his situation: the rightful inheritance of social and 
material advantage in a strongly patriarchal community, and the recovery of his patrimony is 
an absolutely valid reason for revenge – alongside filial piety and respect for the gods (301).  
The children’s determination to preserve the patriline, through the son’s control of family 
resources, and the daughter’s acquisition of a suitable husband, demonstrates what matters most 
in a reproductive context to each sex: Orestes’ success depends on his own status (and public 
perception of his willingness to defend his honour), and Elektra’s on her being the wife of a 
high-status male (to be purchased with sufficient dowry). 
 
Many of Orestes’ justifications for matricide are self-contradictory, however: the house is on 
the point of extinction, yet he would be glad to die if triumphant; he dares his mother’s furies 
because he fears those of his father; and he wishes to redeem his father’s honour on earth – 
despite the chorus’ assertion that Agamemnon already dwells in honour in Hades (354-362).259  
Orestes also seeks vengeance simply out of fear for his own life: in response to a frightened 
Klytaimestra’s warnings to him about her ἐγκότους κύνας, ‘wrathful hounds’ (924) – a mother’s 
Furies – he replies, τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς δὲ πῶς φύγω παρεὶς τάδε; ‘But how can I escape those of 
my father, letting this go?’ (925).  Agamemnon’s Furies – who have never yet made an 
appearance in any tragedy – have been hiding for ten years, whereas Klytaimestra’s Furies 
appear almost instantaneously.  Both Atreid children are in more tangible danger of death from 
their human enemies than from Agamemnon’s Furies (which have never appeared in any extant 
tragedy); Orestes tries to quieten Elektra’s noisy celebration of his return (233-234) because he 
is well aware that his mother and his father’s cousin Aigisthos are likely to react badly to the 
children’s plot to assassinate them.260  But almost all of the peripheral characters are in 
agreement with the children’s plan, and it is unclear as to who nearby might overhear and betray 
the young Agamemnids; the chorus of slaves in Khoephoroi, for example, are no less committed 
than the Atreid heirs to the destruction of Klytaimestra.261 
 
                                                          
259 Orestes is willing to die (and so wipe out the very last Pelopid) once he has accomplished his work (Khoe. 438).  
The chorus observes that if Agamemnon had been slain at Troy, he would even now be ruling among the spirits 
of all the others killed there, since he had been a king in life (354-362).  Cf. Akhilleus’ eye-witness account of life 
in Hades (Od. 11.488-491), where ruling as a king is less preferable even than living in the real world as a thrall. 
260 The matricidal son is also in conflict in Euripides’ Orestes with Menelaos his closest (i.e., patrilineal) kin, and 
with his matrilineal grandfather Tyndareos as well. 
261 See Khoe. 75-81; 423-25; 935-36. 
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The ‘character’ of this chorus is much more important to audience perceptions of Klytaimestra 
than their status as mere slave-women suggests; older than Elektra – perhaps considerably so – 
they are possibly captives taken by Agamemnon before the Trojan expedition (171).262  The 
chorus declare that it is right to suppress their resentment of those who enslave them, and to 
approve what their masters do (75-83), yet they quite clearly resent their present masters, 
Klytaimestra and Aigisthos; in fact, they view Elektra and Orestes as their ‘proper’ masters, 
and weep for their sufferings.  The chorus also reiterates the tragedy’s central message: only 
those related by blood can properly perform revenge, and to this end they further target Orestes 
concerning the shameful mutilation of Agamemnon’s corpse (439-443).263  Their query as to 
what compensation there may be for spilled blood is slyly ambiguous (48): more blood is 
required by the Fury who comes (400-404), and their ‘preferred’ master Orestes will no less 
become the object of the Furies’ justice for Klytaimestra’s death. 
 
Although there is no evidence that Klytaimestra herself has ever harmed any of them, the 
chorus’ hatred for her is intensely personal; their first direct mention of Klytaimestra describes 
her as δύσθεος γυνά, ‘that godless woman’ (46).264  Urging Elektra to vengeance, they insist 
that retribution for enemies – by implication, even kin – is a righteous act before the gods (122-
123).  They gleefully declare that they would like to see Klytaimestra (and Aigisthos) suffer the 
terrible torture of being coated with pitch and then burned alive (267-268).265  The chorus’ great 
kommos – the so-called ‘Ode of Bad Women’ – contributes to the general accusations of 
specifically female evil against Klytaimestra (585-652).266  The message of this ode seems to 
be that ἔρως ἀπέρωτος, ‘love without love’ (600) – i.e., sexual desire – is only an evil found in 
women, and one which threatens mate-ships among humans and beasts alike (599-601).  
According to EP research on short-term mating, as well as sexual fantasy, it is in fact men who 
                                                          
262 On the paradoxes of the Khoephoroi’s chorus, see In Vellacott (1984:113); Baldock (1989:41); McCall (1990:4, 
23, 26); Rehm (1992:59). 
263 According to Sommerstein (2008:267n99), Agamemnon’s corpse was desecrated in order to forestall a ghost’s 
vengeance. 
264 See also Orestes’ first invective against Klytaimestra, which describes her as the ‘woman’ who killed 
Agamemnon ‘by concealed treachery’ (3b). 
265 On being burned alive while covered with pitch, see also Aiskh. fr. 118; trag. adesp. 226a; Plat. Gorgias 473c; 
and Hesychius k4849.  See also Sommerstein (2008:247n58). 
266 On the “intense, ferocious misogyny” of this ode, see Rose (1992:244).  On this ode’s contribution to the 
dematernalization of Klytaimestra, see Saxonhouse (1984:23).  In Vellacott’s (1984:111) opinion, the bitter chorus 
is voicing the play’s single message: all women are damned by the actions of a few.  Cf. Ferguson (1972:95). 
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are eager for impersonal sex.267  According to the chorus (Khoe. 602-638), females falling to 
this dangerous ‘love without love’ include Althaea, daughter of Thestius, who killed her own 
son Meleagar; Skylla, daughter of Nisius, who killed her father for love of conquering Minos; 
and the Lemnian women, who killed their husbands.  The chorus concludes its cautionary tale 
of evil murderesses with reference to  
 
δυσφιλὲς γαμήλευμα, ἀπεύχετον δόμοις 
γυναικοβούλους τε μήτιδας φρενῶν 
ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ τευχεσφόρῳ, 
ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ δηίοις ἐπικότω σέβας. 
τίω δ᾽ ἀθέρμαντον ἑστίαν δόμων 
γυναικείαν τ᾽ ἄτολμον αἰχμάν, 
 
‘[a] hateful marriage, abominable to the household, female schemes of a cunning mind, 
against an armoured man, destroying with ill-will all reverence for a man; I value the 
hearth in a home left unscorched, and a woman not emboldened by a warlike 
temperament’ (625-630). 
 
Some contend that the ode aims to indict all women as potentially dangerous, but the 
irreverently overly-bold woman with a cunning mind is clearly Klytaimestra.268  Before we 
even meet the queen in person for the first time, the chorus authoritatively reports the ominous 
dream that has prompted Elektra’s libation upon Agamemnon’s tomb (523-524), the famous 
nightmare (in part borrowed from Stesikhoros) which prophesies Klytaimestra’s betrayal and 
death at the hands of her son.269  The chorus’s early reference to the ‘shocking’ dream (32-43) 
implies that – until this past night – Klytaimestra and Aigisthos have ruled Argos for ten years 
                                                          
267 On the tendency of males – rather than females – to seek out impersonal, commitment-free sexual experience, 
see discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 18; 23; 23n49; 25-26; 25n58; 25n61; 25n62; 26n71; 30; 33; 60; 67; 74-75; 75n387; 
77; 77n398; 79; 79n406. 
268 Lefkowitz (2007:176) observes that these women are evil not because they murder, but because they murder 
male kin; on slaughter of kin as the most abhorrent form of murder, see Vickers (1973:402). 
269 On Stesikhoros’ early sixth century extended lyric account of Orestes’ matricide and subsequent confrontation 
with the Furies (fr. 219 Page 1962) as the origin of Klytaimestra’s dream in Khoephoroi, see (Anderson 2005:122-
123); Sommerstein (2008:xii-xiii).  The specific (and brief) mention in the existing fragment of Stesikhoros’ 
‘Oresteia’ is: ‘A serpent with the top of its head stained with gore seemed to her to approach, And out of it the 
Pleisthenid king appeared.’ (n39: Page 1962: fr. 42.)  For a more informed analysis and comparison of the parallels 
between the breast-baring scenes in Aiskhylos’ Khoephoroi and Homer’s Iliad (22.82-85), see O’Neill (1998:216). 
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without any previous ill omens; perhaps the gods were waiting for Orestes to grow up, in 
preference to Agamemnon’s brother as avenger. 
 
The chorus details this dream, after informing Orestes that the godless Klytaimestra has sent a 
libation to appease Agamemnon’s spirit (523): they say that Klytaimestra gave birth to a snake, 
swaddled it like a baby, and fed it from her breast – where her blood is mixed with the milk 
(527-533).  This dream is not the first appearance of a snake in the Oresteia: Kassandra (Aga. 
1233) describes Klytaimestra as a snake; and Orestes insists that he and Elektra were orphaned 
by a viper’s killing his father (Khoe. 247-249).  In his prayer to his father’s tomb, Orestes 
enthusiastically identifies himself as the snake, and cites his mother’s dream as justification for 
his intended matricide (540-550).  Klytaimestra herself realizes too late the dream’s meaning; 
her final on-stage words agree that Orestes is the snake she has borne and nourished (928-
929).270  Critics (and especially psychoanalytic critics) argue that the dream represents a deeply 
disturbed mother-child relationship, but they almost always interpret this episode from the 
child’s perspective, and never address the question of how women in an audience might absorb 
this appalling sadosexual experience.271  The dream shows that women can and do feel 
ambiguity about a physical motherhood which can bring pain, disappointment, and increased 
risk of death – as well as joy – but critics sympathetic to Orestes and Elektra are typically more 
interested in whether or not the Atreid offspring suffer from Klytaimestra’s maternal 
‘insincerity’; those sympathetic to the children’s view of things are forced to conclude – against 
evidence – that all and any positive feelings she expresses about motherhood must be feigned.272 
 
Stesikhoros’ original version of Klytaimestra’s dream is reshaped to a very specific purpose in 
Aiskhylos’ play.  The fact of Klytaimestra’s motherhood is massively over-denied in the 
Oresteia, because Aiskhylos wishes to justify the matricide in Khoephoroi; he therefore has to 
                                                          
270 See Herodotus (3.109), who (erroneously) states that the viper’s young ‘take revenge’ on their mother for killing 
the father during copulation, eating their way out of the female’s body.  See also O’Neill (1998:219-220); 
Sommerstein (2008:245-246n53). 
271 Psychoanalytic interpretation ignores ambivalence in women toward maternality, in preference to a child-
centric perspective, an approach also seen in mainstream critical discussion.  For examples, see Whallon 
(1958:271); and Bowman (1997:136, 138), who manages to analyse every possible aspect of the dream, except for 
the physically sadistic act inflicted upon the biological mother.  Cf. Watson (2012:np), who suggests that the dream 
represents the natural fear of the female that she will lose her life in bearing a child.  Euripides’ Medeia (Med. 250-
251) states an obvious fact when she declares that giving birth to children can sometimes kill mothers, just as men 
sometimes die fighting men in battle. 
272 See, for example, Whallon (1958:274).  Reflexive disbelief in women’s testimony about their life-experiences 
is hardly new, and has been adequately addressed in many other fields of inquiry and advocacy. 
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work very hard to distance the avenging, devoted mother of the first play from the adulterous 
woman who dies by the sword in the second play.  He does this in two ways: through 
accusations that Klytaimestra is a ‘false’ mother, and through the claims of others that they are 
Orestes’ ‘true’ parents.  Elektra, the Nurse, and even the household of Strophios (the father of 
Pylades and husband of Agamemnon’s sister Anaxibia) are all thrust forward in Khoephoroi as 
the ‘real’ nurturers of the young Orestes.  Elektra announces early in the play that the hated 
woman ‘with ungodly spirit’ who bore her is no mother (190-191).273  Instead, Klytaimestra 
will be replaced for her by a brother; Orestes will receive the love due a mother, for Elektra 
hates Klytaimestra, πανδίκως ‘with all justification’ (240-241).  Perhaps following these 
attacks, some critics view Klytaimestra’s desperate appeal to reverence for motherhood with 
suspicion,274 even though the only ‘evidence’ that Klytaimestra is lying about her grief for the 
purportedly deceased Orestes comes from one hostile witness loyal to the Atreid oikos, and one 
who also vies for the position of ‘true’ mother of the heir: Orestes’ Nurse.275  The ‘family’ 
Nurse was reliably more loyal to the male’s oikos than the introduced daughter of a competing 
oikos would ever be, but (virtually) no critic ever suggests that ‘mother-rivalry’ covertly 
motivates the Khoephoroi’s Nurse.276 
 
Based solely on this Nurse’s biased report, some insist that Klytaimestra’s flaws as a mother 
are very real.277  The Nurse claims to have ‘mothered’ Orestes, which most critics assume 
means that she breast-fed him, contradicting Klytaimestra’s desperate appeal to the respect due 
the mother’s breast at which he so often fell asleep while suckling (896-898).  Orestes also 
specifically likens his experience of suckling from Klytaimestra to that of the snake in the 
dream; violent, and potentially deadly.  That the Nurse may have suckled Orestes does not entail 
that Klytaimestra never has, and even if his mother never fed him herself, this does not prove 
                                                          
273 On Elektra’s denial of Klytaimestra’s maternality, see also Saxonhouse (1984:23). 
274 In Whallon’s (1958:274) opinion, for example, the “unloving” Klytaimestra’s plea for her life is a “cold and 
desperate deceit”. 
275 See, for example, Stanford (1942:115); Ferguson (1972:96-97).  Some critics accept without question the 
Nurse’s accusations about Klytaimestra’s duplicity; see Goheen (1972:120-121); Saxonhouse (1984:23); Goldhill 
(1986:15); Burnett (1998:112).  According to Karydas (1998:2-3), the traditional status of the trophos (Nurse) as 
one of the family in Greek society enhances the credibility of Aiskhylos’ character in this play. 
276 Karydas (1998:65) is one of the few (if any) to suggest that this Nurse’s pronouncements might be biased or 
self-interested. 
277 Garner (1990:39); Rabinowitz (2008:103).  Cf. Whallon (1958:274).  Some argue that Klytaimestra’s maternal 
feelings are sincere, however, and that the trilogy acknowledges her active mothering; see O’Neill (1998:225); 
Saïd (2005:229); Lefkowitz (2007:176). 
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that she does not love him.278  Upper-class and patrilocally-married women were (and are) 
pressured to conceive as many children as possible in as short a time as possible (generally at a 
cost to their own health), and these mothers were traditionally forced to hand their infants over 
to wet-nurses.279  Accusations that Klytaimestra is a poor mother are deliberate misinformation, 
because there is no evidence in the text to suggest that she does not love her offspring.  If Elektra 
(or Orestes) had been sacrificed at Aulis, their mother would have been just as vengeful.280 
 
Collapsing Klytaimestra’s maternality also enables her enemies to overinflate the idea of 
Agamemnon as a good father, even though it was father Agamemnon who slew his own child; 
while Klytaimestra has been forced by circumstances to heavily disinvest in Orestes and 
Elektra, she never attempts to kill them.  Orestes and Elektra are in deep denial about their 
father’s sin; the compulsive idealization of Agamemnon as the adored father – by almost 
everyone in the play – occurs despite their awareness of the τῆς τυθείσης νηλεῶς ‘pitiless 
sacrifice’ of his own child (Khoe. 242); the idealization of Agamemnon throughout the trilogy 
is in no way incidental to the increasing vilification of Klytaimestra, however.  Orestes accuses 
his mother of abandoning him, and of ‘selling’ him out of the house (913-915), but according 
to Klytaimestra, she sent him to the house of a friend – his paternal aunt and her husband – for 
his own safety (914).  It hardly seems likely that Orestes was sold to an unfriendly oikos, 
especially as cousins Orestes and Pylades are the best of friends.  The fact that Pylades – the 
one eligible bachelor still friendly to the house – will also benefit materially after Klytaimestra’s 
death through marriage to an well-dowered Atreid daughter is somewhat neglected in critical 
discussion of Klytaimestra’s matricide.  Far from being an inadequate mother, Klytaimestra is 
a strongly attached, active supporter of her previous husband’s offspring: her support for her 
surviving Atreid children confirms EP findings that the presence (and positive intervention) of 
the biological mother prevents a stepfather from eliminating unwanted, existing offspring from 
a female’s previous unions – a common practice across species.281  Thanks to her intervention, 
                                                          
278 Saïd (2005:229) and Lefkowitz (2007:176) also seem to assume that Klytaimestra did in fact suckle her son. 
279 On the species-typical early weaning and outsourcing of lactation of aristocratic children in order to expedite 
rapid conception of further children by aristocratic mothers, see Hrdy (1999a, 2009).  On critical ignorance of the 
actualities of upper-class use of wet-nursing, and mistaken assumptions about Klytaimestra’s affection toward her 
offspring based on this “failing”, see Vellacott (1984a:154-155). 
280 On Klytaimestra’s genuine love for all her children, see Anderson (1929:145); Margon (1983:296-297); 
Vellacott (1984:74-75).  Other sources show that Klytaimestra appears to have happily borne some number of 
Aigisthos’ children (S. El. 585-590; Hyg. Fab. 122, 124). 
281 On the protective presence of biological parents, see Chapter 1, pp. 41n179; 48; 54. 
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Orestes is saved, and so owes his mother his life twice over.282  Klytaimestra’s response to the 
news of Orestes’s death is also exactly what you would expect of a sincerely attached mother: 
she wails about ruin, and she blames the family curse for continuing to strip her of her loved 
ones (691-699).  Klytaimestra’s previous attempt to bargain with this family curse (Aga. 1569-
1573) has come to nothing: by the time of Euripides’ IT, Pelops’ spear – a cherished but malign 
reminder of patrilineal sin – is still lurking in the inner chambers of the house.  Just a few lines 
later (718), she describes the event as συμφορᾶς ‘a misfortune’.  This is the woman who 
described in exultant detail the killing strokes she gave her husband: if she felt any happiness – 
or even just relief – at the news of Orestes’s death, she would not trouble to conceal it; she and 
Aigisthos have been the uncontested rulers of Argos for ten years, and she need deceive no one 
about her true feelings. 
 
Klytaimestra’s tears upon hearing the ‘fake news’ of Orestes’ death are scripted as real, and the 
only reason to doubt her grief depends upon the testimony of a hostile witness, biased evidence 
too rarely challenged.  The Nurse claims that Klytaimestra is only pretending sorrow in front 
of the servants, and is really laughing at events, while she herself is full of genuine misery, 
remembering all the hard, unpleasant labours she undertook for the infant Orestes, received 
straight from his mother after birth and raised for his father (737-763).  Klytaimestra 
emphasizes her emotional pain at the never-ending loss of her beloved children, while the Nurse 
dwells simply upon her loss of time and effort.  Yet – according to critics’ comparison of their 
speeches – the Nurse’s ‘love’ for Orestes is somehow more ‘authentically maternal’ than that 
of the actual mother.283  The Nurse’s further assertion that the news will bring joy to Aigisthos 
(743-744) is thrown into question by Aigisthos’ actual response: he may not love Orestes, but 
he calls the news οὐδαμῶς ἐφίμερον, ‘by no means delightful’ (840), and ἂν φέρειν δόμοις/ 
γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἄχθος αἱματοσταγὲς φόνῳ ‘another blood-reeking burden of slaughter for the house 
to bear’ (839-843).  If Klytaimestra has saved Orestes’ life in sending him away, and if her 
maternal grief at his apparent death is genuine, then the chorus’ overwrought ode detailing the 
evils of women who slay their own kin – something which Klytaimestra has never done – is 
                                                          
282 Agamemnon killed the child of Klytaimestra’s first husband as part of his takeover attempt on the throne and 
on the woman; presumably the incoming Aigisthos would have killed the child Orestes, unless this had been 
prevented.  On ‘take-over’ infanticide across species, including humans, see Chapter 1, pp. 49n231; 55n269; 
61n309. 
283 On Klytaimestra’s insincere grief, see Vickers (1973:403); Pontani (2007:221).  Cf. Taplin (1978:145) and 
Gamel (1999b:37), who contend that her tears are genuine and persuasive.  Margon (1983:297) is one of the few 
to view this accusation of the Nurse as propaganda, fuelled by “antipathy” against Klytaimestra. 
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just another attempt to misdirect the audience: other critical views for the killing of a ‘bad’ 
Klytaimestra as deserved are equally in need of serious re-examination, beginning with the 
children’s appeal to ‘the will of the gods’, and their claims about the ‘necessity’ of material 
goods. 
 
The oracle of Loxias-Apollo as motivation for Klytaimestra’s murder is frequently cited in 
critical discussion, and many agree with Orestes that his matricide is the result of divine will – 
even of divine compulsion – just as Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigeneia was divinely 
motivated.284  Orestes hopes that Zeus – well aware of all events – will give testimony that the 
matricide was just (984-989).285  Loxias outlines the unlovely consequences to Orestes of 
ignoring the oracle: madness; leprosy; exile; assaults by the Erinyes; and the loss of his own 
life, forsaken by all friends (269-296), and – as Orestes observes – the oracle Apollo has never 
told untruth (559).  Loxias fails to warn Orestes that even if successful he will be pursued by 
disease-bringing powers from beneath the earth, however, and that he himself has no power to 
prevent the assaults of the Furies because they will be generated irresistibly by a mother’s 
blood; when Orestes realizes that he cannot avoid madness and the pursuit by the Erinyes, he 
announces his intention to seek Apollo’s help once more, because only Apollo’s command 
compelled him to commit kin-murder (1026-1039).  At this point he is conspicuously silent 
about being motivated by material considerations, a silence shared by those viewing his murder 
of Klytaimestra as a noble or heroic urge. 
 
The children’s materialism is the one motivation for matricide attracting confusion, and the 
least critical discussion, perhaps because it does not suit modern perceptions of ‘noble’ 
tragedy’s treatment of religious and social conflict.286  Neither of the Atreid children are the 
                                                          
284 Zeitlin (1965:495-496); Lloyd-Jones (1970c:6); Sommerstein (1996:199); Fletcher (2012:45).  On Apollo’s 
threats against Orestes, see also Sewell-Rutter (2007:97).  Cf. Garvie (1986:xxxi), who argues that Orestes is free 
to disobey the “commands” of the gods, and Gagarin (1976:76), who argues that from a legal position, Orestes is 
absolutely culpable, whether or not the gods commanded the act.  See also Jones (1962:100); Sharrock and Ash 
(2002:39). 
285 Nobody denies that Orestes committed a bad action, but, as Athena represents her father in securing Orestes’ 
acquittal in Eumenides, it could be said that Zeus does approve the matricide, and so natural penalty for the act is 
waived.  Aigisthos, on the other hand, ἔχει γὰρ αἰσχυντῆρος, ὡς νόμος, δίκην, ‘[he] received justice as an adulterer, 
according to law’ (Khoe. 990).  Athenian law permitted the killing of an adulterer, but only if the offender was 
caught committing the adulterous act. 
286 Cf. Kitto (1968:83), and Sommerstein (1996:367), who both recognize Orestes’ materialism; most critics 
massively understate the lack of resources as motive, however, despite constant reference to it in the play.  Jones 
(1962:144), for example, contends that the play’s suggestion of “anxiety about inheritance” is “contextually 
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least bit embarrassed about the importance of recovering their family possessions, however; to 
the Greeks, Orestes’ desire to secure his patrimony actually confirms his noble status.  In her 
speech over Agamemnon’s tomb, Elektra bewails the use of family property by her mother and 
Aigisthos (135-139): not only is the proper heir deprived of the family wealth, but worse, two 
enemies, neither of whom are Atreids, are getting all the benefit of it.  As Klytaimestra is being 
murdered inside the house, the chorus confirm that the alienation of Atreid property is a central 
element of the revenge (942-945).  Standing over the corpses of Aigisthos and Klytaimestra, 
Orestes holds the liberation of Argos, the restoration of paternal honour and the repossession 
of his despoiled wealth in equal importance (973-974).287  Agamemnon’s wealth that he worked 
so hard to get – according to Elektra (Khoe. 135-139) – has been alienated from his patriline.  
The children’s loss of their father would have benefitted them both if only Agamemnon’s death 
had been appropriate to his high station.288  The humiliating death of their father – at the hand 
of a woman – is clearly hazardous to their social status, but critical discussion ignores the 
potential threat to Orestes’ and Elektra’s material and social wellbeing of Klytaimestra’s future 
children by Thyestid Aigisthos.289  Sibling-competition to control mundane wealth is won by 
the Atreids in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia, but neither the death of Klytaimestra nor the acquittal of 
Orestes can control the ancient family daimon; Oresteia-sequels foreground Atreid Orestes’ 
eventually lethal conflict with his maternal half-siblings, Thyestids Aletes and Erigone.290  In 
some versions, Orestes kills Aletes and retakes the throne, and also plots to kill Erigone – but 
in others he marries his half-sister and produces a doubly Pelopid child, Penthilos.291 
 
                                                          
unsatisfactory”, and “unconvincing”.  Others view the surviving children as more obsessed with the family’s 
position and power; see Ferguson (1972:94); MacEwen (1990b:20). 
287 The only other instance of πορθήτορας ‘despoilers’ (974) in the tragic corpus is Klytaimestra’s reference to 
Agamemnon as πορθήτωρ, the ‘sacker’ of Troy (Aga. 907). 
288 On the benefits of a father’s noble death, see Auer (2006:265, 272). 
289 Cf. Bell (1991:177), however, who observes that Elektra is morally “outraged and alienated” by the birth of 
Klytaimestra’s children to Aigisthos. 
290 Aigisthos’ and Klytaimestra’s offspring – Aletes and Erigone, and Helen, a daughter – are said to have been 
slain by Orestes during his murders of his mother and her lover; Bell’s (1991:228) source is Ptolemaeus 
Hephaestion 4, quoted by Photius Library 479.  On Aletes, see also Hyginus (Fab. 122).  Sophokles’ Elektra 
specifically acknowledges the existence of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos’ other offspring in her tirade of woes (S. 
El. 585-590).  Erigone, in some stories (and perhaps in lost tragedies by Sophokles and Philokles), continued to 
make trouble for the children of her father’s enemy Agamemnon; see Gantz (1966:682). 
291 Orestes married Erigone – after his marriage to Hermione – and sired Penthilos upon his half-sister; see Bell 
(1991:187).  Orestes also marries his cousin Hermione (after events in Euripides’ Andromakhe), because no other 
family is prepared to unite with a matricide. 
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The persistence of troubles for the ‘winning’ Atreids after Klytaimestra’s death show that the 
consequences of kin-killing are always worse than any benefit; matricide is a moral crime 
attracting a mother’s Furies.  Scholars diverge wildly on just how much guilt attaches to the 
matricide of Klytaimestra, but the children’s pursuit of vengeance ends no one’s suffering, 
because guilt is unavoidable, and the killers all suffer ruin for their evil acts.292  Sorrowing over 
her father’s grave, Elektra foresees that ruin is unconquerable, and evil is everywhere (337-
338).  Similarly, the chorus despair that blood-vengeance creates unending ruin because the 
hand stained by murder can never be purified (66-74); later they see that Orestes comes to save 
the house, but brings only death, and there is no knowing when ruin will cease (1068-1076).  
The chorus’ anguish over kin-murder is selectively fixated on the menfolk of the oikos, 
however: the troubles of the house derive firstly from Thyestes, forced by Atreus to eat his own 
children, and then from the murder of Agamemnon; the many impiously slain Tantalid children 
and Klytaimestra, the impiously murdered mother, are studiously ignored.  The slaughter of 
innocents, it is clear, is insignificant compared with the assassination of a brutal but successful 
war-criminal.293  The true first cause of Atreid ruin actually goes further back than this chorus 
cares to admit: the accursed Tantalids are the authors of the oikos’ unending cycle of ruin, and 
so must also provide their own remedy (466-475).  What keeps the personified deity Ate awake 
and active is the willingness of each generation to commit atrocity – under the guise of 
vengeance – in order to secure power; the urge to compete and win is sanctified by a thin veneer 
of religious justification, and because the gods – reputedly – approve the unending cycle there 
can be no escape.  The final words of the chorus in the play concern the power of the personified 
Ate or Ruin (1076): to avenge death with death never brings the spirit of Ate to sleeping rest, 
and this is confirmed by the immediate appearance of the Erinyes in the first scene of the next 
play, where only the subterfuge of Olympian Apollo can lull them into slumber.  The return of 
the heir Orestes has no power to force the ancient evil out of the house, any more than the 
mariticidal Klytaimestra’s earlier plea for the Pleisthenid spirit of vengeance to decamp to some 
other house (Aga. 1569-1573); only the intervention of gods in the next play will forestall it. 
                                                          
292 On the moral resolution of the play in ruin unending, see Lesky (1983b:82); Heath (1987:26).  Some contend 
that the endless cycle of Ruin is the consequence of the much earlier sins within the family, not recent crimes; see 
Whallon (1958:275); Ferguson (1972:95).  Others argue that Orestes’ mother-murder far exceeds all earlier crimes 
of the family; see Lesky (1966b:85); Garvie (1986:xxxii-xxxiii); Conacher (1987:102).  On the family crimes, see 
Chapter 2, pp. 96-97; 120n125; Chapter 3, pp. 214-215; 254n213, and the Conclusion, pp. 296-297. 
293 On the play’s erasure of Iphigeneia’s cruel death and the moral redemption of Agamemnon who slew his own 





The chorus may pray for a cessation of the cycle of vengeance, but further acts of bloody justice 
cannot bring the violence to a halt (Khoe. 803-806).  As the chorus observe, the murder of 
Agamemnon was accomplished by κλυτὰ βυσσόφρων Ἐρινύς, ‘the famous, deep-thinking 
Fury’ (649-652).  In the first play of the Oresteia, far-famed, deep-thinking Klytaimestra 
channelled this erinys of vengeance, but the house’s spirit of ruin now occupies another; the 
crimes continue, and each one outdoes and obscures the horror of the previous offence.  The 
appearance of the Furies to Orestes alone suggests that Orestes bears the focal blame for an act 
actually committed by three of Pelops’ descendants: himself, his sister, and his cousin.294  
Orestes’ apparent ‘contrition’ comes much too late, but his regret is not for the loss of a mother, 
but is really for himself and his remaining family, polluted by his act (1016-1017). 
 
The Khoephoroi closes in chaos.  If Orestes’ act was not impious, then he would not be the 
target of the Furies, but the wrathful hounds of his mother – which she specifically warned him 
about (924) – are attracted by the fresh blood of his mother on his hands (1054-1055), 
confirming the magnitude of his impious crime.  To the best of every character’s ability, a 
dehumanized Klytaimestra has been depicted as deserving bloody death, and this hounded 
Orestes is now the focus of all audience sympathy and approval.  His suffering – only earned 
through his impious act of matricide – now completely obscures Agamemnon’s equally impious 
sacrifice of Iphigeneia and Klytaimestra’s subsequent ten years of grief.  Aiskhylos’ Eumenides 
‘resolves’ the question of moral right to murder by exonerating all male murderers, but the price 
of peace is enormous; prosocial ancient female divinities charged with the supervision of 
ancient laws determined by the primacy of biological relationships are effectively subverted, 
through a kind of double-think denial and judgement against Klytaimestra’s – and by extension, 
all women’s – fact and right of biological motherhood.  Critical discussion acknowledges this 
trilogy’s neutralization of female power, but gravitates to ‘more interesting social issues’ 
affecting public life: the political suppression of private blood-feud and the development of 
civilized systems of justice.  The Eumenides in no way seeks to eliminate the violent cycle of 
                                                          
294 On the appearance of the Erinyes as indicating Orestes’ madness and the working out of the curse, see Brown 
(1983:19); Garvie (1986:xxix); Sewell-Rutter (2007:98). 
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vengeance, however; instead, violent killing is subsumed under civic control, and Athens will 
– by the gift of the gods – benefit through aggressively imperialist military ventures.295 
 
Critics have long acclaimed Aiskhylos’ Eumenides as a positive depiction of social progress, 
but the role of misogyny in this developing ‘civilization’ has more recently attracted analysis 
informed by feminism.296  Scholars who laud the play’s success in progressing society from 
revenge-feud to law should recall that all of the ruling males in this narrative kill reproductive 
rivals in order to secure power: Zeus killed Athena’s mother Metis, ostensibly in order to control 
Wisdom, but actually to forestall the birth of a serious rival; Agamemnon killed Klytaimestra’s 
first husband and son, in order to secure her as mate, and then killed her first daughter, to 
increase his own status and thus reproductive potential; and Aigisthos killed Agamemnon, to 
return kingship to his own paternal line.  Views of the Eumenides as a wonderful parable for a 
civilized democratic city ignore the inconvenient fact that this civilization is founded on denial 
of female reproductive autonomy.  Some elements of the play’s narrative are traditional, but 
Aiskhylos also made significant innovations to the story.297  Although she appears only briefly 
in this third play of the Oresteia, Klytaimestra as an implacable ghost is viewed by some as a 
more imposing character than ever before.298  Even this frightening ghost makes no mention 
Iphigeneia’s sacrifice in this play, however, and some conclude that the Eumenides completes 
the reversal of audience sympathy for Klytaimestra.299  Only the Pythia of Delphi and fugitive 
Orestes are human (and Elektra does not appear at all in Eumenides) but all of the play’s other 
characters are supernatural: Klytaimestra is a ghost; Athena and Apollo are Olympians; and the 
Erinyes, daughters of primeval Night, are hideous and implacably dangerous ancient deities.300 
 
                                                          
295 The social centrality of internal family-feuds of the rich and powerful are set aside in favour of civilized killing 
– external warfare – but the real consequences of this institution – moral corruption and insatiate enslavement – 
will be the subject of Euripides’ later Oresteia plays. 
296 Ferguson (1972:106); Sommerstein (1989b:24-25); Sharrock and Ash (2002:41); McDonald (2003:18); 
Mitchell-Boyask (2008:108). 
297 On innovations to the story, see Dover (1957:236); Ferguson (1972:102); Brown (1983:30); McDonald 
(2003:17).  On the Erinyes’ pursuit of Orestes, and Apollo’s protection of the matricide are the stable elements of 
the story, see Podlecki (1987:4); Sommerstein (1989b:5). 
298 On the ghostly Klytaimestra in Eumenides as “impressive”, see Kitto (1968:88).  Cf. the self-pitying and pitiable 
ghost of Agamemnon in Book 24 of the Iliad. 
299 Kitto (1968:92); Vickers (1973:410); Baldock (1989:39). 
300 Critics struggle to identify Orestes as the central tragic figure in this work; see Norwood (1948:113); Ferguson 
(1972:105-106); Vellacott (1984b:41).  Hall (2010:223) suggests that the tragedy’s hero is actually the chorus of 
Furies, whose ‘narrative problem’ is resolved through their personal transformation. 
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Although some scholars have praised this play’s trial-scene as the mechanism of a civilizing 
process – and this play of the trilogy is the one most ostensibly framed as a court-room agōn – 
others deny that the play depicts actual contemporary legal process.301  The outcome of the trial 
of Klytaimestra’s killer – set upon the Areopagus – is the mythological first step in Athens’ 
path to cultural glory, and critics have read the Oresteia as alluding to political events of the 
day, most especially the Argos treaty of 462 BCE; the political background to the Oresteia of 
458 BCE was a complex culmination of factors – reform of the Areopagus, the assassination of 
Ephialtes, and Perikles’ ascendancy – leading to the trilogy’s unlikely resolution under the aegis 
of the traditional Athenian Areopagus. 302  If Aiskhylos had wanted to write a straightforwardly 
political play (albeit with supernatural elements), he could well have done so, as his Persai of 
472 BCE (with its informative ghost) demonstrates.303  The primary agōn in his Eumenides is 
not between democratic Athenian citizens and aristocratic oligarchs backed by Sparta, however, 
but between ancient female divinities from beneath the earth and modern, patriarchal gods from 
Olympos, who are battling over the right to adjudicate human moral matters.  Orestes does not 
deny that he enacted the matricide – his only real defence – and does not propose that the 
matricide was just; only that he acts out of fear, prompted by Apollo.  Orestes’ main defence is 
technically that of self-defence, and Eumenides is the first drama to formally engage in 
‘character assassination’, blaming the victim for her own death.304  The personal honour of the 
woman murdered by her own son is thoroughly trampled in the course of this contest, along 
with that of those ordained to avenge her; the ghost of the unavenged Klytaimestra is wandering 
                                                          
301 Vellacott (1977:118; 1984b:124); Sommerstein (1989b:16; 2010a:26); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:102).  See also 
Arist. Ath. Pol. 57.3.  On the social and moral duty of kin to avenge murder, see Else (1957:429); Plat. Laws 
9.872e.  Some suggest that the Erinyes take the role of legal prosecutors because there are no human descendants 
to avenge Aigisthos and Klytaimestra in the traditional manner; see Lloyd-Jones (1970b:2); Mitchell-Boyask 
(2008:29). 
302 On political events of the day, see Schaps (1993:506-507); Debnar (2005:10) Sewell (2007:94-95).  On 
Aiskhylos’ attitude toward the historic function of the Areopagus, see Dover (1957:234, 236); Mitchell-Boyask 
(2008:103); Sommerstein (1996:100, 418-421).  On Aiskhylos as pro-democratic, and the Athens in Eumenides 
as the realized ideal of Ephialtes’ political aims, see Ferguson (1972:110); Vickers (1973:105); Fagles (1984:xiv).  
On the play’s relation to Ephialtes’ reform of murder-laws (and his subsequent assassination), see Rose (1992:246-
256); Storey and Allan (2005:109); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:101); Rabinowitz (2008:38); Sommerstein 
(2010b:154).  See also Plut. Per. 10.8; Arist. Ath. Pol. 25.2, 4; Antiphon 5.68; Diodoros 11.77.6. 
303 Critics differ as to how (or if) the play’s agōn between divinities reflects social conflict between contemporary 
Athenian groups; see Vellacott (1984b:121); Bowie (1993:12); Griffith (1995:82); Wohl (1998:65); Anderson 
(2005:123).  Cf. Sewell-Rutter (2007:106), who contends that critical emphasis on the purely political overlooks 
the extreme characterization of the avenging Furies of Klytaimestra. 
304 Sommerstein (2010a:29-30).  On the persecution of Klytaimestra in this play, see Vellacott (1984b:124). 
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in the world because she is not honoured by society in Hades (Eum. 95-102).305  Klytaimestra 
reminds the Erinyes that she has prepaid for their advocacy with exclusively-offered libations, 
gifts, and feasts, and she calls to them in order to save her very soul (Eum. 106-116); Orestes 
somehow still eludes their judgement.  In their dream, the Erinyes are still doggedly pursuing 
the matricide, however (130-133), and it is only Apollo’s power that holds them in his temple; 
Klytaimestra eventually manages to awaken them but too late: Orestes, even though his hands 
are still stained with his mother’s blood, has escaped, and the Pythia – the official voice of 
Delphi – confirms that Orestes is  
 
δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ὀμφαλῷ μὲν ἄνδρα θεομυσῆ 
ἕδραν ἔχοντα προστρόπαιον, αἵματι 
στάζοντα χεῖρας, 
 
‘a man, abominable to the gods, perched upon the omphalos, seeking purification for 
pollution, his hands dripping with blood’ (40-42).306 
 
The Furies track the matricide through the scent of human blood, which Orestes cannot shake 
off, no matter how much he washes (246-254).  Yet Orestes insists that the call of the blood on 
his hands is fading, because a piglet has been sacrificed on his behalf beside Apollo’s hearth 
(280-283).  A mother’s blood is difficult to recall once it vanishes underground (261-263), 
however.  The Erinyes possess the ability to pursue the polluted Orestes firstly because they 
dwell beneath the earth, and secondly – although Hesiod’s Erinyes are daughters of Earth – 
Aiskhylos makes them parthenogenetic daughters of the non-Olympian goddess Night (416-
417).307  As the daughters of Night, they have a sacred duty to perform – to follow and punish 
with madness the man who murders a mother – but they are being thwarted in their ancient duty 
by Apollo, and thus deprived of their rightful honour (312-396).  Orestes may claim that he has 
been completely purified by sacrifices of suckling animals and running water alike (445-452) 
but if he was truly free from pollution, then his hands would not still be dripping blood; these 
                                                          
305 Presumably, she must still be wandering, since the suborned Erinyes failed to avenge her honour; see 
Sommerstein (2008:367n33). 
306 Although the Pytho is relating an event that has just happened, she is telling the story using the present tense 
for narrative emphasis. 
307 On the descent of the Erinyes, see Lloyd-Jones (1970b:1); Sommerstein (1989b:8).  Cf. Vellacott (1984b:116) 
warns that the term ‘Fury’ is a Latinization of the original Greek, and carries a connotation of “blind irrationalism”, 
which distorts the Greek conception of them as a kind of “law of nature”. 
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Furies have no trouble in tracking him and only the intervention of Olympian Apollo can 
prevent his capture.308 
 
Aiskhylos made these ancient and all-powerful blood-hunting female deities the legal defenders 
of Klytaimestra’s honour because of their symbolic importance to the ancient Greeks.309  The 
dramatic impact of these distant figures of ancient legend is difficult to estimate, but outside of 
Aiskhylos’ Oresteia, the Erinyes enjoyed a traditional role as implacable avengers.310  There is 
clearly some connection between these ancient entities, and the ‘Semnai’ of Athens, but – 
according to some – Aiskhylos’ use of the term ‘Eumenides’ to describe the existing Areopagus 
semnai (‘solemn’; ‘august’; ‘awe-inspiring’) fertility-deities is another narrative innovation.311  
Characterization of the Erinyes-Eumenides as litigators bolsters dramatic tension by pitting 
implacable powers against an ordinary man, a perennially appealing narrative scenario, even 
when the protagonist is a flawed anti-hero.  Erinyes as guardians of community morals protect 
parents against abuse by children, punish those who fail their oaths, and – in the Iliad (19.407ff) 
– monitor and prevent even other gods’ contravention of the laws governing supernatural 
power.312  Aiskhylos’ Erinyes have no compassionate interest in Klytaimestra personally, only 
in their duty to attend to contraventions of ancient law: crimes in the family’s history failing to 
attract the Erinyes’ attention include Klytaimestra’s adultery (as well as Agamemnon’s 
infidelities, and Helen’s); the historic Thyestean feast; Agamemnon’s recent wartime atrocities.  
                                                          
308 Cf. Sommerstein (2008:386-387n67), who argues that Orestes’ ability to interact with other men shows he is 
no longer polluted. 
309 The earliest recorded appearance of the Erinyes seems to be a reference to E-ri-nu on Linear-B tablets (KN 200, 
KN 208) from Mycenae.  See Ventris and Chadwick (1973:127, 306-307, 411, 476); Podlecki (1987:7).  Sewell-
Rutter (2007:82-83) suggests that the Erinyes were a relatively unimportant remnant from pre-archaic Mycenaean 
religion, whereas Sommerstein (1989b:6) contends that the Linear-B reference to the Erinyes originally alluded to 
a Peloponnesian goddess, probably the Arcadian goddess later known as Demeter-Erinyes.  Aiskhylos may have 
been exploiting audience awareness of Demeter’s and Klytaimestra’s common reputation as deprived, angry, 
avenging mothers.  Cf. Brown (1984:264-266; 278n117), who views any connection between the Erinyes of 
Eumenides and Demeter-Erinyes as unlikely, and suggests that Euripides may be responsible for equating the 
Erinyes with the Eumenides, in Orestes (408 BCE). 
310 On the Erinyes’ precedence over Olympians and mortals alike, see Sewell-Rutter (2007:88). 
311 Lloyd-Jones (1970b:2); Podlecki (1987:5); Sommerstein (1989b:11-12).  Cf. Brown (1984:202-263), who 
argues that the term ‘Semnai’ is not a name but a kind of job-description, applied to a number of deities. 
312 Lloyd-Jones (1970b:1); Brown (1984:280); Podlecki (1987:7); Sommerstein (1989b:7).  For literary examples, 
see Il. 9.454, 571; 21.412; Od. 2.135, 11.279-280; on the Erinyes of Oidipous’ father Laios, see Pind. Ol. 2. 38-
42; Hdt. 4. 149 (cf. Paus. 9. 5. 15).  Cf. Brown (1983:28), who argues that the Furies of one crime are not 
necessarily those of another but come into being anew with each crime.  Else (1957:427-8) – citing Plato’s Laws 
(9.865a-869e, 871a-874d) – points out that those who kill under certain circumstances (i.e. the justifiable homicide 
of thieves, in flagrante adulterers, and kin-killing slaves) are free of pollution and require no purification or pursuit 
by Furies, as is the man who kills his brother in self-defence, or in military combat. 
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The Eumenides’ Erinyes are primarily concerned with Klytaimestra’s matricide as an act of 
disrespect for parents.313  That such powerful entities are willing to defend her suggests that her 
cause is a just one; even the father-avenging Orestes did not have good reason to kill his own 
mother, something with which at least some viewing the play might agree.314 
 
Respect for their long-held status cannot prevent the fall of these guardians of virtue, 
however.315  The transformation – and constraint – of their traditional function is essential to 
understanding why Klytaimestra has to die unavenged.  Some argue that the matrilineal Erinyes 
are deliberately juxtaposed with the patriarchal Olympians.316 Others conclude that the 
complete neutralization of the Erinyes by the end of Eumenides demonstrates ‘political 
resolution’ at the divine level.317  The confrontation between the two types of deity is intensely 
acrimonious and personal, however.318  Apollo boasts that he has forced the Erinyes to slumber 
while Orestes makes his escape, and he also subjects the Erinyes to purely gratuitous insult: 
 
κακῶν δ᾽ ἕκατι κἀγένοντ᾽, ἐπεὶ κακὸν 
σκότον νέμονται Τάρταρόν θ᾽ ὑπὸ χθονός, 
μισήματ᾽ ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν Ὀλυμπίων, 
 
‘they were born of evil, since they dwell in evil darkness, in Tartaros beneath the earth, 
the objects of hatred of men and Olympian gods’ (67-73). 
 
                                                          
313 Jones (1962:150); Gantz (1966:680-681); Vellacott (1984b:158); Sewell-Rutter (2007:90). 
314 According to Beck (1975:67), the trilogy addresses whether Klytaimestra is evil enough to deserve being killed 
by her own child.  Some research indicates modern audiences tend to approve Klytaimestra’s case over that of 
Orestes; see Gamel (1999).  Cf. Michelini (1979:158), who argues that the complaint of the Erinyes about blatant 
disrespect also likely evoked the sympathy of an Athenian audience obsessed with social recognition. 
315 On the Furies as dangerous, death-dealing females, forced to become useful contributors to the state’s 
prosperity, see Thompson (2004:98).  Mace (2004:58) draws attention to the description of the Erinyes in the 
Oresteia as ἄπα ‘without offspring’ (Eum. 1033; Aga. 752; Khoe. 1006), suitable to their status as “barren, aged 
virgins”; in her opinion, however, they have a power of “giving birth” to “acts of retributive bloodshed”.  See 
Pausanias (1. 28. 6), on Aiskhylos’ innovative representation of the Semnai/Erinyes as having snakes in their hair.  
On the contrast between the beautiful Erinyes in contemporary visual depictions and the beastly, hideous, 
shrivelled, bat-like Furies in Aiskhylos’ Eumenides, see Maxwell-Stuart (1973:83-84); Heath (1999a:33-35); 
Taplin (2007:58-59).  Apollo thinks they should dwell in the cave of some blood-drinking lion (Eum. 193-194), 
but the Furies are already dwelling among blood-drinking lions – Tantalid filicides, cannibals, and matricides. 
316 Vellacott (1984b:121-122). 
317 Kitto (1968:89-91). 
318 Cf. Athena, who does not appear to hate the Erinyes as deeply as Apollo does. 
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Upon discovering that Apollo has aided their quarry – a matricide – to escape (149-154), the 
Erinyes’ insult to the Delphic throne and omphalos dripping with polluted blood is just as 
offensive, despite the truth of their observations (162-167).  In fact, many of their arguments 
against Apollo’s case are so incontestable that he can only respond by resort to outrageous 
insult.  The Erinyes point out that, although Apollo claims to be speaking for Zeus in valuing 
the life of a father higher than that of the mother, Zeus himself overthrew his own father, and 
took his throne (640-642).  Apollo cannot deny this inconvenient history, and so responds ὦ 
παντομισῆ κνώδαλα, στύγη θεῶν, ‘O utterly loathsome beasts, hated by the gods!’ (644).319 
 
Apollo cannot deny that Klytaimestra has not killed any of her own blood-kin, and that 
Agamemnon’s blood has not evoked any Fury: the Erinyes testify that they take no interest in 
the murder of men by wives, because that is not death by kindred (210-212).  Apollo’s response 
illustrates the new zero-tolerance approach of the polis to the insupportable crime of 
husbandicide; in his view, the real matter of the trial is the respect due to the sacred institution 
of marriage, a social custom owing little to ancient blood-ties, but a pillar of the new democratic 
civilization of patriarchal Athens.  He accuses the Furies of holding the ‘vows’ of Zeus and 
Hera – the goddess of marriage – in contempt, and he further insists that the closest, dearest ties 
between mortals derive from Aphrodite, and so the ‘bed’ of the married couple is greater than 
sworn oath (213-218).  This contention is one of Apollo’s principal arguments defending 
Orestes on the charge of matricide, but it is hard to imagine that Aiskhylos’ original audience 
agreed with him; arranged marriage in ancient Greece (or in Athens, at least), had little to do 
with ‘close, dear ties’ between males and females, and everything to do with the production of 
legitimate children and the prosperity of the oikos.  The notion of monogamous – sexually-
exclusive – marriage, essential to the survival of the state, was something of a hot issue in 
Athens at this time; how could ‘Kyprian’ relations – which for men occurred in many acceptable 
contexts outside of marriage – count for more than an oath sworn before the gods?  There is 
some humour in Apollo’s reference to the sacred marriage-vows of Hera and Zeus, whose 
deeply troubled marriage according to legend failed to embody the Athenian ideal of female 
compliance with male reproductive advantage.  Despite this, as the hieros gamos (sacred 
marriage) and supposed model for the human institution, it deserves consideration for what it 
                                                          
319 On the contrast between the polite rationality of the Erinyes, and the discourteous invective of Apollo as a 
distraction to the issue, see Vellacott (1984b:119). 
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may reveal about the marital relationship, in fiction and in reality, and how this influences the 
depiction and reception of the character of Klytaimestra. 
 
Archaic Hera was originally much more important than her husband Zeus, something 
demonstrated by the archaeological presence of her many magnificent temples.320  The Iliad 
(4.50-52) positions Hera as the ultimate authority over a number of important cities in Atreid 
territory: Argos, Mycenae, and Sparta, while Hera herself boasts in the Iliad (18.364-366) that 
she is the preeminent female deity, a position deriving as much from her own birth as from 
being wife to the king of gods.  The Homeric Hymn to Hera (1-5) also celebrates the authority 
of this queen, who enjoys at least equal position with her husband Zeus, reckoning her descent 
through the female line.  All of this begs certain questions: Why should Hera – the goddess 
most likely to resent the husband who claims superiority – preside over the institution of human 
marriage in an unashamedly patriarchal culture?321  While Zeus’ promiscuous (and forced) 
adultery with women divine and mortal goes unpunished (despite his wife’s antipathy), Hera’s 
sexual jealousy attracts her husband’s condemnation and occasional violence; furthermore, 
Greek authors assigned sexual pleasure in marriage not to Hera, but to another goddess.  
Physical love between Hera and Zeus in mythological literature is generally the result of some 
cunning strategy: Hera’s seduction of Zeus – who does not desire his wife – depends upon the 
magic of Aphrodite’s girdle, which Hera has borrowed for this very purpose (Il. 14.187ff), and 
on appropriate bribes to the god of Sleep (Il. 14.236-241, 267-279).  When her own social 
position on Olympos is never under any threat, why does she object so much to Zeus’s sexual 
dalliances?  After all, none of his bastard offspring are likely to overthrow the divine status 
quo.322  Although he hates her, and reacts to Hera’s rebellions with violence, Zeus never moves 
to divorce his sister, the Olympian queen. 
 
Hera’s reputation for being a ‘difficult’ wife rests primarily on her endless antagonism toward 
her husband’s bastard offspring, especially Zeus’s son Herakles, but her hate-filled plots are 
                                                          
320 On the predominant worship of Hera in the late Bronze Age, see Burkert (1985:131-132); O’Brien (1993:11); 
Blundell (1995:34-35); Spawforth (2006). 
321 Although Hera is often cited as the divine patron of marriage, she is not always the principal marriage deity 
across Greek states; see Clark (1998:15-16).  In Burkert’s (1985:134) opinion, marriage-myths involving Hera are 
never happy experiences, but end in social chaos. 
322 Cf. Clark (1998:16), who argues that the conflict between Hera and Zeus is over the threat to her position. 
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really aimed at her husband.323  The long lists in Iliad (14.315-328) and Theogony (886-920) of 
Zeus’s sexual adventures do not even include all of his unions and offspring, as the extant 
Homeric Hymn to Selene (14-18) demonstrates.  Most immediately previous to his union with 
Hera, Zeus’s marriage to Leto produces the highest-status gods Apollo and Artemis.  Only then 
does he take Hera as his wife, producing the relatively unimportant Hebe, Ares, and Eileithyia; 
Zeus then produces Athena, the favoured child of his heart, by himself (Theog. 921-929); 
Athena, however, is not his own production, but a conceptus stolen from another wife, the 
goddess Metis.  Angry Hera was the perfect avatar of the typical Greek wife in an androcentric 
culture which approved men’s extramarital sexual behaviour; hyper-sexual, promiscuous Zeus 
cannot be stopped by either his jealous wife or the mortal women he takes by force.324  Hesiod’s 
Theogony records their first conflict, which is over reproductive matters: all of his unions before 
her produce beautiful children – and mostly daughters (the best way to ensure that a father will 
never be overthrown by a son), and Hera is the last of Zeus’s many divine ‘wives’ (Theog. 886-
920).  Zeus never loves any of Hera’s children as he loves the daughter he managed to produce 
without her; according to Homer, Zeus views their natural son Ares as ‘the most hated of the 
gods’ (Il. 5.890-891).  Hera is primarily wife, and so her relationships with her own offspring 
are relatively unimportant in myth, but as the archetypally wicked stepmother she receives 
significant attention in mythological narrative.325  Approaches to the problem of Hera’s step-
motherhood have long been influenced by fashions in critical theory, including psychoanalytic 
literary study, and feminist-gender analysis.  Slater’s (1968:11) study of Hera, marriage, and 
the ancient Greek psyche argues that the divine marriage of Hera and Zeus reflects the reality 
of Greek marriage – male sexual license, and step-motherly jealousy of rivals’ offspring.326  
Moreover, although critical views of Hera depict her as unreasonably jealous of her husband’s 
affairs and bastards, Hera’s pain and outrage are the realistic and predictable responses of an 
                                                          
323 Burkert (1985:134).  The production of Leto’s offspring before his union with Hera does not mesh with the tale 
of Hera’s refusal to allow Leto to give birth out of marital jealousy. 
324 Herakles and Zeus are Greek ideals of hyper-masculinity – victorious in battle and inexhaustible in sexual 
endeavour; see Burkert (1985:128-129).  According to Burkert (1985:128-129), the ancient mythographers arrived 
at a figure of one hundred and fifteen “loves of Zeus”.  On the non-consensual nature of Zeus’ sexual unions, 
Zelenak (1998:26); Barnes (2006:109). 
325 Burkert (1985:132-134); Blundell (1995:34-35).  On step-motherhood and the evil stepmother motif in Greek 
literature in the ancient world, see Watson (1995).  The Greek narrative stereotype of the malicious stepmother is 
a universal literary stereotype also evidenced across cultures (and one which belies the actual figures for actual 
step-parental infanticide, most often carried out by step-fathers).  See also discussion of step-parental 
disinvestment, abuse, and murder, in Chapter 1, pp. 53-54; 53n261; 54n263; 54n264. 




abused wife and stepmother in a polygynous culture.327  This royal marriage is certainly not 
founded on ‘the sanctity of sacred vows’, but on male domination and infidelity and female 
resentment: the Iliad outlines several episodes in which Zeus delights in aggravating his wife 
simply for amusement (Il. 4.5-6; 8.407-408), but Hera’s suspicious responses to his schemes 
(Il. 1.536-543) are met with terrible threats and reminders of previous abuse (Il. 1.561-594; 
15.14-22); unsurprisingly, the sight of her husband fills Hera with hatred (Il. 14.153-158). 
 
The hieros gamos of Hera and Zeus is in fact a bitter bond between an angry, battered wife and 
an adulterous bully.328  Yet critics often accept Apollo’s contention that marriage has been 
‘blessed’ by the marriage of Hera and Zeus, an assertion central in evaluating the relative 
‘moral’ offense of Agamemnon and Klytaimestra.329  In truth, neither Zeus nor Agamemnon 
behave respectfully toward their wives, and Apollo’s declaration simply reflects double-
standard attitudes of his contemporaries to marriage.330  In a patricentric culture Zeus’s 
‘disrespectful’ marriage counts as culturally successful, however: his wife ultimately obeys 
him; he enjoys access to any woman he wants; and he never faces threat of divorce.  
Klytaimestra’s resistance to Agamemnon’s lack of respect is a cultural anomaly.  Despite 
Apollo’s pronouncement about the sanctity of human marriage vows, human marital relations 
in the Oresteia follow the persistent mythological model of conflict in divine marriage, because 
most of these myths about Zeus and Hera, their parents Rhea and Kronos, and their grandparents 
Gaia and Ouranos centre on typically human reproductive conflicts, in adultery, the production 
of children outside of marriage, and males’ violent suppression of autonomous female fertility 
through harm to offspring. 
 
Apollo – the most favoured son of Zeus and Leto – is a god very closely associated with the 
Athenian ideals of admirable masculinity, but this god with a conspicuous lack of wife (and 
                                                          
327 On the natural antipathy between co-wives in polygynous cultures, see Chapter 1, pp. 41-42; 42n185; 53; 63.  
Cf. Beye (1975:159), who argues that Hera’s anger at Zeus’s infidelities reflects real-life conflict in Athenian 
marriage, which defined women solely as child-bearers, and Blundell and Williamson (1998:4), who observe that 
the angry Hera’s harm-doing would never be tolerated in real Greek wives by their menfolk. 
328 In Blundell’s (1995:35) opinion, the mythological Hera is a good source for Greek men’s attitudes to marriage 
and motherhood.  According to Clark (1998:24), the primary theme of the Zeus and Hera mythic corpus is not 
marriage, but “marital discord”. 
329 On marriage and the tensions between men and women in a patriarchal culture, see Ferguson (1972:103); 
Macleod (1982:136); O’Brien (1993:174). 




reproductive success) argues fervently about the supremacy of the marriage vow.331  Whether 
the oracle of Delphi is any kind of reliable witness is a significant thread running through the 
play.332  According to the Pythia, Apollo-Loxias is his father Zeus’s prophet (Eum. 19), and 
Apollo himself declares that he cannot lie, because the throne of his oracle is authorized by 
Zeus (615-618).  Apollo also promises Orestes that he will not, under any circumstances, betray 
him (64-66); by his own admission, Apollo is equally liable for the murder of Klytaimestra, 
because he induced the son to kill his mother (82-84).  In reply to the Erinyes’ accusation that 
he alone is culpable for Klytaimestra’s death, Apollo agrees that the cause of the matricide lies 
with his oracle, and that he himself gave shelter to the matricide afterwards (199-205).  Apollo 
admits to Athena his responsibility for the matricide, and claims that his suppliant Orestes has 
been purified within his temple (576-581).  Orestes’s statement in evidence to Athena insists 
that he killed his ‘black-hearted’ mother in part because Loxias foretold great suffering for him 
if he did not (Eum. 458-467).  The chorus’s cross-examination of Orestes also establishes 
Apollo’s responsibility for the oracle which led to Klytaimestra’s death (593-596).  Based on 
all this testimony, Orestes’s legal defender should also be standing trial for Klytaimestra’s 
death, but – as the chorus’s examination of Apollo ascertains – it is Zeus the Father of Gods 
and Men who is ultimately responsible, having ordered the matricide in retaliation for female 
audacity against male rule (622-639).  The legitimacy of Klytaimestra’s case appears to be 
discredited at this point, but Apollo is about to play his greatest argument of all, one which 
invites serious question, but which will – when accepted by Athens’ patroness – disempower 
not just Klytaimestra, but all women, everywhere and for all time.333 
 
Critics struggle with Apollo’s denial of biological maternality; generally not because of doubts 
about the authority of his oracle, however, or because even he himself as an abetter of matricide 
has an obviously vested interest in having Klytaimestra’s matricide acquitted.  Discussion 
centres more often on whether Apollo’s fake-fact ‘biology’ represents contemporary 
                                                          
331 Herakles’ marriages and experience of fatherhood are also poor models for male behaviour; in madness he 
murders his first wife Megara and their children, and on his death-bed he hands his concubine Iole off to his son. 
332 There are many references in Thoukydides to Athenian faith in the oracle of Apollo.  See Thouk. 2.8, 17, 47, 
5.103, 8.1.  Cf. Roberts (1984:17), who contends that the original audience of the Oresteia may not necessarily 
have approved or believed the Delphi oracle – for example, Plutarch De Pythiae oracularis, De defectu oraculorum 
(Moralia V); and Cicero De Divinatione – and Sewell (2007:147-148), who points out that no other god is the 
target of so much scepticism in tragedy as Delphic Apollo. 
333 Interpretation of this scene is often influenced by critical attitudes toward the shining – but duplicitous – figure 
of Apollo; see Kitto (1968:92-93); Fontenrose (1971:85).  On the unscrupulous Apollo’s shadier side, see Roberts 
(1984:71, 81); Vellacott (1984b:47); Rehm (1992:105). 
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understanding of reproduction; did the Athenians truly believe – or did they just want to believe 
– that women are simply vessels for male seed?  The chorus’s interrogation of Orestes 
deliberately sets up the context for Apollo’s denial of female reproductive agency: in reply to 
the Erinyes’ assertion that they never hounded Klytaimestra because she was not kin to 
Agamemnon, Orestes idly wonders whether he himself is even blood-kin to his mother (605-
606).  The Furies’ response is intense, and very specific: πῶς γάρ σ᾽ ἔθρεψεν ἐντός, ὦ μιαιφόνε,/ 
ζώνης; ἀπεύχῃ μητρὸς αἷμα φίλτατον; ‘How else did she nurture you within her girdle, you 
blood-guilty man?  Do you reject your mother’s blood, closest of all?’ (607-608).  Orestes’ 
‘patsy-question’ musing immediately evokes Apollo’s view on whether the killing of his 
mother Klytaimestra was just (609-613); Apollo prefaces his reply with the reminder that his 
oracle never lies, and that Zeus is behind all his oracular pronouncements (615-618).  The 
chorus – unaware of where their direction of questioning is going to lead them – ask how an 
impious matricide could expect to hold any power of office (653-654).  Apollo’s speech in reply 
not only denies the female reproductive power, but through the spurious analogy of Athena’s 
‘creation’, attributes true parenthood to males alone.  This is an argument far beyond the needs 
of his case; as infallible oracle, his pronouncement that Zeus was ultimately responsible for the 
matricide ought to have been justification enough for the death of Klytaimestra.  Klytaimestra 
may be the worst wife ever (by Athenian standards), but what need has the defender of Orestes 
to destroy her capacity for motherhood – and by implication, the maternal capacity in all 
women? 
 
Apollo’s declaration is a litany of biopolitical lies: 
 
οὔκ ἔστι μήτηρ ἡ κεκλημένου τέκνου 
τοκεύς, τροφὸς δὲ κύματος νεοσπόρου. 
τίκτει δ᾽ ὁ θρῴσκων, ἡ δ᾽ ἅπερ ξένῳ ξένη 
ἔσωσεν ἔρνος, οἷσι μὴ βλάψῃ θεός. 
τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦδέ σοι δείξω λόγου. 
πατὴρ μὲν ἂν γένοιτ᾽ ἄνευ μητρός: πέλας 
μάρτυς πάρεστι παῖς Ὀλυμπίου Διός, 
οὐδ᾽ ἐν σκότοισι νηδύος τεθραμμένη, 




‘She who gives birth is not the mother of the child; she is only the nurse of the freshly-
sown embryo.  He who mounts is the parent; she preserves the foreign fruit, which the 
god then leaves unhindered.  I give to you a sure sign of this testimony.  A father may 
create without a mother: close by is a witness, the child of Olympian Zeus, who was not 
produced in the darkness of the body, but is the sort of offspring otherwise not borne by 
a god’ (657-666). 
 
Apollo’s expertly-spun lie flatters Athena’s exceptionality and idealizes her uniquely close 
relation to the Father of Gods, but the τεκμήριον ‘sure example’ of Zeus’s ‘motherless’ creation 
was nothing of the sort: Athena was originally engendered in the usual manner within Metis 
and Metis– still pregnant – was later devoured by Zeus, continuing a long history of cannibalism 
by male gods to preserve their superior power (in this instance to prevent the production of the 
son destined to overthrow Zeus).334  It is in fact the Furies – the fatherless daughters of Night – 
who are the only truly parthenogenetic goddesses in this story, something the audience might 
well have known; Athena was originally the product of both male and female, while the 
Erinyes’ mother was not impregnated by any male.335  Greek cosmogony is replete with female 
deities – including Zeus’s wife Hera – who give birth without any male input: the converse is 
rarely evidenced.  Athena is a more effective mother-denier than Apollo, however, and feels no 
ambivalence about her loyalties to the male.336  Following a distasteful exchange between an 
offensive Apollo and the affronted Erinyes (713-733), Athena announces that she will cast her 
vote for Orestes, for one simple reason; 
 
μήτηρ γὰρ οὔτις ἐστὶν ἥ μ᾽ ἐγείνατο, 
τὸ δ᾽ ἄρσεν αἰνῶ πάντα, πλὴν γάμου τυχεῖν, 
ἅπαντι θυμῷ, κάρτα δ᾽ εἰμὶ τοῦ πατρός. 
οὕτω γυναικὸς οὐ προτιμήσω μόρον 
ἄνδρα κτανούσης δωμάτων ἐπίσκοπον, 
                                                          
334 On Zeus’s deception and consumption of Metis, who was on the point of giving birth to Athena, see Hesiod’s 
Theogony (886-920).  Cf. the Greater Hymn to Athena (5-12), which says nothing at all about Metis.  On the 
parentage of Athena as an inappropriate argument, see Saxonhouse (1984:27-28). 
335 While some accounts state the Erinyes originated in the drops of blood from Ouranos’ severed genitalia, other 
myths, including Eumenides (321) define them as the offspring of Nyx, Primordial Night.  See also Lykophron 
432; Virg. Aen. 6.250; Ovid Met. 4.453. 





‘there is no mother who gave birth to me, and, with all my heart, I approve the male sex 
in every way, except in the matter of marriage.  I am utterly of the Father.  Thus, I will 
not value the fate of a woman who killed her husband, the guardian of the house’ (734-
740). 
 
Athena’s statement agrees with Apollo’s obvious lie, and makes it clear that ideological 
affiliation is more ‘true’ than biological reality.337  As an avowed virgin this patroness of Athens 
will never be the guardian of any man’s house, and so will never be torn between allegiance for 
husband or father; as far as she is concerned, she has no mother, she will never be a mother, 
and so she has nothing in common with women who bear children, and especially not with a 
woman who suffers the loss of a daughter.  Nothing is ever said in (extant) myth about Metis’ 
personal experience of painfully losing both child and life.  Athena does not care that her own 
mother has been eliminated by her father, any more than Elektra cares that her father has slain 
her sister, because they are androcentric good girls.  Apollo’s very unbiological theory of 
biology only sways the outcome of the trial because Athena – who casts the deciding vote – 
does not deny that she is solely the child of Zeus, and thus without a mother.  Athena’s vote 
acquits the young man for choosing his father over mother (and over slain sister) because – like 
her paternal half-brother Apollo, and her only (remaining) parent, father Zeus – she approves 
of Orestes’ vengeance on behalf of the patriline.  Critics debate the narrative importance of the 
Olympians’ denial of female parenthood, however, and how this influences audience 
sympathies for Klytaimestra and her killer.338  If Apollo can win the point, then the Erinyes’ 
right to vengeance is made void, but in this play they are never permitted to answer his point; 
if they did, he would likely lose. 
 
Critics also disagree on whether Apollo was voicing the understanding of the contemporary 
public about reproductive biology, but the archaeology of ancient animal husbandry 
demonstrates that the role of the female in breeding was fundamentally well-understood, 
                                                          
337 On the “fact” of Athena’s (and Dionysios’) motherless creation, see Zelenak (1998:70).  Both these deities were 
necessarily conceived and gestated in the wombs of women, who were later killed by Zeus, who then preserved – 
and appropriated – their offspring. 
338 On the ineffectiveness of Apollo’s speech, see Gagarin (1976:102-103); Hogan (1984:1720); Ireland (1986:29).  
Cf. Hester (1981:267); Kovacs (1998:149); and Sewell (2007:113), who all contend that Athena’s judgement is 
made independently of Apollo’s posturing.  On the statement as the crucial climax of the play, see Vickers 
(1973:636); Gagarin (1976:88). 
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contributing to the domestication and refinement of livestock useful to humans.339  As upper-
class breeders of horses and hunting dogs, and as farmers who bred livestock of all kinds, many 
– if not most – Greeks would certainly have known the biological essentials, and the 
philosophical topic of generation and the relative contributions of male and female was of 
considerable interest to many Greeks.340  Some critics conclude that Eumenides consciously 
aims to neutralize the frightening female power of biological reproduction, inconveniently 
necessary to the cultural reproduction of the androcentric polis; others argue that the play 
depicts the male desire to usurp the disturbing power of reproduction for themselves.341  One 
argument against audience acceptance of Apollo’s argument is Greek epikleracy: if a man’s 
daughter did not transmit something important in her own right, then any woman could have 
borne a dead man’s brother’s seed successfully in order to protect the inheritance.342  Given the 
inevitability of paternity uncertainty, social arrangements preferentially based on verifiable 
kinship or blood-relations must always favour the female; while the presence of own kin 
provides social support for married females, the absence of female kin is associated with 
reproductive outcomes which favour the patriline.343  Female Athenians held the biological 
power to transmit males’ property and citizenship – as the Greeks defined it – but they did not 
enjoy social, legal powers in their own right: Apollo’s revisioning of biological fact should be 
read in the context of Athenian comprehension and worries about legitimacy, inheritance, 
citizenship, and power.344  There was no good reason for Athenian males to view themselves 
as the sons of women – unless a woman, as their patriarch’s only child – is the transmitter of 
their patrilineal status.  In Greek cultural terms, all children borne by Klytaimestra are legally 
                                                          
339 On Plato’s interest in how the best examples of each sex could be bred under controlled conditions (Rep. 459e), 
see Campbell (1989:57). 
340 On contemporary belief about the contribution of females and males to reproduction in relation to Apollo’s 
declarations (and Athena’s approval of these), see Kember (1971, 1973); Vickers (1973:435n37); Gagarin 
(1976:102); Campbell (1989:56); Mayhew (2004); Bakogianni (2011:37).  See also Aristotle, De Generatione 
Animalium (716a5-23, 727a2-30, 727b31-33, 728b18-31, 765b8-20, 763b, 766a17-30, 783b26-784a12): 
Aristotle’s discussion argues that pure male semen contains the human spore, while women’s menstrual fluid 
provides the necessary nourishment.  Others argue that the Greeks would have rejected Apollo’s unbiologically 
based theory; see Mitchell-Boyask (2008:119); Hall (2010:222-223). 
341 On how Apollo’s denial of maternity completes the transformation of Iphigeneia’s loving mother into the enemy 
of Orestes, see Vickers (1973:413-14); Zeitlin (1965:492); Saxonhouse (1984:26); Burnett (1998:111). 
342 On the epikleracy, see Rabinowitz (1993:5). 
343 See further discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 41n179; 47-48; 50; 65n333; 52-53; 71n362; 81; 83; 83n430; 83n432; 
84; 84n436. 
344 On Athenian legitimacy, Rosenmeyer (1982:361); Burkert (1985:142); Goldhill (1986:59).  Several tragedies 
– Alope, Antiope, Auge, Danae, Ion, and Melanippe Sophe – all depict men’s fear of lineage extinction, and many 
plays address the fear of a daughter’s son – exposed at birth – returning and displacing the preferred (and proper) 
patrilineal line; Seaford (1990:161). 
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and socially their father’s children.  Because sons in patrilineal Athens are always ‘of the 
father’, and so Atreid Orestes is logically the natural ekthros of Klytaimestra his father’s killer: 
what is unexpected in the Oresteia is that Tyndarid Klytaimestra refrains from expediting the 
death of her enemy’s son.345  There has been a great deal of critical debate about the ‘murdering 
mothers’ of Greek mythology, but filicide by mothers – excepting the famous hostilities of 
Medeia – is actually relatively rare in myth; women who kill their children in Greek literature 
do so primarily to restore the honour of their natal family, and they never attract the same 
reputation for loathsome evil which attaches to Klytaimestra, perhaps the only woman in myth 
to act on behalf of dishonoured female kin.346 
 
Like Apollo, Athena chooses to act on behalf of the male litigant, and she is willing to do 
whatever is necessary in order to exonerate Orestes; in order to achieve the desired result, she 
will introduce the concept of mitigation and cast her own vote to break the verdict-tie.347  In 
reply to the chorus’s direct accusation that Orestes chose to become a matricide (425), Athena 
enquires as to his intention: was he compelled or was he in fear (426)?  The chorus’ astonished 
response to this admits to the possibility of justification for mother-murder (428).  The Erinyes’ 
case is founded on the natural law of action and consequences: Athena offers acquittal on a 
legal technicality.  Although Orestes’ trial shows him as equally innocent and guilty, the real 
issue is the struggle between divinities to administer justice; it is not surprising that the goddess 
of warfare wins the legal agōn.348  Some critics conclude that the Eumenides’ lauded resolution 
is in fact a miscarriage of justice, and that the victory of patriarchalist deities over the ancient 
protectors of blood-rights reflects the politics of gender-inequity in early fifth century Athens.  
The female-defence team of Erinyes is bribed, threatened, overthrown and suborned, and the 
                                                          
345 Klytaimestra’s expectation that Orestes will inevitably become her worst living enemy is contextually realistic; 
see Loraux (1998:39); Komar (2003:39).  Visser (2000:155) points to the impossible situation of the married 
woman: her own children belonged to her husband’s patriline, but she still belonged to her own natal family, and 
always would. 
346 On misogyny, misandry, and ambiguous motherhood in ancient Greece and Greek mythology, see Slater (1968, 
1974); Burnett (1998:178).  On maternal filicide and vengeance on behalf of natal blood-kin in tragedy, see Burnett 
(1998:179); Visser (2000:155, 158). 
347 One aspect of the drama has that has attracted a disproportionate degree of critical attention is the quite 
unnecessary question of whether Athena casts a tie-breaking or a tie-creating vote, but whatever the vote, Orestes 
by tradition must be acquitted.  On Athena’s manipulation of the verdict to avoid offending the Erinyes, who she 
rightly fears (Eum. 480-481), see Lloyd-Jones (1970b:4); Gagarin (1975); Seaford (1995:210-211).  For a review 
of scholarship on the question before 1980, see Hester (1981:265). 
348 On Orestes as both innocent and guilty, see Fagles and Stanford (1977:82).  On the defeat of natural justice and 
the victory for the gender status-quo, see Gagarin (1976:77-78); Vellacott (1977:120-122); (2010:226-227).  On 
the narrative necessity of Athena’s victory, see Carne-Ross (1981:57). 
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verdict of a hung jury set aside to ensure that a mother-murderer is acquitted by a judge who 
proudly admits to a definite gender bias.349 
 
Critics draw attention to the convoluted gender dynamics of the Oresteia’s apparent resolution 
of gender conflict in the Eumenides.350  The slow progress of the Oresteia inevitably culminates 
in divorcing Orestes from his matrilineal heritage, just as the goddess Athena has always been.  
Some contend that Athena incorporates male and female perspectives, but gender-balanced 
Athena never once experiences the true female life-experience typical in a preindustrial context 
of universal female-marriage without contraception: mating, marriage, gestating, birthing, and 
child-rearing.351  Some even suggest that Athena’s femininity makes her a natural ally to 
women.352  Critics also debate the root causes of gender conflict in the Eumenides.353  Some 
suggest that, ultimately, issues in this play cannot be resolved because conflict between the 
genders in the real world is irresolvable.354  The triumphant transformation of the subdued 
Erinyes for the betterment of human society is the result of direct threat of force and blatant 
bribery, and their feelings and wishes – let alone their ancient duties – are of no interest to the 
Olympian regime, yet many critics persist in reading the resolution of the play as a positive gain 
for human civilization.355  Like the Olympians of ancient Greek myth, history (or literary 
                                                          
349 On Athena’s biased judgement, see Sharrock and Ash (2002:41); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:117).  Cf. Conacher 
(1987:211), whose perception of Athena’s avowed “prejudice” actually follows the text, rather than critical fantasy 
ideals about the goddess’ “impartial benevolence”. 
350 Winnington-Ingram (1983a:100; 1983b:126); Burkert (1985:141).  Cf. Seaford (1995:214), who argues that 
“gender confusion” is resolved at the end of Eumenides. 
351 On the gendering of Athena in the Eumenides, see Spatz (1982:130); Hogan (1984:176); Herington (1986:143); 
McClure (1997:133); Storey and Allan (2005:105); Sewell (2007:114).  Ancient works depict Aiskhylos’ calm 
and noble administrator as possessing a sometimes bloodthirsty nature; in the Greater Hymn to Athena (3), Athena 
is a mighty defender of cities, and the Odyssey’s Athena is the scheming, undefeatable, and bloodthirsty ally every 
Greek male hopes for (Od. 13.394-396; 22.256, 22.273; 22.297-299).  On the personification of Athena according 
to the ideological requirements of an imperialist Athens, see Burkert (1985:135-40); McClure (1997:132); 
Kennedy (2009:2).  On the mythological exaltation of the motherless Athena in the myths of patriarchal Athens as 
an expression of male desire to live in a world without women, see Loraux (1993:11); Raber (2000:311); Komar 
(2003:8). 
352 Lefkowitz (2007:178). 
353 On the subordination of matrilineal kin-relationship to the structural necessities of patrilineal marriage, see 
Thomson (1946:288); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003:243); Rabinowitz (2008:107).  Athena and Poseidon’s conflict 
over the patronage of Athens (Varro’s story, in Augustine’s De Civitate Dei 18.9) becomes the aetiology for the 
suppression of female citizenship right, and the social supremacy of males; narrative elements of Varro’s myth of 
patriliny also appear in Aiskhylos’ trilogy.  On the conflict between Athena and Poseidon as responsible for the 
gender-inequities among human men and women, see Seaford (1995:216); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:31-32). 
354 Carne-Ross (1981:58). 
355 On the Oresteia and the creation of civilization, see Dodds (1960:23); Lloyd-Jones (1970b:4-5); Vellacott 
(1984b:32, 124-125); Baldock (1989:33); Sewell-Rutter (2007:89, 101). 
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analysis) is written by the victors, and the suppression of female reproductive autonomy is no 
less central to covertly androcentric civilization in the modern world than it was in a more 
overtly patriarchal ancient culture.  Views of Klytaimestra are shaped by the necessary (albeit 
preconscious) acceptance of this cultural imperative. 
 
Orestes departs the stage, apparently released from all consequence for his matricide, but the 
real peril in this story is not resolved at all: the defeated Erinyes despair for the loss of their 
honour, and the loss of respect for the ancient laws (778-792).  The Furies foresee great famine 
for Athens, the natural result of such disrespect (Eum. 784-788); as the Greater Hymn to 
Demeter shows (305-307), famine was at times a terrible, tangible reality for ancient Greeks, 
who through bitter experience knew the enormous power of offended gods to inflict suffering 
upon humankind.  Athena denies their loss (795), but she also tries to settle out of court, offering 
the Furies certain compensations if they agree to drop the case and withhold their wrath: these 
include thrones beside altars in an underground dwelling (804-807).  The chorus’ response is 
simply to repeat their expectation of calamity for the city and for the citizens of Athens (808-
821).  Athena then resorts to the stick, threatening to employ the thunderbolt to which only she 
and Zeus have access – followed quickly by the promise of sacrifices from Athenians, if they 
yield to her will (826-836).  The chorus bewail this treatment (837), protesting their dishonour 
to their great mother Night (842-847).  Athena magnanimously declares that she will forgive 
the Erinyes’ angry objections – in recognition of their greater age – but reminds them that, 
through the favour of Zeus, she holds the upper hand; while they are much wiser, she is still 
wise enough, through the gift of wisdom from Zeus (848-850).  Zeus appropriated this wisdom 
from Athena’s mother; Athena – the motherless spirit of Athens – is also about to appropriate 
beneficial powers, this time of fertility, from the matrilineal Erinyes; in the patriarchal culture 
of ancient Athens, the biological product of a female body – Orestes – becomes the putative 
product and legal possession of the male citizen father.  Athena’s bribes also depend, as she is 
at pains to point out, on the Furies’ cooperation in the restraint of the natural male tendency to 
civil conflict (862-863).  She prefers men’s innate urge to conflict over status – ἐν ᾧ τις ἔσται 
δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔρως, ‘in the one who experiences terrible lust for glory’ – to be directed toward 
plenty of external war-making, which will bring in wealth enough to make offerings to the 
Furies (864-865).356  If critics are looking for an aetiology of progressive civilization in this 
                                                          
356 On Athena’s blessing of plenty of external conflict as a mechanism to dissuade civil conflict (and as proof that 




play, the EP finding that the redirection of intrasexual male competition for wealth and status 
into aggressive actions outside of the social group is more likely to lead to the eventual 
supremacy of that group is a more reasonable candidate; encouraging males to place the well-
being of the abstract state over the lives of mere individuals – including non-combatants – 
within that group is an inevitable outcome of this disposition. 
 
The turning point of this potentially catastrophic agōn between Zeus’s favoured child and the 
ancient upholders of moral goodness is Athena’s declaration that ἔξεστι γάρ σοι τῆσδε γαμόρῳ 
χθονὸς/ εἶναι δικαίως ἐς τὸ πᾶν τιμωμένῃ, ‘it is possible for you to become rightful landowners 
in this country, and honoured in all matters’ (890-891).  She is now offering the Erinyes the 
ultimate bribe – the right to become legally certified Athenian citizens, and – from the Athenian 
point of view – no enticement could be greater.  The reconciliation between the disputants 
quickly turns to contractual details concerning the material prosperity of the Athenian peoples; 
Athena will ensure that no oikos will prosper without the aid of the Furies, and in a moment the 
Erinyes’ moral authority is lost forever (894-900).  Having succumbed to Athena’s bribes, the 
Erinyes enquire as to which blessings they should bestow upon the Athenians (902); Athena 
specifies beneficent climate and the blessings of patriarchal Athenian civilization: agricultural 
fruitfulness, fertility of livestock, and the continuation of human lineages – especially in pious 
oikoi – but the greatest gift of military victory is hers alone to give (904-915). 
 
Athena’s triumphant welcome to the safely subordinated Erinyes also usurps control of their 
original, retributive function: the Furies’ hostile wrath must in future crush the man whose 
ancestors have committed sins, even the man who loudly boasts of his success (930-937).  Who 
on earth could this allude to but the Atreids, including Agamemnon, and his heir Orestes?357  
Athena earlier offered the Erinyes the function of enhancing citizen prosperity; now, as she 
reveals, the Furies will bring both great happiness and great grief to the human race (950-955).  
But the Furies have exactly the same duties as they had previously, one of which is to afflict 
the descendants of those who have committed sins.358  The Erinyes’ response to Athena’s 
statements are peculiar, given the previous events within the oikos of Orestes: they forbid that 
                                                          
357 In fact, the ‘loud boaster’ could refer to any of the major characters in the trilogy: Agamemnon, Klytaimestra, 
Aigisthos, and even Orestes, all of whom glory in their deeds.  All of these characters – even Klytaimestra – are 
also the descendants of humans who have been cursed for their actions (or in the case of Tyndareos, inaction). 
358 Athena offers powers over fertility to the Erinyes which are rightly the domain of the existing Semnai, already 
resident beneath the Areopagus; see Sommerstein (1989b:11). 
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men should die ‘prematurely’, and they ask of their sisters the Fates that all lovely young 
women should live and get husbands (956-967).  How can any man die before his time, when 
everything is of Zeus?  And what about the lovely young woman of the Agamemnon’s first ode, 
the unripe grape who never had a husband?  How can the Furies proudly acclaim the Fates as 
their sisters ‘of the same mother’, if – as Apollo insists – the mother is no parent?  If Apollo 
spoke truly – and Athena was his primary witness in this respect – then Orestes is rightly 
acquitted; why then this late allusion to motherhood, and the following references of the 
processional escort to the Furies’ as children of the great goddess Night (1034), who – as the 
mythic record agrees – conceived them without male seed? 
 
Critics disagree as to the aftermath of the play’s conflict resolution.359  The play’s triumphant 
ending covertly undermines its own internal logic, however, with allusions and references to 
some very inconvenient outcomes.360  The likely consequences of the trampling of natural aidōs 
– ‘respect’ – is one of the unfortunate truths the play’s ending glosses over: how can there ever 
be a happy ending in a world which exonerates matricide?  The chorus once warned that if 
mother-slaughter prevails, then all ordained laws would come under threat, and parents should 
expect much suffering at the hands of children (490-498).  The best way to maintain social 
order is through fear of consequence, and if their jurisdiction is overruled, human behaviour 
will decline (522-525); the altar of Justice must not be impiously spurned and trampled – for 
the purpose of material gain – and those who disrespect their parents must suffer the inevitable 
punishment (538-548).  The victories in the Oresteia – the sack of Troy, the Aulian sacrifice to 
bend the winds, the treading upon precious fabrics, the slaughter of a mother, the acquittal of 
Orestes, and the subversion of the guardians of law – are all iterations of the same disastrous 
crime: the desecration of aidōs.  The Erinyes fear that if they are demoted, natural justice will 
be trampled; they are not demoted, but set to become the bloodthirsty hounds of Athens, rather 
                                                          
359 On the play’s satisfactory ending, see Rabinowitz (2008:108); Rutherford (2012:182).  On the transformation 
of the Erinyes into apparently empowered, radiantly beautiful, benign guardians and foreign resident foreigners’ 
of Athens, see Lloyd-Jones (1970b:3); Walton (1980:5); Roth (1993:14-15).  Cf. Vellacott (1977:118, 1984a:157).  
Vellacott (1977:120-121) concludes that the audience’s positive reception of the defeat of aidōs foreshadows the 
real-life decline of morality in Athens, which led to the “appalling collapse” of city life through war.  See also 
Thoukydides, 3.82-84. 
360 The Furies are confined in darkness underground, Klytaimestra is slain, scorned, and wandering as a ghost, and 
Elektra – an instrument in her own mother’s death – becomes in successive tragedies a maddened, immoral, and 
pitiful figure; see Foley (1981:157); Komar (2003:41).  On the false resolution of the trilogy to the benefit of the 
male and the disadvantage of the female, the disempowerment of the Erinyes, the disenfranchisement of women, 
and Orestes’ lack of remorse, see Gagarin (1976:97-98, 100); Saxonhouse (1984:27-29); Vellacott (1984a:75, 156; 
1984b:35); Storey and Allan (2005:246); Lefkowitz (2007:178). 
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than the guardians of aidōs.  The existence of violence per se is not challenged in the course of 
creating civilization, but the question of when aggression may be justified is definitively settled 
through divine agreement: Athenians – male citizens – should not waste their war-making gift 
in civil dispute (with other citizens, at least), but in expansionist warfare, and individual (and 
non-citizen) members of an oikos – even children – may be sacrificed without consequence to 
enable this.  Orestes’ victim was the enemy of her own husband and his patriline, but more 
importantly, of the greater imperial project, and so Aiskhylos’ Oresteia finds the way to ennoble 
Agamemnon’s filicide, to exonerate a matricide, and utterly excuse a mother’s murder. 
 
This section has illustrated how one of the most popular tragic trilogies of all time depicted the 
birth of human civilization in making males the true parents of children.  Despite the obvious 
logic of Klytaimestra’s case against her husband for murder of their child, through narrative 
sleight-of-hand, the Oresteia is always for the male, sanctifying murder of women who kill 
husbands, even the terrible sin of matricide.  This chapter shows how the story of Klytaimestra, 
already undergoing thematic shifts, completes the depiction of Klytaimestra as a woman who 
committed the worst kind of crime: husbandicide.  The murder of children, the murder of 
mothers, and the destruction of ancient moral values: all count for nothing against the centrality 
of the patriline in the developing democratic empire of patriarchal Athens.  The Oresteia was 
acclaimed in its own time, and extant tragedies produced after it all respond to it in important 
ways.  As the next chapter will show, Sophokles approved the genius of Aiskhylos, and repeated 
the basic story.  Sympathy for Klytaimestra’s biological motherhood is entirely suppressed in 
his Elektra, and his Atreid children abominate their mother as an even more despicable figure 
than in Aiskhylos, however.  Euripides, on the other hand, chose to explore some of the 
inconsistencies in the previously two-dimensional view of the evil queen, culminating in a 
posthumously produced tragedy damning the filicidal Agamemnon, and leaving his audience 
in no doubt that Klytaimestra had every good reason to plan her immoral husband’s demise. 
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CHAPTER III: THE CLASSICAL KLYTAIMESTRA 
 
This chapter investigates how the two extant tragedians from the second half of the fifth century 
handle the story of Klytaimestra and her broken family.  Aiskhylos’ Oresteia (458 BCE) 
portrayed the necessary subordination of women’s reproductive powers to the husband-led 
family in the mid fifth-century polis; the later Atreid plays of Sophokles and Euripides depict 
the inevitable consequences of this in women’s alienation from their own children.  Both 
tragedians freely (if unwittingly) employ the frame of reproductive politics to convey their 
particular messages about the behaviour of the Athenian state, but each chooses to emphasize 
a very different aspect of Klytaimestra’s mythic character: Sophokles’ drama plays up the 
destruction of the family through wifely adultery, while Euripides draws attention to men’s 
disruption of the mother-offspring relationship.  Tragedy in later fifth-century Athens was 
profoundly affected by the long Peloponnesian War between the Athenian-led Delian League 
and the anti-Athenian alliance led by Sparta; patriotic, compulsive expansionism ultimately 
resulted in the downfall of the Athenian empire.  Sophokles and Euripides reveal, in 
Klytaimestra’s life-experience within the filicidal Atreid oikos, the creation of gender conflict 
through a political need for aggressive violence in men and compliant domesticity in women.  
Sophokles’ Elektra features a young woman deprived of the marriage and children she yearns 
for, in paradoxical juxtaposition with extreme – even unnatural – patrilineal affiliation with her 
deceased father and absent brother, combined with an excessive hatred for a remarried mother.  
Sophokles seems to approve the heroic, aristocratic Orestes and his struggle to regain his 
ancestral throne, but the four plays of Euripides question the slaughter of a vulnerable, aging 
queen by a brutal young man, followed by his realization that this murder was unforgivably 
wrong; the apparent victory of matricide becomes a disaster for everyone concerned.  EP 
research suggests that the most closely-related individuals give each other the most support and 
attachment, but the lives of Klytaimestra’s children will be deeply disrupted by the murder of 
such close kin.  Euripides’ Elektra gives Klytaimestra a reasonable voice in self-defence of her 
killing of Agamemnon; the Iphigeneia amongst the Taurians offers Iphigeneia an opportunity 
to recall her loving and beloved mother; the Orestes shows how the Atreid siblings’ natural – 
and morally appropriate – remorse for the wrongful killing of their mother is subverted through 
appeal to self-interest and spite; and the Iphigeneia at Aulis shows how the military ambition 
of Agamemnon tore his family apart, as well as how Klytaimestra as the fictional standard for 




Some critics contend that the three Elektra-plays of Aiskhylos, Sophokles, and Euripides – the 
plays most fundamental in perceptions of Klytaimestra as a killer and mother – are alike in their 
characterization of Klytaimestra as an adulteress; others maintain that the tragedians differ 
substantially in their portrayal of Klytaimestra and her interactions with her daughter Elektra.1  
Critical interpretation of Klytaimestra’s family relationships in Sophokles’ Elektra frequently 
depends on whether critics perceive Euripides’ play as responding to Sophokles’ play: reading 
Euripides’ sympathetic Klytaimestra as a deliberate refutation of Sophokles’ unpleasant mother 
positions Sophokles’ as the first of the two Elektra-plays.2  Some critics – with good evidence 
– argue that the sequence is Aiskhylos-Euripides-Sophokles, placing Euripides’ Elektra perhaps 
a decade before that of Sophokles’.3  While the dating of the plays cannot – on available 
evidence – be definitively asserted, others argue for a sequence of Aiskhylos-Sophokles-
Euripides.4  Euripides’ marked abhorrence in Elektra (and Orestes) of the casually committed 
matricide in Sophokles’ drama suggests that this the correct sequence; this thesis assumes that 
Sophokles’ Elektra precedes that of Euripides, and that Euripides’ work is a response to at least 
some of Sophokles’ assumptions.5  A good case can be made on a number of points that 
Euripides found some fault with Sophokles’ telling. 
 
A biopoetic analysis influenced by narratological studies also supports a reading that Euripides’ 
Elektra responds in narrative structure and thematic development to an earlier version by 
Sophokles.  Assuming evolutionary principles of increasing intelligence and competition, one 
                                                          
1 For critical views of the stylistic relationships between the three Elektras of Aiskhylos, Sophokles, and Euripides, 
see Whitman (1951:161); Jones (1962:272); Vickers (1973:553-557); Baldock (1989:110); Harder (1995:29); 
McDonald (2003:59); Anderson (2005:131); Bakogianni (2011:196).  On Sophokles’ Klytaimestra and the 
Klytaimestra of Pindar’s Pythian (11:22-25), see Jones (1962:152). 
2 On the sequence of the two Elektras, see Murray (1965:77); Kovacs (1998:142).  On Sophokles’ Elektra as a 
remedy-response to Euripides’ Elektra, see Post (1953:151); Vellacott (1984b:151).  On the dating of Sophokles’ 
Elektra, see also Owen (1936).  On Sophokles’ revisioning of the story, see Kirkwood (1958:35); Jones (1962:157-
159); Gantz (1966:682); Burton (1980:192); Walton (1980:21); Segal (1981:257, 268); De Romilly (1985:68); 
Davidson (1988:49, 71-72; 1999-2000:119); Garner (1990:123); Bowman (1997:136n13). 
3 Lesky (1972:392-394); Collard (1981:2); Harder (1995:15); Kovacs (1998:142); March (2001:22); and 
cautiously, Lloyd-Jones (1994:8-9).  Storey and Allan (2005:115, 257) place Sophokles’ Elektra as late 410s.  On 
the respective dates of the Elektras, with Euripides’ as the prior play, see Mastronarde (2010:34) (E. Elektra around 
420); Ley (2007:112-113) (E. Elektra after 421 but before 415, and S. Elektra after 411 but before 409). 
4 On an earlier Sophoklean and a later Euripidean Elektra, see Ferguson (1972:381); Sale (1973:viii); Arnott 
(1981:179); Sewell (2007:154); Roisman and Luschnig (2011:32).  Cf. Cropp (1988:li), who prefers 420-419 for 
Euripides’ play, with Sophokles’ Elektra earlier still. 
5 See also Denniston (1939:xxxv); Segal (1966:521n61); Conacher (1967:202n9); Walton (1980:26); Cropp (1988: 
xlviii-xlix); Lembke and Reckford (2010:15); Roisman and Luschnig (2011:31-32).  On Euripides’ Orestes as a 
fourth Elektra-play, see Vickers (1973:553-554). 
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would expect human appreciation of narrative complexity to increase as a function of literary 
aesthetic, and, because artists would aspire to top each other’s achievements, that audiences 
would expect more over-the-top experiences to stimulate their sensibilities.  In light of this, 
Euripides’ Elektra can be read as a scornful, outraged, over-the-top response to Sophokles’ 
status quo crowd-pleaser, which approves the heroic Orestes’ matricide.  There are aspects of 
characterization and plot in Euripides’ play which would likely have attracted Sophokles’ 
attention, but which go unremarked in his Elektra.  Euripides’ Elektra is manifestly dismissive 
of inherited nobility, a concept promoted as natural and desirable in Sophokles’ play, while the 
humble contrition of Euripides’ Klytaimestra in Elektra also passes unanswered in Sophokles’ 




Sophokles’ late fifth-century Elektra revisits Aiskhylos’ Khoephori, but his characterization of 
Klytaimestra, Elektra, and Orestes differs substantially from the Oresteia of 458 BCE.  The 
Oresteia reflects a period of imperial expansion and prosperity, but Sophokles’ Elektra was 
produced during the Peloponnesian War, when the might of Athens was in decline.  It seems 
that Sophokles’ peers thought of him as a model citizen and an excellent tragedian; modern 
critics agree that Sophokles was a wealthy, patriotic, moral conservative, twice elected general 
for Athenian military campaigns, whose family wealth came from the manufacture of military 
arms, and who believed in inherited excellence.6  While Sophokles’ work is less directly 
political than that of Aiskhylos or Euripides, he is interested in the power of the human spirit 
to endure adversity.7  Sophokles’ conflicted, suffering, lonely heroes do not always inspire 
admiration; they often monopolise the stage at the expense of the chorus, whose traditional role 
is substantially reduced.8  Nevertheless, scholars ancient and modern agree that Sophokles had 
a particular gift for the creation of character, and one of the most distinctive features of 
                                                          
6 Jameson (1971); Gregory (2002:147); Sewell (2007:152); Scodel (2012:30).  Sophokles was born in 497/6 at 
Kolonos and died in Athens in 406/5; on the outline of his life, see the Marm. Par., the Life of Sophokles, and the 
hypothesis to Oidipous Kolonos.  On Sophokles as a model citizen, see Bowra (1967:49); Buxton (1984:3); Lloyd-
Jones (1994:6); Sommerstein (2002:41); Storey and Allan (2005:111-112). 
7 On Sophokles’ interest in human endurance, see Bowra (1966:143-144; 1967:44); Walton (1980:19); Lesky 
(1983b:196); De Romilly (1985:67); Sommerstein (2002:44, 46-47); Storey and Allan (2005:116, 130). 
8 On Sophokles’ isolated, heroic figures, see Easterling (1983:145); Storey and Allan (2005:120-123).  On the 
strength and agency of Sophokles’ chorus, see Sommerstein (2002:45). 
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Sophokles’ Elektra is the centrality – and exceptionality – of the individual.9  There is 
disagreement concerning Sophokles’ female protagonists: some view these fictional women as 
independent, active agents, others as women who act to uphold traditional androcentric values 
and views about acceptable female roles; according to others, however, Sophokles’ tragic vision 
is thoroughly pessimistic about the institution of marriage.10 
 
This study reveals how reproductive concerns underlie the narrative theme and characterization 
in Sophokles’ Elektra, through the eponymous protagonist’s manic desire to marry and 
reproduce before her fertility declines, and through her resentment of her mother’s continuing 
production of children in a second marriage.  Elektra and Orestes are both specifically 
concerned to regain control over their patrilineal inheritance, in contrast to their sister 
Khrysothemis, who is willing to live harmoniously with her mother and stepfather.  Sophokles’ 
play has much to say about the social dangers of speech: the unreliability of hearsay figures 
heavily in the play, as does Elektra’s inability to control her emotive – hysterical – outbursts.  
In this Elektra the chorus alludes to the Erinyes, but the expected Furies do not appear; the only 
monstrous female to be found is in Elektra’s hostile descriptions of her mother, but every 
appearance of Klytaimestra undermines this account.11  The tragedy ostensibly aims to obscure 
(or at least excuse) the death of Iphigeneia and instead draw attention to female adultery as an 
unspeakable moral crime, but the characterization of Elektra as an unreliable commentator and 
the actual appearance of a rational, compassionate Klytaimestra both undermine this overt aim. 
 
Sophokles’ Elektra is the only extant work by Sophokles featuring Klytaimestra and 
Agamemnon’s family.  Critics differ on how the characterization of the eponymous Elektra 
exemplifies the play’s thematic concerns, and are divided on the topic of Klytaimestra’s 
matricide between optimists, who view the murder as just, and pessimists, who view the play’s 
                                                          
9 According to the ancient Life of Sophokles (21), Sophokles had exceptional, concise powers of characterization.  
See also Lattimore (1964:5); Trypanis (1981:159-160); Easterling (1983:140; 1977:129); De Romilly (1985:71-
72); Budelmann (2000:88-89); Fotheringham (2000:np); Scodel (2005a:243).  On the particular emphasis in 
Sophokles’ Elektra upon character psychology, see Norwood (1948:142); O’Brien (1964:18-19); Jones (1962:145, 
159); Trypanis (1981:155); Hogan (1991:270-271); Dunn (2012:99). 
10 On the character of Sophokles’ female protagonists, see Trypanis (1981:148); Wiersma (1984:55); Sommerstein 
(2002:56-57); Storey and Allan (2005:120).  On Sophokles’ ambivalence about women and the bleakness of 
marriage, see Hall (1994:xi-xii); Lyons (2003:124); Patterson (2012:381). 
11 For the origins, manifestations, and social function of the Erinyes (and their later manifestation in Latin literature 
as Furies), see discussion in Chapter 2, pp. 106n77; 156; 163-165; 167-168n301; 168-172; 168n303; 168n305; 
169n307; 170n309; 170n310; 170n311; 170n312; 171n315; 171n318; 172n319; 178-179; 178n335; 184-185; 
184n358; 185n359; 185n360. 
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tone as one of dark injustice.12  One recurring theme in this Elektra is the tension between 
hearsay and credulity.  Khrysothemis believes the evidence of her own eyes about the discovery 
of the lock of hair upon Agamemnon’s tomb, and wants her sister Elektra to believe her report 
of it (El. 885-890), but Elektra persuades Khrysothemis to doubt what she has seen (920-933), 
and to rely instead upon the hearsay account of Orestes’ death – despite it being a convincing 
one – which the audience knows is a deceptive lie, and upon the funerary urn supplied to her.  
Elektra’s own ability to distinguish truth from falsehood is highly unreliable: on the one hand, 
she proclaims that she is not such a fool as to believe that the dead (i.e., Agamemnon) can rise 
again (940-941), but, during her declarations of joy over Orestes (1315-1317), she asserts that 
if she saw her father now, she would believe he had miraculously returned to life; tellingly, the 
chorus earlier observed (S. El. 137-139) that Elektra can never raise her father from the lake of 
Hades. 
 
Khrysothemis’ report of Klytaimestra’s dream to Elektra (417-425) is a hearsay sequence of 
multi-layered narrative intentionality.13  In that dream, Klytaimestra is a first-level witness of 
events; but she then retells those events to the Sun; this report is overheard by some unnamed 
person in the palace; ‘this one’ (τις, 417) relates the eavesdropping to Khrysothemis; 
Khrysothemis relates this account to Elektra; and all of this is witnessed by Sophokles’ 
audience, including the modern reader.14  The five-times-reported dream places an Agamemnon 
returned to life (419), once more at the side of his queen, and in possession of the ruling sceptre 
of Mycenae.  Elektra declares that it must be Agamemnon who has sent the ‘ugly’ dream to 
spur his son to revenge, and so enable both Orestes and Elektra to honour him with rich gifts, 
but her disposition to believe repeated stories – along with the play’s overall exploration of 
expeditious lying – casts her interpretation into serious doubt. 
 
The greatest liar in the play is Orestes, who urges the Paidagogos to announce under oath that 
Orestes is dead (47-48); furthermore, in Orestes’ opinion, οὐδὲν ῥῆμα σὺν κέρδει κακόν, 
‘nothing which is said for gain is evil’ (61).  The characterization of Orestes as shameless 
deceiver is problematic for those arguing that the heroic matricide is a just and noble act, but 
the Greeks did view lying as justified under certain circumstances: Xenophon, for example, 
observes that men must invent lies to suit the current purpose, and that lying is the most 
                                                          
12 Grene (1957:124); Lesky (1966a:290); Segal (1981:249); Bowman (1997:131-132); Wright (2005b:172). 
13 On multi-order intentional fiction, see the Introduction, p. 9. 
14 It is because of this dream that Khrysothemis has been sent with offerings to the tomb of Agamemnon. 
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profitable policy in wartime (Hipp. 5.9).15  That Orestes lies to his grief-stricken sister – his 
only true philos in the palace – is much harder to justify, because he can be in no doubt as to 
the loyalties of those living within the palace; Elektra’s later declaration to the urn reveals that 
Orestes has previously entrusted her with many secret messages about his plan to punish 
Klytaimestra (El. 1153-1156).  Fully aware of her loyalty for himself and of her hatred for his 
ekthroi, her brother lies about his own death, reiterating that Orestes’ ashes lie within the 
funeral-urn in his hand (1098-1118).  The entire play is only 1510 lines long, but Orestes 
conceals his true identity from her right up until line 1223.  Once Elektra is finally in on the 
deception, she repeats the lie about the contents of the urn to Aigisthos (1452-1455), acting on 
the chorus’ advice that Aigisthos could be ensnared through deception (1437-1441). 
 
The persistent deception practiced by the supposedly noble and sympathetic characters in this 
play is echoed by their inability to distinguish between reality and fantasy.  Elektra’s initial 
failure to recognize the mature Orestes is quite reasonable, yet Khrysothemis (presumed to be 
Elektra’s younger sister) has no difficulty in recognizing a single lock of his hair on first sight.  
Elektra’s declaration to Orestes that she could never forget his visage, even in troubled times 
(1285-1287), makes no sense, given that she completely failed to recognize him in earlier 
conversation (1106 ff.).  Elektra’s inability to recognize the servant into whose hands she 
entrusted her beloved little brother is also unaccountable (1344-1350): young Orestes may be 
expected to change radically in the course of ten years, but an adult man does not change so 
much in that same time.  Elektra never acknowledges that she was completely wrong about the 
hair – Khrysothemis finds and correctly identifies Orestes’ hair – and the Elektra’s recognition-
scene restates the thematic message that people do not, in fact, possess the ability to see what 
is true, even when it is clearly in front of them, and especially during troubled times.16 
 
Perceptions of Klytaimestra in this play depend on audience sympathy for her daughter Elektra; 
Elektra is Klytaimestra’s estranged child and ekthros, characterized through the depiction of a 
sequence of character-portraits of the moody Elektra in conflict with the others.17  One third of 
this play is over before Klytaimestra appears, but Elektra and her friends tell us a great deal 
                                                          
15 On the strategic (and moral) value of lying, see also Xenophon, Agesilaos (1.17); Anabasis (2.6.22); Kyropaedia 
(1.6.31-34).  On expeditious lies in time of war in ancient Greece, see also Hesk (2000); Danzig (2007); Jay (2010). 
16 On Khrysothemis’ powers of perception, see Gellie (1972:118-119). 
17 Grene (1957:123); Kirkwood (1958:35, 136); Campbell (1989:18).  On the prominence or centrality of female 
characters (including the chorus) to this play; see Jones (1962:142-143); Musurillo (1967:94); Gellie (1972:106); 
Burton (1980:186); Lloyd-Jones (1994:167); McLeish (2003:86). 
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about her; Elektra’s first speech (86-120) dwells upon the pitiful loss of her father – we learn 
that her mother and her mother’s lover split Agamemnon’s head open with an axe (97-99) – 
and Elektra alone laments him (100-102), with the obvious implication that Agamemnon’s wife 
Klytaimestra ought to have undertaken this duty.  The partisan and bloodthirsty chorus’ address 
to the grieving Elektra agrees that Klytaimestra is δυστανοτάτας… ματρός ‘an unfortunate 
mother’, who has enacted δολερᾶς ἀθεώτατα… ἁλόντ᾽ ἀπάταις ‘ungodly treachery through 
deception’; Agamemnon has perished, κακᾷ τε χειρὶ πρόδοτον ‘betrayed by her evil hand’, and 
their greatest hope is that she will be destroyed (121-127). 
 
Elektra’s suffering in ἀκόρεστον οἰμωγὰν, ‘insatiable lamentation’ (123) is the root of critical 
dislike of the queen, but to what degree is Klytaimestra truly responsible for Elektra’s 
unhappiness in Sophokles’ retelling?  This biased witness is the blindly devoted child of 
Agamemnon, the resentful step-daughter of Aigisthos, the exploitative sibling of a kind and 
gentle Khrysothemis, the survivor (and denier) of her sister Iphigeneia’s slaughter at Aulis, and 
the devotee of her much younger, but dominant brother Orestes.  Klytaimestra’s prayer for 
continued life and prosperity observes that not all of her children oppose her with hatred (S. El. 
650-654); it cannot be the case that she refers to Orestes (who does hate her), and it might be 
the case that she refers to the compliant Khrysothemis, but her observation suggests very 
strongly that Klytaimestra and Aigisthos have produced at least one other child.  Elektra, in 
fact, complains to Klytaimestra about her παιδοποιεῖς, ‘conceiving children’ by the man who 
killed Elektra’s father, and casting out her previous, legitimate children (S. El. 589-590).  A 
young woman in a pre-contraceptive context who has successfully borne three or four offspring 
before is likely – after ten years of second marriage – to have produced further children; 
interpretation of Elektra’s vilification of her mother must take the apparent existence of these 
rival siblings into account. 
 
Elektra’s present suffering is actually of her own making, and as the characterization of sister 
Khrysothemis demonstrates, unnecessary; similarly – despite the accusations of Elektra and her 
supporters – Sophokles’ Klytaimestra is a lesser mortal, nothing like Aiskhylos’ majestic and 
threatening Klytaimestra in the Agamemnon.18  While Elektra’s breast bleeds from the many 
blows she inflicts upon herself (89-90), there is – despite critical assumptions – no direct 
                                                          
18 Bowra (1944:236, 239-240); Gellie (1972:113-115); Vickers (1973:568); Stevens (1978:114).  On Elektra as 
the most malevolent character in this play, see Baldock (1989:106-107). 
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evidence that Klytaimestra is also beating her; Klytaimestra may exchange verbal abuse with 
her daughter, but claims that she has never done her daughter violence (520-524).  Elektra 
declares (to Orestes, while she is still unaware of his true identity) that her mother uses violence 
and other torments against her (1196), but if Sophokles wanted a villainous Klytaimestra who 
had been beating Elektra, he would have had her admit it; his Klytaimestra is unafraid to say 
exactly what she thinks, and admits to the murder of Agamemnon readily enough (526-527).  
Her willingness to reveal her attitudes is also indicated by her insistence that Agamemnon’s 
decision to sacrifice Klytaimestra’s child instead of one of Menelaos’ offspring was wrongful, 
because the expedition was for the sake of Helen and Menelaos; furthermore, she feels no regret 
for the death of Agamemnon, because even Iphigeneia, if she could speak, would acknowledge 
the foolishness of Agamemnon’s judgement (536-551).  Elektra completely dismisses 
Klytaimestra’s motivation in motherhood, and only ever alludes to Agamemnon’s killing of her 
sister Iphigeneia when forced to defend her father’s sacrifice (563-576).  Klytaimestra accuses 
Elektra of foolishness in refusing to understand that Agamemnon’s death for Iphigeneia’s sake 
was inevitable; the particular pains of motherhood are evident in her declaration that in 
begetting Iphigeneia, Agamemnon suffered less pain than Klytaimestra did in bearing her (528-
533).  Elektra responds that Klytaimestra has shamefully killed Elektra’s father, which 
outweighs any possible justification, righteous or not (558-560); the shamefulness of 
Agamemnon’s death requires a necessary vengeance, and like her mother before her, the loss 
of a philos provokes in Elektra a dark urge to violence, culminating in an exultation over bloody 
revenge.19 
 
Some critics – completely persuaded by the various characters’ reports – conclude that 
Sophokles’ Klytaimestra is indeed an utterly evil, beastly adulterer who deserves punishment 
by horrible death.20  This Klytaimestra personifies the imagined fears of the Athenian man: that 
a weak-willed, evil-minded woman, who over-reacts and lacks self-control, would jeopardize 
the patrilineal oikos, a cautionary example for both men and women; if anybody in the play can 
be accused of emotional over-reaction and loss of self-control, it is not Klytaimestra, but 
Elektra, who is constantly being told by her friends and allies to be quiet and exercise self-
                                                          
19 Cf. Bowra (1944:239-240), who agrees with Elektra’s assertion that husband-murder can never be justified. 
20 Denniston (1939:xxix); Bowra (1944:232); Whitman (1951:153, 163); Kitto (1958:14); Lesky (1966a:288); 
Ferguson (1972:548); Sale (1973:17); Burton (1980:224); Kitzinger (1991:313); Roisman (2008:111). 
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control.21  Elektra’s testimony is unabashedly partial, and her account of her mother opens with 
the statement that their relationship is one of ἔχθιστα ‘most bitter enmity’ (261-262).  Yet many 
critics accept Elektra’s argument (560-562, 591-592) that Klytaimestra’s act of vengeance was 
motivated solely by her illicit love, rejecting Klytaimestra’s direct testimony that the murder of 
Iphigeneia is her reason for the mariticide.22  Elektra reports that Klytaimestra sits about in the 
palace, taking pleasure in Agamemnon’s death, and insulting him in her laughter and feasting 
(S. El. 277-281); she even jeers at her avengers during her last moments.23  Many embrace this 
hearsay report of Klytaimestra’s celebration as sufficient evidence of her evil, but we do not 
directly witness any of this behaviour in the play, which only appears in Elektra’s hostile 
witness-statement.24 
 
Critics sympathetic to Elektra point to the lack of remorse in Sophokles’ Klytaimestra for the 
killing of her husband.25  Delight over conquered enemies was expected and approved by 
Greeks; why should Klytaimestra regret her proper vengeance against the man who killed her 
child?26  Like her mother, Elektra has waited many years for the opportunity to exult in 
fulfilment of revenge, but unlike Klytaimestra in the Agamemnon, Elektra’s exultation in 
Sophokles’ play has rarely attracted critical condemnation and disgust.  Victory sometimes 
involved desecration of an enemy’s corpse, and Elektra commands that Aigisthos’ corpse be 
thrown to those who will properly bury him – beasts and birds (S. El. 1487-1489).  The Greeks 
viewed vengeance upon enemies as a necessary, honourable, and morally excellent behaviour, 
but to be eaten by dogs and birds was an appalling fate, from the Greek point of view.  Critical 
expectation that Klytaimestra should repent of her act also reveals a view that Agamemnon’s 
sacrifice of her child was a forgivable crime, and therefore insufficient motivation for 
vengeance.  In ancient Greece, harm is always due to enemies, and vengeance is always due to 
those who have killed one’s blood-relatives, even for those ekthroi who once were philoi.  In 
                                                          
21 On Klytaimestra as lacking self-control, see Wolfe (2009:705-706).  On the atypical and immoderate 
emotionalism of Elektra, see Norwood (1948:143); Baldock (1989:105); Dunn (2012:103).  On Elektra’s histrionic 
outbursts, see also Bowman (1997:147). 
22 On adultery as Klytaimestra’s real reason for killing Agamemnon, see Bowra (1944:328); Jones (1962:151); 
Sale (1973:8); March (2001:12).  Winnington-Ingram (1980:220) and Burnett (1998:137) offer unsympathetic 
readings of Klytaimestra and her grief for Iphigeneia. 
23 On the audience’s loss of sympathy for Klytaimestra in response to her debauchery, see Bowra (1944:239-240); 
Burnett (1998:133-135). 
24 Sale (1973:6); Winnington-Ingram (1980:232); Wright (2005b:182). 
25 See, for example, Lesky (1983b:162-163, 297). 
26 On the fate of Aigisthos’ corpse, see Kitto (1958:52); Gellie (1972:128); March (2001:19-20).  On 
Klytaimestra’s failure to properly perform the death-ritual for Agamemnon, see also Seaford (1985:316-317). 
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order to justify Orestes’ matricide, Sophokles needed to destroy Klytaimestra’s status within 
the oikos as philos and mother.27  He does so partly by eliminating Aiskhylos’ earlier intense 
emotional confrontation between mother and son, and by undermining Klytaimestra’s maternal 
function, transferring it to others.  Elektra’s speech to the urn which she believes holds Orestes’ 
ashes conveys the explicit message that Klytaimestra is no longer the children’s mother, but is 
first and foremost her ekthros, ‘enemy’ (1153).  Yet this apparent enmity from the woman who 
used to be her mother is not evidenced, as Klytaimestra has never renounced her parentage of 
the children who despise her; when she hears the terrible news of Orestes’ death, Klytaimestra 
observes that δεινὸν τὸ τίκτειν ἐστίν: οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς/ πάσχοντι μῖσος ὧν τέκῃ προσγίγνεται, 
‘To give birth is a marvellous strange thing; for, having experienced evil from them, a person 
does not hate one’s offspring’ (770-771).  That Orestes no longer poses any danger comes as 
some reprieve, yet Klytaimestra still does not hate either of these children (770-771).  
Khrysothemis actually reports that Elektra is going to be imprisoned in exile, not killed (S. El. 
379-382), while Klytaimestra asks to live in peace alongside those of her children who do not 
hate her (S. El. 657-658), and says nothing about killing those who do hate her.  Imprisonment 
of Elektra when Aigisthos is present – to protect her from her own self-destructive behaviour – 
and Klytaimestra’s willingness to let Elektra free when Aigisthos is absent demonstrates her 
compassion for her troubled child.28  Elektra loathes a mother who is for the most part relatively 
civil to her, but adores a brother who is at times short-tempered and annoyed by her devotion; 
she worships her dead, filicidal father, but treats her living, affectionate sister as beneath her 
contempt – until that sister proves useful.29 
 
No expression of motherly affection will persuade Elektra to abandon her hatred of 
Klytaimestra.  Left on stage with the chorus, Elektra proclaims that Klytaimestra is only 
pretending to love Orestes, but is secretly gloating over his death (804-807), persuading some 
critics that Klytaimestra’s grief at the false news of Orestes’ death (766-768) is feigned, or 
minimal, at best.30  Klytaimestra has logical reason to be pleased about the news, because the 
alienated and threatening Orestes – in conspiracy with a ‘blood-sucking’ Elektra – was plotting 
                                                          
27 In the view of many critics, the play is full of references and incidents which seek to undermine Klytaimestra’s 
maternal nature; see Ferguson (1972:539), for specific examples. 
28 Cf. Sale (1973:8), who argues (based on S. El. 379-382 and 657-658) that Klytaimestra wishes for the death of 
both her children.  Cf. Ferguson (1972:540). 
29 On Elektra’s seriously dysfunctional relationships with all her family members, see Segal (1966:504). 
30 Kirkwood (1958:57); Blundell (1989:151); Roisman (2008:107); Perris (2011:6-7).  On her conscious 
suppression of a natural and authentic grief, see Sommerstein (2010b:239). 
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her death, even in exile, so that she could not sleep easily (775-787); however, her lines actually 
give no evidence of gloating, but indicate that she is genuinely distressed.  For example, she 
views her preservation through Orestes’ death as κακοῖς, ‘by means of misfortune’ (768), not 
happy accident.  If Elektra’s misery in living with her father’s murderers is real enough (S. El. 
262-264), then Klytaimestra’s daily endurance of the angry, obsessively grieving Elektra, 
alongside the constant expectation of death at her son’s hand, is equally obvious to an unbiased 
audience.  Elektra wants only to be accepted (and acceptable) as her father’s loyal daughter; to 
be useful to her father’s son and heir is a part of her self-identification; this invites better 
consideration of what is driving her rejection of her mother, the only biological parent still 
available to her. 
 
The co-residential presence of the biological mother is one of the consistently minimal 
necessities predicting offspring survival through childhood (and strongly indicating 
stepdaughter survival at most ages), but Elektra protests throughout the play that she is the 
daughter of the father alone, and that her wretched mother is no mother at all (273-274, 597-
598, 1194) – even though Elektra is rather more her mother’s daughter in character than she 
herself would care to admit.31  The first words of the chorus to Elektra describe her as the 
‘daughter of a most unfortunate mother’ (121-122), but the play makes her conspicuous 
rejection of her matrilineage a priority; the Paidagogos’ opening address to Orestes praises his 
glorious patrilineage as ‘son of Agamemnon, the general of Troy’ (1-2), and early in the play 
Elektra proclaims her allegiance and affection for Agamemnon (86-120).  Her mother was of 
royal lineage, but a father’s status and reputation is what matters most in almost all human 
cultures, and especially in the ancient Greek context.32  But Elektra’s listed miseries 
demonstrate the contradictions of her position as an assassinated – and humiliated – king’s 
daughter: she has lost her father to impious murder by a mother; she is enslaved within her own 
father’s house; although fully mature, she lacks husband and children of her own; and she 
suffers the absence of Orestes, the one full-blood kinsman who might alleviate all of her sorrows 
(254-309).  But many of these woes are the result of her chosen responses to her situation: even 
the sympathetic chorus warn her that her persistent, extravagant displays of mourning can have 
                                                          
31 On the protective factor of biological parents to offspring in stepfamily marriages, see discussion in Chapter 1, 
pp. 41n179; 48; 54.  On Elektra’s actual – and increasing – similarity to her mother, see Scodel (1984:86); Des 
Bouvrie (1990:257). 




no positive effect on her situation (140-143), because her excessive sorrowing is only making 
things worse for her (217-219).33  Although the chorus speak out because they care about 
Elektra’s well-being, she rejects their sensible advice to avoid creating misery out of misery 
(235), and is adamant that she will never cease lamenting (229-232), which is the only proper 
behaviour of εὐγενὴς γυνή ‘the nobly-born woman’ (257-260). 
 
According to Elektra, her mother torments her by pointing out that Elektra is not the only one 
to have lost a dear one, cursing her to be caught in lamentation forever (289-292).  Klytaimestra 
has been mourning her own devastating loss for much longer than Elektra has been lamenting 
the death of her filicidal father, but Elektra studiously ignores and denies the effect of 
Iphigeneia’s death on her mother.34  Elektra insults her mother – and in direct speech, rather 
than her hearsay testimony of Klytaimestra’s insults – with the accusation that she is more tyrant 
than mother (597-598).  Yet Klytaimestra has prevented Aigisthos from executing Elektra: she 
has not arranged for the assassination of Orestes; and she lives harmoniously enough with 
offspring who do not hate her (650-654), even the daughter (Khrysothemis) fathered by her 
enemy Agamemnon.  If Elektra would only curb her endless lamentation, then she would enjoy 
all of her rightful advantages in life, but in response to the patient and compassionate 
Khrysothemis’ pleas for moderation, Elektra replies that she has nothing to gain from self-
restraint, since she lives ‘miserably, but sufficiently’ (352-354); Khrysothemis points out to 
Elektra that her life would be more agreeable if only Elektra would think more sensibly (394).  
Elektra refuses to think sensibly about a good many things, however, including her confused 
ideas about her family. 
 
Elektra not only insists that Klytaimestra is no mother (1194), but also that she herself was 
Orestes’ real care-giver – even before Agamemnon’s death – to the point of claiming that it was 
she who saved Orestes from murder (1132-1133).35  With the death of her brother, Elektra’s 
nursing investment has now come to nothing; she also denies that any other woman in the whole 
                                                          
33 On Elektra’s mental deformation through unnaturally extended, extreme mourning, see Carson (2009:78). 
34 According to Bell (1991:177), the teenage Elektra’s experience of her mother’s angry infidelity outweighed any 
negative effect of her sister’s murder by their own father; cf. (S. El. 585-588).  Lack of feeling for female kin is 
not atypical in women surviving patriarchal social structures; see Blundell (1989:153).  On the potentially lethal 
effects of loss of offspring for women, see Chapter 1, pp. 46-47; 47n215; 55, 64n264. 
35 On Sophokles’ reinvention of Elektra as nurturer and rescuer of Orestes, see Jones (1962:147); Gantz 
(1966:676); Lesky (1983b:165); Rosslyn (2000:34). 
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house was ever as good a nurse as she was to Orestes (1143-1148).36  Elektra is protesting too 
much: she has never married or borne a child, and so could not have been Orestes’ wet-nurse.  
Nor was she Orestes’ primary care-giver, whatever she fondly imagines; some other woman – 
his real mother, or perhaps a family nurse – bore the major care of the baby.  Thus, the years of 
investment in Orestes by the real parent are denied, and his sister imagines that her little brother 
lives only because of Elektra’s hard work.  Critics are often interested in how Klytaimestra 
violates family relationships, but here Elektra disrupts the natural biological roles in this family: 
filicides become family heroes, sisters become mothers and brothers become sons, while 
mothers become enemies and tyrants.37  Familial relationships are further destabilized when the 
chorus also try to assume the role of Elektra’s mother (233-235), while Elektra herself addresses 
her brother’s tutor as father (S. El. 1361); the fervent dislocation of Klytaimestra as a mother is 
a necessary element in Sophokles’ Elektra’s casual acceptance of matricide. 
 
Critics cannot agree on whether Sophokles’ obsessive Elektra is noble or amoral; a long-
suffering hero or a psychologically disturbed sociopath.38  While Orestes’ vengeance is clearly 
motivated by dispassionate pragmatism, critics agree that Elektra is driven by excessive, self-
destructive emotionalism, and some conclude that emotionality – not revenge – is the real theme 
of the play.39  Some suggest that Elektra’s excessive preoccupation with maternity springs from 
her thwarted sexuality, and many view her continued lack of a husband – and therefore children 
– as a very severe deprivation indeed.40  Elektra has lost one parent through murder, and will 
                                                          
36 Cf. the Nurse in Aiskhylos’ Khoephoroi, who also bewails the nil return on her investment.  On the uniquely 
special relationship of (paternal) sister and brother in ancient Greece, see Bremmer (1997). 
37 See Blundell (1989:152-153). 
38 On the intense critical debate about Elektra’s ethos and mental condition, see Segal (1966:511-512); Woodard 
(1966:126); Walton (1980:23); Dihle (1994:112); Ewans (2000b:xxix-xxx, xxxiii-xxxiv); McDonald (2003:57); 
Wheeler (2003:377); Carson (2009:78).  Some (e.g., Bowra (1944) 242, Lucas (1951) 7, and Musurillo (1967) 
106-107) refuse to view Elektra as an unattractive character – despite all evidence.  Denniston (1939:xxiv, xxviii), 
for example, maintains that the “beautiful figure” of Elektra is “heroic, but at the same time gentle, loving, and 
womanly”.  On Elektra’s stubborn attachment to certain ideas as an admirable force for positive moral change, see 
McDonald (2003:46); Roisman (2008:98); Lembke and Reckford (2010:14-15); Roisman and Luschnig (2011:31).  
Whitman (1951:161); Segal (1981:289); and Roisman and Luschnig (2011:248) perceive the ennoblement of 
Elektra through endurance of suffering, but Grene (1957:124); Jones (1962:147); Segal (1966:506); Kitto 
(1968:131-132); Gellie (1972:129-130, 218); Kells (1973:10); Lesky (1983b:161); Seaford (1985:315); and Hall 
(1994:xxiii) conclude that Elektra is corrupted through adversity. 
39 Ferguson (1972:538); Gellie (1972:112); Bowman (1997:131).  On Elektra’s ineffectiveness as typical of 
impotent and housebound fifth-century women, see Beye (1975:281). 
40 On the twisting of Elektra’s sexuality, see Ferguson (1972:539); Carson (2009:77, 79).  On the destruction of 
her life through lack of children and husband, see Bowra (1944:233); Gellie (1972:109, 120).  Cf. Lefkowitz 




lose the other through her own design; Elektra’s desperate desire to be married (and thus 
produce children) makes sense, because to lose her most socially important parent while still 
materially dependent is a serious threat to survival and life-time success: with every day that 
passes, her mother and stepfather fail to arrange her marriage, and Elektra’s life-time 
reproductive prospects diminish, whereas Klytaimestra continues to produce children using the 
resources rightfully belonging to the offspring of Agamemnon.41  Atreid Elektra’s future, after 
the play’s close, would be far from assured.42 
 
Consequently, because vengeance is – in the Greek view – incompatible with femininity, 
Sophokles maintains sympathy for the maniacal Elektra’s lust for revenge through the chorus’ 
repeated exhortations to action, and through emphasis upon her brother the absent heir as the 
rightful avenger, and upon the unswerving loyalty of Agamemnon’s daughter to the dead 
father.43  Upon hearing of Orestes’ death (S. El. 764-765), the chorus observes that the whole 
house is now utterly destroyed.  Elektra and Khrysothemis still live and breathe, but any family 
without a son is ἄπαις, ‘childless’.  When confronted with the apparent death of Orestes, Elektra 
begins to view herself – a woman – as the last possible avenger still standing (951-957), but the 
audience knows that her brother is alive, and will relieve her of this improper, unfeminine 
obligation.44  Elektra, like many women in tragedy, properly supports the male in all things, 
even though – in the Atreid oikos – behaving as a female compliant with the social status-quo 
is a life-threatening situation. 
 
                                                          
41 On the childless Elektra’s inability to empathize with an actual mother, see also Kells (1973:10); McClure 
(2012:374-375).  Cf. Finkelberg (2003:368ff, 373, 375-376), who argues that editors of the play generally amend 
τοκέων, ‘parent’ to τεκέων, ‘youngsters’, and that Elektra’s much-vaunted regret over childlessness (S. El. 187) 
actually refers to her parentless condition; as Elektra’s legal protectors, Klytaimestra and Aigisthos have abused 
their position by failing to negotiate a marriage for her.  On the deferral of a coresident daughter’s reproductive 
activity when her mother is still producing children, see Chapter 1, p. 52n253.  On the role played by parents in a 
daughter’s marriage in traditional societies, see Chapter 1, pp. 29-30; 30n28; 44. 
42 On the play’s ending and an unsaved Elektra, see McLeish (2003:87); Wright (2005b:192).  Cf. Storey and Allan 
(2005:122) argue that the plays ends happily, and Whitman (1951:153), who points out that Sophokles’ Elektra 
achieves all her goals, including the murder of her mother, seemingly without negative consequence.  On the lack 
of consequences for Elektra as active co-perpetrator of the matricide, see Whitman (1951:156).  Cf. Gellie 
(1972:129), who contends that there were no Furies for Elektra in the traditional narrative because she never 
provided an active hand in the matricide. 
43 Gellie (1972:110); Wiersma (1984:48); Burnett (1998:127).  See S. El. 303, 317-323, 455-456, 604-605. 




While her mother’s infidelity provokes straightforward outrage, Elektra’s defence of the 
impious sacrifice of her sister by their father is convoluted and unconvincing (563-576); there 
is no acknowledgment at all in Sophokles’ Elektra, of Agamemnon’s adultery, even from 
Klytaimestra.45  Elektra and Klytaimestra both work to undermine each other’s moral position 
on the family filicide, adultery, and mariticide in their set-piece Great Agon debate.46  Elektra’s 
attack on Klytaimestra effectively deflects the attention of the audience away from the 
contribution to family dysfunction of the persistent Tantalid ethos; she maintains killing a 
husband is much worse than killing a child, and so Klytaimestra must actually have been 
motivated by adulterous lust (560-562).  Elektra’s defence of Agamemnon’s sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia (563-576) depends – as she herself notes (566) – on the hearsay account of his 
accidental offence of Artemis (569-572), although it is unclear if she refers to his boasting or 
his killing of the stag within the sacred grove.  Artemis prevents the fleet from either going on 
to Troy, or from returning home (573-574).  Agamemnon’s venial stupidity – all foregrounded 
in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia – are absent in this tragedy; in Sophokles’ retelling of events, 
Agamemnon actually wanted to resist the goddess’ demand, and so Iphigeneia’s death is all 
Artemis’ responsibility (575-576).  Lastly, in Elektra’s view, even if Agamemnon had acted 
selfishly in order to advance his brother’s cause, Klytaimestra had no good reason – and 
certainly no law on her side – to have avenged Iphigeneia’s death (577-579).  Elektra boasts 
that – if she had had the power to do so – she would have enlisted Orestes to punish her mother 
(603-605).  Klytaimestra remarks to the chorus that Elektra insults her mother when she is old 
enough to know better, and Elektra agrees that this is all wrong behaviour, but insists that 
Klytaimestra’s δυσμένεια ‘enmity’ is forcing her to such action (617-620); Klytaimestra’s sins 
appear to be offences against Elektra’s patrilineal claims to status and social position (586-590), 
through the diversion of resources into another man’s children.47  From an evolutionary 
perspective, Elektra’s potential lifetime success as the stepdaughter (of her mother’s new 
husband) is compromised, but, as the publically and steadfastly loyal heiress of her father she 
stands to benefit socially and materially. 
 
                                                          
45 On Sophokles’ Elektra as unique in extant classical literature in the concern shown over adultery – even to the 
point of approving matricide – see Scodel (1984:84); McClure (2012:374-375). 
46 On the dramatic importance of this agōn-scene, see Kirkwood (1958:140); Musurillo (1967:95); Swart (1984). 
47 On Elektra’s complaint about the threat to her own inherited position and family reputation, see also Burnett 
(1998:137-138), who contends that the exchange of arguments between Elektra and Klytaimestra is incoherent.  
The exchange is coherent if one perceives the dialogue’s subtext of reproductive politics, however. 
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For all that each participant in this agōn makes a logical case for their own interests, only one 
may win.  Some argue that Elektra is fairly the victor, but because she cannot discredit 
Klytaimestra’s claim that the murder of Iphigeneia was the main justification for the murder of 
Agamemnon, Elektra erases the emotional horror of Iphigeneia’s murder by refocusing the 
agōn onto Klytaimestra’s other offences.48  The chorus is well aware of her selective blindness 
in this respect, responding to Elektra’s complaints about the killing of her father (201-212), 
with a warning that she should keep silence, because she is ignoring the initiating events of her 
situation, and herself risks adding to the family misfortune (213-216).  The audience at this 
point may be reminded not only of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice, but also of the earlier sordid events 
in the family history – her grandfather Atreus’ murder of Thyestes’ children, Atreus’ rivalry 
with Thyestes over throne and wife, and Thyestes’ adultery with Atreus’ wife?  Or to great-
grandparents Pelops’ and Hippodameia’s conspiracy to overthrow Hippodameia’s father?  Or 
to the first ancestor Tantalos’ impious murder of his son, and outrageous taunting of the gods 
for curiosity’s sake alone?  That it might easily have been any or all of these woes suggests that 
Elektra should be very careful indeed about ascribing all of her woes to the actions of her 
mother, and to Thyestes’ son Aigisthos (who had in his own right a duty of revenge against the 
Atreid line).  Only the sacrilegious murder of Iphigeneia can justify Klytaimestra’s act as 
righteous vengeance; the traditional plot demands Klytaimestra’s death, under any and all 
circumstances, and this is why the impiety of the sacrifice as sufficient cause must be revoked.49  
The intuitively obvious sanctity of the mother-child bond in the context of blood-ties must not 
outweigh social and divine demands upon Agamemnon, and the emphatic denial of 
Klytaimestra’s claim of loving, motherly attachment to her slain child in Sophokles’ play stands 
in stark contrast to the approaches of Aiskhylos and Euripides to this character.50  Yet there are 
persuasive suggestions in Sophokles’ Elektra that Klytaimestra’s maternal love for her daughter 
is natural and authentic. 
 
                                                          
48 On Elektra’s winning position, see Kitzinger (1991:306); Burnett (1998:137-138).  Cf. Wiersma (1984:52), who 
argues that Klytaimestra’s main point of defence – the death of Iphigeneia – (S. El. 528, 531-2, 537-541) is rational 
and in the right, and Segal (1966:536, 1981:251), who concludes that Elektra fails to give a plausible answer to 
the facts of Agamemnon’s filicide.  See also Blundell (1989:262). 
49 On the conventions and terms of the debate, see also De Wet (1977:33); Blundell (1989:267). 
50 Critics variously account for Sophokles’ erasure of Iphigeneia in terms of sympathy for or against Klytaimestra; 
see Jones (1962:158); Segal (1966:536-537n84); Kitto (1968:137); Otis (1981:4); Lubeck (1993:21); Burnett 
(1998:137); Scodel (1999:113); Roisman (2008:105). 
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The proper, patriarchal structure of the oikos is one man and his various dependants.  As a 
resident in the foreign oikos of her husband, Klytaimestra’s original philoi are her own relations, 
her parents, siblings, cousins, and offspring; this natural affiliation constitutes an uneasy 
challenge to the Greek ideal of a wife’s allegiance to a husband’s extended patriline, including 
children unrelated to her personally.  Klytaimestra’s willingness to see her husband’s brother’s 
offspring die instead of her own child may appear hard-hearted, but it is an unconscious 
calculation based on degree of genetic relation, as when parents spontaneously risk their lives 
to save their child.51  Critics sometimes disapprove Klytaimestra’s wish that Menelaos’ child 
had died instead of Iphigeneia, but an algorithm of exponentially greater paternal uncertainty 
suggests that a husband’s brother’s children are less certainly the first cousins of Klytaimestra’s 
own children; on the other hand, Hermione is also – through her mother Helen – Klytaimestra’s 
matrilineal niece, and thus almost certainly related to her own children, including Elektra – 
whose allegiance is to the more uncertain patriline rather than to the matriline.  Agamemnon – 
a father prepared to sacrifice his child’s life in order to save his social position – is the hard-
hearted parent in this family tragedy, but Elektra is so obsessively attached to the idea of 
paternal infallibility – and maternal shortcomings – that no amount of evidence of his 
wrongdoing will persuade her away from his cause, least of all the brutal slaughter of her sister.  
To protect Agamemnon’s reputation – her ultimate aim – Elektra must also sacrifice the 
memory of Iphigeneia.52  Elektra becomes an accessory after the fact in the matter of 
Iphigeneia’s death, and her support of her father’s act through refusal to acknowledge her 
sister’s suffering confirms once again that she is her father’s philos first and foremost, and 
Klytaimestra’s ekthros: in fact, Elektra actually conceals her father’s crime by resorting to a 
version of the story which denies his wrongdoing.53  Despite the frequent critical view of her 
as a loving sister, Sophokles’ Elektra’s love for family is slavish, unrequited devotion to a 
                                                          
51 On altruism and estimations of degree of relatedness, see Chapter 1, pp. 44-45; 44n198; 52n252; 53; 53n258; 
77.  In Blundell’s (1989:162) opinion, Iphigeneia is more obviously Klytaimestra’s philos than the unrelated 
Atreids Agamemnon or Menelaos, or Menelaos’ Atreid children will ever be, explaining Klytaimestra’s suggestion 
that one of Menelaos’ children ought to have been sacrificed to enable the war. 
52 On Elektra’s conspicuous lack of regret for her sister’s brutal death, see Blundell (1989:167); Hall (1994:xxiii); 
Roisman (2008:105); Sommerstein (2010b:237). 
53 One definition of ‘criminal accessory’ states that “The assistance to the criminal may be of any type, including 
emotional or financial assistance as well as physical assistance or concealment.”  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accessory, accessed Feb 5, 2016.  Cf. Segal (1981:271), who describes Elektra as 
Agamemnon’s staunchest supporter. 
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brother, and exclusively focussed upon male kin.54  Those reading Elektra as sweet and noble 
would do well to consider her interactions with her only living full-blood sister, Khrysothemis, 
a model of self-restraint and careful forethought; Elektra abuses her gentle spirit, and is only 
civil to her when Khrysothemis – against her better judgement – takes up Elektra’s hopeless 
cause.  Khrysothemis’ character is also commentary on Elektra’s dangerous lack of self-
awareness and her self-destructive attachment to her father; Khrysothemis does not interact at 
all with Orestes, or with her mother Klytaimestra, but her mother’s reference to children who 
do not hate her likely refers to this mild-natured daughter.  This self-controlled, tender-hearted 
Khrysothemis is unique to Sophokles’ version of the story, and she offers a dramatically 
significant contrast to Elektra in two major scenes, described below.55  On every count, the 
calm, considered views of Khrysothemis – an utterly atypical Atreid – serve to show Elektra as 
a dangerous extremist. 
 
While Elektra struggles to control her emotional outbursts – even when her brother and the 
Paidagogos order her to do so – Khrysothemis’ first speech points out that emotionally self-
indulgent outbursts achieve nothing good, and raging against those in power results only in loss 
of freedom (330-340).  In reply to Khrysothemis’ sensible warning, Elektra insists that 
defending her father’s honour is more important to her than her own life (398-399), and Elektra 
disparages Khrysothemis’ refusal to renounce her maternal descent in favour of patrilineal 
affiliation (364-368).56  Despite Elektra’s cruel accusations, Khrysothemis reassures the chorus 
that she is accustomed to her sister’s verbal abuse; furthermore, she would not have bothered 
Elektra, but did so only to warn her of coming danger (372-375).  Elektra’s berating of 
Khrysothemis positions the whole world as full of enemies, and if Khrysothemis is not with her 
(and thus with father Agamemnon), then she must be for the mother (341-344).  Alongside her 
potentially self-destructive obsession with Agamemnon’s honour, Sophokles’ Elektra 
demonstrates a degree of paranoia, narcissism, perhaps even sociopathy; Elektra’s conversation 
with her sister also shows that she is a hypocrite; from her very first appearance Elektra has 
bewailed her lowered standard of living, yet, in response to Khrysothemis’ plea for more 
                                                          
54 On the “gentle, loving, and womanly” Elektra, see Denniston (1939:xxviii).  On Elektra’s sweet femininity, see 
Musurillo (1967:106-107).  Lesky (1983b:195) argues that Sophokles’ Elektra rivals Antigone as an example of 
sisterly love. 
55 On Khrysothemis as the foil for the aggressive Elektra, see Gantz (1966:681). 
56 On Khrysothemis’ hesitation and the problem of maternal heredity, cf. McClure (2012:372). 
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moderate behaviour, Elektra boasts that she does not yearn for comfortable living (361-363).57  
Elektra is psychologically unstable long before the matricide occurs, but Khrysothemis is a 
consistently rational, compassionate young woman: even the chorus suggests that if only 
Elektra could learn some sense from Khrysothemis – and she from Elektra – they might both 
profit (369-371).  Elektra’s interest in her sister is purely instrumental, however. 
 
The cold condescension of this woman – admired by some as “gentle and loving” – toward the 
sweet-hearted Khrysothemis disappears only after her sister offers welcome news about 
Klytaimestra’s nightmare: Elektra suddenly addresses her as ‘dear one’ (431), in an attempt to 
persuade Khrysothemis to disobey her mother’s directions to offer libations at Agamemnon’s 
tomb.  This affectionate endearment appears again as she tries to persuade Khrysothemis to 
Elektra’s scheme to murder Klytaimestra and Aigisthos (986) which would benefit (and save) 
them both; being nobly-born, they suffer through their father Agamemnon’s dishonour (987-
989).  Through moderate behaviour Khrysothemis has already saved herself, however; if this 
sensible Atreid daughter throws her lot in with the dangerously unstable Elektra (and with their 
dead father and apparently dead brother), she will doom herself to certain death, because the 
proposed plan will certainly fail (1026). 
 
Elektra views Khrysothemis’ prudent forethought as cowardice (1027), as do some critics, who 
contrast the cowardly sister with the brave, but Khrysothemis is no coward: she stands up to 
her ungrateful sister quite without fear, warning her of the likely punishment for excessive 
mourning (379-384).58  In fact, in Greek terms, Khrysothemis is the ideal wife and daughter-
in-law, possessing a proper woman’s prudent morality as well as highest-status patrilineage.59  
The imprudent Elektra is not interested in saving her own life by behaving sensibly; rather, her 
reply to the impending punishment (387) is to the effect of ‘the sooner, the better’; Elektra’s 
imprisonment awaits only the arrival of Aigisthos, which she welcomes.  Once she surrenders 
to Elektra’s persuasion, Khrysothemis also bravely withholds the queen’s offerings for the tomb 
                                                          
57 On Elektra’s mental pathology, see Chapter 3, p. 232n154.  On her hypocrisy, see Elektra’s statement on her 
sufficient living (354). 
58 On the morally inferior Khrysothemis, see Whitman (1951:156); Kirkwood (1958:137-139); Kitto (1958:10); 
Easterling (1977:124).  On the kindly, sensible and straightforward Khrysothemis as the foil to Elektra’s reckless 
and stubborn foolishness, see Kirkwood (1958:229); Gellie (1972:189); Blundell (1989:161); Lloyd-Jones 
(1994:3-4); Ewans (2000a:41, 2000b:xxix); Wright (2005b:179-180); Roisman (2008:102-103).  See also Plato, 
Meno (71e-73b). 
59 Cf. Conacher (1967:202), who describes the nubile Khrysothemis as all that a young girl should be. 
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(468-471), despite the risk of Klytaimestra’s displeasure.  By the end of the sisters’ second 
conversation, however, there can be no further reconciliation: Khrysothemis refuses to help in 
the killing of her mother and stepfather, and Elektra cannot comprehend her sister’s sensible 
advice (1032, 1039, 1048-1050, 1055-1057).60  In keeping with the EP/narratology view,61 
while Elektra is a fictional character, her apparent inflexibility reflects the typical process of 
‘escalating commitment’ or ‘sunk-costs’ fallacy: having invested years in enraged lamentation, 
she cannot back out of the dangerous corner she now finds herself in.  Once Elektra resolves to 
attempt the assassinations by herself, nothing and nobody can restrain her (1045-1049).  In 
Elektra’s opinion, Khrysothemis’s reticence contributes to Elektra’s dishonour (1035), even 
though Khrysothemis is acting out of care for her foolish sister (1036).  True communication 
between the sisters is impossible because Elektra lacks objective insight into her own 
fanaticism, and into the moral harm of matricide (1038-1049), but Khrysothemis bears Elektra 
no malice, refusing to divulge her sister’s plan to her mother (1033-1034), and thus saving her 
angry sister’s life.  Khrysothemis observes that what Elektra says is ‘doing right’ must result in 
self-harm (1042), but Elektra refuses to acknowledge her advice (1043).  The Greeks aspired to 
harm their enemies, and to help their friends.  Harming oneself would therefore only help one’s 
enemy; Khrysothemis’s attempts to save Elektra from herself are the actions of a friend. 
 
Inconveniently for those who argue that Klytaimestra in this play is evil because she is a bad 
mother, Khrysothemis’ liberty confirms that Klytaimestra and Aigisthos are willing to 
incorporate Agamemnon’s children into present family life: Elektra’s disruptive dissatisfaction 
toward her mother and stepfather is an optional position.62  In the wake of Khrysothemis’s 
refusal to join in with Elektra’s plan to assassinate their mother the chorus observes that the 
young of birds take care to sustain their own parents (1058-1065).  Birds, of course, do not 
behave like this; only some few of the so-called higher mammals – elephants, cetaceans, 
primates etc – provide anything like care for parents, or grandparents.  It is not Khrysothemis’s 
reverence for a parent that is in question, but her choice of which parent, in this case, the mother 
over the father.  The chorus’ observations on the proper respect shown by avian offspring 
toward their begetters (1058-1062) suggests that Sophokles’ play has something to say about 
idealized family relations, but Elektra’s respect for her parents is necessarily divided; the Atreid 
                                                          
60 On sunk-costs, see also Chapter 2, p. 119n120. 
61 On literary realism and cognitive processing of character and plot, see discussion in Introduction, pp. 8-9. 




siblings clearly inherit aspects of their ethos – or phusis, ‘nature’, from both of their parents, 
not just from the father.63 
 
Elektra shares many aspects of her personality with her mother, and the characterization of 
Khrysothemis also suggests that Klytaimestra’s ethos of patience and compassion was 
transmitted to at least one of her children, but Klytaimestra’s capacity to carry out a plan has 
been handed on to another of her children by Agamemnon: Orestes.  Upon arriving at the Atreid 
palace, the Paidagogos advises Orestes that they must not hesitate, but should act at once (21-
22).  Orestes agrees that the time for action has come, and that the proper moment determines 
all action (75-76).  Sophokles’ Orestes may be firm of purpose, but he is just as self-centred as 
Elektra, and is a poor example of a loving brother, revealing his true identity only after long 
delay, and an entirely gratuitous testing of the miserable Elektra’s loyalty (1223).  Elektra, who 
quite fails to recognize this grown man, requires no better fulfilment of her desperate patrilineal 
ambitions than his evidence of identity – his father’s σφραγῖδα ‘seal or signet’ (1223) – and her 
self-surrender to the returned Atreid patriarch is fervent.  All of their pointless exchange 
contributes nothing to the action, but the scene’s palaver does reveal the true natures of the 
matricidal Atreids.  Orestes’ muted responses to her declarations of joy indicate that he has 
himself fully under control (assuming that he feels any happiness in need of suppression); rather 
than being the traditional helpmeet of myth, Elektra now becomes a potential hindrance to 
action. 
 
Having described their mutual relationship as φίλτατον ‘dearest’ (1224, 1233), the rightful head 
of the house Orestes immediately begins to order her about (1236), explaining that he does not 
want anyone inside the house to overhear them (1238); in fact, it was he himself who 
dangerously prolonged their conversation, drawing out her ignorance of his true identity (1205-
1222), and his own utterances have been as long and loud as hers were.  Elektra declares that 
Orestes’ arrival has ‘set her lips free’ (1256), but her previous complaints (along with 
Khrysothemis’ testimony) demonstrate that her lips have already been rather too free; Orestes 
insists that the only way to guard the freedom to speak is by not speaking (1259), but Elektra 
simply cannot keep quiet (1254-1263), and Orestes tries again to calm her excessive joy (1271-
                                                          
63 According to some, Elektra exemplifies (albeit exclusively in respect of her father) the bird who nurtures its 
own parent; see Segal (1966:488); Gellie (1972:121); Harder (1995:26).  Cf. Segal (1966:492), who suggests that 
literary references to birds in ancient Greece are rarely happy allusions.  Segal (1966:499) also observes that 
Elektra is more like her female parent than she can perceive.  On Sophokles’ interest in phusis, see Blundell (1988). 
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1272), and forestall her delaying speeches, but Elektra has so much more to share (1281-1287); 
finally, he commands her to exercise some self-control and curb her superfluous speech, 
because it is endless reiteration of the obvious which thwarts the moment for action (1288-
1300).  Orestes’ request is, of course, completely ignored and, over the course of the next 21 
lines, Elektra joyfully reiterates every obvious thing: Aigisthos is absent; Klytaimestra is in the 
house; and she herself is deliriously happy, but will conceal this joy from her hated mother 
(1301-1321).  The rest is all emotive indulgence, which Orestes has on several occasions 
ordered her to constrain.  All this she concludes with the invitation to Orestes to command her, 
because without him, she had only two choices, to die with honour, or save herself through 
revenge (1319-1321); yet she has upon meeting him ignored all of his commands.  Orestes’ 
brusque response (1322) – unsurprisingly – commands her to keep silent.  At this point things 
are so bad that the Atreid retainer feels obliged to step in.64 
 
The Paidagogos admonishes both children, calling them the greatest of stupid fools, lacking 
inborn sense to save their own lives (1326-1328); his advice is simple (and by now formulaic) 
– delay brings danger, and now is the time for action (1337-1338).  The Paidagogos’ quick 
update on the state of the house within manages to gets matters back on track, but Elektra 
immediately derails the action once again, failing to recognize the very man to whom she 
entrusted the life of her little brother (1344-1352).  Although both Orestes and the Paidagogos 
have ordered Elektra to silence, upon hearing the servant’s story she launches into what might 
be the most absurd speech in extant tragedy (1354-1363).  The Paidagogos’ embarrassed 
response is gives no evidence at all that he is even slightly pleased to be reunited with her (1364-
1371); he curtly informs her that she has said quite enough (1364), then proceeds – once again 
– to recommend immediate action (1369).  Neither of these men have any kind words for 
Elektra: to Orestes she is simply a distracting nuisance, and even the family servant is rude to 
this obstructive daughter of the house.  Orestes, while still incognito, cruelly and quite 
gratuitously remarked upon her ruined body and miserable, unmarried state (1181-1183), 
unkind and unnecessary jibes which cut to the heart of Elektra’s complaint about her life.  Nor 
was there any actual need for Orestes to prolong her distress over the urn (1205-1222).  If he 
had disclosed his true identity much more promptly, the revengers’ plot might have proceeded 
                                                          
64 Cf. Bowman (1997:148), who views the silencing of Elektra as necessary to accomplishing the true telos of the 
vengeance: Aigisthos’ death.  Ewans (2000b:xxxiv) likens the character of the old Paidagogos to contemporary 
political amoralists.  Cf. March (2001:12), who argues that Orestes is the vengeance’s central planner; on Elektra 
as the director and Orestes as instrument of matricide, see Musurillo (1967:108); Sommerstein (2010b:246-247). 
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with her immediate inside assistance.  Elektra’s complaint to the chorus (166-172) about her 
brother’s messages confirms that Orestes had ample time to test her loyalties long before his 
arrival; he chose not to let her know he was coming.65  What he has revealed is his inherited 
Atreid ethos: a pragmatic attitude toward female members of the family as useful tools, rather 
than as philoi deserving of gentle affection. 
 
Klytaimestra’s and Agamemnon’s son possesses many of their least attractive characteristics, 
and some critics view this Orestes as decidedly full of ignoble motives.66  Others agree that 
Sophokles’ tragedy works hard to downplay Orestes’ oracular compulsion to matricide, his 
subsequent madness, and his persecution by the Erinyes.67  Sophokles’ matricidal Orestes is 
also unique in his preferred sequence of revenge killings: in Aiskhylos and Euripides, Aigisthos 
is killed first, making the killing of the mother the narrative climax of the action, but Sophokles’ 
Klytaimestra is killed first, and Aigisthos – the principal antagonist in this Elektra – is still 
living by the close of the play, marched away to be executed off-stage.68  Many critics accept 
the official Atreid line that Aigisthos is a cruel tyrant, but Elektra’s reference (203-206) to the 
unspeakable feast at which her father was killed by two hands – presumably Klytaimestra and 
Aigisthos – also evokes the other unspeakable feast in the family history, a crime committed by 
Agamemnon’s father against the family of Aigisthos.69  According to Elektra, Aigisthos insults 
Atreid honour because he sits on the throne and sleeps with Agamemnon’s wife in 
Agamemnon’s bed (266-274).  There are problems with reflexive critical dislike of an evil 
Aigisthos who deserves his fate, however, not least because the murder of adulterers was just 
and permissible in ancient Athens only when an adulterer was caught in the act, which is not 
the case in this play.  Furthermore, critical dislike of Aigisthos assumes that Klytaimestra’s 
participation in infidelity for reasons of her own is irrelevant; and, more significantly, the focus 
                                                          
65 On Orestes’ prolonged delay in revealing his identity to Elektra, see Gellie (1972:123); Wright (2005b:188-
189).  On the dysfunctional relationship between the indifferent, emotionally cruel Orestes and Elektra, see Wright 
(2005b:186); cf. Burnett (1998:129) and Roisman (2008:109-110), who insist that Orestes demonstrates real 
affection and sympathy for his distressed sister. 
66 For highly negative views of Orestes, see Lesky (1983b:161); Hall (2010:312); Roisman and Luschnig 
(2011:247, 256).  Cf. Roisman (2008:96), who argues that, although he is a deceitful opportunist, Orestes is also 
respectful, commanding, logical, and temperate, and McDonald (2003:57-58), who warns that an ancient audience 
would have approved Orestes’ utilitarian tactics. 
67 Grene (1957:123); Stevens (1978:116); Winnington-Ingram (1980:229). 
68 On Sophokles’ new sequence of the deaths of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos and audience perception of the 
matricide; see Burton (1980:220); Blundell (1989:181); Bowman (1997:143); Konstan (2008:78).  On Aigisthos 
as the principal villain of the play, see Gellie (1972:128). 
69 Ferguson (1972:547); De Wet (1977:26, 31); Burnett (1998:135). 
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on adultery ignores the ways in which Sophokles erases Iphigeneia’s sacrifice as cause of 
Klytaimestra’s mariticide.  Critical focus on this play’s unusually powerful Aigisthos – in 
contrast to Aiskhylos’ cowardly lion, and Euripides’ pious host – also fails to explain the 
excessive violence of the children’s murder of their mother Klytaimestra, while the still-living 
Aigisthos exits intact at the play’s close.70 
 
The inevitably immoral behaviour of the Atreid matricides is something this Elektra cannot 
exonerate, however, despite the conspicuous omission of Orestes’ madness as a consequence 
of mother-murder, and some critics also conclude that the vengeful Elektra bears at least equal 
moral responsibility for Klytaimestra’s killing.71  In Sophokles’ retelling the queen’s 
impassioned appeal to pity is answered only by brutal taunts from the chorus and Elektra, and 
Elektra urges her brother to strike her mother twice as hard (1410-1415).72  When Elektra prays 
that the gods will punish the treacherous hands who dealt death (205-212), she refers to 
Klytaimestra and Aigisthos, but – as the audience familiar with earlier Oresteia works is aware 
– it is the treacherous hands of her matricidal brother which will attract punishing deities.  This 
scion of the self-destroying Tantalid oikos cannot see that murdering her own mother will invite 
further suffering into the family, but instead insists that to leave her father’s murder unavenged 
would signify ‘the end of piety among mortals’ (245-250).  Elektra persistently complains that 
Agamemnon was murdered dishonourably and immorally through trickery (122-127, 193-200), 
yet Orestes freely accepts Apollo’s directive that Orestes must accomplish a righteous revenge 
through cunning and alone (although the Paidagogos, Pylades, and Elektra are all essential 
accomplices) (32-37).  Aigisthos’ last speeches (1493-1494, 1497-1498) – words which Elektra 
warned he must not be allowed to utter (1493-1494) – remind the audience that his execution 
will take place dishonourably in darkness, and Orestes’ reply does not contest this accusation 
(1495-1496).  The children’s protestations about upholding Atreid honour cannot be accepted 
at face-value, and there are other, more likely (although less noble) motivations behind their 
actions. 
                                                          
70 Although Aigisthos’ hand slew Agamemnon, Klytaimestra was the target of greater hatred because, as a wife 
with access to his person, she enabled an enemy to assassinate her husband; her unconcealed sexual infidelity 
(from Elektra, at least) increases her children’s hatred of her.  Sommerstein (2010b:239-240) points out that 
Orestes’ secret messages to his sister appear to focus the revenge upon Klytaimestra alone. 
71 Whitman (1951:168); Kirkwood (1958:35); Gellie (1972:127); De Wet (1977:35); Kitzinger (1991:326). 
72 Klytaimestra’s first horrified cry reveals that her honoured guests have betrayed the hospitality of her house (S. 
El. 1404-1405).  She immediately calls for the protection of Aigisthos (1409), whereas the queen in Aiskhylos’ 




Some insist that Sophokles approves the matricides’ revenge, but this play offers no reassurance 
that the matricide is morally righteous.73  The ambiguity of the oracle’s advice is demonstrated 
in the anxious exchange between the siblings after the murder of their mother – they worry that 
things are only well if Apollo has prophesied well (1424-1425), which suggests that Apollo has 
the capacity to prophesy badly.74  Klytaimestra and Aigisthos are the enemies in this narrative, 
and Sophokles and Aiskhylos both appear to be enthusiastic militarists who supported the 
killing of political enemies; according to the Atreid children, their personal enemies are also 
usurpers and political tyrants to boot.  There is therefore no moral ambiguity in Orestes’ and 
Elektra’s bloody assassination of their father’s killers: it is only the blood-relationship between 
the children and their slain mother which complicates the otherwise righteous vengeance: this 
is why Klytaimestra’s death is less focal than the play’s culminating indictment of Aigisthos.75  
Still, some suggest that Sophokles ignores the problem of matricide in order to draw attention 
to issues of speech, action, truth, and lies;76 others conclude that the message of this play is that 
bloody restoration of rulership is inherently polluting of those who enact it.77 
 
Vengeance in Sophokles’ Elektra is clearly of considerable thematic importance, but the Atreid 
siblings’ very pragmatic approach to family wealth and power is surprisingly under-discussed, 
and some struggle with the undeniable prominence of the Atreid children’s financial motivation 
to matricide, perhaps viewing it as ignoble.78  Elektra’s motivations are just as materialistic as 
her brother’s; in fact, there are many more references within the play to material inheritance 
                                                          
73 Musurillo (1967:104); Sale (1973:1-2); Winnington-Ingram (1983c:216); Blundell (1989:150).  Cf. Burnett 
(1998:138), who contends that the success of Elektra’s and Orestes’ plot for revenge confounds critics who want 
to believe that the aim of tragedy is to condemn violence.  The matricide is accomplished with little fuss in 
Sophokles’ play, and with few qualms.  For explanations of this, see Gellie (1972:127); Burnett (1998:140). 
74 This supports a view of this play as preceding Euripides’ Elektra, in which the Disokuri observe that Apollo did 
indeed prophesy badly. 
75 In Lesky’s (1983b:167) opinion, critics ignore the moral problem of matricide in favour of focus upon the 
suffering of a great soul.  Cf. Goldhill (1992:94), who concludes that the play addresses Elektra’s madness, not 
moral justice.  See also Roisman (2008:106) and Hall (2010:313), who argue that the play does not condemn the 
matricide per se, but simply raises questions about the children’s role in it.  In Burton’s (1980:224) opinion, just 
vengeance is the dramatic plot’s moral focus.  Cf. Kirkwood (1958:34), who argues that vengeance is not the 
central theme in Sophokles’ Elektra as it is in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia. 
76 Ferguson (1972:536); Kitzinger (1991:299). 
77 Segal (1966:523-524); Ewans (2000b:xx). 
78 On the pragmatic materialism of Orestes (and Elektra), see Bowra (1944:247); Lucas (1951:8); Segal 
(1966:513); De Wet (1977:28-29); Sorum (1982:210); Burnett (1998:139n62).  On the Greek respect for the 
acquisition of material goods, see Perikles’ Funeral Oration (Thouk. 2.35-46).  See also Xenophon’s description 
of the proper wife’s important function: to guard the household’s material goods (Oik. 7.25). 
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than to the children’s inherited ethos, and everybody in the play is manifestly concerned with 
who will secure control over the enormous family fortune.79  Just as Orestes wants to regain his 
material inheritance (resources), Elektra wants to win a high-value mate (i.e., with resources), 
points which are overlooked, despite their textual prominence, and probably also their 
pertinence in the minds of the original Greek audience.  For example, even Klytaimestra’s 
prayer to Apollo makes enjoyment of that Mycenaean wealth a key element in her hopes for 
freedom from troubles (648-654).  Orestes’ first speech implores the gods to let him regain 
control of his riches (72), the same great gold of Mycenae that the Paidagogos gloried over in 
the first few lines of the play (9).  Orestes also resents the misappropriation of his wealth by 
father’s cousin Aigisthos (1289-1291).  Elektra expects to goad Khrysothemis into action with 
the fact that they are both dispossessed of the wealth which should be theirs (959-960); her 
attempt to persuade Khrysothemis to her cause (448-458) naturally assumes that the long-dead 
Agamemnon will want to assist them in order to ensure his status in Hades through future rich 
offerings for himself from his living descendants.  Status is also undoubtedly a paramount 
motivation for Elektra, and her antipathy for the woman who has cast her aside and jeopardized 
her social standing is central to the play; Agamemnon’s children cannot benefit after his death 
from his status because his social reputation has been undermined through being killed by a 
mere woman.  Furthermore, some conclude that Elektra’s hatred of her mother is also rooted in 
Klytaimestra’s personal failures in motherhood and marriage, but Klytaimestra in this play is 
presently a good wife to Aigisthos and mother of their offspring – within her new family.80  
Reference to the children produced by Klytaimestra and Aigisthos – rivals for the household 
resources – casts new light on Elektra’s urgent desire to be married (with the inevitable transfer 
of family wealth).  Sophokles’ attribution of existing children to the union of Klytaimestra and 
Aigisthos opens the possibility of future conflict and bloodshed; some suggest that lost tragedies 
– Erigone, for example – may address the vengeance of the children of Aigisthos and 
Klytaimestra against Agamemnon’s offspring.81 
 
The possession of wealth and status is a mixed blessing, however.  The aristocratic house 
requires intense effort to maintain position and reputation, and the proper duty of the aristocratic 
                                                          
79 On Elektra’s desire to regain family wealth and attain fame, rather than any pursuit of justice, according to some; 
see Jones (1962:148-149); Blundell (1989:156); Rabinowitz (2000:128-129). 
80 Segal (1981:261).  On Klytaimestra’s authentic maternal feeling; see Norwood (1948:144); Kirkwood 
(1958:93); Woolf (1966:123); Lesky (1983b:163); Kells (1973:7); Segal (1981:260); Budelmann (2000:66, 71). 
81 Hall (1994:xxiii; 2010:312-313); Sommerstein (2010b:249). 
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child is to uphold the honour of the oikos, and increase its kleos.  As the Paidagogos observes, 
Orestes’ patrimony is one equally prosperous in gold and disasters (11-14), and Orestes has 
been reared from childhood to the single purpose of eliminating his mother and her lover and 
restoring his house.  The chorus’ commentary on nurture, family, and social status also observes 
that those who are nobly born are compelled to seek out more glory, even if this means a life of 
misery (1082-1089).  Elektra’s attempt to persuade Khrysothemis to join her little conspiracy 
(968-985) depends heavily on the desirability of undying kleos, ‘fame’, which will accrue to 
them if they succeed, winning them both suitable marriages (971), along with honour at feasts, 
and social recognition by other courageous citizens.  While kleos is often translated as ‘fame’, 
it also involves an evaluative element of reputation, and respect; aristocratic power is secured 
through public perceptions that the family is willing and able to enforce respect for their 
privileged position, and when position is lost – as Elektra’s sad fate demonstrates – a family’s 
wealth and power must be reinstated (1090-1092).  The Atreid heirs must demonstrate that they 
have the will to avenge their father’s honour and win back the right to rule.82  In fact, Orestes’ 
and Elektra’s campaign to regain their patrimony is entirely right and proper, as the absence of 
the Furies at the ending of Sophokles’ Elektra suggests; the failure of Klytaimestra’s avenging 
hounds to appear further implies that the children’s vengeance is also righteous in the context 
of adultery.83 
 
Although Klytaimestra lives in the palace with Aigisthos for ten years after the death of 
Agamemnon, no Erinys has ever attempted to bring Klytaimestra to account for either her 
murder of Agamemnon (275-276), or for her sexual relationship with her husband’s cousin and 
usurper.  Klytaimestra believes that the gods have saved her (280-281), because she is buying 
them off every month with sacrificial offerings but perhaps the Furies simply have no legitimate 
reason to persecute her.84  The Erinyes’ traditional, sacred duty is the pursuit of kin-killers, but 
Klytaimestra has killed no kin, only an unrelated individual who had murdered his (and her) 
own blood-kin.  Yet Elektra insists that the gods must be on her side: calling upon the gods of 
                                                          
82 On the need for high-status ruling families to demonstrate their willingness to avenge insults and so retain their 
reputation for effectiveness, see Chapter 1, pp. 18-19; 35n134; 70n360. 
83 Critics disagree on why Sophokles omits the Furies from his version of the story; see Kirkwood (1958:66); Jones 
(1962:149); Bowman (1997:147); Wright (2005b:173); Sewell-Rutter (2007:103, 133-134).  Some suggest that 
Elektra is the designated Fury in this play, as Klytaimestra was in the Agamemnon; see Bowra (1944:259); 
Winnington-Ingram (1980:233); Rosslyn (2000:36); Storey and Allan (2005:122).  Cf. Klytaimestra’s alarming 
description of Elektra as drinking her life-blood (784-786). 
84 In all probability, the ancient Greeks might also have agreed that gods – who often took sides – were backing 
the queen and her lover. 
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the underworld – Hades, Persephone, and Hermes – she ascribes to the Erinyes the duty of 
punishing those who commit secret adultery (110-114); she calls upon them to avenge the 
murder of her father, because this murder was ἀδίκως ‘unlawfully’ committed as part of the 
adultery (115-116).  Elektra cannot invoke the Erinyes in their traditional role as avengers of 
blood-murder because the only traditionally polluting murder among the Pelopids in this 
generation was of Iphigeneia, by the very man she now wishes to avenge.85  If the traditional 
Erinyes will not pursue Klytaimestra for husband-murder, then let there be a new sort of Fury, 
to avenge disrespect for the laws of marriage; the Atreid-loving chorus agrees that the Furies 
will come to avenge a ‘polluted’ bed (489-494).  The choral ode to nurturance and family 
suggests that Elektra as a loyal daughter has the right (and perhaps obligation) to enlist the help 
of the ‘twin Erinyes’ to avenge the adulterous-murder (1078-1081); the identity of this pair is 
later confirmed in the chorus’s description of Orestes and Pylades as κύνες ‘hounds’, entering 
into the fabulously wealthy paternal oikos to prepare the slaughter of Klytaimestra (1388-1393).  
Agamemnon’s son and Agamemnon’s nephew are both prepared to uphold the honour of their 
house, and restore the family’s fortunes, but references to their shared ancestor Pelops and the 
curse upon the rich patrilineal house throughout the play are never coincidental, and evoke 
specific associations and meanings at strategic moments in the narrative. 
 
The house’s forefathers – Tantalos, Pelops, and Atreus – all betray those who trusted in them, 
and patrilineal descendants Agamemnon and Orestes also deceive and exploit the trust of philoi 
in order to commit kin-murder.86  As soon as Klytaimestra appears in Elektra, she refers to the 
latest Pelopid crime: Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigeneia; the chorus’s preceding allusion to 
Pelops’ dire influence upon the land, through Myrtilos’ curse upon him and the house (502-
515) shows that Agamemnon is also a criminal with the same family ethos.87  The Paidagogos’ 
opening reference to the magnificent gold of Mycenae is followed in the next breath with his 
observation that the house of Pelops – which owns that gold – is πολύφθορόν ‘rife with ruin’ 
(8-10).  According to the mythic corpus, Pelops had at least twelve legitimate sons, but his son 
                                                          
85 The only murder in this generation if one excludes Agamemnon’s murder of his patrilineal cousin Tantalos, who 
was Klytaimestra’s first husband. 
86 For the many inter-generational crimes of the House of Tantalos, see accounts in Chapter 2, pp. 96-97; 120n125; 
Chapter 3, pp. 214-215; 254n213, and the Conclusion, pp. 296-297. 
87 The play’s reference to Μυρτίλος ἐκοιμάθη (S. El. 509) is generally translated as ‘Myrtilos fallen into sleep’, 
but this fails to acknowledge the passive ἐκοιμάθη, the 3rd sg. aor. ind. pass. of κοιμάω, ‘lull, put to sleep’; Myrtilos 
did not ‘fall’, but was pushed (by Pelops) into ‘sleep’ in the deeps of the sea.  According to Burton (1980:201n22), 
Sophokles’ lost Oinamaos and Euripides’ extant Orestes both attribute the family’s woes to Pelops’ charioteering. 
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Atreus manages only two, Agamemnon only one, and Menelaos no legitimate sons at all (only 
two bastards, by slaves): the house becomes apais ‘childless’ with every successive 
generation.88  The preservation of the family in the oikos – exemplified here by Orestes – was 
an overwhelming Greek cultural imperative; the threatened destruction of the oikos is one of 
the chief themes in tragedy, and Sophokles’ Elektra no less so.89  Orestes is well aware of the 
consequences of the ancestral curse, but still begs the gods’ assistance in regaining control of 
that house, along with all its riches (67-72).90  Chronic family breakdown in this family, it 
seems, is a small price to pay for ongoing wealth and power.  Orestes may say that he comes to 
as a just cleanser to the house (69-70), but his act of matricide exacerbates family breakdown.  
Aigisthos – just as much a beneficiary of the double-edged inheritance of Pelops’ phusis as 
Orestes himself is – enquires whether his execution should take place within a house already 
greatly burdened by the sorrows of the Pelopids (1497-1498), and Orestes can offer no 
justification to this pointed question, beyond that it will at least witness Aigisthos’ woe (1499). 
 
The family woes will not end with Aigisthos’ death, however: Orestes’ troubles are only going 
to get worse.  Orestes’ observation as Aigisthos is led away is thus doubly ironic: he declares 
that ‘bitter death’ is the only fitting punishment for those acting ‘outside of the law’, and the 
best deterrent for further crime (1506-1507).  But – according to this play – the only law that 
Aigisthos has broken is that of the so-called sanctity of marriage; his murder of Agamemnon – 
the son of his father’s enemy – is completely legitimate under Greeks revenge-conventions, and 
his recovery of the throne his father once claimed is an essential element of his vengeance.  The 
chorus’ joyful closing refrain – ‘O Seed of Atreus, after many sufferings, through freedom you 
have now come to your uttermost end!’ (1508-1510) – is therefore utterly misplaced.  Orestes 
is not free; he will pay a bitter price for his crime of matricide and the sufferings afflicting the 
house will continue.  The uttermost end of his act is yet to come: he will be pursued by the 
Furies, because, as the audience was well aware, these deities exist to avenge blood-murder, 
and not – as some in the play insist – adultery.  Pelopid Orestes is willing to take the family 
curse along with the family power and gold, and so things will inevitably end badly for him; 
nothing turns out well for Elektra either: the Elektra ends as it begins, with Elektra alone, 
                                                          
88 On the utterly dysfunctional and monstrous Pelopid lineage, see Wright (2005b:178, 193-194). 
89 Segal (1981:256) observes that almost all the play’s odes address the destruction of an oikos.  In Patterson’s 
(2012:387) opinion, this play charts the destruction of both households and marriages. 
90 The play opens and closes with references to the house of Pelops (the father of Atreus), specifically to its wealth, 
and its curse; see Segal (1966:528-529). 
216 
 
outside the paternal oikos.  According to the chorus, Orestes is the last of the Pelopid house 
(765).  Yet the chorus also declares that Elektra shares her ancestry with sisters Khrysothemis 
and Iphianassa (154-163): only when it seems that her brother – the last real Pelopid – is no 
longer alive (and only then) Elektra herself – a woman – shoulders the inherited obligation to 
seek vengeance (951-957).91 
 
Sophokles’ Elektra is concerned with the dreadful threat to proper, patrilineal transmission of 
an oikos’ wealth and influence from those who εὐνὰς ὑποκλεπτομένους,/ ἔλθετ᾽, ‘secretly seize 
the beds’, that is, engage in secret adultery (114-115).  The chorus urge courage and patience 
(173-179), but Elektra’s youthful blossom is long withered, and she still has no husband or 
children (185-188); according to the chorus (764-765), ignoring the existence of the full-blood 
Atreids Elektra and Khrysothemis (and perhaps also Iphianassa), the patriline will die out with 
the apparent death of Orestes.  Khrysothemis is aware of her obligation to protect the 
patrilineage, urging Elektra to exercise self-control and to cease her inflammatory outbursts, 
lest they perish completely, and the family line be lost (1009-1011), which certainly implies 
that women can somehow transmit the patrilineage.  Both sisters appear to think that daughters 
do possess the power to transmit something important (1009-1011).  Neither sister is married; 
one of Elektra’s principal complaints is that she is being prevented from producing an Atreid 
child because Aigisthos will not permit any potential avenger to be conceived (958-966).  
Elektra claims that Khrysothemis also laments her increasing age, lack of marriage and 
children, and the alienation of family wealth (959-966), but we never actually witness 
Khrysothemis complaining or even expressing the same regret that Elektra does about these 
things.  The potential reproductive contribution of their sister Iphianassa – briefly mentioned 
by the chorus (158) – does not appear to count for much.  News of Orestes’ death is a terrible 
blow for the epikleros Elektra, a woman with her most fertile years behind her, and one who is 
already in crisis about the breakdown of the family patriline; in the absence of the male heir, 
she must now take full responsibility for preserving the Pelopid seed.  Elektra is desperate to 
be the philos of the noble Agamemnon, and eager to exterminate her ekthros Klytaimestra; her 
unreasonably excessive hatred for her mother is the natural obverse of excessive or over-
functioning devotion to her irrationally idealized father.  The greatest moral problem raised by 
                                                          
91 On the transmission of the duty to vengeance to the deceased Orestes’ sisters, see De Wet (1977:28-29). 
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the play is the devastation of endless blood-letting within the family; when one’s philos 
becomes one’s hated ekthros, an oikos becomes its own worst enemy.92 
 
This study of Sophokles’ Elektra has illustrated – through the examples outlined above – the 
incompatibility between women’s roles as wives within an androcentric culture and women’s 
desire to raise children to maturity: Klytaimestra does not desire, despite considerable 
provocation, to kill those of her philoi who are also ekthroi – Orestes and Elektra – but in real-
life family reconstructions, it is not uncommon for women to support a new husband (and her 
offspring with him) over the demands and expectations of previous children; infanticide or 
filicide through neglect in these circumstances – even by biological mothers – is not unknown.93  
In patriarchal ancient Greece married, dependent women were required to transfer their loyalty 
from natal family to the oikos of current husband, even as they were presumed to retain 
dangerous allegiances to natal family.  Given the ancient mortality rates for husbands and wives 
through warfare and childbirth respectively, conflicts of loyalty in remarriage must have been 
an everyday matter in Athens; fearful anticipation of potentially unfavourable outcomes for 
husbands could account for the ambivalence – if not outright misogyny – toward married 
women – and mothers – found in ancient literature.  Elektra may be the daughter fathers hope 
for – a woman who rejects matrilineal affiliation in favour of patrilineal loyalties – but she is 
also a woman no man would seek out as wife, or as mother of his own patrilineal heirs, because 
of her extreme allegiance for her own father.  Turning from Sophokles, we next explore how 
the character and life-history of Klytaimestra – a woman who chose daughter over husband – 
is plotted out in Euripides’ Atreid tragedies, a plotting informed by gender conflict based in 
differences in reproductive biology. 
 
Euripides: Elektra, Iphigeneia among the Taurians, Orestes, and Iphigeneia at Aulis 
 
While Aiskhylos and Sophokles express an empathy for the plight of Orestes and his filial 
obligations, Euripides seems more interested in how the women in the Atreid oikos survive and 
                                                          
92 On the treatment in Sophokles’ Elektra of family members, philoi, as ekthroi, ‘enemies’, see Blundell 
(1989:149); Ewans (2000a).  On the relationship between family disasters and ancestral crimes in Sophokles’ 
Elektra, see Segal (1966:528-529).  On Pelops as the original source of the tendency to family conflict between 
philoi, see Jones (1962:142); Burton (1980:201).  Cf. Rutherford (2012:233), who argues that the play ignores 
questions about the inherited curse of Pelops and family disasters. 
93 See discussion of selective maternal disinvestment in Chapter 1, pp. 46; 46n206; 46n208; 55-57; 55n268; 
55n271; 55n272; 78. 
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adapt to the social dynamics of an unashamedly androcentric society.  His plays also respond 
strongly to previous dramatizations of Klytaimestra’s life-experiences, parodying Aiskhylos’ 
and Sophokles’ avenging brother, sister, and patrilineal cousin.94  Across the plays discussed 
here – Elektra, Iphigeneia among the Taurians, Orestes, and Iphigeneia at Aulis, along with 
some material from Troades, Helen and Andromakhe – we also see how the women of the 
family show us the many faces of Klytaimestra: Elektra her unforgiving, blood-thirsty daughter, 
and her daughter Iphigeneia the blood-sacrifice who forgives father and mother both; Helen the 
loving sister, and her daughter, Hermione, Klytaimestra’s niece and foster-daughter (and her 
cousin Orestes’ only hope of marriage); and her unrelated reproductive rival Kassandra, who 
leaves Troy with the express intention of destroying both Agamemnon and his wife.  Aiskhylos 
showed the sacrifice of Iphigeneia through the account of elderly men who had never even been 
to Aulis, but Euripides shows us first-hand the collision between Agamemnon desperate for the 
war to proceed at any cost, and Klytaimestra desperate to save her child, along with the 
consequences of her failure to do so.  The original audience knew (from tragedies we no longer 
possess) that the Atreid oikos continues in discord long after Orestes returns home to rule.95 
 
Unlike Sophokles and Aiskhylos, Euripides is not renowned for military engagement or 
accomplishment; he is also remarkable in his comparative lack of success in competition.96  
While some scholars acclaim him as a posthumous genius, others contend that Euripides’ 
frequent failure to win in competition is due to the undignified, political content of his plays.97  
Yet since these plays are much more popular in the modern world than those of Aiskhylos and 
                                                          
94 Modern critics disagree about the exact dating of many of Euripides’ plays; with one important 
exception (Elektra), the chronological scheme of Storey and Allan (2005:135-136) on the extant works 
will be followed in this thesis: Alkestis [438]; Medeia [431]; Herakleidai [430]; Hippolytos [428]; 
Andromakhe [427-425]; Hekabe [425]; Hiketides [423-420]; Elektra [in their scheme, 420/419]; 
Herakles [416]; Troades [415]; Iphigeneia en Taurois [414]; Helen [412]; Ion [412-410]; Phoinissai 
[409]; Orestes [408]; Bakchai [407]; Iphigeneia en Aulidi [407]; and Kyklops [unknown].  The nine 
italic dates, in Storey and Allan’s (2005:134) view, are strongly backed by good evidence.  On Euripides’ 
Elektra as produced around a decade later, see discussion above, Chapter 3, p. 188; 188n2; 188n3; 188n4.  On 
Euripides’ relatively prodigious creative output, see Webster (1967:12).  His last great victory – a first 
prize for Iphigeneia at Aulis – came after his death in 405. 
95 In Garner’s (1990:165) view, Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon is the primary source for Euripides’ Troades, Helen, 
Iphigeneia among the Taurians, and Iphigeneia at Aulis, which all illustrate the unfolding of the Atreid curse. 
96 On Euripides’ relative lack of tragic success, see Stevens (1956:91-94); Collard (1981:1); Gregory (1991:188); 
Rehm (1992:24); Kovacs (1994:14-16); Rutherford (1996:xviii); Doherty (2001:37); Mastronarde (2002:5); 
Sommerstein (2002:49); Storey and Allan (2005:132). 
97 Michelini (1987:70); Hall (1997a:xv-xvi).  On the best of Euripidean plays – admired in ancient times, but now 
lost – see Collard et al (1995:5); Storey and Allan (2005:132). 
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Sophokles, it is the apparent inability of his contemporaries to value his drama which invites 
explanation.98  In fact, Euripides’ drama was enormously popular with ancient audiences, as 
well as scholars, but most often in the fourth century after his death (and after the Athenian 
empire had lost its drive and dominance); Aristotle (Poet. 1453a29-30) describes Euripides as 
τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν, ‘definitely the most tragic of the poets’.99  Some suggest that the 
distinctive emotionality and uncertainty in Euripides’ work may account for the survival of his 
dramas through two thousand and more years.100  The one consistent theme in his work is the 
centrality of eris, ‘strife, quarrel, contention’, especially eris among the Atreids.101 
 
Critics admire the distinctively innovative and inventive stylistic quality of Euripidean drama, 
and agree that he excels at the depiction of complex psychology in individuals afflicted by 
unforeseen catastrophe, including betrayal by philoi.102  He seems interested in the failure of 
characters’ communications, with others and with themselves, and in delineating secondary 
character, beyond the play’s primary conflict.103  Some critics argue that his drama leans more 
heavily on realistic character than on plot, and some insist that his presentation of female 
character is especially realistic; others maintain that Euripides’ characters serve to illuminate 
human nature in general.104  Euripides’ sympathetic depiction of women’s psychology – and 
                                                          
98 On the reception of Euripides’ tragedy in the ancient world, see Ferguson (1972:237); Knox (1985:5); Collard 
and Cropp (2008a:xi-xiv).  According to Kovacs (1994:16), there is no Athenian testimony for a view of the poet 
as a social critic.  On Euripides’ unparalleled popularity in the late twentieth-century, see Storey and Allan 
(2005:136); Sommerstein (2002:4), while Mastronarde (2002:6) comments on the universal appeal of Euripides’ 
dramas. 
99 On Aristotle’s especial approval of Euripides, see Kovacs (1994:34); Gregory (2005:254).  On Euripides as the 
most popular ancient poet – after Homer – see Collard (1981:1); Hall (1997a:x); Mastronarde (2010:6). 
100 On the survival and appeal of Euripides’ plays, see Lesky (1983b:202); Knox (1985:5); Michelini (1987:120); 
Kovacs (1994:13, 37); Rutherford (1996:xix); Sommerstein (2002:49); Zeitlin (2008:331).  On the remarkable 
intertextuality within Euripides’ work, see Webster (1967:278); Dover (1980:53); Vellacott (1984b:vii); Sharrock 
and Ash (2002:69); Wright (2010:65). 
101 For discussion, see Ferguson (1972:244) Wilson (1979:7); Lesky (1983b:202, 299). 
102 On Euripides’ innovation and creative excellence in dramatic style, see Lattimore (1953:3); Bowra (1966:148); 
Conacher (1967:3); Ferguson (1972:240-242); Adrados (1975:193); Eisner (1979:156); Walton (1980:210); 
Collard (1981:1); De Romilly (1985:84); Michelini (1987:74, 87, 122); Blondell et al (1999a:73); Sharrock and 
Ash (2002:69); Sommerstein (2002:49, 55, 58); Storey and Allan (2005:131, 151). 
103 Mastronarde (2010:245).  On Euripides’ gift for character psychology, see, Bowra (1967:50); Walton 
(1980:26); De Romilly (1985:79); McDonald (2003:96); and on his especial skill in his depiction of 
psychologically realistic humans and their suffering; see Greenwood (1953:19, 7); Lattimore (1955:vi); Bowra 
(1966:158); Bowra (1967:55); Conacher (1967:5, 14, 341); Webster (1967:13, 280); Ferguson (1972:239); Lesky 
(1983b:400); Hall (1997a:xvii).  On Euripides’ innovative approach to both noble and socially marginal characters, 
see Webster (1967:287); Walton (1980:29); Michelini (1987:63, 127); March (1990:38); Sommerstein (2002:56); 
Gregory (2005:261-262). 
104 Trypanis (1981:166); Gregory (2005:261).  On Euripides’ fascination with the extreme passion of women’s 
psychology, see Trypanis (1981:165-166); Stanford (1983:38); Michelini (1987:113); McClure (1995:58).  On the 
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men’s misogyny – certainly appears to focus on gender conflict from the female point of view; 
his drama often addresses separation and reunion between women and their offspring, or with 
the problem for women of a husband’s self-centred or extramarital reproductive behaviour.105  
Euripides was also perhaps uniquely interested in how female φιλότεκνος (philoteknos) 
‘fondness of children’ could be undermined or corrupted.106  Scholars have viewed Euripidean 
tragedy as a window into Euripides’ pro- or proto-feminist orientation.107  Others dispute the 
view that his plays are feminist tracts, or even very interested in female psychology.108  
Euripides may or not be a feminist sympathizer, but he correctly identifies the conflict between 
males and females as rooted in mutually exclusive reproductive strategy. 
 
Euripides’ male characters are equally realistic, but also starkly villainous.109  His especially 
unlikable Atreids – the expedient Agamemnon, the unheroic Orestes, and even the capricious 
Menelaos – serve to support a view of Euripides as sympathetic toward women’s social 
plight.110  According to some, Euripides’ negative depiction of the Atreid males as unheroic 
                                                          
centrality of female characters and choruses in Euripides’ plays, see Ferguson (1972:244-245); Segal (1993:230); 
McClure (1995:40); Sommerstein (2002:57); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003:280); Rutherford (2012:401). 
105 On Euripides’ particular interest in females’ negative experience of gender-conflict, see Bowra (1967:51); 
Vellacott (1975:126); Scafuro (1990:127); Segal (1993:73); Blondell et al (1999a:80-81); Sommerstein (2002:57); 
Cropp (2005:283, 285).  In Vellacott’s (1975:82) opinion, Euripides could see only too well that as long as there 
would be two sexes, there would be unresolvable tensions between them; this view suggests that the natural, 
evolved antagonism in two-sexed species was apparent to the ancient dramatist.  On problems of marriage in 
Euripides’ works, see Blaiklock (1952:1-2); Lesky (1983b:208); Vellacott (1984b:158-159).  On marriage and 
concubinage in ancient Athens and in tragedy, see Sealey (1984); Michelini (1987:80); Seaford (1990:169); Segal 
(1994).  On male behaviour as chief disrupter of women’s philoteknos in Euripidean tragedy, reflecting the 
historical reality of men’s inhumanity to women, see Vellacott (1975:95-96). 
106 In Zeitlin’s (2005:219; 2008:319, 329-330; 2008:323) view, Euripides was particularly concerned with child-
birth, infancy and the early nurture of children, but also the destruction of mother-child bonds.  See also Ferguson 
(1972:239-240); Vellacott (1975:130); Lesky (1983b:329); Seaford (1990:169).  The love of children is not only 
a female trait in Euripides, however: in Herakles (633-636), πᾶν δὲ φιλότεκνον γένος, ‘the whole human race is 
child-loving’. 
107 Vellacott (1975:17-18) concludes that the world in Euripidean tragedy is completely controlled by men, and 
Euripides’ life-goal was to prove the guilt of such men, Zeitlin (2005:200) that Euripides’ Elektra, Orestes, and 
the Iphigeneia in Tauris are all responses to the suppression of maternal right in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia. 
108 Webster (1967:13); Blondell et al (1999a:82). 
109 On the realism of Euripides’ male characters, see Blaiklock (1952:xv); McClure (1995:57).  Cf. Zelenak 
(1998:109), who argues that Euripidean males are usually pathological, debased, and dehumanized.  On the 
character contrast between Euripides’ males and females, see Rosslyn (2000:65); McDonald (2003:97). 
110 On Euripides’ negative depictions of Agamemnon, see Blaiklock (1952:172); Vellacott (1984b:16); McDonald 
(2003:35); Carson (2009:93).  On Euripides’ unpleasant Menelaos, see Blaiklock (1972:75); Mastronarde 
(2010:302).  On Euripides’ unlikable Orestes across a number of plays, see Blaiklock (1952:165); Storey and Allan 
(2005:142); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:110). 
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derives from contemporary social distaste for the war-makers in Athens.111  Some conclude that 
Euripides’ typically repellent male protagonists are evidence of the playwright’s opposition to 
gendered inequity, others that the misogynistic speeches of his male characters are Euripides’ 
ironic comment on contemporary male attitudes.112  Whatever his personal beliefs were, his 
characterizations certainly evidence real-world male reproductive preoccupations: many of the 
misogynistic declarations uttered by men in Euripidean tragedy concern male desire to control 
reproduction, to counter troublesome female philoteknos, or to eliminate women from the 
reproductive process altogether, most famously Hippolytos’ tirade (Hipp. 616-668).113  Still 
others argue that Euripides’ (so-called) ‘transgressive’ female characters illustrate the poet’s 
disapproval of many Athenian conventions, including inherited aristocratic power, social 
inequity, religious institutions, and militarism.114 
 
Euripides’ view of the wider universe has been seen as simply one of bleak, arbitrary, and 
inescapable suffering.115  There seems to be no divine justice in this universe, because the gods 
themselves create human suffering, and the only cure for suffering is the philia between family 
and friends.116  Within this universe, Euripides’ tragic gods embody the most unattractive 
aspects of typical human social behaviour: status-seeking, jealousy, and self-interest.117  
Unsurprisingly, women in Euripidean tragedy never succeed in overthrowing male hegemony, 
and even Euripides’ sympathetic Klytaimestra in IA is still destined to fall to her own son’s 
                                                          
111 For discussion of the influence of militarism and imperial expansionism on and in Euripidean tragedy, see Kitto 
(1968:367); Michelini (1987:63); Crane (1990:437); Gregory (1991:10, 187); Hall (1997a:xii); Davidson (1999-
2000:117); Sommerstein (2002:59); McLeish (2003:106); Carson (2006:8). 
112 On the so-called ‘misogyny’ of Euripides, see Lattimore (1955:vi); Elliot (1969:121); March (1990:33, 63). 
113 The Hippolytos (616-677) speech has earned a critical reputation as the most definitively misogynistic; 
Hippolytos’ speech revisits Hesiod’s picture of female indolence and consumption of men’s wealth (Hipp. 625-
626; 634-345); see Rogers (1966:33); Michelini (1987:294); Kovacs (1995:118-119); Mills (2002:69).  See also 
Polymestor’s anti-female speech in Euripides’ Hekabe (1178-1183), and the generally misogynistic tone of his 
Andromakhe.  Cf. also Euripides’ fragmentary Melanippe (Wise Melanippe or Captive Melanippe) (fr. 497) 
Collard et al (1995:261): the speaker insists that failing to do away with bad women only encourages them.  
Euripides’ Andromakhe has many statements highlighting the failings of women, but these are most often uttered 
by women themselves (And. 83-85, 91-95, 181-182, 269-273, 352-354, 930-938, 943-956), confirming the 
intrasexually competitive evolutionary strategy in women of derogation. 
114 See Gregory (1991:187; 2002:149-150), for example. 
115 Webster (1967:289); Vickers (1973:79); Sommerstein (2002:58-59). 
116 On suffering in Euripides’ plays, see Conacher (1967:4-5, 12); Vickers (1973:18-19); Collard (1981:5); Segal 
(1983:245-6); Rutherford (1996:xxi); Blondell et al (1999a:79; Sommerstein (2002:58).  On Euripides’ hostility 
toward malevolent gods – especially Apollo – see Greenwood (1953:15); Bowra (1967:50); Kitto (1968:228-330); 
Eisner (1979:159); McDonald (2003:96). 
117 On the similarity of badly-behaved, anthropomorphic gods to real humans in Euripidean tragedy, see Vickers 
(1973:39); Foley (1985:22-23); Knox (1985:10); McLeish (2003:112); Storey and Allan (2005:145).  On Euripides 
as a conventionally pious Athenian, see Stevens (1956:87-94); Lefkowitz (1989:70-82). 
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sword.118  The earliest extant play of Euripides to highlight marital conflict and the taming of 
women who are also devoted mothers is the Alkestis of 438 BCE, while Euripides’ Telephos, 
produced in the same year and now extant only in fragments and in summary, is thought by 
some to depict Klytaimestra as a good mother.119  It seems that Klytaimestra in Telephos 
devised the abduction of baby Orestes in order to assist Telephos’ request, and is a genuinely 
distressed (and thus good) mother in her attempt to protect the infant boy – from his own father 
– during the fracas.120  In Euripides’ plays set after the death of Agamemnon, Klytaimestra 
faces a life in which she was unable to protect her child – this time a daughter – from her 
husband Agamemnon.  All of Euripides’ extant Atreid plays – Elektra, Iphigeneia among the 
Taurians, Orestes, Helen, Andromakhe, Iphigeneia at Aulis – feature a more human 
Klytaimestra than previous characterizations of her in surviving plays of Aiskhylos and 
Sophokles; for the first time, Orestes’ matricide of a despondent, grandmotherly queen is 




This Elektra repeats many previous plot and character aspects of the traditional Atreid narrative, 
along with much that is unique to Euripides; this discussion views Klytaimestra in Euripides’ 
Elektra as a response to Aiskhylos’ magnificent murderous queen, and also to Sophokles’ 
mundane mother-figure.122  Audience impressions of Klytaimestra depend heavily – once again 
– upon her relationships with her offspring, and on their attitudes toward her; likewise, 
Euripides’ unheroic Atreid children are made unlikeable in their sordid behaviour toward their 
                                                          
118 On the failure of Euripides’ tragedy to truly empower its female characters, see Rabinowitz (1993:14); Zeitlin 
(2005:219). 
119 Nelson (1990:35-37, 48, 50-51); Collard et al (1995:5); Storey and Allan (2005:258).  For the fragments and 
papyri of Telephos, see Collard and Cropp (2008b); for discussion of the fragments, see Handley and Rea (1956); 
for a tentative summary of the play’s plot, see Heath (1987a). 
120 Collard et al (1995:20).  Hyginus’ Fab. 101 states that Telephos went to Agamemnon, ‘and by Clytemnestra’s 
advice snatched the infant Orestes from his cradle, threatening to kill him if the Achaeans did not heal him.’  Trans. 
M. Grant.  http://www.theoi.com/Text/HyginusFabulae3.html#101, accessed June 24, 2014. 
121 On the close relationship of Euripides’ Elektra to Aiskhylos’ Khoephori, see also Kovacs (1998:143); Storey 
and Allan (2005:140).  Cf. Ferguson (1987:18, 382), who sees this play is a direct challenge to all previous Elektra-
plays. 
122 On Euripides’ Elektra as a new sort of play, see Burnett (1998:245).  On the play’s innovative self-reference 
and awareness of genre, see also Winnington Ingram (1969:131-132); Arnott (1973:50-51); Goldhill (1986:252-
253); de Jong (1991:119); and Perris (2011:1). 
223 
 
mother, especially in the play’s unpleasant ending.123  Euripides also reminds the audience that 
the unfortunate Klytaimestra is an inheritor – and so a victim – of the Tyndarid curse, implied 
in Elektra’s reference to her as ἡ πανώλης Τυνδαρίς ‘the all-destroying daughter of Tyndareos’ 
(60). 
 
Euripides’ Elektra is explicitly concerned with the natural conflict between male and female 
reproductive interests.124  Klytaimestra observes that she was not married to Agamemnon by 
her father in order for her offspring to be killed, yet that same husband has slaughtered her 
daughter (El. 1018-1023).  Agamemnon’s Trojan campaign had no real interest in protecting 
the institution of Greek marriage; military alliances and respect for his leadership – with the 
attendant (but largely unconsciously anticipated) reward of greater reproductive opportunity – 
are more important to him than the natural interests of his wife in their children born 
legitimately within marriage.125  Agamemnon’s heir Orestes also gives precedence to 
reproductive interests in his discreet enquiry about the nature of Aigisthos’ sacrifice to the 
Nymphs: is this ritual, he asks, τροφεῖα παίδων ἢ πρὸ μέλλοντος τόκου; ‘For the nurturance of 
his children, or for a child likely to come?’ (626).  This confirms that Klytaimestra has produced 
more than one child with Aigisthos, and has the power to produce more: Orestes’ inquiry also 
suggests that it is likely that she may be pregnant at the time of the matricide.  These offspring 
that are likely to come are a very real potential threat to Orestes’ attempts to regain the throne, 
because any sons of Aigisthos who survive Orestes’ vengeance will simply perpetuate the cycle 
of intrafamilial violence.  Despite this, there is little critical acknowledgment of the contributing 
factor of rival siblings to the matricide.126 
 
Elektra’s pursuit of vengeance is also strongly flavoured by reproductive concerns.  According 
to the Farmer – Elektra’s erstwhile husband – suitors in the past were beginning to pursue 
Elektra, whose blossoming fertility constituted a terrible threat to the new regime: Aigisthos 
                                                          
123 Critical discussions of this Elektra tend to sympathize more with the murdered mother, and less with the 
matricidal children; see Gellie (1981:1, 6); Mossman (2001:377).  Some view Elektra’s extreme mother-hatred as 
clinically pathological; see Blaiklock (1952:166); Kitto (1968:335); Whitman (1974:133); McLeish (2003:134).  
On this Elektra as a sordid treatment of the story, see Lucas (1951:1, 8); Blaiklock (1952:165); McLeish 
(2003:135). 
124 Some highlight the play’s preoccupation with gender hostility and distorted marriage; see Zeitlin (1970:665, 
668-669); Vellacott (1984:158). 
125 On the greater reproductive rewards to those males with a reputation for military prowess, see Chapter 1, pp. 
18; 18n22; 37-38; 37n151. 
126 On the competition between siblings for parental investment, see Chapter 1, pp. 45n202; 53; 53n258. 
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deliberately prohibited her marrying a noble for fear that an aristocrat-class grandson of 
Agamemnon might one day avenge his maternal grandfather (20-24).  This passage seems to 
imply that when a daughter reaches her marital season, only deliberate intervention could 
prevents marriage from occurring.127  Aigisthos marries the blossoming but troublesome 
Elektra to a peasant specifically in order to prevent the birth of noble children, because – as 
everyone knows – a peasant’s child would inherit a low nature, and therefore pose little danger 
(267-269).  Aigisthos believes that he ensures his own security by neutralizing Elektra’s 
specifically aristocratic reproductive potential, but this danger has not been neutralized through 
sexual activity to her lowly husband, and so this ostensibly married pair have assiduously 
concealed from Aigisthos the fact that Elektra remains a virgin (270-271).  This desire to 
suppress Elektra’s reproductive capacity certainly suggests that women have the capacity to 
transmit something of their own family’s nature, in contrast to Aiskhylos’ vision of women as 
only a vessel for the male seed.  The whole episode seems to assume that, once the marriage is 
consummated, some part of Elektra’s reproductive capacity will be safely neutralized; bearing 
the Farmer even one child appears to compromise her capacity to bear any noble offspring in 
the future.  Yet matters of inherited ethos in this play are not straightforward: the apparently 
humble Farmer’s descent from good Mycenaean stock is impeccable, and only the lack of 
material wealth excludes him from the noble class, and so prevents him seeking revenge for 
Agamemnon’s death (35-42).  But this good Farmer is in fact the only truly noble character in 
the whole play, selflessly declining to impregnate his young wife, specifically in order to 
preserve her ability to produce a noble child.  Elektra – gloating over Aigisthos’ corpse – 
declares that when men marry wives of a higher status, people only take notice of the wife (936-
937); she means to impugn Klytaimestra, but she herself is in the same, difficult position as her 
mother, married to a man viewed as inferior in status and masculinity.128  As a daughter of the 
highest (albeit deceased) king among the Greeks, Elektra will under all conditions have to marry 
downward (unless she was to marry a non-Greek, or a god); the indigenous Tyndarid princess 
Klytaimestra also outranked her previous husband Agamemnon, whose Pelopid prince-status 
mirrors Aigisthos, and who like Aigisthos, is king of Argos through his marriage to a Tyndarid 
princess.  All of these matters derive from the political fact of Elektra’s reproductive powers, 
                                                          
127 In Elektra’s case, however, men of the most illustrious families of Greece would hardly wish to marry a woman 
whose father was easily vanquished by a woman, and whose family wealth is being redirected to a competing 
branch of the Tantalid clan. 
128 On the naming of children for the father as a statement of paternal confidence, see Chapter 1, p. 52n247. 
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and her potential to be a mother will become pivotal in the children’s later ensnarement of their 
mother. 
 
Reproductive politics are also clearly at play in Elektra’s attack upon the dead Aigisthos’ 
masculinity: she despises her stepfather’s delight in his own feminine good looks – which help 
him seduce women – declaring that she would rather have a man who looks like a real man, 
because real men are brave in battle, and pretty men are fit only for singing in a chorus (947-
951).129  Elektra further taunts Aigisthos’ corpse by saying that a woman who has engaged in 
one adulterous affair will undoubtedly engage in others (918-920), and even Klytaimestra’s 
vilification of Agamemnon includes an insult to her sister’s Helen’s ‘lustfulness’ (1027-1029); 
Elektra turns this attack back upon her mother, observing that Klytaimestra and her sister Helen 
have much in common: as soon as Agamemnon left the house, Klytaimestra made herself 
beautiful before a mirror, as a preparation to sexual mischief (1068-1075). 
 
Her other insult to the dead man’s masculinity is that sure indicator of a husband’s domestic 
subjugation to a woman – the inheritance of names not from the father, but from the mother, 
something Elektra loathes (930-937); in her opinion, Aigisthos is no proper patriarch, and the 
children he sires will be known primarily as Klytaimestra’s.130  Elektra herself has serious social 
and reproductive reasons to be known as her father’s child, so another part of her strategy for 
distancing herself from her mother is the traditional method of intrasexual derogation: she 
targets her attack upon Klytaimestra’s illicit sexuality, but this Klytaimestra – in contrast with 
previous depictions – cares deeply about her public reputation (30, 642ff, 900-904, 1013ff, 
1039ff).131  After Aigisthos’ death Elektra demonstrates the same concern with gossip and 
public disapproval, claiming that her mother cheered for the Trojans because she did not want 
her husband to return (1076-1079).  This is in contrast to Aiskhylos’ Klytaimestra who was 
praying for her husband’s return so that she could avenge Iphigeneia, and while Euripides’ 
queen who, while remorseful about her vengeance, is likely to have prayed for Agamemnon’s 
hasty return for similar reasons. 
                                                          
129 Vickers (1973:556) correctly identifies Elektra’s desire for a man with a masculine face as evidence for the 
importance of sociobiological thematic concerns.  On male face-shape, and female preferences for masculine men 
as impregnators and effeminate men as co-parents, see Chapter 1, pp. 35-37; 77-78. 
130 On women’s willingness to name a child for the putative father as an expression of paternity, see Chapter 1, p. 
52n247. 





Elektra’s hatred for her mother is shared to some degree by many supporting characters in the 
play.132  But almost all of the Elektra’s characters are also unlikeable, and the Atreid siblings 
are frequently viewed as particularly unattractive.133  Euripides’ Klytaimestra – remorseful, 
compassionate – is very unlike her bitter, revenge-seeking daughter; if the mother-murdering 
Elektra is noble and courageous because (as some critics believe) she is steadfast in hope of 
revenge, then the patient, husband-murdering Klytaimestra – who waited ten years for revenge 
– ought to receive the same admiration.  Other character types in this play turn out to be 
surprisingly atypical: the Messenger – who should give the audience real facts – is in fact an 
untrustworthy liar,134 while the lowly peasant Farmer behaves with surprising nobility; his 
opening speech might have been the first time an Athenian audience ever heard a kind word 
about Klytaimestra.135  The Farmer – who we have every reason to trust – observes that, even 
though Aigisthos is determined to kill Elektra, who was shut up in the house, it is Klytaimestra 
who continues to brave Aigisthos’ displeasure, and who is saving Elektra’s life (27-28).  The 
Farmer’s astonishing testimony on Klytaimestra’s life-experience is also the first character-
witness for her defence in extant tragedy: Klytaimestra, according to this likeable character, ἐς 
μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρα σκῆψιν εἶχ᾽ ὀλωλότα, ‘had reason to destroy her husband’ (29).  In this Elektra, 
it is Aigisthos – not Klytaimestra – who threatened the infant Orestes’ life, (14-18), while the 
Farmer credits the rescue of the baby Orestes not to Elektra – as in previous retellings – but to 
Klytaimestra’s handing over of the infant to an elderly family servant; in Sophokles’ Elektra, 
the unrelated, brutally focussed Paidagogos raises Orestes to be a soulless avenger, but 
Euripides’ Orestes grows to maturity safely among his loyal extended family in Phokis – his 
patrilineal aunt Anaxibia, and cousin and dear friend Pylades. 
 
This retelling of the matricide does not attempt to replace Klytaimestra as the natural mother of 
Orestes; rather, Euripides constantly draws attention to the inescapable physical truth of 
Klytaimestra’s motherhood, and on her loss of a beloved child.  Her very first utterance on 
                                                          
132 On the chorus’ negative attitude toward Klytaimestra, see O’Brien (1964:15, 18); Roisman and Luschnig 
(2011:223). 
133 On the contrast between the unpleasant Atreid siblings and the sympathetic Klytaimestra (and Aigisthos), see 
Lucas (1951:6-7); Kirkwood (1958:36); Vellacott (1963:12); Whitman (1974:132); McDonald (2003:90); Storey 
and Allan’s (2005:265). 
134 On the untrustworthy Messenger in this play, see Gellie (1981:4). 
135 According to Blaiklock (1952:175), the Farmer in the Elektra sets the standard for sanity (as does Tyndareos 
in the Orestes).   
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appearance refers to her lost child Iphigeneia (1002).  Euripides also confirms that Klytaimestra 
had good reason for her murder of her daughter’s killer; he makes Aigisthos the principal 
ongoing threat toward Elektra and Orestes; he highlights Klytaimestra’s defiance of Aigisthos 
to save the lives of Agamemnon’s children; and he attributes Agamemnon’s death equally to 
Aigisthos.  The true-hearted Farmer also reminds us that Aigisthos had his own axe to grind 
with Agamemnon (and Agamemnon’s patriline) because he is the son of Thyestes (10).  
Agamemnon was the target of two separate vengeance-campaigns, both to avenge the impious 
slaughter of children.136 
 
Euripides also shows that the children’s testimony concerning their mother’s character is 
unreliable.137  When the incognito Orestes enquires if Klytaimestra permitted Elektra’s 
marriage to a peasant, Elektra replies γυναῖκες ἀνδρῶν, ὦ ξέν᾽, οὐ παίδων φίλαι, ‘Well, 
stranger, women love their husbands, not their children’ (264-265).  But Klytaimestra loved her 
child Iphigeneia more than her husband Agamemnon, and she saves Elektra’s life at the cost of 
disobeying her husband Aigisthos.  Elektra, however, insists that her removal from the house 
by her mother is aimed to ‘please’ Aigisthos (61), which we know – from the Farmer’s 
testimony – is simply not true; Klytaimestra is remorseful, and should be credited with saving 
Elektra’s life.138  Euripides’ Klytaimestra – like many mothers entering a second marriage – is 
torn between her attachment to children from a previous union and to her new family, of 
husband and offspring.139  Klytaimestra is also still actively fertile; Elektra bitterly resents her 
unwelcome maternal half-siblings, because she and her brother are now πάρεργα ‘secondary’ 
(62).140 
 
                                                          
136 Cf. Sophokles, who gives Elektra every opportunity to dismiss all possibility of mitigation for Klytaimestra, 
accusing her mother specifically of violent abuse, and depicting her as incapable of rescuing anybody. 
137 On the contradiction between Elektra’s constant carping on her mother’s faults and the mild-mannered queen’s 
speech and behaviour; see O’Brien (1964:21); Arnott (1981:184-185); Wolfe (2009:706). 
138 On Klytaimestra’s remorse and Elektra’s rescue, see Denniston (1939:xxx); Lucas (1951:6); Walton (1980:26); 
Lembke and Reckford (2010:76). 
139 According to the Greeks themselves, women are naturally φιλότεκνος ‘child-loving’ (see discussions, Chapter 
3, pp. 220-221; 220n105; 220n106; 284n287), so Elektra’s claim that her mother hates her children is shocking, 
and clearly aims to accuse Klytaimestra of being an unnatural woman. 
140 In real life, post-pubescent daughters remaining in the parental home experience a compromise in lifetime 
fertility, especially if the mother is still reproductively active; see discussion in Chapter 1, p. 52n253.  Cf. Ferguson 
(1972:384), who argues that Elektra hates her mother because she (jealously) desires children, yet is afraid to have 
sex.  On Elektra’s preoccupation with sexual issues, see McDonald (2003:115). 
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Klytaimestra has rarely been given the chance in tragedy to defend herself explicitly, but her 
direct testimony suggests that Euripides views her reputation for evil as unearned: 
 
καίτοι δόξ᾽ ὅταν λάβῃ κακὴ 
γυναῖκα, γλώσσῃ πικρότης ἔνεστί τις. 
ὡς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς: τὸ πρᾶγμα δὲ 
μαθόντας, ἢν μὲν ἀξίως μισεῖν ἔχῃ, 
στυγεῖν δίκαιον: εἰ δὲ μή, τί δεῖ στυγεῖν; 
 
‘indeed, when expectation of evil seizes a woman, her reputation is a bitter one.  In my 
opinion, this is unfair: in understanding the matter, and deciding to hate, then it is right 
to hate, but when not knowing the facts, why should one choose to hate?’ (1013-1017). 
 
Klytaimestra’s defence against the charge that she unjustly killed Agamemnon also raises an 
issue ignored or denied by Sophokles and Aiskhylos: the double standard in male adultery, 
evidenced in the aggravating arrival of Kassandra (1030-1040), and the double standard in the 
male parent’s choice of sacrificial victim at Aulis (1041-1045).  Euripides’ Klytaimestra only 
turned to a lover after Agamemnon had returned with Kassandra, and thus after her husband’s 
death (1030-1039), a radical departure from previous tradition; she also testifies that she was 
forced to turn to her husband’s enemy Aigisthos as accomplice only because no other man was 
willing to avenge the offences against her (1046-1048).  Sophokles’ Elektra insisted that 
Klytaimestra acted primarily out of lust for an existing lover, and by rewriting this detail, 
Euripides refutes prior adultery as the primary motive for Agamemnon’s death, and thus for the 
children’s hatred of their mother.141 
 
Klytaimestra’s self-defence includes a proposed scenario in which Menelaos is abducted 
(instead of Helen), and his brother’s son, Orestes, chosen to be sacrificed (instead of 
Iphigeneia), illustrating how the events of the Trojan expedition depend upon strict expectations 
of gender behaviour (1041-1045): no army would mobilize to assuage Helen’s outrage upon 
the theft of a husband, and it is more probable that some other suitor would simply take her as 
a wife (as happened in Troy after the death of her husband, Paris).  Similarly, if Klytaimestra 
                                                          
141 On sexual jealousy as Klytaimestra’s motive for revenge in Euripides’ Elektra, see Zeitlin (1970:663n52); 
Storey and Allan (2005:142-3). 
229 
 
had sacrificed her own male child (Orestes) in order to enact war against the abductors of her 
sister’s husband (Menelaos), no Greek would blame her own husband (Agamemnon) for 
executing the sacrificer of his son, even if that sacrificer was motivated by necessity.  The 
chorus’ response to Klytaimestra’s arguments in self-defence merely highlights the inherent 
inequity in social expectations of gender behaviour: in their view, all φρενήρης ‘sensible’ 
women ought to obey their husbands, and this is the only type of woman worth listening to 
(1052-1054).  Euripides forces his audience to see how myth reinforces the idea that a mother’s 
emotional attachment to a child must not compete with one man’s recovery of a trophy wife, 
and another man’s reputation and right to rule.  Her gender-inverted fantasy shows how the 
dynamic of parental investment and mating opportunity – and the social arrangements 
facilitating these – operates differently for the sexes. 
 
Yet, instead of evoking audience expectation of Klytaimestra’s potential reproductive 
motivations in grief or lust, Euripides draws the audience’s attention to the role in events of the 
inherited family curse.  Klytaimestra shares the blame for Agamemnon’s death equally with 
Aigisthos – Thyestes’ son – as the Farmer’s first speech witnesses (8-10).142  The play’s early 
allusion to the Atreus-Thyestes backstory to the present vengeance is sometimes obscured by 
editors’ substituting the name of Aigisthos directly in translation for ‘the son of Thyestes’ (613), 
but this mention of the patronymic is entirely the point, reminding the audience of the deep 
wounds within the family.  Once Klytaimestra and Aigisthos lie dead upon the stage, the chorus 
also observe that οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς οἶκος ἀθλιώτερος/ τῶν Τανταλείων οὐδ᾽ ἔφυ ποτ᾽ ἐκγόνων 
‘There is no house more wretched than that of Tantalos, nor has one ever come into being’ 
(1175-1176).  Agamemnon and Aigisthos’ shared ancestor Tantalos is the original perpetrator 
of the most intergenerationally persistent family crime, the murder of children.143  Kin-killing 
does not stop with Agamemnon’s generation: according to later myth, Orestes the last (male) 
Tantalid is responsible for the death of his young half-brother, Aigisthos and Klytaimestra’s 
son, Aletes.144  This play makes the point several times that the Atreid children are actually 
                                                          
142 See also Elektra’s promise to avenge to Agamemnon lying in the underworld, σᾶς ἀλόχου σφαγαῖς/ Αἰγίσθου 
τ᾽, ‘through the slaughter of your wife and of Aigisthos’ (123-124). 
143 He killed his own son, Pelops, his grandson Atreus slaughtered his brother’s sons (and along with Thyestes 
killed his half-brother Khrysippus), and Tantalos’ great-grandson Agamemnon slaughtered his own daughter.  
Euripides’ constant references to the family genealogy suggest that Agamemnon and Aigisthos are equally both 
Tantalids; Agamemnon may have surrendered the sceptre, but Aigisthos has just as much right to take it up (along 
with the consequences for his forebears’ sins).  For further discussion of the family crimes, see Chapter 2, pp. 96-
97; 120n125; Chapter 3, pp. 214-215; 254n213; and the Conclusion, pp. 296-297. 
144 See Hyg. Fab. 122. 
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Tantalids: Orestes’ prayer to Zeus (673) reminds the audience that Elektra and Orestes are 
Zeus’s descendants – through Tantalos; the Farmer remarks that Agamemnon, upon dying, has 
‘left behind the ancient sceptre of Tantalos’ (11).  In seeking to regain their father’s throne, 
Orestes and Elektra cannot escape the Tantalid family curse, as Kastor’s divine judgment at the 
play’s end reveals: μία δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους/ ἄτη πατέρων διέκναισεν, ‘it was one patrilineal ruin 
which has destroyed you both together’ (1306-1307).  Orestes and Elektra may be beneficiaries 
of Tantalid power and wealth, but they must also inherit the terrible consequences of Tantalid 
sin.145 
 
Klytaimestra belongs to a different family, however, and Euripides takes trouble to restate this 
throughout the play; we learn that Aigisthos now rules in part because he is ἄλοχον ἐκείνου 
Τυνδαρίδα κόρην ἔχων ‘holding the bridal bed of Tyndareos’ daughter’ (13).  Klytaimestra is 
referred to formally by her husband as Tyndareos’ daughter, as the Messenger’s account of 
Aigisthos’ sacrifice to the Nymphs observes (803-807).  Her Tyndarid affiliations are also 
foregrounded in the appearance of Kastor and Polydeukes – of all people – in the deus ex 
machina at the end of the play (1238).146  Their unexpected appearance is foreshadowed in the 
chorus’ welcome to this Tyndarid in her first appearance, as they welcome her as 
 
βασίλεια γύναι χθονὸς Ἀργείας, 
παῖ Τυνδάρεω, 
καὶ τοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ξύγγονε κούροιν 
Διός, 
 
‘queen of Argos, daughter of Tyndareos, and kinswoman of the noble sons of Zeus’ 
(988-991). 
 
Sophokles’ Elektra denied her maternal lineage, but Euripides’ Elektra is constantly confronted 
by her Tyndarid heritage (116-117).  Two lines of descent (and allegiance) exist in every family, 
something Aiskhylos’ Apollo specifically denies, but this is highlighted in Klytaimestra’s 
                                                          
145 Cf. O’Brien (1964:13-14, 31), who observes that if Klytaimestra is a villainous killer, then the mean and 
vindictive Elektra is surely of the same kind. 
146 Of all the gods who might have appeared to wrap this retelling up, Euripides produces Klytaimestra’s brothers.  
On the naturalness of loyalty between sister and brother in ancient Greece, see Bremmer (1997). 
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amazingly compassionate reply to Elektra’s lengthy insults (which culminate in bare-faced 
threat to kill her mother): 
 
ὦ παῖ, πέφυκας πατέρα σὸν στέργειν ἀεί: 
ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τόδ᾽: οἳ μέν εἰσιν ἀρσένων, 
οἳ δ᾽ αὖ φιλοῦσι μητέρας μᾶλλον πατρός. 
συγγνώσομαί σοι, 
 
‘O child, you always love the father who begot you, and so it is: some are of the male, 
on the other hand, some love the mother more than the father.  I will excuse you’ (1102-
1105). 
 
Despite the many efforts of the father-loving Elektra at character-assassination, it is 
Klytaimestra’s genuinely compassionate nature which hastens her death: this mother trusts her 
daughter’s invitation, and so willingly enters the Farmer’s hovel.  Elektra takes Klytaimestra’s 
maternal nature for granted, and exploits it to the full.  The chorus’ earlier sly snipe at the queen 
– that they care nothing for women who do not accede to their husbands in all things (1052-
1054) – is also undermined by Klytaimestra’s eagerness to fulfil her wifely duties: as she enters 
her daughter’s home, she directs her servants to pasture the chariot-horses until she has 
completed the sacrifice for Elektra’s birth-giving, after which she will join Aigisthos at his 
sacrifice in the meadow, for she has obligations to her husband also (1138).  Klytaimestra is not 
only a loving mother, but a conscientious, supportive wife.  Most astonishingly, for possibly 
the first time in tragedy, Klytaimestra is also depicted as a loving grandmother.147 
 
Critical views of Klytaimestra are often based on the queen’s arrival to welcome what she thinks 
will be her new grandson: almost all scholars focus upon the stark contrast between the richly 
attired queen in her chariot and her ruined, ragged daughter.148  Some accuse Klytaimestra of 
being both insensitive and grossly materialistic, lamenting for a dead daughter in front of an 
                                                          
147 On the unheroic exploitation of Klytaimestra’s grand-motherliness, see Rabinowitz (2008:121); Wolfe 
(2009:709); Hall (2010:264). Elektra’s expedient lie about a supposed grandson, delivered to Klytaimestra by the 
Old Man, is certainly cold-blooded (E. El. 651-660).  On Klytaimestra’s embrace of grand-motherhood – an 
important natural stage in a female’s reproductive life-history – that ultimately betrays her to her death, see O’Brien 
(1964:28); Burnett (1998:239). 
148 On the similarly brilliant entrances of Klytaimestra (in Euripides’ Elektra) and Agamemnon (in Aiskhylos’ 
Agamemnon) on chariots, see Zeitlin (1970:657). 
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impoverished, living Elektra, and boasting of her liaison with her husband’s enemy.149  Some 
critics contrast Klytaimestra’s affection for a dead daughter with her rejection of a living one, 
but Elektra’s conspicuously displayed poverty is of her own making, and she could be the happy 
child of a ruling queen in a famously rich realm.  Furthermore, in ancient Greece there is no 
shame in insulting one’s enemy, and Klytaimestra was the victor in the matter of Iphigeneia’s 
impious death.150  Euripides may play into audience expectations with his evocation of 
Aiskhylos’ magnificent woman, in the chorus’ description of her as ὀρεία τις ὡς λέαιν᾽ 
ὀργάδων/ δρύοχα νεμομένα ‘the roaming mountain lioness in the meadow-woods’ (1163-
1164), but as she enters her daughter’s home we see that this legendary lioness has been 
declawed.151  But a great distance lies between Aiskhylos’ victorious, exultant queen and the 
reflective, regretful mother in Euripides’ Elektra.152  Scholars are divided on Euripides’ 
characterization of Klytaimestra and Elektra; estimations of Elektra’s character as sympathetic 
or sociopathic are strongly influenced by critics’ disposition to take the side of either daughter 
or mother.153 
 
The play’s centrepiece agōn (998-1138) also offers ample evidence that Elektra’s 
overwhelming hatred for her mother is callous and unwarranted, and characterizing 
Klytaimestra as a pleasant-natured, defenceless grandmother renders Elektra’s hatred 
gratuitously brutal; according to some, Euripides has transformed Sophokles’ long-suffering 
Elektra into a psychologically damaged beast.154  Elektra is preoccupied with her social and 
material disinheritance but her much-bewailed deprivations are obviously self-imposed, rather 
                                                          
149 On Klytaimestra’s rejection of Elektra, Kubo (1967:26); Zeitlin (1970:663-664). 
150 On the approval of victory over enemies in ancient Greece, see discussion in Chapter 2, pp. 149; 149n239. 
151 On Klytaimestra and other Greek heroines as lionesses in literature, see Konstantinou (2012). 
152 On the stark contrast of Euripides’ remorseful and reconciliatory queen with those of Aiskhylos and Sophokles, 
see O’Brien (1964:28). 
153 On Klytaimestra as vulnerable, domesticated, and sympathetic: see Denniston (1939:xxix); Norwood 
(1948:254); Lucas (1951:6); Vellacott (1963:14; 1975:130, 237); Murray (1965/1918:78); Thury (1985:18); 
Ferguson (1987:18); Cropp (1988:168); Lloyd (1992:68); Sewell (2007:167); Lembke and Reckford (2010:11); 
Roisman and Luschnig (2011:210-214); others caution against reading the character of Klytaimestra as overtly 
sympathetic (see, Kubo (1967) 17-18, 28; Whitehorn (1978) 8; Gellie (1981) 5; Lloyd (1992) 68; Komar (2003) 
43.  On Elektra as unsympathetic, see Norwood (1948:256); Lucas (1951:6); O’Brien (1964:35-36); Conacher 
(1967:201, 203, 205); Kubo (1967:15, 25); Kitto (1968:333); Baldock (1989:107-108); Storey and Allan 
(2005:265); Roisman and Luschnig (2011:31); as justified in her persecution of her mother, see Denniston 
(1939:xv); Kubo (1967:24-25); Whitehorn (1978:7-8); on the agōn as serving to alienate audience from the 
daughter, see Norwood (1948:255-256); Cropp (1988:172); Baldock (1989:109). 
154 On Elektra’s psychological pathology, see Murray (1965/1918:77); Kitto (1968:334); Walton (1980:26-27); 
Ferguson (1972:382, 386-387; 1987:18); Davie (1998:133).  Some critics contend that her degeneration is spiritual 
and moral as well as psychological; see Denniston (1939:xxviii); Lembke and Reckford (2010:4). 
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than being imposed by Klytaimestra.155  Elektra may be living in a hovel with the Farmer, but 
there is clearly no need for her to descend to demeaning labour (54-59): her husband urges her 
to refrain from menial tasks (66-67), and Elektra herself calls a slave out of the house to receive 
the water-jar from her, once she has ostentatiously carried it from the water-source (140-142).  
In reply to the kindly chorus’ invitation to the upcoming feast for Hera (171-174), Elektra 
demands that they behold her ruined appearance, so unfitting for the daughter of the king who 
subjugated Troy (175-189).  Elektra never acknowledges their subsequent friendly offer of 
suitable clothes and jewellery (189-191), yet the apparent lack of such finery is one of the 
reasons she now shuns her kinsmen Kastor and Polydeukes, both of whom once sued for her 
hand in marriage (311-313).  In later conversation with the incognito Orestes, she complains – 
incorrectly – that she is forced to fetch water from the river, and is deprived of dances and 
festivals because she has no clothes (309-311).  Rejection of her mother in favour of the father 
– albeit deceased – requires Elektra to display willingness to endure deprivations, a form of 
costly signalling to attract social sympathy and approval of her patrilineal affiliation.156  In this 
play, however, this freely-adopted cost is shown to be self-defeating and unworthy of 
admiration, whereas Klytaimestra’s willingness to invest in her apparent grandchild is a natural, 
entirely commendable behaviour. 
 
Euripides’ more sympathetic presentation of Klytaimestra also utilizes the obvious contrast 
between one husband – Agamemnon the impious, treacherous kin-killer – and the other: 
Aigisthos the pious, generous host who is betrayed by his guests.  In contrast to previous tragic 
versions of the story, Euripides returns to Homer’s dangerous Aigisthos, the Atreids’ ancestral 
enemy (Od. 1.35-40; 1.299-300; 2.235; 3.249-252; 3.303-303; 3.308); it was quite possible for 
ghosts to appear and give witness in tragedy, as Aiskhylos’ depiction of Klytaimestra in 
Eumenides demonstrates but no extant tragedy permits Agamemnon to identify his principal 
murderer – Aigisthos – quite so definitively as Homer does in the Odyssey: ‘Aigisthos wrought 
my death and doom; he killed me, with my accursed wife, having invited me to his home and 
entertaining me at dinner, just as someone slaughters an ox at manger.  Thus I died a most 
                                                          
155 On Elektra’s corrupting preoccupation with loss of position and wealth, see Vellacott (1984a:156-157); 
McDonald (2003:115).  On Elektra as an orphaned, social isolated, and abused Atreid princess, see Zeitlin 
(1970:649; 2003a:281).  Cf. Kovacs (1998:147); Rabinowitz (2008:120).  Vellacott (1984b:160) draws attention 
to an emotionally indifferent Elektra’s astonishing claim her impoverished life is ‘more cruel’ than her (sacrificed) 
sister’s (E. El. 1092-1093).  Cf. Lloyd (1986:2, 4-6), who contends that Elektra and Orestes have every good reason 
to resent their disastrous material situation, because the death of their father throws the whole house into jeopardy. 
156 On costly-signalling, see Chapter 1, p. 20n38. 
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lamentable death’ (Od. 11.409-412).  Aiskhylos and Sophokles both depict Aigisthos as a 
cowardly brute, dependent on the greater wits of his wife, but Euripides returns us to the δόλιον 
‘crafty’ Aigisthos (El. 166) found in Homer (Od. 3.303), the man equally or even primarily 
responsible for Agamemnon’s death.157  Euripides’ – and Homer’s – emphasis on the equal or 
greater culpability of Aigisthos for the death of Agamemnon strongly suggests that previous 
tragic vilification of Klytaimestra – and the valorization of her murder – should not be taken 
for granted.  Euripides’ Aigisthos replaces previous Klytaimestras as Agamemnon’s chief 
murderer and despoiler: Sophokles’ Klytaimestra stages sacrifices and dances to celebrate 
Agamemnon’s death (S. El. 287-281), but in Euripides’ Elektra it is Aigisthos who drunkenly 
abuses Agamemnon’s grave (E. El. 327-331); Elektra’s lament implies that although it was 
Klytaimestra’s hand upon the killing weapon (160, 164), the murder itself was committed on 
Aigisthos’ behalf (165).  Elektra further confirms that her father was slain by his wife and by 
Aigisthos (123-124), as in the Farmer’s opening speech (8-10); and she describes Aigisthos – 
without any reference to Klytaimestra – as the man who killed her father and holds his sceptre 
(318-322, 866-869).  Orestes also implies that Aigisthos is the primary killer, and that – as in 
Homer’s Odyssey – Klytaimestra was the victim of sexual seduction (599-600). 
 
Once Orestes has dispatched Aigisthos, the Messenger rejoices that ‘Agamemnon’s slayer lies 
dead on the ground – Aigisthos’ (763-764).  Elektra’s response to this welcome news is to 
enquire how exactly Orestes has killed Thyestes’ son (772-773), reminding audiences that 
Agamemnon’s slayer is yet another recipient of the Tantalid disposition to intrafamilial killing.  
Aigisthos slew Agamemnon because of his inherited obligation to avenge the insult done to 
Thyestes by Agamemnon’s father Atreus.  The Farmer’s opening speech also frames 
Agamemnon’s death – specifically at the hand of the son of Thyestes – as a part of the Atreid 
family feud (8-10), and the Old Man confirms it in his advice to Orestes that killing ‘the son of 
Thyestes along with your mother’ (613) is the way to recover his patrimony.  Aigisthos himself 
alludes to the ancient family conflict in his conversation with the incognito Orestes (as reported 
by the Messenger to Elektra), declaring ἔστι δ᾽ ἔχθιστος βροτῶν/ Ἀγαμέμνονος παῖς πολέμιός 
τ᾽ ἐμοῖς δόμοις, ‘The son of Agamemnon is the most hostile enemy of my blood and to my 
family’ (832-833).  The conflict between the lineages of Thyestes and Atreus is personal on 
two interconnected levels: the political and the biological, because Aigisthos is fully entitled – 
                                                          
157 On Euripides’ positive characterization of Aigisthos, see O’Brien (1964:27-28); Ferguson (1972:18, 382); 
Walton (1980:26); Baldock (1989:108); Davie (1998:133); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003:347).  On the polluted 
Aigisthos in this play, see Lloyd (1986:16); Burnett (1998:233-234). 
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as a full-blooded (if incestuously conceived) Tantalid in his own right – to possess Tantalos’ 
sceptre (11).  If Aigisthos’ children inherit the wealth of the house, then Orestes’ (and Elektra’s) 
outlook is dismal; if Orestes manages to assassinate Agamemnon’s usurping cousin, he will 
also have to pre-emptively eliminate Aigisthos’ growing offspring, or the whole pattern of kin-
killing will be repeated.158  But Euripides’ Orestes is neither Sophokles’ stone-cold and 
expeditious killer, nor Aiskhylos’ malleable, miserable instrument of Apollo: this Orestes is an 
affectionate brother and a reluctant and reflective avenger, desperately seeking proof that he 
should commit what is for him a godless act.159  Hesitant Orestes contrasts with Elektra the 
overconfident action-hero, eager to slaughter her own mother (276-279).160 
 
Nevertheless, although Euripides’ Orestes may be a better brother, he is a poor respecter of 
social laws of xenia.  Orestes hopes that if he is invited to feast with Aigisthos, the gods will 
help him to slay his host at dinner (637-638).  While this is probably an allusion to the οἰκτίστῳ 
‘most pitiable’ (Od. 11.413) manner in which Agamemnon his father was dispatched, it is 
hardly less shameful for Orestes to murder a host while a guest than it was for Aigisthos to have 
dealt a dishonourable death to his guest as reported in the Odyssey (11.409-412).  Worse, 
Orestes’ cowardly murder of his host comes as Aigisthos bends down to inspect the entrails of 
a ritually sacrificed calf (El. 838-843).  The children complain that Aigisthos showed impiety 
toward Agamemnon’s corpse (323-331), but Orestes shows just as much impious disrespect for 
Aigisthos’ hacked body, urging his initially hesitant sister to an almost ritualistic denigration of 
Aigisthos’ corpse (895-906).161  Elektra does not fear to offend the gods over this desecration: 
what she dreads is the ready criticism of her δυσάρεστος ‘fastidious’ city (904).  Yet these 
children also demand respect for their own persons: Elektra fully expects her body to be 
καθυβρίσαι, ‘insulted’ – presumably a euphemism for rape – before she is dead (698), and so – 
if the vengeance-plan fails – she is prepared to kill herself by the sword simply to avoid this 
insult (686-698).  Conventional piety matters little to these matricides: in direct parody of the 
debate between Orestes and Pylades in Aiskhylos’ Khoephori (899-903), the siblings’ debate 
                                                          
158 This fact of reproductive politics also surfaces in Hyginus’ later retelling (Fab. 22) of the family saga. 
159 While still incognito, he tenderly responds to Elektra’s declaration of love for her absent brother, asking what 
could be dearer to Orestes than what she saying (244). 
160 According to some, the characterization of Orestes in Euripides is no less negative than that of his sister and 
fellow-matricide Elektra; see Norwood (1948:256); Vellacott (1963:14); O’Brien (1964:36); Walton (1980:26); 
Ferguson (1987:18); Goldhill (1992:95); Burnett (1998:230-231); Storey and Allan (2005:265); Roisman and 
Luschnig (2011:257).  Cf. Lucas (1951:6) and Lloyd (1986:10, 19), who suggest that Orestes is less odious than 
scholarly discussion contends. 
161 Sophokles’ Elektra also complains bitterly about the impiety shown toward their father’s tomb (S. El. 277-281). 
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on the rightness of mother-murder shows that this Orestes has little faith in Apollo’s oracle (El. 
966-973).  Aiskhylos’ Orestes submits himself with little difficulty to Apollo’s oracle, but 
Euripides’ Orestes is well aware that Apollo has commanded him to do something wrong (975).  
The most surprising statement of all is Orestes’ suggestion – in response to Elektra’s worry that 
something bad might happen if Agamemnon is not avenged – that the oracle ἆρ᾽ αὔτ᾽ ἀλάστωρ 
εἶπ᾽ ἀπεικασθεὶς θεῷ, ‘was spoken by an alastōr having taken the form of a god’ (979).162  
Elektra denies that any spirit in disguise could rightfully sit upon the holy tripod at Delphi (980), 
but Orestes remains unconvinced that an oracle to matricide could ever be good (981).  Both 
children come to regret their actions under the influence of this demonic oracle, but the expected 
return on their wrongful action outweighs their fear about potential costs.  The benefit of being 
a Tantalid king, however, is – and always has been – further catastrophe. 
 
The chorus liken the returning Orestes to a sacrificial lamb (92, 513), and recall Pan’s arrival 
in Argos bearing the gift of the golden lamb to signify the award of rightful kingship to Atreus 
(699-712).  In Orestes this rightful kingship will be renewed, and the chorus may overtly 
support the return of the Atreids (699-712), but the song’s following verses draw attention to 
other features of the family history: the tender lamb removed from its mother in the Argive 
mountains (699-700); a wife seduced away (718-723) and a throne claimed by the wife-stealer 
(723-725).  The usurper’s theft of the golden lamb results in catastrophic disaster in the natural 
world, evidence of Zeus’s displeasure (727-736), and the song concludes with stern words for 
Klytaimestra (744), who killed her husband in neglect of due reverence for the gods.163  Yet the 
chorus’ awe-inspiring example of divine anger at this historic narrative – Thyestes’ effrontery 
in taking both wife and throne away from Atreus – is suddenly undermined by the chorus’ 
unanticipated remark that they simply don’t believe such incredible tales (737-742)!  
Furthermore, they conclude that the purpose of such stories is merely to frighten mortals into 
remembering to worship the gods (743-745).  This undermines their condemnation of 
Klytaimestra, who failed to revere those same gods.  Some conclude that the song bears witness 
that the divine blessing of the lamb of kingship is a curse, bringing with it the burden of kin-
murder, cannibalism, and impious slaughter.164  If anyone has provoked the family’s long 
                                                          
162 The last incarnation of the Tantalid alastōr seems to have been Klytaimestra in Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon. 
163 Euripides’ Orestes makes these same events just another episode in the misfortunes of the curse-ridden family 
(Or. 998-1006). 
164 On the curse of the golden lamb of kingship, see Ferguson (1972:389); Morwood (1981:365-366). 
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history of misfortune, it is not the avenging Klytaimestra’s irreverence which is to blame, but 
the offences against natural piety of Tantalos, of Pelops, of Atreus, and his son Agamemnon.165 
 
Euripides’ plot also addresses the supposed resolution of divine conflict in Aiskhylos’ 
Eumenides; in this play the δειναὶ θεαὶ ‘dreadful goddesses’ (1270) will not be reconciled to 
Orestes’ acquittal, nor bribed to increase the prosperity of Athenians, but will sink down 
beneath the hill, stricken with grief, to become an oracle for truly pious humans (1268-1272).166  
Euripides does not use the term Erinyes for these goddesses, although they are clearly the 
κυνώπιδες ‘dog-eyed’ avengers of the slain Klytaimestra (1252).  Respect for Apollo is lacking: 
Kastor permits Elektra to look upon him, since he who authorized the killing – Apollo – is the 
one truly culpable for the matricide (1292-1297), while his earlier statement pronounced that 
the killing of his sister Klytaimestra by her offspring – on Apollo’s ‘unwise’ advice – was ‘not 
just’ (1245-1246).  Kastor orders Orestes into exile because a matricide may not inhabit the 
place where he killed his mother, but Orestes will not suffer death (1265-1266) because Apollo 
will shoulder the burden of moral guilt for the matricide (1266-1267).167  Euripides’ gods are 
patently of a different nature to those of Aiskhylos or Sophokles.  Orestes’ attitude to the gods 
– even when the god is also his maternal uncle – is utilitarian rather than pious; the gods are 
just as pragmatic, are just as materialistic, and are little interested in the tragic life-experiences 
of humans far below them: they ignore Elektra’s prayers, and also the offence done to 
Agamemnon so long ago (198-200).168  Once Orestes has killed Aigisthos, he offers praise to 
the gods (890-894), but – as soon as their mother lies dead – he begins to doubt the justice of 
the god’s command: now he understands that the matricide is a step too far into darkness, an 
unwise and hollow victory.169  The chorus’ lyrical image of a magnificently cruel Klytaimestra 
seizing the killing axe in her own hand and slaughtering the returning husband compares her to 
a prowling mountain-lioness in the rich lowland meadows (1156-1163), but this is immediately 
belied by the reality of the wretched, vulnerable Klytaimestra begging her son and daughter not 
                                                          
165 Later authors recognized the abhorrence of Atreus’ deeds; see Seneca’s Thyestes. 
166 Cf. Sewell (2007:168), who contends that the horrified Elektra and Orestes somehow become their own Furies 
following the matricide. 
167 In Gellie’s (1981:8) view, the speech of Kastor overturns Apollo’s authority, and shows that there is no real 
divine sanction for the matricide and that the children have acted solely out of spite and materialism.  Cf. Thury 
(1985:6), who argues that the Dioskouri heal the horror felt by the matricidal brother and sister. 
168 Orestes has signalled his pragmatic attitude to religious matters early in the play, and the chorus warn Elektra 
– seeking to get the better of her enemies – that she should not bother the gods with laments, but with offerings 
(193-197). 
169 On the contrast between Sophokles’ triumphant conclusion and the empty victory of Euripides’ Elektra, see 
Bowra (1966:151); Ferguson (1972:393); Morwood (1981:369). 
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to kill their own mother (1165).  Upon hearing the last cries of Klytaimestra, Sophokles’ chorus 
exulted that the blood of killers was flowing in recompense by the will of those long dead (S. 
El. 1416-1421), but in Euripides’ play the chorus pities the slain Klytaimestra, and emphasizes 
that she too suffered miserably (E. El. 1169-1171); they observe that her blood now stains the 
hands of her children (1172-1173), and conclude – as they have done throughout the play – that 
no house is more miserable than that of Tantalos (1175-1176).  Orestes himself describes the 
mother-murder as μυσαρά ‘abominable’ (1179), and Elektra agrees that despite the justice of 
the deed, the sufferings they inflicted on their own mother will become more memorable than 
the children’s victory (1186-1189).  Before the matricide, the children fantasized about 
reclaiming their wealth and control over the house of Agamemnon in Argos, but both children 
now see that the reward for matricide is social ostracism for Orestes, and lack of marriage for 
Elektra (1190-1200).  According to Kastor, the Atreid siblings will be also forcibly separated 
for all time.170  Pylades exhorted Orestes in Aiskhylos’ Khoephori to hold all men as enemies, 
rather than the gods (Khoe. 906-907): Euripides shows the real consequence of doing exactly 
this.  When mortals put fear of gods – and obedience to wrongful oracles – before the common 
human values of community and fellowship, the reality is exile and social ostracism.  If they 
had simply stopped at the revenge-killing of Aigisthos – the equal if not predominant killer of 
Agamemnon in this play – then both children would have salvaged their own material and social 
benefit; mother-murder, however, propels them through mere success and past all possibility of 
happiness in life.  The children are painfully aware of their wrongdoing, as their anguished 
confessions (and the chorus’ confirmation of these) demonstrate (1182-1184, 1203-1205, 1207-
1209, 1221-1223).  Elektra declares that putting her hand to the sword – a Euripidean innovation 
– was a terrible suffering (she means for herself) (1226).171  Far from crowing over her bloody 
corpse, the children now become tender mourners, covering their mother’s flesh with a robe, 
and closing her terrible wounds (1227-1232).  Klytaimestra was a philos who had become an 
ekthros; now, Elektra declares that she places the garments upon one who is both dear and yet 
not dear, the last of woes (1230-1232).  Dawning regret is far from the last of the children’s 
woes, however, as the gods arrive to enforce the full consequences of trampled moral law.  
Upon receiving their fates from Kastor, Elektra concludes that their separation and exile is the 
result of her dying mother’s curse (1323-1324); once they were separated and sent out of the 
house by their mother in order to protect their lives, but now it is avenging their father’s honour 
                                                          
170 On the collapse of the Atreid house because of the matricide, see Burnett (1998:230); Rabinowitz (2008:122). 
171 Elektra’s increasing participation in the act – from Aiskhylos to Sophokles to Euripides – makes good narrative 
sense in terms of dating the Elektras according to intensification of dramatic horror. 
239 
 
which will sever them permanently.  The lesson of the play to the demos is this: humans, in the 
name of the gods, do what humans should not do, namely, to turn upon blood-kin; once the act 
is accomplished, there will be no victory-cry, because the children’s hands are irrevocably 
stained with blood (1171). 
 
Many critics conclude that Euripides is disgusted by the especially immoral act of mother-
murder, but others argue that viewing matricide as abhorrent is inappropriately ahistorical; 
some contend that the play’s moral question simply remains unresolved.172  Some suggest that 
the real, covert moral problem of the play is the incompatibility of aristocratic values and 
democratic ideals.173  Euripides does draw attention to the discrepancy between notions of 
upper-class nobility and the sordid reality of aristocratic behaviour in the matricidal Orestes’ 
astonishment at the honourable attitudes of the peasant Farmer, a mere commoner who is far 
nobler in nature than either of the aristocratic Atreid children.  Disbelieving the Farmer’s oath 
upon Aphrodite (43-46) and Elektra’s protestations that the Farmer has honourably respected 
her virginity (253-255), Orestes scrabbles through a number of alternative reasons why the 
Farmer does not act on his matrimonial rights (256-261): the one thing he cannot accept is that 
a peasant might behave with honour.  More importantly, Euripides challenges the view that 
excellence is an inherited quality.  Orestes and Pylades may present as aristocratic young men, 
but – as the Old Man observes to Elektra – appearances can be deceptive, especially the 
appearances of apparently well-born young men, many of whom turn out to be entirely 
worthless (550-552).  A second issue concerning the transmission of ethos in this play is the 
problematic relationship between the possession of wealth and a noble nature.  According to 
Elektra, it is a universally accepted truth that nobody wants to be friends with or give assistance 
to the very poor (1131).  Elektra’s filthy appearance of poverty and social deprivation are 
voluntary, however, as is her service in the most menial of tasks – something the Farmer has 
specifically requested her not to do (64-66).  Textual evidence indicates that the Farmer’s oikos 
does have slaves, and that the Farmer himself is no slave; to describe their oikos as very poor 
                                                          
172 On Euripides’ revulsion at the immoral matricide, see Norwood (1948:256-257); Vellacott (1963:11); O’Brien 
(1964:25, 30); Bowra (1967:52); Walton (1980:27); Arnott (1981:189); Trypanis (1981:181); Ferguson (1987:16); 
Davie (1998:133-134).  See also Rosslyn (2000:57), who argues that the absence of Athene and the progress of 
civilization (as in Eumenides) proves that Euripides rejects the whole story as an appropriate foundational myth 
for Athens.  Cf. Lembke and Reckford (2010:4), who suggest that so-called “moral outrage over matricide” may 
be a modern projection; in their view, Greek men would (generally) have approved Orestes’ actions. 
173 On Euripides’ anti-aristocratic Elektra, see Arnott (1981:179, 189); Rosslyn (2000:55).  On the everyday anti-
aristocratic ambience of the play, see Webster (1967:15); Arnott (1981:180); Sharrock and Ash (2002:66). 
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obscures the much worse terrible conditions of all those in the ancient world without any 
property at all, including legal ownership of their own persons.  The wise Farmer, however, 
declares that it is possible to show a noble nature even if one is poor (362-363).  Unlike most 
characters in tragedy, Orestes actually learns a valuable life-lesson from his encounter with a 
different kind of person: nobility cannot be predicted from appearance or possession of wealth; 
those who judge character from these cues are fools, and would better assess nobility from how 
people actually live, whatever their material resources (367-385, 394-396).174  Orestes – and 
the Elektra’s audience – also learn that the lowest class – the unfree –also possess the natural 
capacity for true loyalty (that is, to the patriline of their rulers).  The early conversation between 
the Old Man and Orestes on the likelihood of a slave uprising against Aigisthos’ regime 
assumes that slaves will support whomever is presently most powerful, for that is their nature 
(631-636); after the assassination of Aigisthos, the palace slaves initially take arms against 
Orestes in support of the present regime – Klytaimestra is still technically their queen – but as 
soon as Atreid Orestes declares himself and is authenticated by an elderly slave, the slaves 
freely commit themselves to his rule, a gratifying display of loyalty to the house (844-855). 
 
Euripides’ Elektra dislodges the matricide of Klytaimestra from its traditional, purely 
aristocratic context: a peasant is the noblest character in the play; a woman renowned for evil 
turns out to be an unprepossessing grandmother who fears the disapproval of the demos; and 
the young Atreid pillars of patriarchy are stricken with regret upon fulfilling their obligation to 
revenge.  Euripides’ children – under orders from a suspect divine authority – are shown to be 
acting primarily in their own material interests; Orestes comes to kill his mother and Aigisthos 
in order to recover his patrimony, his city, and his crown (610-614).  Modern criticism tends to 
dismiss Elektra’s horror at social demotion, viewing the good Farmer as a worthy marriage-
mate, but Elektra is reasonably motivated by issues of inheritance: the children of Agamemnon 
are dispossessed, and the rule of Argos should belong to her full brother.  These are concerns 
which all narrative – including serious ancient and modern drama – foregrounds: the same 
human preoccupation with who will rule, who they will mate with, and who are their true 
offspring and legitimate heirs.175  When all the evidence has been presented, the dispossessed 
                                                          
174 See also Elektra’s excursus over the corpse of Aigisthos, claiming that possession of wealth is brief, and only 
good character remains true (940-944); cf. the truly noble Farmer, who will be bought off with great wealth and 
packed off to Phokis – by the judgement of the gods – to witness his virgin wife properly married to her cousin 
Pylades, a genuine noble (1284-1287). 
175 See also Burnett (1998:237), who agrees that Elektra’s desire for vengeance is equally motivated by Aigisthos’ 
restriction of her right to marry and transmit her inherited class-status.  Cf. McLeish (2003:134), who believes that 
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aristocrats who have inarguably committed the most impious atrocities to regain their power 
and wealth are no longer to be viewed as heroic, while the vulnerable, slandered Klytaimestra 
– who eloquently observes that an evil reputation destroys a woman (1013-1029) – is given 
every opportunity in Euripides’ Elektra to refute previous accusations and slurs.  Another of 
Euripides’ Oresteia-plays picks up on the ongoing consequences for these accursed, antiheroic 
Atreids: Euripides’ Iphigeneia among the Taurians strands the matricidal Orestes upon a distant 
shore accompanied by his loyal companion Pylades, separated from Elektra but reunited with 
a sister he never thought to see again.  The IT offers a reading of Klytaimestra through the eyes 
of the one Atreid child without reason to hate her: Iphigeneia. 
 
Euripides: Iphigeneia among the Taurians 
 
Iphigeneia among the Taurians (414 or 413 BCE) is an Oresteia sequel which tracks down the 
family’s missing daughter, and gives her a voice long denied.176  Rescued and deposited at the 
end of the known Greek world, Iphigeneia has had many years to contemplate her father’s 
willingness to murder her, but no time at all to reflect on her mother’s vengeance upon 
Agamemnon, for she has not yet heard of it, nor of Klytaimestra’s murder at the hands of her 
son.  Euripides places his surprisingly sympathetic characters in a traditional narrative pattern 
of maiden and hero in flight with stolen treasure.177  Critics vigorously debate this otherwise 
unusual tragedy’s quality and content and some – including Aristotle (Poet. 1452b) – view the 
IT as one of Euripides’ best works.178  Some contend that the IT is optimistic and happy, and 
that the matricide of Klytaimestra is depicted positively.179  Rescue – not retaliation – is the 
                                                          
the question of who has the right to rule, and how that power should be transmitted, motivates the play’s action in 
ways a modern audience cannot fully grasp. 
176 On the IT as the obvious sequel to Aiskhylos’ Oresteia, see Caldwell (1974/75:34); Cropp (2000:36); Fletcher 
(2003:44); Sommerstein (2005:166); Storey and Allan (2005:268).  On the dating of the IT, see Lattimore (1973:3): 
413 BCE; and Blaiklock (1952:176): 414 BCE.  Cropp (2000:60) argues that either of these two could be correct.  
Storey and Allan (2005:268) suggest 414-411 BCE. 
177 Cf. Belfiore (1992a:362-363), who contends that the focus of character-centric modern scholars on the tragedy’s 
intrigue neglects those aspects of the IT’s plot that most impressed Aristotle: the brother-sister near-killing, and 
the recognition as escape-from-peril. 
178 Arist. Poet. 1452b.  On the greatness of the IT, see Norwood (1948:248); Hulton (1962:368); Belfiore 
(1992a:368-370); Kovacs (1999:146); Taplin (2007:149).  On the IT’s remarkable plot innovations, see Ferguson 
(1972:400); O’Brien (1988a:98); McDonald (2003:123); Rutherford (2012:336). 
179 McLeish (2003:166-167) describes the IT as a busy, sunny drama with a happy ending, very like New Comedy.  
According to Hall (2010:273), Euripides became increasingly interested in the fate of Orestes after the matricide.  
Cf. Burnett (1971:60), who argues that the miasma of matricide in IT becomes a fortunate factor enabling the 
children’s happy escape. 
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thematic focus of this play, however, and there are numerous character and thematic doublings, 
as well as inversions of roles – the sacrificed becomes a sacrificer, and Artemis’ avatar is saved 
by Iphigeneia, who was herself once saved by the goddess.180  Beneath all of the narrative 
intrigue lies the fact of a young girl’s sacrifice by her father, and the impending slaughter of a 
vulnerable, troubled brother; the play is full of reference to intrafamilial murder.  The 
Herdsman’s first address to Iphigeneia acknowledges her family connections (238-239), 
reminding the audience of the most important facts of her family life: she was slain by one 
parent and – in a rare Klytaimestra-centric admission in this genre – avenged by the other.  
Scholars generally read Iphigeneia as an agreeable and attractive tragic heroine, but there is less 
agreement on her attitude toward her parents: the father who slew her and the mother who 
avenged her.181 
 
Agamemnon’s slaughter of Klytaimestra’s previous husband and child does not appear in this 
play; rather, Iphigeneia informs us that she was conceived after Klytaimestra loosed her maiden 
girdle, and that she therefore is the first-born of Λήδας ἁ τλάμων κούρα, ‘the tlamōn daughter 
of Leda’ (IT 209-210).  Many translate tlamōn as ‘wretched’ of ‘ill-fated’, but it can equally 
denote ‘patient’, ‘enduring’, ‘steadfast’, as well as ‘overbold’; Euripides places this word here 
because the mother of Iphigeneia is all of these things.  Since Iphigeneia does not yet know of 
Agamemnon’s and Klytaimestra’s murders, she does not yet imagine that her mother has been 
both overbold and ill-fated.  The story of Iphigeneia’s own family experiences in the IT follows 
the chorus’ narrative of the woes of Tantalos’ house, including the familiar catastrophes 
following the arrival of the golden lamb (179-202).182  In Iphigeneia’s opinion, her mother’s 
nurture of her daughter was disrespected by her father, who sacrificed his child as a beast in a 
joyless ritual (211-213); she further describes herself as a sacrificial animal, confirming that her 
own father was prime mover of the evil events (359-371).  Iphigeneia thought she was to be 
married to Akhilleus, but now – utterly betrayed by the father she adored – she dwells on the 
shore of the Hostile Sea, ‘without husband, without children, without city, without friend’ (220).  
                                                          
180 On doubling in character and plot, see Burnett (1971:48); Caldwell (1974/75:25); Sansone (1975:284-287); 
Garner (1990:171); Lubeck (1993:15); Belfiore (2000:25); Zeitlin (2005:201).  On Euripides’ handling of the 
tradition of Iphigeneia’s rescue (and the innovation of her second rescue), see Lattimore (1964:40-41); Ferguson 
(1972:410); Cropp (2000:45-46); Hall (2013:xxvi). 
181 On the characterization of an attractive Iphigeneia, see Lattimore (1973:5); Whitman (1974:17); Vellacott 
(1975:201); Hall (2013:298).  Others point to Iphigeneia’s darker role as sacrificer of human captives for twenty 
years; see Bell (1991:264); Taplin (2007:150).  On narrative incoherencies in Iphigeneia’s memories of her past, 
see Ferguson (1972:403, 407); Vellacott (1984:165); Bell (1991:264). 
182 As in Euripides’ Elektra, the golden lamb signifies that kingship is inseparable from unbearable misfortune. 
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Despite her awareness of Agamemnon’s impious sacrifice, Iphigeneia displaces the ultimate 
responsibility for her death onto her uncle Menelaos and her aunt Helen, for whose sake the 
war was waged (355-358).  Iphigeneia hates Helen (525), and believes that Helen owes her a 
debt (523); the incognito Orestes also insists that Iphigeneia died for the sake of a wretched 
woman (566).  The chorus of enslaved Greek women in the Taurian temple support Iphigeneia’s 
prayer that Λήδας Ἑλένα φίλα/ παῖς ‘Leda’s beloved daughter Helen’ might arrive, and have 
her throat cut by Iphigeneia’s hand in payment for her crimes (439-446).  Iphigeneia’s and 
Orestes’s later conversation about Helen and Menelaos also shows that there is no love lost 
between the twin branches of the Atreid family (531-535). 
 
After Aunt Helen, Iphigeneia hates all of the Greeks most closely involved with putting her to 
death, including the prophet Kalkhas (531-533), and Odysseus (533-535), and she has in no 
way forgiven them.  The Taurians, aware of her pitiable history, view her preparation of 
strangers for sacrifice as an opportunity to avenge herself upon Greece (337-350).  Once she 
carried out her religious duties with compassion for her victims, but recent dreams of the killing 
at Aulis have made her savage; she is prepared to bestow yet another curse upon her own oikos, 
if her brother does not fetch her home to Argos (774-778).  She declares that Artemis saved her 
by substituting a deer, and it was this that Agamemnon truly killed (783-786); every tragedy so 
far (and Euripides’ Iphigeneia in Aulis is yet to come) makes the blood upon the altar that of 
Iphigeneia, however.  Orestes seems to have no idea of any deer: his report to the unknown 
Argive insists that there is no question that Iphigeneia was slain (563-566).  Iphigeneia endures 
in a liminal state – alive and dead, rescued and slain – as her letter to Orestes demonstrates 
(770-771); all of these in-between years she has spent in brooding upon the father who betrayed 
her. 
 
Questioning her designated sacrificial victim – the incognito Orestes – Iphigeneia enquires 
about the son of Atreus, the so-called King Agamemnon (545).  Upon hearing that the once 
prosperous man is dead, slaughtered by his own wife (552), her response is remarkable (553): 
without knowing why Klytaimestra acted, Iphigeneia simultaneously pities the ‘lamentable’ 
woman who killed her husband, and the father who also committed murder.183  Having heard 
that her killer Agamemnon is now dead, her need for vengeance is easily set aside.  On hearing 
more of the story, she approves the κακὸν δίκαιον ‘righteous evil’ (559) committed by the son 
                                                          
183 On the IT as the only instance of any character’s genuine love for Klytaimestra, see Vellacott (1984b:167). 
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against the husband-killer, but – as Orestes wryly observes – for all its righteousness, no god 
blesses this deed (560).  Iphigeneia enquires about the ‘daughter of the house’ (561).  At first, 
Orestes speaks of Elektra (562), but Iphigeneia turns the conversation to the sacrificed daughter 
(563).  Orestes simply confirms that this daughter is dead (564); Iphigeneia replies that both 
daughter and father who killed her are τάλαινα, ‘wretched’ (565).  As she later laments the false 
marriage that ensnared her, and the holy water used at her sacrifice, Orestes replies with what 
might possibly be the only recriminations he ever utters against his father’s treacherous murder 
of Iphigeneia: ᾤμωξα κἀγὼ τόλμαν ἣν ἔτλη πατήρ, ‘And I also lament our father’s cruel deed’ 
(863).184  Having finally learned Orestes’ true identity, Iphigeneia declares that self-restraint – 
not revenge – is the only path to the elimination of the family curse (991-995); she has every 
natural right to avenge herself upon the patriline of the father who slaughtered her at Aulis, but 
perceives that their house will be freed from the family curse only by forgoing the obligation 
and desire for revenge. 
 
Iphigeneia has fostered a hatred of her father all these years, but she recalls her mother with 
true and tender regard.185  Before Orestes has disclosed his real identity, Iphigeneia recalls her 
infant brother, 
 
ὃν ἔλιπον ἐπιμαστίδιον, 
ἔτι βρέφος, ἔτι νέον, ἔτι θάλος 
ἐν χερσὶν ματρὸς πρὸς στέρνοις, 
 
‘whom I left still at the breast, still a new-born babe, still brand-new, still a child in the 
hands and heart of his mother’ (231-234). 
 
Her memory of the infant Orestes suckling at the same breast which Klytaimestra will 
desperately proffer in a futile attempt to save her life is a rare tragic description of Klytaimestra 
as an engaged and loving mother, in contrast to the hostile witness statements in previous works 
which denied she was Orestes’ real mother.  As Orestes tries to persuade Iphigeneia of his true 
identity, he calls upon the happy memories of a maternal Klytaimestra he is sure she can recall: 
the bath she received from her own mother’s hands in preparation for her marriage to Akhilleus 
                                                          
184 Τόλμαν denotes daring, boldness, and effrontery, but can also refer to a daring cruelty. 
185 On Iphigeneia’s positive imagery of Klytaimestra, see also Vellacott (1984b:165, 170). 
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(818), and the lock of hair she sent from Aulis to Klytaimestra upon learning she would be 
sacrificed (820).186  Naturally, Iphigeneia is interested in finding out why her mother has killed 
her father (926), but Orestes refuses to answer any of her questions about the first cause of the 
matricide (925, 927).  In Euripides’ Elektra, both Orestes and Elektra regretted their terrible 
deed as soon as they accomplished it: now, Orestes cannot bear to remember that righteous evil, 
an act which the gods disapprove.  Even the sympathetic Taurian king Thoas has heard of that 
abominable matricide, committed by ὃν Τυνδαρὶς τίκτει κόρη, ‘he who Tyndareos’ daughter 
brought into the world’ (1319).  We have heard of ‘Orestes son of Agamemnon’ so often that 
it is a shock to be reminded of his maternal lineage.  The Messenger, on the other hand, 
describes Iphigeneia as Agamemnon’s daughter three times in his report to king Thoas (1290, 
1331, and 1398).  Orestes might wish to obscure the dreadful reality of the corrupted child-
parent relationship, but Euripides forces the audience to confront both horrors: a son has slain 
the mother who bore him, and a father has slain the daughter he begot. 
 
Iphigeneia has been betrayed by the Greeks, kept from family, homeland, and any chance of 
marriage and children – although without the fierce resentment seen in her sister – and through 
Artemis’ intervention forced for twenty years to sacrifice humans: it is difficult to view her 
substitution at Aulis as a rescue.187  She has lost any chance at a normal life, but she has also 
lost her human innocence, just as Orestes’ rescue from sacrifice here at Tauris may save his 
house from extinction, but – as a Tantalid and matricide – the Atreid heir can never fully regain 
his humanity.  Like Iphigeneia Orestes may be born of Tyndareos’ daughter (806), but on his 
father’s side he is the true heir of Pelops (807); Orestes’ initial joy at discovering his sister 
evokes the special bond shared by siblings of the same father (800-801).  He is most persuasive 
in persuading Iphigeneia of his identity through his intimate knowledge of the terrible strife 
between Thyestes and Atreus, and the ambivalent blessing of the golden lamb (811-813); and 
of Pelops’ murder of Oinomaos (811-826); his final argument is the presence in the house of 
the spear used by Pelops to kill the father of his would-be wife (822-826).  Mention of this 
hidden spear is a convenient way to bring attention back to Pelops’ treacherous behaviour.188  
This is the unavoidable truth of the family history, but having situated Orestes as the latest scion 
                                                          
186 This detail alone should suggest that Euripides’ later placement of Klytaimestra at Aulis at the time of sacrifice 
is a startling innovation, and one increasing sympathy for the horrified mother. 
187 Hall (2013:xxvi) contends that Iphigeneia is in her middle-thirties; a woman’s fertility begins to rapidly degrade 
from her early thirties on. 
188 According to O’Brien (1988a:113), the hidden spear of Pelops is a Euripidean innovation.  Other myth makes 
Pelops responsible for the sabotage of Oinamaos’ chariot which causes the king’s death. 
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of many evil-doers, Euripides must somehow make his Orestes a nice fellow.189  Matricidal 
Orestes is recuperated as the selfless true friend of Pylades, once the loyal assistant in killing 
Klytaimestra, but now also a much nicer character in this play; Orestes offers his own life so 
that his friend Pylades might live (605-608), an astonishing – and unprecedented – self-sacrifice 
for any Pelopid. 
 
As Iphigeneia’s patient information-gathering reveals (912-921), Pylades may be Elektra’s 
cousin (and thus Iphigeneia’s cousin) but, more importantly, he is the accursed Orestes’ only 
friend (919).190  Pylades in Euripides’ Orestes is also now his brother-in-law; if Orestes dies 
upon this mission, and if Pylades gets children on Elektra, then the house of Agamemnon will 
survive (698).  However, Pylades is worried, as he well might be, that ‘the many and the evil’ 
will only see that he abandoned Orestes in Tauris, in order to get his hands upon the throne 
through marriage to Elektra, the ἔγκληρος ‘heiress’ (678-682).  Refuting all of Apollo’s 
argument on biological inheritance in Aiskhylos’ Eumenides, Orestes confirms that Elektra’s 
offspring by Pylades will then be Agamemnon’s true descendants; Pylades’ reassurance to 
Orestes about the survival of the Atreid patriline is centred on their homosocial friendship, 
however, not on attachment to his future wife Elektra (716-717).  Orestes declares that Pylades 
is sprung of a pure, undiseased house, in comparison with the δυσσεβῆ καὶ δυστυχῆ ‘godless 
and unfortunate’ Atreids (693-694), but Pylades is also a grandson of Atreus, through Anaxibia 
the sister of Agamemnon.191  Aiskhylos’ Orestes insisted that he had been purified; Euripides’ 
Orestes wears his pollution for the killing of Klytaimestra as a badge of guilt, undeniable, and 
ineradicable. 
 
                                                          
189 According to some, Euripides disapproved Orestes in the IT; see Ferguson (1972:401); Cropp (2000:36-37); 
Wright (2005a:283-284).  For more positive views of Orestes’ character and ethos, see also Lattimore (1973:5); 
Whitman (1974:19-20); Sansone (1975:286); Kovacs (1999:48); McDonald (2003:123).  Cf. Blaiklock 
(1952:177), who contends that the IT is not at all interested in Orestes’ character. 
190 The fourth-century Erōtes, long attributed to Lucian, is the first real reference to Pylades also having to stand 
trial for Klytaimestra’s death, although there is no extant play which does not make him an active accessory to 
matricide.  Euripides’ Orestes actually casts Pylades as the principal villain of the attempt to assassinate Helen, 
kidnap and kill Hermione, and burn down the palace.  Kallikratidas’ defence of the love of boys utilizes the story 
of Pylades and Orestes as the perfect example of selfless male love: ‘the two men lived together right from infancy, 
slew Klytaimestra and Aigisthos together, and stood trial for the matricide together… Pylades tended Orestes like 
a lover and like a father in his madness… and each man wanted to be the one to sacrifice himself to save the other’ 
(Er. 47).  See Lucian.  1925.  Lucian. Vol. IV.  With an English translation by A. M. Harmon.  London: Heinemann. 
191 In this play Atreus’ grandson Pylades, whose hand assisted Orestes in killing Klytaimestra, completely escapes 




Arriving in Tauris, Orestes raves that he is being driven mad by the Erinyes that only he can 
see, in punishment for his unforgivable crime (77-81).  The Herdsman – a witness to his 
madness – passes his reports on to Iphigeneia (284-290): the Erinyes are like hellish dragons, 
their hound-like faces fringed around with deadly snakes; they breathe fire and gore, and beat 
their wings (286-289).  Worst of all, Orestes cannot escape the vision of his mother’s body 
carried in the Fury’s arms, about to be hurled at him (290).192  The crazed Orestes attacks cattle, 
and then falls to the ground, foaming at the mouth (307-308).  These ‘mother’s hounds’ will 
never leave him alone (928-932), yet by the time he gets to Tauris, Orestes has been acquitted 
by the gods: some of the Erinyes – according to Aiskhylos, at least – accepted Athena’s bribe, 
but others continue to dog Orestes, even to the end of the known world (961-944).  Orestes 
realizes now: he has been betrayed by the god who tricked him into committing matricide, and 
Apollo has sent him as far away from Hellas as possible, in shame (711-715).  The awful things 
he has done to his mother – about which he will not speak – occurred because κακὰ/ ἐς χεῖρας 
ἦλθε, ‘evil came into my hands’ (940-941).  That evil led to an act which was not righteous, 
despite the earlier attempts of Aiskhylos and Sophokles to paint it as such; Orestes’ hands are 
still stained with blood, and the Erinyes have every right to pursue him. 
 
The Atreid siblings also play out conventional generic gender-stereotypes in this play.  The 
clever Iphigeneia offers to employ deception on Orestes’ behalf (1031), for example, and 
Orestes agrees, knowing that δειναὶ γὰρ αἱ γυναῖκες εὑρίσκειν τέχνας, ‘women are dreadfully 
proficient in the art of contrivance’ (1032).193  Iphigeneia takes advantage of the trust of the 
Taurians, exploiting her local reputation for piety and wisdom in order to deceive the king 
(1199-1202).  Orestes also urges Iphigeneia to manipulate the chorus’ especially feminine 
susceptibility to empathy (1054), and so Iphigeneia appeals – atypically, for tragedy – to a 
notional commonality of interest between women, in order to enlist the chorus’ support (1060-
1062).194  Iphigeneia’s self-interested request for the chorus’ complicity is a dangerous matter: 
these Greek women are slaves, far from home, and completely at the mercy of their barbarian 
captors; Iphigeneia promises that if the chorus help her and her kin to escape, she will ensure 
that the Greek women are rescued (1067-1068).  It is with some surprise that we learn from 
                                                          
192 For a powerful modern illustration of this moving scene in IT, see The Remorse of Orestes (1862), by William-
Adolphe Bouguereau. 
193 Orestes himself, of course, resists his mother’s attempts to persuade him to forgiveness, an important aspect of 
every tragic version of the matricide. 




Athena that these women are going to have a happy ending, escorted from Tauris as reward for 
the γνώμης δικαίας ‘righteousness of their resolve’ (1467-1468): the female-slave chorus in 
tragedy does not generally enjoy such good fortune. 
 
The play explores how the endless clash between male and female social and reproductive 
interests shape a family’s history.  Iphigeneia’s declaration that a house yearns for a lost man, 
but little notices the loss of a woman (1005-1006), explains her offer to sacrifice her own life 
in order to save Orestes, but draws pointed attention to an unfortunate family history: the loss 
of Iphigeneia – a mere female – actually created very notable consequences: the assassination 
of Agamemnon; the usurpation of the throne of Argos by Aigisthos; the impious matricide of 
Klytaimestra; and the madness and exile of Atreid heir Orestes to the end of the world, 
persecuted by the Erinyes.  The loss of another woman of the house – Helen – had the most far-
reaching effects of all: the fall of the Troy, and widespread death and disruption of Greek lives.  
Orestes’ response to Iphigeneia’s selfless offer shows that murdering his mother has taught him 
a lesson worth the learning: that the women of the house are important; Orestes will not rest 
now until the lost Iphigeneia is safely returned to the oikos (1007-1011).  Orestes may be the 
first Atreid to respect the lives of others, even when at risk to his own.  Similarly, Iphigeneia is 
perhaps the first Atreid woman (perhaps even the first tragic woman), to equate the love for a 
sister – Elektra – as highly as for her brother (1056-1059).  Euripides’ attempts to make Orestes 
a better man do not extend to making the Greeks better world-citizens, however; Orestes and 
Iphigeneia’s exchange on the moral acceptability of murdering the barbarian king Thoas, their 
host, indicate that self-interest must prevail (1020-1023).  Nor is there reason to suggest that 
Euripides wants the Athenians to reconsider their belief in themselves as superior; that 
Iphigeneia should lie to the king who respects and admires her is understandable (1157-1221): 
he is, after all, not a Greek.  Nonetheless, it is significant that King Thoas, upon hearing about 
the matricide, insists that Greeks have transgressed boundaries that not even a barbarian would 
dare (1174).195 
 
Euripides constantly reminds the play’s audience that the Atreid family’s bleak history lurks 
behind all of the suffering, but he takes the analysis further: the causes of Iphigeneia’s death 
are ancestral but also contemporary; spiritual, but also social.  The play’s very first word is 
                                                          




‘Pelops’ (1), and Iphigeneia describes how this ancestor wins Hippodameia in marriage; Atreus 
is later born, and then his sons Agamemnon and Menelaos; Agamemnon is her begetter, but 
Iphigeneia identifies herself matrilineally as τῆς Τυνδαρείας θυγατρὸς Ἰφιγένεια παῖς, 
‘Iphigenia, daughter of Tyndareos’ child’ (5).  We then learn that she was sacrificed by her 
father ‘for Helen’s sake’ at Aulis (9-10), followed by a stark (and rare) evaluation of 
Agamemnon’s real reasons for assembling the fleet: he wanted a καλλίνικον στέφανον, a 
‘gloriously triumphant crown of victory’ (12), and he was τούς θ᾽ ὑβρισθέντας γάμους/ Ἑλένης 
μετελθεῖν, Μενέλεῳ χάριν φέρων, ‘doing a favour for Menelaos, prosecuting the trespass upon 
his marriage to Helen’ (13-14).  There is no suggestion here that he was aiming to defend Greek 
marriages; rather, Iphigeneia’s life counted for nothing against the demands of personal glory 
and the obligations to patrilineal philoi, and Agamemnon’s social and political standing 
required his daughter’s death.196  Iphigeneia’s version of events also bestows a heavy degree of 
guilt upon Kalkhas, the spiritual mentor of the Akhaians’ military adventure; according to 
Kalkhas, the unfavourable winds at Aulis are the result of Agamemnon’s failure to fulfil his 
vow to Artemis of the year’s fairest product, and in the prophet’s view, this must refer to 
Klytaimestra’s child Iphigeneia (17-24).  We also learn from her that the false enticement of 
marriage to Akhilleus was actually the idea of her father’s ally Odysseus (22-25).  Iphigeneia 
insists that she was an unwilling victim as the Akhaians held her over the altar, and put her to 
the sword (26-27); now she consecrates for sacrifice those Greeks – also unwilling victims – 
who venture as far as the land of the Taurians, and this is the price of her rescue from the altar 
by Artemis (28-41).  The rescued Iphigeneia in the IT is still in debt with Artemis, however: 
she is not going to return home with Orestes, but is destined to live as key-keeper in the temple 
at Brauron, receiving the garments of women who have died in childbirth, bound to Artemis 
and forever apart from her family (1462-1467).  Blood-loving Artemis is entitled to keep 
Agamemnon’s fairest product as of right, from before she was even born, despite the second 
apparent rescue of this Atreid princess by her brother.  Iphigeneia further insists that, if the 
goddess does not save the Pelopids (Iphigeneia, Orestes, and Pylades), humans will no longer 
believe Apollo’s oracles, but we have already seen that Apollo’s oracles are not to be trusted 
(711-715).  The gods have not been kind to the Atreids, and the Atreids are in general no less 
unkind to each other; all of their wealth, power, and glory has not brought this family lasting 
happiness.  Iphigeneia can never forget that – and the chorus remind her – she is the daughter 
                                                          
196 That Menelaos as political ally is also blood-kin only intensified the pressures upon Agamemnon at Aulis. 
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of a man who commanded a thousand ships and ten thousand men at the siege of Troy, the 
eldest of Atreus’ glorious sons – and of a father who slew her like a beast (138-143). 
 
The IT serves to highlight the incompatibility between males’ pursuit of victory and status 
through many generations and females’ reproductive life-time success.197  The rot in this family 
is deeply embedded: as the chorus observes, δεινή τις ὀργὴ δαιμόνων ἐπέζεσε/ τὸ Ταντάλειον 
σπέρμα διὰ πόνων τ᾽ ἄγει, ‘The wrath of some dreadful demon boils over against the seed of 
Tantalos through the conveyance of suffering’ (987-988).  Orestes still believes that their 
illustrious lineage is a blessing, however, and it is simply the chances of life which have brought 
them evil (850), but Iphigeneia sees clearly that while she was ill-fated, so was the father who 
slaughtered her (851).  Possession of political power in the house is the reason that woes 
continue: according to this play, the sorrows of the house began with the dispute between the 
Pelopid brothers – the latest spawn of Tantalos – over the golden lamb, the sacred signifier of 
kingship (186-202).  With the weight of family ambition hanging over them at all times it is no 
surprise that Iphigeneia wonders whether any being – mortal, divine, or ‘something between’ – 
can deliver the Atreid children from evil (898-899).  Some critics suggest that this play itself is 
the something between (898-899) which will deliver the children, and bring the sickening cycle 
of inter-family violence to a close.198  Iphigeneia is certainly done with her ill-will toward 
Agamemnon, but on hearing that Klytaimestra was his killer, she does not bear her mother any 
malice, unlike other Atreid siblings; even Orestes takes no opportunity in this play to denigrate 
his father’s killer.  It is no coincidence that the ever-mourning Elektra is absent from this play: 
her active antipathy toward Klytaimestra is too fixed in myth for even Euripides to avert. 
 
Klytaimestra in the IT is forgiven and reinscribed as a tender and loving mother.  The 
characterization of Iphigeneia shows us the cherished, sensible daughter who is as much a 
victim of her culture as of the gods and of her own terrible lineage as of her own ambitious 
father.  This is the daughter whose ethos mirrors that of her mother, as the play’s many 
references to the matriline confirm.  There may be some dispute as to the extent to which the 
Atreids are redeemed in this play, but there can hardly be doubt that Tyndarid Klytaimestra, at 
                                                          
197 A number of other scholars point to the family ethos of betrayal and kin-killing over generations of Atreides; 
see Sansone (1975:290); Vellacott (1984b:164); Belfiore (2000:23-24); Zeitlin (2005:201). 
198 On the IT as signalling the end of Tantalid doom and the redemption of both Iphigeneia and Orestes from the 
barbarism of the Tantalid lineage, see Burnett (1971:47); Caldwell (1974/75:38); Sansone (1975:295); Belfiore 
(2000:22); Cropp (2000:31, 35).  Continuation of the family history in myth reports that Orestes returns home to 
slay his brother Aletes, while Erigone will later prosecute the kin-killing Orestes in the Athenian courts. 
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least, is absolved in the IT of her famous reputation for unforgivable evil.  The unforgivability 
of the crime done to Klytaimestra, however, is foregrounded in Euripides’ next Oresteia work: 
the Orestes shows why redemption for Orestes’ immoral and unjustified – and unjustifiable – 




If Orestes of the IT is a better kind of Atreid, then surely the eponymous protagonist of 
Euripides’ Orestes of 408 BCE is a much worse one.199  Family dysfunction lies at the core of 
much popular modern fiction, just as much as it did in ancient literature, and nothing draws out 
quite so much bad behaviour as reunion between warring branches of a family: the unexpected 
appearance of Klytaimestra’s remaining family – her father Tyndareos, her kindly sister and 
her sweet niece – turns this play into dark comedy family-reunion.  According to some critics, 
only the peripheral (and in fact, non-Atreid) members of this dysfunctional family represent 
goodness, and relative sanity.200  This drama owes much to Aiskhylos’ Oresteia and the 
Elektras of Sophokles and Euripides but Euripides takes particular trouble in Orestes to contrast 
irremediably destructive violence of the corrupt Atreids with Tyndarid compassion and 
innocence.201  Euripides implies that Klytaimestra married into an unrepentantly immoral 
family, and the so-called ‘resolution’ of the Orestes confirms that there can never be a happy 
ending for these Pelopid-Atreids.202  Klytaimestra’s action against her husband appears in an 
anti-Atreid light: Agamemnon was a member of a god-accursed, inhumane oikos, and his wife 
did not deserve to be killed by youngsters as blighted as their infamous ancestors; Atreid 
Orestes’ acquittal in Aiskhylos’ Athens is lambasted here through his conviction and death-
sentence in Euripides’ Argos.203 
                                                          
199 On the play’s production date as 408 BCE, see Lesky (1966a:393); Vellacott (1984b:176); Storey and Allan 
(2005:272); Wright (2006:33); Carson (2009:178).  On the overwhelming popularity of the Orestes in the ancient 
world, see Lesky (1966a:393); West (1987:28); Hall (2010:285).  Scholars struggle to explain the popularity of a 
play with so many amoral, unlikable characters; see Fuqua (1978:2); Wolff (1983:341, 356); Vellacott 
(1984b:179); Euben (1986:223); Porter (1994:43); Ewans (2000b:xix-xx); McLeish (2003:176); Morford and 
Lenardon (2007:446); Carson (2009:178).  On the excellence of the Orestes, see Zeitlin (2003b:309); Nisetich 
(2010:183). 
200 Blaiklock (1952:175); Conacher (1967:218); Vellacott (1984b:182); Lloyd (1992:118). 
201 Fuqua (1978:7); Garner (1990:149); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003:401); Zeitlin (2003b:312).  On the Orestes as an 
indictment of Greek inhumanity, see Vickers (1973:595); Vellacott (1984b:176, 181), Porter (1994:53), and 
Carson (2009:178) argue that the Orestes’ heavy atmosphere of violence derives from Euripides’ despair and 
disgust at political events of the period, especially the long war with Sparta. 
202 On the disharmonious ending of the Orestes, see Vickers (1973:595); Burnett (1998:266). 




Like other tragedians, Euripides foregrounds gender politics in his drama, but in Orestes he is 
especially interested in the collision of the Atreids’ inherited ethos with women’s and men’s 
individual life-histories.  The only good Atreid in this tale – Menelaos – is at pains to distance 
himself from his patriline, a scathing contrast to the tragic Elektra’s famous determination to 
cast off all association with her mother’s wicked heritage.  The behaviour of the young Atreids 
Orestes and Elektra and their Pelopid cousin Pylades verges upon demonic by the close of the 
play, while Orestes’ remorse and redemption as intimated in the IT is rejected and ridiculed in 
the course of the narrative.204  Many critics identify the desperate situation of the play’s three 
young protagonists with the roaming, anti-democratic groups of aristocratic hetaireiai – ‘clubs 
of companions’ – in 408 BCE, who created chaos in Athens through murders and arson, and 
would only tolerate democracy if they themselves could control the demos.205  That struggle to 
rule the city of Athens is used here to frame the contest between the three Pelopids who 
committed the worst crime possible – the murder of their own mother – and the normal, 
everyday citizens who abhorred such kin-killers; the murder of close kin betrays the natural, 
original laws of altruism, which follow the degree of genetic relationship.206  The general tone 
of Orestes is one of despair at the acquittal of the indefensible, with the democratic citizenry at 
the mercy of amoral demagoguery, and the health of the city threatened by the morally depraved 
and criminally insane.207  More significantly for this present study, this work also features 
thematic elements centred upon the reproductive politics of gender inequity, highlighting the 
social necessity of male control over female procreative power, and the idealization of 
generation-by-the-male; the misogynistic passages in the Orestes reflect male fear of the 
challenge of female sexuality to paternal certainty.208  Echoing Apollo in Aiskhylos’ 
                                                          
204 On the unpleasantness of the Atreid children and their cousin in this work, see Zelenak (1998:127, 129); Storey 
and Allan (2005:272).  Cf. Lesky (1983b:352), who argues that there is “fervent love” between Orestes and Elektra, 
while cousin Pylades’ demonstrates “self-sacrificing friendship”. 
205 Ferguson (1972:559); Willink (1986:xxiii); Hall (1993b:265, 267, 2010:286); Zelenak (1998:128); Fletcher 
(2012:140).  Some argue that the play’s ending demonstrates Euripides’ loss of all hope due to a corrupt humanity’s 
expedient militarism, see Vickers (1973:587); Vellacott (1975:71); Burnett (1998:249). 
206 On altruism and kin relationships, see Chapter 1, pp. 44-45; 44n198; 52n252; 53; 53n258; 77. 
207 Norwood (1948:270); Blaiklock (1952:188); Kitto (1968:331) Ferguson (1972:562). 
208 On cultural responses to males’ fear of female sexual threat to paternal certainty, see Chapter 1, pp. 69-70; 
70n359; 72-73; 73n377; 77; 81-84; 84n436.  See also Nisetich (2010:176-177), who argues that the gender conflict 




Eumenides, Orestes insists that he was obliged to come to his father’s rather than mother’s 
defence because his father was the principal begetter (Or. 552ff).209 
 
This play’s Orestes defends his matricide as an act of love for his father; furthermore, in his 
view, anyone with a virtuous mother is a lucky exception, because wickedness is the normal 
condition in females (1605-1607).  Threatening to kill the most agreeable character in the play 
– the virtuous Hermione – Orestes bitterly declares that a mother’s blood is not enough for him, 
because he will never grow tired of killing wicked women (Or. 1590).  Wicked women are 
those who act counter to a husband’s paternity interests: Orestes concludes that when the 
marriages of mortals are established in good order, a lifetime of happiness results, but that when 
they do not fall out well, then everything within and outside of the marriage suffers misfortune 
(602-604).  Good order apparently means according to male benefit: the chorus’ comment on 
Orestes’ declaration observes that αἰεὶ γυναῖκες ἐμποδὼν ταῖς συμφοραῖς/ ἔφυσαν ἀνδρῶν πρὸς 
τὸ δυστυχέστερον, ‘Always women as a nuisance and misfortune hinder the doings of men’ 
(605-606).210  Orestes’ extremist outburst must serve to alienate him from the audience, because 
it seems unlikely that Greek men – even those who might instinctively suspect their own wives 
– would wish their own status as legitimate citizens to be undermined by a general presumption 
that all women – including their mothers – were naturally wicked.211  Euripides’ Orestes 
exploits predictable audience interest in dysfunctional gender-relations, and there are almost 
certainly political messages in the text, but this play at the narrative level seeks to verify Atreid 
Orestes’ moral culpability for the matricide as an especially repugnant crime. 
 
The Atreid children’s response to what they perceive as the demos’ unreasonable prosecution 
of the matricide is unconstrained rage, followed by the wreaking of destruction.  The Orestes 
conspicuously positions the inevitability of human suffering as the consequence of historic 
family atrocity, beginning with Tantalos, the founder of the patriline (1-27).212  This play is one 
of the only extant tragedies that marks Atreid Menelaos – by both his luxury and looks – as 
                                                          
209 Other plays – Khoephori, Eumenides, and both Elektras – make similar declarations about the planting of male 
seed in female vessels. 
210 On the inevitable clash of female and male lifetime goals, see Chapter 1, pp. 74; 79n405; 79-82; 84. 
211 Actual female rates of infidelity (and female production of illegitimate offspring) across known cultures suggest 
a remarkably low level of female ‘wickedness’, certainly in comparison to males’ aggressive sexuality and 
engagement in adultery.  See discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 50-51; 51n246; 76-78; 77n398; 78n401. 
212 The chorus’ musings on the fleetingness of fortune (340-344) immediately precedes their doubt as to the 
worthiness of the house of Tantalos (345-346). 
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another descendant of Tantalos (348-351), but this Menelaos is an admirable family man, 
returning to the palace after long travail, and hearing with dismay about the dreadful doings of 
the δισσοῖν λεόντοιν ‘twin lions’ – he refuses to call Orestes and Pylades ‘men’ (1554-1555).213  
By the play’s final scene, Menelaos is standing in front of the burning palace of Tantalos (1543-
1544) thrown into bloody chaos by the curse upon Pelops (1548-1549).  Elektra may for 
propriety’s sake elide her ancestors’ appalling crimes – although the murder of Agamemnon by 
the godless Klytaimestra is laid out in detail, even as her mother’s motive of Iphigeneia’s unholy 
sacrifice is deliberately omitted – but the message of Elektra’s backstory-montage (28-45) is 
clear: Orestes is but the latest of the Tantalid line to commit an unholy act, and he is paying for 
it now.  After hearing the Messenger’s report of her brother’s trial in Argos, Elektra reminds 
the audience that the criminal Tantalos now hangs suspended between heaven and earth, and 
that Myrtilos’ curse upon Pelops caused the coming of the golden lamb and all the troubles 
(982-1000); Orestes’ and Elektra’s sufferings are merely the last in the τ᾽ ἀμείβει... θανάτους 
θανά-/ των, ‘deaths in exchange for deaths’ instigated by Eris in payment for the hideous feast 
of slaughtered children, and for Aerope’s adultery (1001-1012). 
 
The tragic chorus also turns – as they always do in the wider Oresteia – to the terrible 
consequences of the intrafamilial conflict between Atreus and Thyestes: the great prosperity of 
the house of Atreus is overturned because of strife over the golden lamb, the slaughter of 
γενναίων τεκέων, ‘true-born children’ (815), and because of Atreus’ brutal and terrible 
Thyestean feast (816-817).  After Orestes enters the palace to kill his aunt Helen and her 
daughter Hermione, the chorus observe that the house of Atreus is falling once more in disaster 
(1537-1538).  A few lines later, the impending fall of the house of Tantalos becomes literal, as 
Orestes and Pylades light torches to raze the ancestral palace (1541-1544).  Orestes’ and 
Menelaos’ furious exchange shows that Orestes is determined to murder Hermione and prevent 
his uncle from ruling in the palace even at the cost of his own life (1594-1596).  The chorus is 
correct that the once stalwart Atreid bloodline is now divided: the house of Tantalos is still 
destroying itself.214 
 
                                                          
213 Agamemnon and Aigisthos in Aiskhylos’ plays were also lions, while the lion-cub parable in the Agamemnon 
has been read as referring to a variety of members of the Pelopid family; Orestes and Pylades, of course, are both 
members of the Tantalid clan. 
214 On the connection between Tantalos’ eternal punishment by hanging rock, Orestes’ sentence of death by stone, 
and his intention to kill Menelaos with a stone, see O’Brien (1988b:33-34). 
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The Tantalid family’s dysfunctional dynamics allude directly to compromised mating effort or 
the ruin of parental investment.215  Infidelity, competition for female mates, and destruction of 
children are repeated crimes in this family.  The Orestes refers to the battle between brothers 
Atreus and Thyestes for the golden lamb of kingship and the possession of Aerope, but these 
events are minor compared to Atreus’ outright slaughter of his brother’s sons, and the deception 
of his brother at the subsequent feast of human flesh.  Initially, the next generation of accursed 
Tantalids – the Atreid youngsters – are all traumatized by their immoral mother-murder, but a 
sudden and dramatic shift in character ethos around half-way through the play allows Orestes 
and Elektra (and their cousin Pylades in particular) to revert to their inherited kin-killing 
Tantalid natures.216 
 
The greatest villain in the Oresteia saga is no Tantalid, however; this play agrees with almost 
all extant tragedies that Delphian Apollo – ‘ignorant of what is good and just’ (416-417) – is 
ultimately accountable for the unjust (161-165), ‘unnatural’ (163, 192), and ‘unholy’ (374) 
murder of Klytaimestra; furthermore, the god has abandoned both children (191-194, 281-287).  
Orestes wants to scapegoat Apollo as the one who ought to be judged as unholy, for persuading 
Orestes to kill his mother (595-596), but Apollo takes no account of anybody’s wishes in this 
play; intervening from on high, he commands the rightfully aggrieved Menelaos to yield the 
throne of Argos to the matricide Orestes (1660), and to give up his recently regained wife as 
well (1638) – albeit keeping her dowry of Sparta (1662).  Nor will the judgements of the demoi 
of two cities be respected: according to Apollo, Orestes is going to get off the matricide charge 
against him in Athens (1648-1652) and his troubles with Argos will all be sorted out (1664-
1665).  The matricides will suffer no compromise in reproductive lifetime success at all: Orestes 
will marry Hermione (1653-1654) and Elektra will marry Pylades, and give him a life of joy 
(1658-1659).  These Atreids will all get away scot-free, because, as Apollo freely confesses, ὅς 
νιν φονεῦσαι μητέρ᾽ ἐξηνάγκασα, ‘it was I who forced him [i.e., Orestes] to be murderous 
toward his mother’ (1665).217  This admission of moral liability obscures the fact that Orestes 
                                                          
215 On a direct parallel between the Tantalid ethos and the moral state of the real war-loving Athens, see Vellacott 
(1975:72-73). 
216 Critics agree that ancestral evil lies at the root of the children’s current predicament in Orestes; see Beye 
(1975:277, 293); Fuqua (1978:7); Zeitlin (2003b:311); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:111); Wright (2008:21); Nisetich 
(2010:71). 
217 Apollo, on the other hand, has nothing to say about the part of Elektra (33) in the matricide, nor about the role 
of Agamemnon’s nephew Pylades, who – according to Elektra – also had a hand in the act (34). 
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was not the only willing murderer of Klytaimestra: his cousin and sister were also involved, 
and not just as bystanders. 
 
Orestes’ admission that Elektra gave her permission for the matricide (284) illuminates his 
sister’s character in the Orestes.  There are two Elektras in this play: the traumatized, suicidal 
sister of the first half of the play, and the second half’s demonic avenger.218  The undignified 
portrayal of the despairing Elektra and her demented brother in the first half of this tragedy 
offers a discordant comment upon their fixed determination in Euripides’ previous Elektra; both 
these Atreid matricides now seem to be suffering some form of post-trauma shock, a more 
natural, human psychological response to events.  Six days have elapsed since the bloody 
matricide, and the children’s last hope is that the arrival of paternal uncle Menelaos, in company 
with his wife Helen (52-56), will save their miserable lives (68-70),219 but these children have 
deliberately severed their link to the matrilineal side of their family, but will also lose the 
support of their paternal uncle.  Without any male kin to protect them (they also lose the support 
of their maternal grandfather, King Tyndareos) the three children become aware of the real 
hopelessness of their future; in strongly androcentric cultures, the lack of male kin pose a 
serious risk to individuals’ lifetime prospects, and these three matricides now have only 
themselves for security.  Matricide may carry a sense of spiritual catastrophe, but the real-world 
consequences for these Tantalids are just as disastrous. 
 
The gloomy Elektra certainly sees no reason to live: her best years are over, and she remains 
unmarried and without children (201-207).  Because of the matricide, it is as if she and Orestes 
are already dead (200-207), but – in her view – their mother Klytaimestra is the person truly 
responsible, and it is her actions which have destroyed husband and children born of her own 
blood as well (195-199).  Elektra understands that if Orestes perishes as a result of the matricide, 
she will have no support – brother, father, or friend – in the world, and so she might as well die 
alongside him (307-310).  There is no sense of victory or gain in her speech, and after hearing 
the verdict of execution handed down by the Argive demos, she pleads with Orestes to slay her 
himself with a sword.  Orestes undertakes to do at once the noble thing – essentially a family 
                                                          
218 On the “tender, human” Elektra of the Orestes’ first half, see Blaiklock (1952:180); on the Elektra of the second 
half of the play as a “homicidal maniac”, see also Vellacott (1975:63).  For negative views of Elektra in Orestes, 
see Norwood (1948:273); Garner (1990:153); Burnett (1998:256); Hall (2010:286). 
219 This is in stark contrast to the character utterances in previous Atreid tragedies that, once the matricide was 
achieved, then death could take them (i.e., Khoe. 438; E. El. 281, 663). 
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murder-suicide – directing Pylades to bury them both together (1018-1068).  In a traditional 
tragedy, this might well be the proper end of matters, and one evoking empathy and compassion 
for these unfortunate children who have foolishly cast aside all kin-relationships, but in this 
tragedy of 408 BCE, something unthinkable will happen instead. 
 
Over the course of almost a hundred lines, Orestes and Elektra are persuaded, little by little, to 
take a pre-emptive, spiteful vengeance upon the uncle who refused to help them, then to slay 
Helen in order to give hurt to Menelaos, and also to set the patrilineal house on fire; their 
‘divorce’ from all kin will be complete.  Pylades, traditionally a quiet, steadfast ally of the 
Atreides, is here transformed by Euripides into co-assassin and dangerous demagogue, leading 
his cousins to choose between death in the midst of glorious destruction, or success and life.  
Aroused by Pylades’ inflammatory speeches, the previously subdued chorus declares that all 
women should hate Tyndareos’ daughter, who has shamed her entire sex (1153-1155); this 
familiar sentiment usually pertains to Tyndarid Klytaimestra, but we find that they now refer to 
Tyndarid Helen.220  Orestes embraces Pylades’ cunning plan with its hope of self-preservation 
(1173-1176), but Elektra crowns the new conspiracy with the suggestion that they should 
capture and if necessary kill Hermione as well (1177-1199); the volte-face of the once-contrite 
Atreid pair is complete.  Lest we forget they have good reason to be ashamed, we are suddenly 
reminded of their mother: Orestes is thrilled at Elektra’s bold suggestion, praising the woman 
who possesses not only a beautiful female form, but the heart of a man; he remarks that if things 
go badly, Pylades will be deprived of such a paragon of wifeliness, if not, then he will be blessed 
in her bed (1204-1209), while the vengeful Elektra, who in previous tragedies urged the killing-
strokes of her brother and crowed over the corpses of her enemies, including her mother, is 
restored.  Whether this man-hearted woman possesses the power to make Pylades the happiest 
of husbands remains to be seen, however; Agamemnon can testify to the blessings of marriage 
with a man-minded woman.  Following the findings of EP about the traditional nature of 
marriage in males’ exchange of female reproductive potential, the union between Pylades and 
Elektra is at core in fact a contract between Orestes and Pylades; Orestes refers to – ‘your 
marriage tie with me’ – when speaking to Pylades in anticipation of death (Or. 1081), and 
Elektra is not consulted about the dissolution of a marriage she so far seems to know nothing 
about.221 
                                                          
220 Only the preceding context of Pylades’ scheme to kill Helen indicates which daughter of Tyndareos they 
specifically refer to. 




Matricidal Orestes’ remorse is replaced by a murderous thirst for blood, reawakened by 
Pylades’ diabolic persuasions.222  The repentant Orestes insisted that it is not only the Fury-
inspired madness which is killing him, but the honest grief he feels in awareness of the enormity 
of his sin of mother-murder (Or. 396-400).  But once he is held to account for monstrously 
spilling kin-blood by Menelaos the brother-in-law of Klytaimestra (413), and by Tyndareos his 
matrilineal grandfather, Orestes defensively loses much of his earlier contrition: now he insists 
that his persecution by Argos is politically motivated; that crimes committed by Agamemnon 
during the war are being held against him; and that ‘friends of Aigisthos’ are treating him 
‘outrageously’ (431-436). 
 
Orestes’ interaction with Klytaimestra’s close kin (459-629) draws attention to the 
irreconcilable conflict between Orestes’ moral shame over his mother’s death, and his desire to 
uphold respect for his father (546-547).  One of these must triumph, and so he resorts to the 
claim that begetting of a child by the father supersedes the nourishing of the seed by the mother; 
thus, it is right to defend the honour of the father above all (552-556).  He also justifies his 
decision to commit matricide by the fact that Klytaimestra went to the bed of her secret husband, 
Agamemnon’s killer (557-561).  But the attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands of filial 
allegiance is almost too much for any child to endure; psychological breakdown ensues.  In the 
midst of an otherwise logical summation of facts surrounding the matricide, Orestes’ earlier 
self-recrimination and horror at his deed are undercut by an irrational outburst concerning 
brazen women: now, his act of matricide was on behalf of all Greece, because if murderous 
women are treated with mercy, men will expose themselves to being killed by their wives (564-
571).  His argument seems to assume that – if given the opportunity – large numbers of women 
would inevitably wish to kill their husbands.223  This is followed by his contention that 
Klytaimestra betrayed her husband – who was leading an army on behalf of Greece – for reason 
of lust, and that she killed the returning Agamemnon in order to avoid the punishment she 
herself deserved (572-578).  Predictably, he omits all mention of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice, and of 
                                                          
222 Norwood (1948:271, 273); Webster (1967:15); Burnett (1998:256); Hall (2010:286).  On parallels between this 
Orestes and Aiskhylos’ Orestes, see Zelenak (1998:128); Fletcher (2012:141). 
223 These lines are marked as deleted in Kovacs’ (2002b:473-475) edition, and probably rightly so: the lines are 
declaimed in a completely different voice; the misogyny is too obvious, and is not one of the themes of this 
particular play.  Cf. Orestes’ regrets before and after this obtruded speech. 
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his father’s foolish introduction of a concubine into the family home, both of which were 
possible defences for Klytaimestra’s actions. 
 
Orestes’ vindication of his father then displaces the blame for the wrong of the Trojan 
expedition entirely onto Helen, because the venture was to remedy her fault and wrongdoing 
(646-650); therefore, the argument runs, Helen’s husband Menelaos now owes Orestes a favour, 
because of the favour done for Menelaos by Agamemnon (655-657).  As for the favour of 
Iphigeneia’s life – one of the few times the sacrifice is ever mentioned in the play – Orestes 
graciously releases Menelaos from having to kill his daughter in recompense (658-659).  The 
transformation of Agamemnon’s unholy child-murder into something Orestes can use to 
persuade Menelaos to help him not only brings the debate to a new low in expediency, but is 
also ironic, because Orestes himself will try to kill Menelaos’ daughter Hermione.  Euripides’ 
Menelaos in the Orestes is an Atreid anomaly, prudent and compassionate, and sincerely 
attached to his wife and daughter; his most important attachment is no longer to his patrilineal 
brother and nephew, but to his wife and his wife’s family.224  Menelaos enjoys a privileged 
status as the son-in-law of Zeus (Od. 4.569-570), and – unlike his brother Agamemnon – is 
destined for material prosperity at home with his own clever and beautiful wife, Tyndarid 
Helen, and his (bastard) son Megapenthes by his side (Od. 4.49-58; 15.75-79; 15.99-130).225  
Upon his arrival in Argos, he declares that he had chanced to hear about the murder of 
Agamemnon at the hands of a wife (Or. 361), but – assuming that Orestes and his mother would 
now be prospering – is shocked to hear about ‘the unholy murder of Tyndareos’ daughter’ (374).  
Menelaos views the impious matricide of his wife’s sister – even though she killed his own 
brother – as a δεῖνα κακά ‘dreadful evil’ (376), an act in terrible juxtaposition with the image 
of Orestes as he last saw him, a baby safe in the arms of his mother Klytaimestra (377-379). 
 
                                                          
224 Typical epithets for Menelaos in Homeric epic emphasise his superior warrior abilities (Il. 7.94-101, 109-119), 
and his relationship with Agamemnon in Homeric epic is a very close one (Il. 6.55-62; 7.113-122; 10.240).  
Menelaos in tragedy is a very different man (Tro. 1030-1035, 1055-1059); cf. the conflicting Atreid brothers’ 
ignoble bickering in the opening scenes of Euripides’ IA.  On the Orestes’ Menelaos as prudent and decent man, 
despite difficult circumstances, see Vellacott (1975:55).  Euripides’ Menelaos in Helen of 412 BCE (an immediate 
narrative prequel to the Orestes) is also a model of warlike bravery, with a noble reputation worth defending (Hel. 
842-854, 944-953), and is a good friend to his men (1606-1609).  Euripides apparently does his best in Orestes to 
reinstate an admirable Menelaos, but in Lesky’s (1983b:352) view, however, Menelaos is the Orestes’ “most evil” 
character. 
225 Homer takes Menelaos’ rulership over Argos for granted, and Menelaos has the authority to empty an entire 
city within his domain, offering to install Odysseus in it as a king, along with his son Telemakhos and all his 
Ithakan subjects (Od. 4.174-177). 
260 
 
Menelaos’ response to the news of the matricide lacks any comment on the death of his brother 
Agamemnon, however; instead, he exhibits positive sympathy for his brother’s murderer 
Klytaimestra, and asks his nephew whether the matricide has done him any good at all (425), 
and Orestes ominously replies: not yet (426).  This is Menelaos’ first mention of his full-blood 
brother Agamemnon’s murder in relation to the matricide, although he and Orestes have been 
discussing the murder of Klytaimestra and its consequences for some time, and both have been 
sympathetic toward the murdered woman.  Menelaos is the one adult male (apart from Orestes) 
who in the patrilineal context should be most offended by Agamemnon’s death, and so take the 
defence of his brother’s honour the most seriously – but this new Atreid kyrios has no intention 
of supporting his paternal nephew against the moral claims of the Tyndarids; he may appalled 
by the inexcusable murder of a mother, but, pragmatically speaking, he also rules as king 
through marriage into that same woman’s family.  Menelaos’ own fortunes will prosper if he 
upholds the honour of the Tyndarid clan, and ultimately, he is willing to sacrifice the honour of 
brother to do so; Menelaos is initially sympathetic (484, 486), but when faced with a loss of his 
own station in life, is not prepared to stand and fight along his nephew (688-692, 711-712).  In 
Orestes’ opinion, his uncle’s refusal to support his kin stems from a desire to gain the rule of 
Argos as well as the kingship of Sparta vested in his wife (1058-1059).  In fact, Menelaos has 
no apparent scheme to usurp the Argive throne, and does want to save Orestes, but he simply 
cannot do so by force of arms (709-712). 
 
His long series of questions to Orestes establishes beyond doubt that every possible 
circumstance is against Orestes’ surviving, because Orestes has reached the absolute limit of 
human misfortune (395-447).  Having heard Orestes’ pleas for help, Menelaos replies that the 
gods are against them (687); that he himself has arrived home bereft of friends and allies, and 
so they can never win a physical fight (688-692); and that only by clever words can the raging 
demos be placated (692-716).  Menelaos indicates that he wants to save his nephew (709-711), 
but a refusal to engage in force of arms is clearly the only effective strategy to achieve this.  
Orestes’ response is that of a child more used to getting what he wants (717-728): later, he will 
assuage his wounded feelings by trying to inflict as much suffering as possible upon his uncle. 
 
The other male character whose support Orestes assumes – wrongly – is Tyndareos, 
Klytaimestra’s father.  Before Tyndareos even utters a word, a shamed Orestes has told us much 
about him: Orestes was loved and nurtured by his maternal grandfather and his grandmother (a 
rare positive reference in the Oresteia corpus to Klytaimestra’s mother Leda); they loved their 
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only (legitimate) grandson as much as they loved their sons, and they do not deserve to suffer 
for what he has done (460-467).  Maternal grandparents cross-culturally exhibit more helping 
behaviours for a daughter’s offspring: there is no mention in the extant Oresteia corpus of 
Orestes’ paternal grandmother, and no evidence that Atreus cared for him.226  Tyndareos is 
more than kindly grandfather; fresh from pouring libations upon the tomb of the daughter slain, 
he arrives seeking the husband of the daughter living (470-473).  Initially, he is pleased to see 
Menelaos, his surviving son-in-law and their relation seems cordial enough, but on catching 
sight of Orestes – his only legitimate grandson – Tyndareos’ mood swiftly changes; few 
characters in tragedy have ever so directly disapproved Orestes as an ‘abominable, mother-
killing serpent’ (479-480).  Menelaos declares that he must honour his brother’s son, since 
Agamemnon was dear to him; Tyndareos responds that kin-allegiance must not take priority 
over the law (482-487), reminding his son-in-law that the ancient (and proper) punishment for 
unlawful killing was exile, in order to prevent further unholy bloodshed (508-518).  In 
Tyndareos’ opinion, Orestes ought to have prosecuted his father-killing mother in the law-
courts; Klytaimestra might have been a wicked woman, but Orestes’ wickedness is greater (496-
506).  No other man in tragedy has ever taken such a stance on the killing of Agamemnon, but 
while Tyndareos is predictably – according to evolutionary psychology – supportive of his 
female kin, he also recognizes the catastrophic, social effect of his female kin’s behaviour.227 
 
Yet, although Tyndareos admits that he has been unlucky in both of his husband-troubling 
daughters (541), he makes it clear that he cannot support the θηριῶδες… καὶ μιαιφόνον ‘beastly 
and bloodthirsty’ behaviour of men such as Orestes, which ‘always brings down ruin upon lands 
and cities’ (518-525); in his opinion, Orestes’ wandering madness proves that his grandson is 
now hated by the gods (530-532).  Klytaimestra may have deserved to die, but for her son to 
commit the killing is beyond all bounds of decency (538-539).  Earlier, Orestes acknowledged 
the wrongness of his deed, but now he launches into a stinging attack on his grandfather: now 
all of this trouble is really Tyndareos’ fault, for begetting such a wicked woman in the first 
place (585-586)!  Orestes’ brazen, heart-breaking speech inspires the bereaved Tyndareos to 
pursue a judgment of death by stoning for Klytaimestra’s death for both matricidal children 
(607-614), and Elektra is specifically held to account by Tyndareos, for ‘setting fire’ to the 
house with her discord (615-621). 
                                                          
226 On the greater assistance offered to children by maternal grandparents, see Chapter 1, p. 50. 




Tyndareos now turns to his surviving son-in-law, declaring that if Menelaos continues to 
support Orestes, he will step no more on Spartan soil (624-626).  Faced with the threatened loss 
of his kingdom – apparently held from Tyndareos as a grace-and-favour principality – Menelaos 
chooses to back his obligations to his wife’s family – and estate – and Orestes loathes him for 
it.  The support of close male kin is essential to the continuation of patrilines, and patrilineal 
power-networks, and Menelaos’ defection imperils the supremacy of his clan.228  In this 
moment of crisis, the persuader Pylades appears, and Orestes quickly becomes an angry thug, 
bitterly observing that Menelaos prefers his connections by marriage to Orestes’ own father 
(752).  Previous Oresteia choruses elaborated on the evils of women, but as Orestes and his 
moral supporter Pylades exit, the chorus breaks into a damning ode on Tantalid evils and Atreid 
troubles: the sacrificing of children, the pitiable feasting, and this latest impiety of the heir 
‘cutting a parent’s flesh with violence forged in fire’ (819-821); furthermore, Orestes had the 
effrontery to shamelessly display his sword ‘darkened’ with a mother’s blood to the sun (821-
822), an action both godless and foolish; it is no wonder that he is now subject to the curses of 
his mother (823-833).229  The choruses of Aiskhylos’ Khoephori, Sophokles’ Elektra, and even 
Euripides’ own Elektra were all desperate for the husband-killer’s blood, and often assisted in 
her execution, but everyone is tired of bloodshed now, it seems, and resort to further violence 
is the business only of the utterly corrupt. 
 
Yet not everyone rejects the continued pursuit of bloody violence, it seems.  The Messenger 
now brings report of the Argive assembly’s debate over whether to stone the Atreid mother-
killers to death; he, at least, strongly approves the matricide.  According to his statement, one 
man among the crowd – a man whose personal reputation was exemplary – speaks out on 
Orestes’ behalf, arguing that he should receive a reward for his actions, since the woman who 
committed adultery and killed her husband casts into jeopardy the willingness of men to leave 
home on military ventures (923-929); those in the crowd disposed to ‘valiant war-making’ 
agreed with this man (930).  Logically, those who are most likely to actively engage in military 
effort are Orestes’ most fervent supporters; since their wives are more likely to spend time 
unsupervised, these men are more likely to be at risk of cuckoldry.  Orestes’ self-defence speech 
at the assembly – although sensible – was not persuasive, however; he appealed to what he 
                                                          
228 On male kin-alliances, see Chapter 1, p. 52n249. 
229 The concept of the Sun as omniscient observer and judge of human behaviour is widespread and ancient in the 
Mediterranean world; see Utu, the Sumerian sun-god, for example. 
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believed was the crowd’s natural distrust of women, arguing that his mother-murder was on 
behalf of all men, since if women are not punished in this way for killing a husband, then all 
men must either kill themselves to avoid being killed, or yield themselves into slavery to their 
wives (931-943).  His argument that all wives secretly wish to kill their husbands is a basic tale 
of gender warfare writ overlarge – that uncontrolled women will destroy men’s civilization – 
yet the greater part of the presumably all-male demos are not moved by this mother-murderer’s 
demagoguery. 
 
Once condemned by his own people, Orestes’ better instincts immediately evaporate: his 
interactions with Elektra – his most devoted supporter – now recall those of Sophokles’ terse 
Orestes, as he commands his sister to suppress her emotion (1020-1044).  Orestes even refuses 
to help Elektra to die, although she fears to be killed by the Argives, which would be grave 
insult to Agamemnon’s house (1037-1040).  Only Elektra’s declaration of deepest attachment 
and her loving embrace move him to realize – as death approaches – that their sibling-love is 
the only happiness they will enjoy, because marriage and parenthood will be denied to them 
(1045-1051).230  The escalating despair of the Atreid siblings, who at this stage still aspire to 
an honourable, self-inflicted death, renders them easy targets for Pylades’ corrupting rhetoric; 
his persuasive speech is the cause of their descent from remorseful torment to manic 
destructiveness. 
 
At the beginning of the story, the regretful Orestes was filthy and incoherent, yet holding great 
faith in the arrival of helpful kin (243-244, 300); but in response to Pylades’ first appearance, 
Orestes concludes that like-minded comrades – even though they are unrelated – are preferable 
to blood-kin (804-806).  In terms of genetic lineage, Pylades is not as close to Orestes as paternal 
uncle Menelaos is – Pylades is the son of Agamemnon’s sister Anaxibia, and so in fact closer 
to Menelaos than he is to Orestes – but he declares he would not want to live if Orestes was 
dead, claiming that he was also one of Klytaimestra’s killers, he wants to share Orestes’ 
inevitable death (1074); the Orestes downplays the blood-relation between then in favour of 
their shared experience, and their shared disposition.  Persuaded by his declaration of solidarity 
in guilt, Orestes immediately succumbs to Pylades’ casual suggestion that perhaps they might 
inflict a little suffering on Menelaos before they go to their honourable deaths (1085-1099).  It 
                                                          
230 The inference that Elektra will somehow take the place of Orestes’ wife has some precedent in Sophokles’ 
Elektra, in which Elektra claims to have overseen Orestes’ welfare, as a true parent. 
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is Pylades who introduces the new idea that the three matricides – if successful – might live 
(1151-1152), in contrast to the previous sentiments for an inevitable but honourable death 
expressed by Elektra (306-307, 1033), Orestes (756, 779, 1035, 1062-1063, 1110, 1116), and 
even Pylades himself (783, 1074, 1091, 1117, 1147-1148). 
 
Once Pylades’ plan is fully outlined – the deserved killing of Helen, the palace set alight, and 
the enticing possibility that they might live after all – Orestes is miraculously cured, once more 
the son of the godlike, mighty Agamemnon, with an inherited right to inflict punishment on 
those who have made him miserable, and the obligation to avoid a slavish death (1163-1170).  
At Pylades’ urging, Orestes casts aside all idea of noble death: spiteful killing without 
consequence of being killed is now a much more attractive option (1172-1174).  From this point 
on, the only thing that matters is survival at whatever cost.  These three Pelopids together make 
up an unholy alliance founded on narrowly-targeted mutual benefit and disregard of all social 
or community value, although Elektra – as a woman – is no equal member of this conspiratorial 
alliance. 
 
While Elektra shows as much enthusiasm and cunning in the conspiracy as either of the Pelopid 
males, the persuasive Pylades insists there is little confidence to be had in women (1103); he 
may ostensibly refer to the loitering chorus, but Elektra – his contracted wife – is standing right 
beside them on the stage.  Earlier, Elektra bewailed the fact that she is still an unmarried maiden 
(26), and unmarried and childless (206), and that if Orestes dies she will be left alone without 
any friend (308-310); Pylades confirms that he had previously consented to marry her, and so 
now considers her to be his wife (1092-1093), but Elektra seems unaware that Orestes has 
already pledged her to Pylades; the marriage between Pylades and Elektra is a male-male 
alliance, however, as Orestes’ comment about dissolving Pylades’ marriage-tie with Orestes 
demonstrates (1078-1081).  The core of this alliance is male and male, in accord with the 
findings of EP that men are more interested in alliance with other males: even as his wife, 
Elektra is a secondary member of their association.231  Pylades – Orestes’ truest friend – disrupts 
the close kinship affiliation between the Atreid siblings, persuading Orestes that excluding 
Elektra from their plans ‘saves time’ (786-789). 
 
                                                          
231 On the greater propensity of males to engage in alliance-making, see Chapter 1, pp. 24; 35; 35n133; 41; 41n180; 
49; 53; 84n436. 
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Cousin Pylades may be a Tantalid through a female ancestor, but he exhibits the malign, 
Tantalid thirst for illicit blood.232  He has already been exiled from his own country by his own 
father Strophios – Agamemnon’s brother-in-law – for his role in the unholy matricide of 
Klytaimestra (765-767); Pylades (covertly replacing Apollo) claims that the entire plan behind 
the matricide was his own (1089-1090).233  The prayer of the three comrades in conspiracy also 
demonstrates just how essential Pylades’ moral support was to the matricide: Orestes delivered 
the killing stroke (Or. 1235); Elektra’s hand was upon the sword (1235); but it was Pylades – 
as in Aiskhylos’ Khoephori – who δέ γ᾽ ἐπεκέλευσα κἀπέλυσ᾽ ὄκνου ‘gave consent and released 
him from hesitation’ (1236).234  After their attempt on Helen’s life fails, Orestes wryly observes 
that he could not tell the difference between the voice of Apollo and the voice of an alastōr, or 
avenging spirit (1666-1669); Pylades embodies the spirit of vengeance in Orestes, just as 
Klytaimestra was an alastōr in Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon.235  Pylades’ plan for gratuitous 
vengeance against Helen and her child (737, 741-743) leads Orestes to proudly proclaim that 
he simply cannot stop at one mother-murder (1589-1590).  Eliminating Helen will further 
enrage the maternal grandfather who now hates him, and devastate the uncle who rejected him; 
the Orestes’ depiction of Helen as a kind-hearted woman aware of the trouble she has caused 
belies all of Pylades’ and Orestes’ evil-saying. 
 
Pylades’ plan is that he and Orestes will gain access to Helen under the guise of supplicants, 
then murder any slaves who protect her, and kill Helen herself (1119-1130), because he views 
Helen as ἣ πλείστους Ἀχαιῶν ὤλεσεν γυνὴ μία, ‘the one woman who made an end of the 
greatest number of the Akhaians’ (743); the Argives will be so grateful that they will forget all 
about Orestes’ evil (1140-1142).  Earlier Pylades had insisted that it is not surprising that a bad 
woman also has a bad husband (737); an observation which slyly suggests that bad-woman 
                                                          
232 See the Phrygian slave’s assessment of him and his cousin, as ‘Greek lions, with twin motions’ (1403-1404), 
of Pylades as ‘the evil Phokian’ (1446), ‘an evil-thinking man... and a murderous snake’ (1403-1407), and a 
‘matricidal snake [who] netted the daughter of Tyndareos in a woven contrivance’ (1421-1424). 
233 Just as Apollo has been doing in every play about the murder of Klytaimestra, Pylades insists on taking an equal 
share in the mother-murder; just as Apollo’s oracle was the motive for Orestes’ determination, so has Pylades’ 
plan always been the means to put that oracle into effect.  Pylades, of course, as the advocate of the gods, was also 
the unexpected voice of consent in Aiskhylos’ Khoephori (900-902): the actor playing Apollo in that play was also 
the actor taking the role of Pylades. 
234 The importance of loyalty and trust between patrilineal cousins in an androcentric society is obvious, although 
the enmity between Aigisthos and Agamemnon suggests that intrasexual competition within the patriline was 
sometimes as likely as potential support.  On Pylades in the Orestes as a self-sacrificing, helpful blood-relation, in 
contrast with the false kinsman Menelaos, see Norwood (1948:273); Burnett (1971:186); Lesky (1983b:352). 
235 Cf. the chorus’ observations on the enormous power of the alastōr, sent by God, as the house of Tantalos begins 
to burn (1545-1548). 
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Klytaimestra’s husband – Orestes’ father Agamemnon – might also have been bad himself.  
Helen’s implied bad husband is Orestes’ closest living male kin, and this is a play in which 
blood-kin are viewed as potential enemies, at least by the Tantalids.  The bad Aunt Helen is a 
mother, but she is also a Tyndarid who honours and respects her slain sister Klytaimestra; critics 
agree that Helen’s affection toward her family members – including Klytaimestra and her 
children – is entirely genuine.236  Just as Tyndareos reminded us that Orestes is a grandchild – 
and a treacherous one at that – so this innovatively depicted Helen reminds us that Klytaimestra 
– like all married women – was much more than just a wife, and in this story, a mother. 
 
The Orestes’ sympathetic delineation of Helen deepens our appreciation of the difference 
between the Tantalids and the Tyndarid clan.  Euripides’ Helen of 413 BCE works hard to 
undermine the four traditional arguments impugning her reputation: that many lives were lost 
beside the Scamander River; that men everywhere curse her; that she abandoned her husband; 
and that she brought the war upon Greece (Hel. 52-55).  A number of characters depicted as 
sympathetic, reliable commentators insist that Helen is innocent and virtuous, that men need no 
external stimulus to seek out war-making opportunities, and that Zeus was the ultimate author 
of the Trojan War.237  Helen’s value is generally assumed in modern discourse to derive solely 
from her physical appearance, but Homer’s Helen is also a great queen, depicted in the Odyssey 
(4.121-137) with all of the accoutrements of a great ruler, and she is the daughter of Zeus (Il. 
3.237-238; Od. 23.218); Euripides’ Helen employs this epic convention (Hel. 17-22, 259, 1144-
1150); the Orestes refers to her as Zeus’s daughter (Or. 1493).  According to the Orestes’ 
Apollo, Helen’s immortal beauty was merely the tool used by the gods to thin out human 
numbers (1635-1642).  So, as he did in Helen of 413 BCE, Euripides reprises Homer’s Helen, 
full of regret for her lost homeland (Il. 24.765-766) and beloved daughter (Il. 3.173-175).  After 
her restoration to husband Menelaos, the Odyssey’s Helen is a most devoted and desirable 
wife.238  Euripides’ Orestes reminds audiences that Helen’s personal sufferings were a result of 
                                                          
236 On Helen’s genuine mourning for Klytaimestra, see Lesky (1983b:343); Davidson (1999-2000:119); Zeitlin 
(2003b:320, 330).  On the morally admirable and “perfectly sweet” Helen of the Orestes, see West (1987:35).  In 
Vellacott’s (1973:75, 77) view, Helen represents what is left of the beauty and goodness of Athens, while Orestes 
embodies the Hellenic war-fever. 
237 See Hel. 36-41; 1151-1160; 1656-1600; 1684-1687.  On similar conclusions about the causes of the Trojan 
War, see also Or. 1639-1642, and E. El. 1281-1282. 
238 When Homer’s Helen found and recognized a disguised Odysseus in the city of Troy, she emphasizes how 
happy she was at the thought she would soon be ‘rescued’ (Od. 4.259-264), and she blames Aphrodite for the 
madness which led her away from her marriage and family (Od. 4.259-264).  Helen in Orestes evidences a similar 
sense of dismay about her absence from Greece (Or. 98, 102). 
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the curse upon the daughters of Tyndareos (Or. 249-250).  Tyndareos’ other daughter – 
Klytaimestra – also suffered marriage troubles, earning a reputation for evil; the chorus’ 
observation in Orestes that πάσαις γυναιξὶν ἀξία στυγεῖν ἔφυ/ ἡ Τυνδαρὶς παῖς, ἣ κατῄσχυνεν 
γένος, ‘Tyndareos’ daughter is naturally deserving of all women’s hatred’, for having ‘put her 
sex to shame’, could obviously apply to either sister (1153-1154). 
 
Euripides’ Orestes foregrounds Helen specifically as Klytaimestra’s officially mourning kin, 
weeping inside the palace for the slain sister who protected her beloved Hermione while Helen 
was in Troy (60-66).  She laments her sister’s death (77-80), and directs Hermione to promise 
to Klytaimestra all of the offerings which are fit for the underworld and appropriate for one 
sister to give another, in order to secure Klytaimestra’s goodwill toward herself, her husband, 
and her daughter (119-123).  Helen’s very last mortal act on earth is spinning thread to adorn 
purple robes, to honour her sister Klytaimestra’s tomb (1431-1436).239  She is also a 
compassionate aunt to her dear sister’s offspring, expressing pity for Orestes, even though he 
is the one who has spilled Klytaimestra’s blood (88-90); despite Elektra’s rudeness to her in the 
opening scene of the play, Helen is also kind and forgiving toward her niece (71-73, 100).  
Helen sends an offering to her sister Klytaimestra’s tomb, seeking her forgiveness toward the 
two children who committed the matricide, but as soon as her kindly aunt has left the stage, 
Elektra attacks Helen’s beauty, and curses her for ruining all of Greece (130-131).  Her 
willingness to engage with her sister’s children (along with Klytaimestra’s fostering of 
Hermione) supports the EP finding that alloparenting occurs most successfully between female 
kin.240  Klytaimestra’s children do not respect their matrilineal aunt or return her affection, 
however; in Elektra’s opinion, Helen is to blame for everybody’s woes and the parents of the 
men who died at Troy would stone her if they caught sight of her (56-60).  This is a view widely-
held in tragedy’s fictional world: upon hearing Helen cry out for help within the palace, the 
chorus loudly demands her death as betrayer and murderer of Greeks (1303-1310).  In 
particular, Elektra (rightly) worries that Helen’s beauty will blunt the edges of the swords 
poised to slay her (1288), even though, in Helen’s opinion, beauty is no great gift.241 
 
                                                          
239 Cf. Klytaimestra’s defence of her sister against the chorus’ bitter accusations, pointing out that to blame Helen 
alone for the war-losses is unfair (1465-1467). 
240 On alloparenting and female kin, see Chapter 1, pp. 41n179; 47-48; 50; 65n333; 52-53; 71n362; 81; 83; 83n430; 
83n432; 84; 84n436. 
241 See Hel. 254-263, 304-305).  Cf. Sophokles’ Deianeira in Trakhiniai, worrying that her beauty would bring her 
pain (Trakh. 24-25). 
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The Orestes’ Helen is also a mother, an important female life-experience she shares with her 
sister, and something rarely explored in other works.  After years apart, Helen and daughter 
Hermione still have affectionate feelings for each other, with Helen having care for her 
daughter’s reputation (108), and Hermione obeying her mother’s direction to place offerings at 
her aunt’s tomb (1323); Helen’s declaration in Helen (282-283) that Hermione is the glory of 
the oikos – and of Helen herself – also suggests there is still strong affection between mother 
and child.  EP research shows that women in general prefer emotional connection to their 
daughters, finding these relationships more fulfilling.242  Like her sister, Helen is reputed to 
have produced a number of children during the most fertile years of her life – during her ten 
year stay in Troy – but (unlike the sacrifice of Klytaimestra’s child) ) the murder of those 
children at the hands of the Greeks during the War is rarely addressed in critical discussion (or 
in tragedy).243  Euripides’ emphasis on the cordial mother-daughter relationship between 
Tyndarid Helen and Hermione also suggests that Helen has good reason to empathize with a 
sister savagely betrayed by offspring.  But his innovative depiction of an appealing Hermione 
also draws attention, especially in terms of her relationship with her aunt Klytaimestra. 
 
If audiences were expecting a reappearance of Euripides’ appalling Hermione seen in that 
earlier Andromakhe (428-425 BCE), then their expectations were certainly confounded in 
Orestes; Euripides strives in Orestes to depict an appealing, more sympathetic and seemingly 
younger Hermione.244  Orestes’ Hermione is the uncorrupted young daughter of two Tyndarid 
mothers, each with a reputation for wickedness, but each redeemed in Euripides’ retelling of 
this story.  For years this girl has been raised by Klytaimestra, alongside her maternal aunt’s 
natural but lethally antagonistic daughter (63-64); this foster-sister Elektra exploits the genuine 
affection between Klytaimestra and her fostered niece, agreeing that for Hermione to go to the 
tomb in her stead would demonstrate proper respect for all the care given by her aunt (109-
110).  When her mother Helen returns, in Elektra’s opinion, Hermione now gives joy to an 
                                                          
242 On women’s preference for daughters, see Chapter 1, p. 57. 
243 On Helen’s offspring, see Stesikhoros fr. 191; Gantz (2004:289, 291). 
244 Euripides’ earlier Andromakhe (perhaps 427-425 BCE) actually supplies a narratively logical sequel to the 
later-produced play Orestes: Hermione is older, unhappily married (to Neoptolemos) and miserably infertile, 
hostile to her husband’s fertile war-captive concubine and her illegitimate child (And. 901-905, 912); Euripides 
shows that antipathy between co-wives derives from reproductive competition.  The Andromakhe’s Hermione, 
Menelaos, and Orestes all demonstrate the worst aspects of the Atreid ethos: Hermione is willing to leave her 
husband, the son of the greatest Greek hero, in order to marry a kin-killing monster, and her ignoble behaviour is 
contrasted with Andromakhe’s compliant concubinage throughout the play. 
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undeserving woman – the returning Helen (Or. 66).245  Elektra has no love for her young foster-
sister, demonstrated in her inspired contribution to the matricides’ plan for revenge (1177-
1178): Hermione, she says, is returning from Klytaimestra’s tomb – let’s seize her and hold her 
hostage (1183-1189), and if Menelaos causes us any trouble, let’s cut the girl’s neck (1191-
1199).  Elektra may well have resented Klytaimestra for murdering her father and taking 
another man to be Elektra’s step-father – as well she should, given the lifetime disadvantage 
for a step-child – but her easy animosity for another child within her home suggests a degree of 
sibling competition well-documented in EP models. 
 
Thus it is that a daughter of Klytaimestra once again becomes a hostage to evil-thinking, child-
killing Atreids.  Orestes – praising the intelligence and beauty of his bloodthirsty full-blood 
sister – begins to dehumanize his foster-sister Hermione as σκύμνον ἀνοσίου πατρός, ‘the 
whelp of an unholy father’ (1213), even though unholy Menelaos is one of the few Atreids who 
has never indulged directly in unholy child-killing.  Hermione, ignorant of her foster-siblings’ 
hatred, arrives at Klytaimestra’s tomb to beg her foster-mother’s goodwill toward these same 
heartless conspirators (1321-1323).  She loves her foster-siblings, and is horrified at the news 
that the demos has doomed her dear cousins to death (1328-1329).  Exploiting Hermione’s 
natural affection, Elektra invites the unsuspecting girl – because she is the foster-daughter of 
Klytaimestra – to pity her cousins and join in their supplication of Helen her mother (1337-
1341); Euripides’ earlier Elektra showed Elektra similarly exploiting her mother’s natural 
affection for a presumed grandchild.  But while the unsuspecting grandmother could not escape 
her bloody dispatch, Hermione is destined to survive; the play’s resolution gives us Apollo 
announcing that Orestes – still holding a sword to this unfortunate girl-child’s neck – is going 
to be her husband, when just moments previously, Menelaos was calling on the demos to attack 
the abominable matricide (1621-1624).246  Now, standing before the palace ready to launch his 
men upon Orestes, Menelaos’ wry comment on this improbable turn of events is εὐγενὴς δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ 
εὐγενοῦς/ γήμας ὄναιο καὶ σὺ χὡ διδοὺς ἐγώ, ‘Well-born from the well-born, may you profit in 
                                                          
245 Cf. Klytaimestra’s reference in Sophokles’ Elektra to living with ‘those children who do not hate me’ (S. El. 
650-654); Sophokles did not specifically identify Klytaimestra’s foster-daughter, however.  See also Ferguson 
(1972:563), who suggests that part of Elektra’s enmity for Hermione derives from a kind of resentful sibling envy. 
246 Some contend that the appearance of Apollo to resolve an unresolvable state of events is simply farcical (see 
Webster (1967) 291; Wolff (1968) 148; Vickers (1973) 585-586; Wolff (1983) 356; Vellacott (1984b) 178).  
Others contend that modern critics misapprehend the dramatic function of the god, which is simply to tie up loose 
ends at the close of the play; see Heath (1987:60); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003:1); Nisetich (2010:180). 
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marrying her I am giving you’ (1676-1677).  Any wish for Orestes’ prosperity as a son-in-law 
is surely sarcastic.247 
 
The natural children of Agamemnon cannot escape their appalling Tantalid heritage, whether 
inflicted through nature, nurture, or a number of curses, but Hermione – reframed as Helen’s 
daughter and Klytaimestra’s niece and foster-child – is compassionate and considerate: this last 
Tyndarid is truly humane, and is now in as much danger of sacrifice to Atreid evil as her cousin 
Iphigeneia was in Aulis.248  Orestes, the Oresteia’s sequel, depicts matricide as just one 
consequence of the corrupting cycle of vengeance, and the Tyndarids – Tyndareos, Helen and 
Hermione – remind us that Klytaimestra was a beloved child, sister, aunt, and a loving mother; 
that the slaughter of mothers is immoral and abhorrent; and that Tyndarid women cannot really 
be to blame for all of the ills of the accursed Tantalids.  The Oresteia’s Euripidean prequel – 
Iphigeneia at Aulis – reopens the question of who and what really is to blame for the endless 
cycle of strife in this troubled family; the moral failings of the great men who wage war at all 
costs are the real, ultimate cause of Klytaimestra’s later husband-murder. 
 
Euripides: Iphigeneia at Aulis 
 
Euripides’ posthumously produced Iphigeneia at Aulis of 405 BCE is a cold-case exploration 
of the backstory to Klytaimestra’s mariticide and matricide, depicting the sundering of mother 
and sacrificed daughter with – according to some – enormous sympathy.249  Critics agree that 
the IA is a prequel which responds to the Oresteia and even to the Iliad.250  The IA plays upon 
audience familiarity with previous versions of the myth, but is innovative in its redrawing of 
                                                          
247 According to the Andromakhe’s Orestes, Hermione was actually pledged to Orestes before Menelaos went to 
Troy (And. 968-969), and so remains his only hope of marriage, because no outside family would deign to join 
their house with that of a mother-murderer (And. 974-978).  On the Andromakhe’s Orestes as so polluted by his 
matricide that he is unable to find any wife except from within the family who shares his taint, see Ferguson 
(1972:330). 
248 On the innocence of the exploited Hermione, the matricides’ only true friend, see Wolff (1968:133); Lesky 
(1983b:352); Burnett’s (1998:260, 269); Nisetich (2010:173). 
249 On the doubtfulness of the IA’s lines due to poor transmission and corruption of the original Euripidean text, 
see Kovacs (2003:77-78); Storey and Allan (2005:273).  The literary quality of the tragedy is debated; see 
Blaiklock (1952:93); Kitto (1968:362); Ferguson (1972:161, 449); Storey and Allan (2005:273); Hall (2010:289). 
250 Sorum (1992:529); Gamel (1999:319); Ley (2007:76-77).  On intertextual constraints evident in IA, the effect 
of previous works showing future events, see Hall (2010:289); Eisner (1979:161).  On the dating of this play, see 
Merwin and Dimock (1978:20); Storey and Allan (2005:135-136). 
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the traditional story.251  Many interpret the collision between the genders in the play as evidence 
of Euripides’ – and Athenians’ – disillusioned weariness with thirty years of war-making.252  
Others conclude that the specific problem of marriage is central to the play, reflecting a late 
fifth-century attempt to mitigate gender disharmony through romanticizing marital love.253  But 
some classicists contend that the IA reflects the natural conflict between male erōs for military 
endeavour with female reproductive values; Euripides’ IA juxtaposes male and female worlds 
of war and love, showing that in an androcentric, military culture, ἔρως for ‘plunder and glory’ 
– the centre of all Greek values – will always prevail.254  This certainly accords with EP findings 
that males prioritize the increase and maintenance of their status and resources in order to 
improve their chances of reproductive activity.255 
 
Euripides’ characters in the IA are particularly realistic, reflecting typical Athenians, but almost 
every well-known character behaves against their mythological type: Akhilleus – the best of 
the Akhaians – is a hesitant anti-hero; the brothers Agamemnon and Menelaos – long-time 
supporters of the Atreid cause – vacillate and bicker; Klytaimestra – the ruin of female 
reputation – is the model of a good wife and mother; and the slain girl-child Iphigeneia is more 
noble and heroic than all of the greatest Greek soldiers.  Euripides’ unexpected character-
assassination of the traditional male heroes is narratively remarkable,256 especially as the IA is 
rich in allusion to the Iliad’s excellent Akhilleus: the chorus marvel at his superhuman abilities 
                                                          
251 On the IA’s innovations and omissions, see Bowra (1966:157); Ferguson (1972:451); Castellani (1985:3); Foley 
(1985:68); Garner (1990:172-173).  On the play’s engagement with contemporary social and political concerns, 
including the misalignment of individualism and the public, greater good, see Walsh (1979:301); Zeitlin 
(1995a:179-181); Blume (2011:187); Markantonatos (2011:193). 
252 Zelenak (1998:131); Storey and Allan (2005:273).  On the IA as criticism of Greek philotimia and the Greeks’ 
uncontrollable ἔρως for warmongery, see Merwin and Dimock (1978:4, 13, 20); Wilson (1979:16); Knox (1985:9); 
Lawrence (1988:106); Sharrock and Ash (2002:70).  See also Thoukydides’ (6.24) comments on the real-world 
Greek army’s lust for war.  Scholars also highlight the play’s use of deception to mirror expeditious propaganda 
of contemporary war-making; see Vellacott (1975:174); Castellani (1985:6); Rabinowitz (2008:115); Hall 
(2010:290); Markantonatos (2011:190, 195, 218).  On the negative depiction of Akhilleus – often extolled as the 
greatest military man in Greek myth – confirming Euripides’ disapproval of heroic philotimia, see Norwood 
(1948:288); Ferguson (1972:458); Vellacott (1975:43); Merwin and Dimock (1978:15-16). 
253 Ferguson (1968:159-160); Foley (1982:75, 159-160, 163). 
254 Cavander (1973:11); Vellacott (1975:201); Zeitlin (1995a:181); Knapp (1997:71). 
255 On males’ attention to their status and possession of wealth, see Chapter 1, pp. 17-19; 19n24; 22; 28-30; 29n91; 
31-33; 34-36; 34n126; 34n130; 35n133; 35n134; 37; 39; 41-43; 49n230; 49n232; 56; 62-63; 64n323; 64n326; 66; 
69; 70n360; 83-84; 84n436. 
256 On the moral failings of the IA’s generals as an allusion to the ethos of late fifth-century Athenians, see 
Wasserman (1949:174); Vellacott (1972:83); Snell (1983:399); McLeish (2003:162); Storey and Allan (2005:27).  
On the characters in the IA as ordinary, typical Athenians, see Ferguson (1968:163; 1972:450, 464).  On the 
character contrast between Iphigeneia and all the other characters, see D. Burgess (2004:37-38). 
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in winning a race against a chariot and four horses on foot (IA 206-215).257  But the appearance 
of Euripides’ anti-Akhilleus immediately sabotages this glorious reputation: he reports that the 
Myrmidons are bothering him about the delay in departure, and have sent him to find out what’s 
going on (801-818).  In the process of searching for Agamemnon, he is instead greeted by 
Agamemnon’s wife in a farcical exchange concerning Akhilleus’ engagement to Iphigeneia 
(821-829); eventually, the astonished soldier denies any intention to marry Klytaimestra’s 
daughter (841-843).  The Old Man then reveals that Agamemnon actually plans to sacrifice 
Iphigeneia, and has called her to Aulis through the strategy of a false marriage; Klytaimestra 
therefore supplicates Akhilleus to assist her, because he has falsely been called Iphigeneia’s 
husband, and it was only his divine descent which persuaded Klytaimestra to agree to the 
marriage in the first place (903-912).258 
 
Akhilleus’ most pressing reason for assisting Klytaimestra is not the rescue of her daughter – a 
child whose throat will be cut – but the insult being done to his honour by Agamemnon: he 
resents being used by the despised Atreids to further their plans; the untoward use of his name 
to bring a dishonoured Iphigeneia to Aulis will make his own person ‘impure’ (938-943), and 
he fears that his own lineage will become secondary to theirs (944-954).  To stand back in the 
face of such insult would seriously jeopardize his personal reputation.259  In fact, if the general 
had only asked for permission to use his name to deceive the mother and daughter, then 
Akhilleus would not now be in this position of having to defend his own honour (959-969); the 
planned sacrifice of Iphigeneia would not be offensive, if only he had been in on the plan.  
Akhilleus coolly admonishes Klytaimestra: ‘calm yourself – I have revealed myself to you as a 
very great god, although I am not: but nevertheless, I will become one’ (973-975), comforting 
words indeed, to a woman about to lose her daughter to the sacrificial blade.  Like the battle-
shy Menelaos in Orestes, this unheroic Akhilleus’ first resort is to reasoned persuasion rather 
than force of arms to achieve his ends (1011-1013); although Klytaimestra thinks this an 
unlikely strategy (1014), she has no choice but to place herself entirely in his hands (1024, 
1033).  Homer’s Akhilleus feared the opinion of no man; Euripides’ nervous Akhilleus would 
rather Klytaimestra get the credit for the persuasion, in case the army finds fault with him for 
                                                          
257 On Homer’s Akhilleus as a warrior willing to commit brutal and ruthless atrocity, see Il. 23.175-177; 24.750-
753); on his relationship with his captive sex-slaves, see Il. 1.345-348, 368-369, 390-392; 9.658-661, 663-668). 
258 In Prag’s (1985:74) view, Stesikhoros’ work (ca. 560-540) was the source for Euripides’ false marriage between 
Iphigeneia and Akhilleus.  Cf. Kypria (43-50), however. 
259 See discussion of males’ willingness to defend their status, Chapter 1, pp. 17; 22; 28; 29n91; 31-32; 34-36; 
34n126; 34n130; 35n133; 35n134; 37; 39; 41-43; 49n230; 49n232; 56; 69; 70n360; 83. 
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resorting to cleverness instead of manly might (1017-1021), an example of extreme gender 
distinction affecting perceptions of physicalized masculinity – cunning being a traditional 
female vice.  Akhilleus – obsessed with his status in the Greek world generally and in the army 
specifically, cannot allow his masculine ethos to be in doubt.260  The IA’s accidental bridegroom 
is a very different man from the wrathful warrior in the opening chapter of the Iliad whose 
promised bed-mate is unexpectedly taken from him by Agamemnon. 
 
Akhilleus’ main motivation is a fretful concern about his reputation – supporting EP’s view of 
men’s concern with public perception of their ability to maintain renown for masculinity – and 
his last words to Iphigeneia are far from “romantic” (despite the previous debates of some 
critics): he applauds her noble self-sacrifice, and now wishes that he might have had the benefit 
of marrying her – Hellas is going to get that – and he suggests that, if she changes her mind, he 
will keep his weapons near the altar, in order to rescue her (1404-1432).261  The Messenger’s 
description of the actual sacrifice contains no mention of Akhilleus hovering nearby in the event 
of Iphigeneia’s need of rescue, because he is now one of the Akhaians, completely complicit 
with the murder.  His priority is his alliances with the army generals, and being seen as a reliable 
ally, an attitude in accord with EP findings on male disposition to intrasexual alliance-making 
and maintenance.  He accepts with approval the death of the girl for the sake of the war, and so 
is happy the sacrifice will now occur with the victim’s assent.  Having promised Klytaimestra 
that he would prevent the sacrifice, his earlier promise may be forgotten; no intervention to 
forestall unholy murder is required, because Akhilleus is now satisfied that Iphigeneia’s noble 
actions will not compromise his good name.  The nature of the act itself is of lesser import; 
what counts is the sacrificial victim’s assent, even if the doomed child’s mother protests. 
 
Euripides’ bringing-low of the best of the Akhaians is nothing compared to his character-
assassination of Atreid brothers Menelaos and Agamemnon, however.  The subject of human 
sacrifice is a tragic matter, but the ludicrous squabble of these royal Atreids foreshadows fourth-
century comedy.  The chorus’ ode praising the golden-haired Menelaos, and the nobly-born 
Agamemnon (175-177) is immediately undercut by their first actual appearance: Menelaos is 
                                                          
260 See Chapter 1. pp. 17-19; 19n28; 23-24; 25-26; 28; 29n91; 31; 33; 34n126; 35-36; 36n143; 37n145; 41; 49; 
49n230; 58-59; 68-70; 73n377; 74-75; 74n380; 75n385; 77-78; 82, for a discussion of perceptions of masculinity 
and men’s social status. 
261 Scholars diverge widely in their view of whether any “romantic” feelings exist between Iphigeneia and 
Akhilleus; see Cavander (1973:9); Walsh (1979:303); Castellani (1985:1, 4); Foley (1985:75); Sansone 
(1991:164); Michelini (2000:51). 
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in hot pursuit of an Old Man, bickering wildly with him over the letter which will save 
Iphigeneia’s life (309-313).  This Menelaos is the petty villain of melodrama, threatening to 
bloody the head of his pursuer with a blunt sceptre, and complaining that the Old Man talks 
rather too much for a slave (311-313).  Enter Agamemnon, the high king of the army, wondering 
– like a ponderous bobby – ‘what’s going on here then’ (317).262  Menelaos launches into a long 
and very serious attack upon his brother’s integrity; he has intercepted Agamemnon’s sealed 
tablet warning Iphigeneia and Klytaimestra away from Aulis, and he accuses his brother of 
behaving like a modern politician, ambitious and greedy, duplicitous and untrustworthy.263  
According to Menelaos, although Agamemnon campaigned hard to get the position of high 
general over the army, his friendliness to all and sundry was insincere, for as soon as he had 
won the office, he refused to receive the common man (337-348).  Agamemnon declares that 
he is leader only because the army chose him as a favour to Menelaos: he wishes he were not 
the supreme general, since that is why it is his daughter who must die (84-93).  Because almost 
everybody lies in this play, Menelaos’ account of his brother’s shoddy behaviour is somewhat 
suspect; but Agamemnon never denies the accusations.  Menelaos’ second point of attack 
concerns his brother’s unhappiness over the possibility that the whole venture might be called 
off; in his opinion, Agamemnon’s dismay derives only from the loss of opportunity to expand 
his status, and increase his renown among the Greeks (354-357).  Agamemnon’s preoccupation 
echoes Akhilleus’ concern with reputation, and both follow the EP finding that males are 
universally concerned with protecting their public persona.  Menelaos points out that the Greek 
army is disbanding itself (352-353), and so what is the point of claiming to be supreme 
commander of thousands of men and ships, when the demos makes up its own mind? 
 
Menelaos claims that his brother asked for Menelaos’ advice about Iphigeneia’s sacrifice in 
order to retain his command (356-357), another point of support for the EP view that alpha-
males work hard to ensure their rule.  Similarly, Agamemnon – upon hearing Kalkhas’ prophecy 
– was relieved and glad to sacrifice a daughter, because it meant retaining his supreme general-
ship; the father’s summons to Iphigeneia was therefore willingly dispatched, and so Menelaos 
is not to blame at all (358-364).  Menelaos concludes that Agamemnon’s present change of 
                                                          
262 He follows up on this clanger with an amusing – but inappropriate – little pun on his own name (321).  
Traditional British seaside puppet-shows present a slow-witted ‘bobby’ (police-man) as a nincompoop, whose 
most famous line must always be ‘Wot’s going on ‘ere, then?’; despite all the Punch-and-Judy palaver, this play 
about child-murder is no comedy. 
263 In Kovacs’ (2002a:199n12) opinion, this passage also differs substantially from Euripides’ original lines. 
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mind surrenders the whole of Hellas to the mocking of barbarians; what any army really needs 
is a man of good sense (370-375).  The chorus’ rather tepid comment on this speech wryly 
observes that it is terrible when brothers fight (376-377): from another point of view it is terrible 
that these brothers reconcile to plot the death of a child to retain personal and political power 
in order to wage bloody warfare.  These irreconcilable aspects of events show the 
incompatibility of males’ pursuit of power at all costs and the struggle of parents (often, and in 
this instance, mothers) to preserve the lives of their offspring.  Agamemnon answers none of 
Menelaos’ accusations: instead, he turns the attack back upon his brother, arguing that it is not 
ambition which brings the army to Aulis, but Menelaos’ own failing to control his wicked wife, 
his lust to regain her, and the oath taken long ago by the suitors of Helen (381-395).  He declares 
that it is hardly proper for Menelaos to enjoy happiness in regaining control over Helen if 
Agamemnon has to suffer the consequences of ‘lawless, wicked’ acts against his own children 
– and he is referring here to the lawless wicked sacrifice – why, he will weep day and night 
(396-399).  There was no mention in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia of long nights of fatherly suffering 
for Iphigeneia, however, despite Agamemnon’s perfunctory hesitation and internal debate over 
the matter (Aga. 205-217): traditionally it was Klytaimestra who lay awake, weeping until the 
sea of her tears was all drained dry (Aga. 887-894, 958), while child-killing Agamemnon 
returned home in triumph, without remorse or even acknowledgment of the price he paid for 
victory.  That mothers feel the loss of children more keenly – due to their greater level of 
lifetime investment in offspring – is well-evidenced in EP research.264  While this scene often 
attracts interest due to the shifts and reversals of the quarrelling brothers’ positions, both are 
intensely aware of how they will be perceived by the army they command, and ultimately, their 
decision rests upon preserving their power, and their reputation as powerful kings, as the 
following exchanges indicate. 
 
Agamemnon yields to Menelaos’ demand, seemingly because the saving letter has been delayed 
too long, however, and the intended victim is now present (IA 471-472).  But this was clearly 
not his only option: even at this stage, the army does not yet know that Iphigeneia is to be 
sacrificed, as the Messenger’s report of the army’s speculations as to her arrival demonstrates 
(415-439).  At this point Agamemnon still has the power to rescue her, and Menelaos has just 
agreed that he will find other ways to retrieve Helen (413-414), but Agamemnon now refuses 
                                                          
264 On mothers’ greater investment and sense of loss when deprived of offspring, see Chapter 1, pp. 46-47; 46n207; 
46n209; 46n210; 47n215; 55n272. 
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to allow the vacillating Menelaos to block the sacrifice.  Agamemnon might also have sent the 
second letter of warning with a young, swift-footed messenger, instead, he sends it with an 
ancient man (139-140), suggesting that, in fact, he has never seriously entertained the notion of 
resisting the prophecy of Kalkhas; he was merely feeling sorry for himself, and worried about 
his command of the army, and so offered a token protest, just as he did in the chorus’ account 
of his decision in the Agamemnon. 
 
Menelaos now begs Agamemnon not to contemplate sacrificing any children for the sake of the 
war (473-484); ironically, he swears oaths by his grandfather Pelops – who was killed as a child 
by his own father and then restored by the gods – and by their father Atreus – who killed the 
children of his brother Thyestes.265  Now, he is filled with pity, for Agamemnon, and for 
Iphigeneia too, since both are his kin; threatening the very foundation of Greek myth, he even 
offers to forget evil Helen and make another marriage; he cannot bear to destroy Agamemnon, 
since brother should not destroy brother; the whole expedition should be disbanded at once; 
what has Agamemnon’s daughter got to do with Helen – nothing; and (somewhat belatedly) to 
kill a child is a dreadful thing (485-495). 
 
Menelaos presents entirely plausible, compassionate reasons for abandoning the war and 
preventing the undesirable sacrifice of Iphigeneia, a child.  The chorus’ response to Menelaos’ 
recantation observes that γενναῖ᾽ ἔλεξας Ταντάλῳ τε τῷ Διὸς/ πρέποντα: προγόνους οὐ 
καταισχύνεις σέθεν, ‘True to your descent from Tantalos the child of Zeus, you speak good 
sense; you do not put your forbears to shame’ (504-505), but what Menelaos has just done and 
said is exactly what his shameful forbears Tantalos and Atreus ought to have done and said: 
rejected the expeditious killing of a child.  Every apparently sensible argument will be 
overthrown in the interests of Atreid honour and glory, however, and all blame for the 
apparently inevitable unholy act deflected scattershot onto others (513-537); a better example 
of the sacrifice of offspring upon the altar of male glory could hardly be found in tragedy, 
showing just how the drive to secure reputation with the ultimate aim of increasing reproductive 
opportunity outweighs even preserving the lives of existing children.266 
 
                                                          
265 This is the first mention in this play of Menelaos’ children as potential victims. 
266 On the evolutionary function of ultimate reproductive goals, see Chapter 1, pp. 21; 21n37.  On male 




Agamemnon’s response to Menelaos’ compassionate arguments for opposing the proposed 
sacrifice of Iphigeneia is a tour-de-force of self-interest and obfuscation.267  He approves 
Menelaos’ brotherly attempt to reconcile, claiming that estrangement of brothers occurs 
principally due to rivalry in love or inheritance (508-509).268  Agamemnon insists that he hates 
the kind of blood kinship that creates pain for everyone involved (509-510), yet he immediately 
adds that they now have no choice but to commit fully to the murder of his daughter (511-512).  
Agamemnon and Menelaos list those who – by insisting on the sacrifice, or making the 
prophecy known – ensure that Iphigeneia cannot be saved (513-537): the Greek army (514); 
Kalkhas, that ambitious ‘bane’ (518, 520); and the ambitious and disloyal Odysseus (527).269  
No matter Menelaos’ sensible arguments, Agamemnon has a ready reply to counter any hope 
of saving his child; he claims that if he fails to carry through on the sacrifice, the whole Greek 
army will descend upon Argos, and utterly destroy the palace at Mycenae, in order to kill both 
Atreid brothers (531-536).  Why this should be the case, when the army exists only because of 
Agamemnon’s and Menelaos’ need to restore their reputation for effective, proprietary 
possession of a wife, is not made clear.270  Just as in Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon, his pity is all for 
himself (537).  There is no suggestion that Agamemnon could simply inform the army – many 
of whom are only at Aulis because of the obligation of a suitor’s oath – that he could not bear 
to sacrifice his own child to simply retrieve his brother’s wife, and there is no suggestion that 
the army might not approve his fatherly sentiment.  Reputedly, only three other men beside 
himself even know of the prophecy at this point – Kalkhas, Menelaos, and Odysseus – and the 
latter, according to at least one version of the story, is already an unwilling participant in the 
war, and would likely grasp any hope of return to Ithaka.271 
 
Aiskhylos gave us only a second-hand – perhaps even third-hand – eyewitness account of 
Agamemnon’s choosing to kill his daughter; Euripides gives us a first-hand view of an 
                                                          
267 It is not at all certain that either Atreid ever truly wishes to extract themselves from the impending act of child-
murder.  According to Ryzman (1989:114-115), Menelaos’ change of heart is only feigned, in order to achieve his 
ultimate goal, while Agamemnon’s initial resistance to the oracle’s demand is equally deceptive, aimed at the 
retention of power and the acquisition of glory. 
268 The enmity between his own kin over Aerope and the Tantalid sceptre, Atreus and Thyestes, is certainly a 
defining example of this. 
269 Respect for Apollo’s prophet does not appear to figure in their debate on whether they should kill Kalkhas or 
not (518-521). 
270 On men’s need to enforce proprietary ownership of female mates in order to maintain the reputation among 
male peers, see Chapter 1, p. 70n360. 




ambitious man upon the brink of filicide for political purposes.272  Homer’s Agamemnon is a 
man driven by the ambition to rule without a rival, to increase his own wealth, to retain his 
social status, and to get unconstrained access to desirable women; so far, he figures as a typical 
alpha male of any time and place.  But, as the Greeks well knew, he is also the villain of the 
Iliad – he, not Hektor, is Akhilleus’ main antagonist and matters only proceed once their 
conflict is resolved – and he lies, and is unwisely arrogant toward his allies; men die for the 
sake of his ego.273  Homer depicts Agamemnon as a poor king and leader from his first 
appearance; he acts as he thinks best for himself, lacking the wisdom to choose the best course 
for the army (Il. 1.22-25, 29-31), and is also clearly a fool when it comes to running his own 
household (Il. 1.111-115). 
 
Euripides’ Agamemnon in IA is perhaps a little less obnoxious than Homer’s arrogant high-
king, but not so very much.  The IA’s Atreid king is equally driven by ambition, by the desire 
for addition wealth, by the need to maintain his social rank, and – not coincidentally – to 
increase his access to fertile-age women through victory in war.  His opening speech attributes 
blame for the war onto the oath sworn by the suitors of Helen, an oath that was Tyndareos’ idea 
(49-65).274  Agamemnon continues throughout the play to blame others for the war: anyone but 
himself.275  That he sees the need to over-defend the decision to kill his child suggests that he 
is not comfortable with the expeditious sacrifice of his child after all; this suggests that there 
are limits to the drive to increase and maintain a reputation for ability to rule, a drive in tension 
with the universal urge – even in males – to preserve the life of one’s own offspring.276  
According to his self-defence, it was Menelaos who invoked the oaths of Tyndareos throughout 
                                                          
272 Considering Euripides’ heavy allusions in this play to the Iliad’s Agamemnon – in particular the conflict 
between Akhilleus and Agamemnon and the proposed marriage of Akhilleus to a daughter – it appears that this 
Agamemnon is the same man featured throughout the many versions of the Oresteia.  McDonald (1990:74, 
2003:135) draws attention to the Greek view – as in Aristotle Nic. Eth. 1161b; Eud. Eth. 1238b – that the (male) 
parent has the right to dispose of offspring however he wishes.  Infant filicides and exposures in tragic myth 
typically tend to be male, however, as in Euripides’ Medeia and Ion. 
273 Even before their quarrel over the reassignment of Briseis, Agamemnon and Akhilleus are contending to be the 
best of the Akhaians (Il. 1.90-91), and Agamemnon is manifestly motivated primarily by the desire to counter any 
threat to his dominance, and maintain his reputation and thus his power at all costs.  Homer is also at pains to 
demonstrate that Agamemnon has a record of lying to his own people (Il. 2.13-15, 2.30-33, 2.136-137, 2.67-70), 
and his whole army agrees Agamemnon has acted with extreme hubris (Il. 13.111-114). 
274 Kovacs (2002a:166-167n1) agrees that these lines represent Euripides’ original text. 
275 Agamemnon often argues that the sacrifice is absolutely going to be – must be – somebody else’s fault; when 
Iphigeneia arrives at Aulis, for example, Agamemnon declares that the destruction of his child is Paris’s fault (467-
468). 
276 On the utility of husbands in preserving offspring lives – from the opportunistic infanticidal attempts of other 
males, see Chapter 1, pp. 49; 61n309. 
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Greece, insisting that all the suitors come to his aid (77-79), and while Agamemnon’s own 
response on hearing Kalkhas’ prophecy is to order the disbanding of the army – because he 
could never bear to harm his own daughter – he claims that it was Menelaos who thought of 
sending a letter home to ensnare Iphigeneia (94-105).  Agamemnon also observes that 
Tyndareos has three daughters: Phoibe, his wife Klytaimestra, and Helen, and he is eager to 
apportion at least some of the blame for this situation onto his sister-in-law Helen, who – under 
the influence of Aphrodite – chose her own husband, much to Agamemnon’s regret (66-71).277  
The chorus agree with Agamemnon’s scapegoating of Helen as the cause of woe for the Atreids 
and their children – the retrieval of Helen the bad wife comes at too great a price – (1253-1254), 
but Agamemnon unfairly blames his sister-in-law for his own, terrible woes, which are entirely 
self-imposed.  There is no possible explanation for the depiction of Agamemnon flailing to 
deflect responsibility for his decision to sacrifice his child other than his own deeply suppressed 
consciousness that he does terrible wrong – against his daughter, her mother, and the wider 
community of families; despite this cognitive dissonance, his drive to enforce the honour of his 
clan will triumph. 
 
The incompatibility of individual ambition and community well-being looms large in the play, 
but almost of the characters – including Iphigeneia – act to increase their individual glory, 
despite personal and social costs.  Agamemnon may say he envies those who pass through life 
without risk of danger, unknown to their mortal peers (16-18), but – as the Old Man points out 
– danger, power, honour are what is admired (in men and male-male relations at least, according 
to both EP study and Greek custom), and if pain is the price for these things, it is a price worth 
the risk; Atreus would expect no less, and the gods certainly see no reason to alter this 
unfortunate reality of mortal life (20-34).278  As the princess Iphigeneia arrives in expectation 
of happy marriage to a very famous man, Agamemnon observes that noble birth results only in 
misery, because the weight of rank enslaves a man; what a fine thing low birth must be (442-
453)!  The overt message seems to be that pitiable king Agamemnon is being pushed against 
his true nature into something entirely unwelcome.279  Homer and Aiskhylos gave us the 
                                                          
277 Other sources insist that Agamemnon successfully wooed Helen on his brother’s behalf: her flight from that 
marriage casts his achievement into disrepute.  Traditionally, the three daughters of Tyndareos are all destined to 
have failed marriages, however. 
278 On men’s disposition to risk-taking in order to increase their reputation for bravery, physical strength, and 
possession of resources, see Chapter 1, pp. 28-29; 37. 
279 Scholars are divided on Agamemnon’s moral character in Euripides’ IA, however, and sometimes contentiously 
so; see Stawell (1929:17); Wasserman (1949:174, 184); Blaiklock (1952:115-116); Jones (1962:247); Kitto 
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irresistibly ambitious, arrogant king, expert in self-promotion and pitiless in war-making.  In 
contrast with the traditional Agamemnon, however, Euripides’ Agamemnon in IA cannot 
pretend that his actions are for the good of everyone; he commands Menelaos and the chorus 
to conceal the truth of their plan from Klytaimestra (538-542).  Agamemnon’s horror upon the 
arrival of Iphigeneia in company of her mother demonstrates his understanding that he is doing 
wrong; Klytaimestra’s desire to accompany her daughter is predictable and prosocial; 
Agamemnon’s duplicitous inhumanity is for nobody’s good but his own (454-459).  
Agamemnon can well imagine the long-term consequences of his atrocious scheme, as 
evidenced by his anger and fear upon finding his wife has come to Aulis.  But his fear cannot 
prevent the plan going forward.  Ominously, he imagines that Iphigeneia, once she discovers 
that her dear father is going to kill her, will curse him with a marriage just like this – expecting 
love, but finding death (462-464).  Although Iphigeneia utters no such curse, a clearer 
intertextual reference to Klytaimestra’s future actions could hardly be found.  Every aspect of 
Klytaimestra’s characterization in the IA is a commentary on the inevitability of a mother’s 
revenge upon the husband who betrays his wife, and who sacrifices a beloved daughter to 
worldly ambition. 
 
Klytaimestra is the unwitting target of her husband’s lies from her very first appearance in the 
IA.  Having delivered a number of ambiguous endearments to Iphigeneia – which to an audience 
in the know only serve to make her joyful innocence more pitiable – Agamemnon claims that 
the length of his grief-filled speech is entirely due to his sadness in handing their daughter over 
to ‘another house’ (685-690).  Klytaimestra at this stage still trusts and loves her husband: her 
reply offers compassion for his grief, indicates her own sadness at marrying-out a beloved 
daughter, and suggests that they will both become accustomed to the loss over time (691-694).  
Agamemnon is desperate to get his sympathetic wife away from the proceedings: although she 
has just arrived after a very long journey, he commands her to return to Argos immediately, 
completely excluding her – the mother – from all marriage festivities (725-736), but 
Klytaimestra has every right – of attachment, custom, and religious duty – to officiate at her 
daughter’s wedding.  In frustration, Agamemnon is reduced to a single word: πιθοῦ! ‘Obey!’ 
                                                          
(1969:364); Ferguson (1972:453); Vellacott (1972:88); Merwin and Dimock (1978:14); Collard (1981:7-8); Siegel 
(1981:257-258); Lesky (1983b:362); Snell (1983:397-398); McDonald (1990:76); Rabinowitz (1993:40); Wolfe 
(2009:712-713); Markantonatos (2011:203).  Some suggest that Euripides’ Agamemnon is simply a typical fifth-
century man, subject to the political and cultural demands of an androcentric society, and sympathetically 
perceived by ancient audiences; see Stawell (1929:18); Norwood (1948:287-288); Wassermann (1949:176-179). 
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(739).  Anyone familiar with Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon would recognize the sly allusion to 
Klytaimestra’s famous cry of πιθοῦ (Aga. 943). 
 
Klytaimestra is accustomed to wifely obedience (726), but this time her husband goes too far: 
evoking the authority of Hera, goddess of marriage – who rules Argos – she reminds 
Agamemnon that she will fulfil the role of the mother within the house, and he should take care 
of matters outside (739-741).280  Agamemnon observes that the wise man should keep a good, 
true wife in his house (749-750), and the chorus immediately tease the omniscient audience 
with a preview of how the Greek army will reach Ilium, where dwells the god-possessed 
prophetess Kassandra (751-761).  Agamemnon’s previously good and true wife in the house 
will in future days receive this very Trojan princess – in the company of her now-hated husband 
– and dispatch them both.  Agamemnon may be Klytaimestra’s philos, but he is no good-and-
true husband, admitting he will betray her himself (459).  The only loyal friend in 
Klytaimestra’s world is the Old Man, originally part of her dowry from Tyndareos (868-871), 
and the only other character in the IA to utterly reject the child-sacrifice; Klytaimestra discovers 
from her loyal family retainer that the proposed marriage is a dreadful lie, told by Agamemnon 
to bring Iphigeneia to Aulis (882-887).  Upon hearing the terrible plans set for her daughter, 
Klytaimestra concludes that Agamemnon must be mad, possessed by an alastōr, and the Old 
Man agrees (873-878).281  He further informs her that the letter sent by Agamemnon in a fleeting 
moment of good conscience to forbid the marriage was intercepted by Menelaos; it is therefore 
he who now bears responsibility for the situation (891-895).  Agamemnon and Menelaos have 
both, alternately, retracted their approval for the sacrifice, however, and so now neither one can 
be held to account for Iphigeneia’s death! 
 
When Klytaimestra confronts Agamemnon about his ‘unholy doings against his own children’ 
(1104-1105), he has no idea that she and Iphigeneia have found out the truth of the imminent 
sacrifice.  There proceeds an interrogation (1124-1143), undeniably evoking that in Aiskhylos’ 
Agamemnon (Aga. 931-943); once again on stage (and in terms of narrative time, previously) 
Klytaimestra is cross-examining Agamemnon on whether he is willing to sacrifice his own 
child.  Agamemnon – unable to deny the charge – wants to know how such an act is an offence 
                                                          
280 Once again, we think of Aiskhylos’ trilogy, in which Hera’s marriage was invoked to excuse Klytaimestra’s 
murderer. 
281 See also Akhilleus’ description of himself as ὡς οὐχὶ Πηλέως, ἀλλ᾽ ἀλάστορος γεγώς, ‘not the son of Peleus, 
but of a new-born spirit of revenge’ (IA 946). 
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against her, the mother of the child in question (IA 1138).  Audiences might reasonably expect 
that she would cite her years of care for her daughter, or perhaps just her love for the child, but 
Klytaimestra’s reply has confounded critics: no other extant tragedy outlines so directly the 
sordid background to their married life together, and this historical account is in no way 
contradicted by Agamemnon himself.  Klytaimestra, it appears, was previously married to a 
man called Tantalos (very likely a descendant of the original Tantalos, and perhaps a brother to 
Aigisthos); Agamemnon slew her first husband, and brutally murdered the infant son nursing 
at her breast; he then escaped the vengeance of Klytaimestra’s brothers by supplicating her 
father, who honoured his request; this killer then received the widowed Klytaimestra in 
marriage (1148-1156).282  This brutal account of one male’s elimination of a rival and rival’s 
child, followed by his requisition of that male’s female mate for reproductive purposes, could 
be lifted from any account of take-over infanticide in the animal world.  Klytaimestra’s 
submission to the rule of her previous family’s murderer is also logical in terms of a female’s 
best reproductive strategy, given the limited lifetime opportunities faced by females across 
species.  What is anomalous in their history, from a biological point of view, is the male’s 
murder of his own pubescent female child, which constitutes an enormous waste of resources; 
for the alpha-male, however, there is no better strategy than increasing his own relative ranking 
and control of resources. 
 
Although some view the IA’s revelation about the origin of their marriage as unimportant, 
irrelevant gossip,283 the passage is patently much more than gossip: it is evidence that, up to the 
unexpected murder of Iphigeneia, Klytaimestra was an exemplary, compliant wife to her second 
husband Agamemnon.  Despite an appalling beginning, Klytaimestra reconciled herself to this 
new union, behaved blamelessly as wife, faithful bed-mate, and prudent keeper of 
Agamemnon’s house, increasing his wealth, and bearing him a fine son, along with three 
daughters (1157-1165).  She – who has been a good and true wife – is going to be deprived of 
                                                          
282 On the narrative importance of Klytaimestra’s unexpected disclosure of Agamemnon’s rarely-mentioned prior 
action in the IA, see also Wassermann (1949:183-184); Lawrence (1988:99); Michelini (1999-2000:49-50); Gibert 
(2005:228, 230); Rabinowitz (2008:111); Hall (2010:288).  According to D. Burgess (2004:42n13), Klytaimestra’s 
marriage to Thyestes’ son Tantalos may be found in Apollodorus (Epit. 2. 16), but nowhere else before the IA of 
405 BCE.  See also Foley (1982:163; 1985:74-75).  Gibert (2005:234) is probably right to suggest that 
Agamemnon’s murder of Klytaimestra’s husband is motivated by the fact that Tantalos (the husband) is the son 
of Atreus’ ancestral enemy Thyestes.  On the consequences of this event in Klytaimestra’s later story, see Foley 
(1985:74-75); Sorum (1992:538); D. Burgess (2004:42n13); Lauriola (2012:36).  In Vellacott’s (1975:130) 
opinion, Klytaimestra’s later actions are exonerated by the evidence in this earlier IA of her miserable marriage to 
a lying child-killer.  See also Eur. IA 1150 ff; Ap., Bib. 2.15-16. 
283 Kitto (1968:367); Kovacs (2003:96). 
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a child as the price merely to regain someone else’s bad wife (1157-1170).  There is no reason 
to believe that she personally disapproved his plan to make war against the Trojans; in the event 
of his victory, she would have shared in his increase in fortune and status, supporting the EP 
finding that women in general approve their men’s tendency to engage in offensive war-
making.284 
 
Klytaimestra also warns Agamemnon quite clearly about the consequences for him personally 
– from her – if he goes through with this action: his obedient, good wife will become κακὴν, a 
wicked one (1184), and his reception upon returning from the war will be that appropriate to an 
equally πονηρόν ‘wicked’ husband and father (1187); she begs him not to allow this to happen 
(1183-1184, 1187).  Every aspect of their family life will be overturned, and so all of her 
parental effort undermined in service to her husband’s political ambition.  What gods will look 
favourably upon a kin-slayer’s homecoming, if he proceeds with the sacrifice (1185-1190)?  
What surviving child would bear to embrace him (1191-1193)?  Has he given thought to these 
consequences, or is he thinking only of his sceptre and command (1194-1195)?  Why should 
Iphigeneia, the child of a faithful wife, be singled out to die, instead of someone else’s child – 
Hermione, for example – and why should the daughter of a bad wife enjoy happy reunion with 
an adulterous mother (1196-1205)?285  Klytaimestra’s apparent readiness to sacrifice to 
sacrifice her sister’s daughter is difficult to appreciate, but explicable in terms of Hamilton’s 
rule of altruism and relatedness: her own offspring must always be more precious to her than a 
less related child, even a niece.286  The chorus weigh in after the close of her speech, urging 
Agamemnon to obey, observing that saving the lives of children is honourable – one of the few 
times we ever hear of such a concept in an Oresteia tragedy – and insisting that no one could 
deny this (1209-1210). 
 
Klytaimestra is contesting the combined power and will of the most powerful males in her 
world, and so she uses the best, most persuasive arguments she can muster; that she fails is no 
indication that her attachment to Iphigeneia is not genuine, only that Agamemnon’s desire to 
                                                          
284 On women’s approval of males’ warmongery, see Chapter 1, pp. 37-38.  On the universality of patriotic female 
support for war, see also Goldstein (2001). 
285 On desperate mothers in tragedy suggesting that someone else stand in as sacrificial victim, see also Hekabe in 
Euripides’ Hekabe, who – trying to save the life of her daughter Polyxena – argues that if it is essential to sacrifice 
the most beautiful of women to death, then surely the daughter of Tyndareos – Helen – should be chosen, since 
she possess the greatest beauty in the world (Hek. 267-270). 
286 On Hamilton’s Rule and altruism, see Chapter 1, pp. 44-45; 44n198; 52n252; 53; 53n258; 77. 
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lead an army to Troy is much greater than a mother’s love, and that women’s reproductive 
success is dependent on male whim.  Klytaimestra’s role in the IA is to demonstrate that neither 
reminders of love nor threat of death were enough to dissuade this general and his closest allies 
from committing unholy sacrifice in the name of war.  Klytaimestra – an utterly exemplary wife 
– endured without complaint her marriage to the husband who killed her first child, the son of 
her first husband Tantalos.  The best wife is the woman who prioritizes her husband’s mating 
effort, but Agamemnon is also a serial child-killer, and even an exemplary wife has her limits: 
if she forgives the murder of yet another child, there might be no end to his slaying of her 
children.287  According to Greek cultural norms, her proper role in marriage is to protect his 
household, and produce children: it is not to enable him to trample the true wealth of the oikos 
– her offspring.  The chorus earlier pointed out that to bear (and rear) children is a marvellous 
power, conveying great love, and that everyone labours universally on behalf of offspring (IA 
917-918); their undiluted approval of parental investment in the IA stands in stark contrast to 
other plays which weigh up the pros and cons of having children.288  Klytaimestra has done 
what every wife should, and borne Agamemnon a legitimate son and heir (along with an 
uncertain number of daughters).289  It is clear from her first appearance that she is a good 
mother, and happy to invest in her and Agamemnon’s offspring, in line with both the chorus’ 
earlier view of parental investment, and the EP research on maternal investment. 
 
Klytaimestra and her daughter arrive in Aulis in great excitement, and this motherly 
Klytaimestra delivers a gracious speech, full of enthusiasm for the imminent marriage, and 
mindful of her children’s comfort (590-630).  Iphigeneia’s first words evidence the loving and 
                                                          
287 Andromakhe demonstrates her goodness by assisting Hektor in his affairs when Aphrodite pleased to ‘trip him 
up’; accepting and suckling her husband’s illegitimate sons, she argues, is the way to win a husband’s love (And. 
222-227), and Homer’s Hektor describes this wife as φίλην “beloved” (Il. 6.366).  Theano the wife of Antenor 
also suckles her husband’s bastard son as often as she does her own children, for the sole purpose of pleasing her 
husband (Il. 5.69-71).  Andromakhe legendarily invests in the children her husband has sired on other women, 
jeopardizing her own reproductive success, but she is completely without kin support, and thus catastrophically – 
even by the cultural standards of ancient Greece – dependent on her husband and his family; her compliance with 
her husband’s reproductive activity outside of marriage may have been purely pragmatic.  Andromakhe is no 
troublesome, philoteknos ‘child-loving’ wife, however, as her laments for Hektor – which omit all mention of 
Astyanax – demonstrate (And. 103-116, 453-457). 
288 See for example, the chorus’ consideration of the topic in Euripides’ Medeia (1081-1115). 
289 On the fluctuating number of daughters in Agamemnon’s oikos, see Bremmer (2002:24); Agamemnon’s 
daughters are four in the Kypria, three in the Iliad and Sophokles’ Elektra, but only two in Hesiod’s Catalogue of 
Women, and Euripides’ Elektra and IT; the sacrificed daughter was variously known as Iphianassa in Sophokles’ 
Elektra and in the Iliad, Iphimede in the Catalogue, Iphigeneia in the Kypria, and in Euripides’ plays.  The Kypria 
has both an Iphianassa and an Iphigeneia.  On Euripides’ use in the IA of narrative details from the Kypria, see 
Lubeck (1993:6, 24, 28).  On the ancient origins of Iphigeneia, see West (1995). 
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obedient daughter, full of affection for her father, but mindful of her mother’s authority (631-
632).290  Klytaimestra remarks that Iphigeneia has always loved Agamemnon the most (638-
639), a casual comment which serves only to heighten the pathos of a father’s impending 
treachery.291  Seeing that her beloved father suffers some distress at the thought of her 
impending marriage, Iphigeneia undertakes to cheer him up: she implores him to stay at home, 
near his children; he replies that it pains him that he cannot, so she delivers a curse upon war-
spears and her uncle Menelaos’ woes (656-658).  This Iphigeneia is a sweet, spontaneous child, 
with no interest in – or understanding of – matters beyond her natural sphere, and certainly no 
desire to win glory for herself in supporting the war-effort. 
 
Once the terrible plan is revealed, this innocent child grasps her father’s knees, and declares 
herself a suppliant (1216-1219).  Now it is clear why Klytaimestra told the story of 
Agamemnon’s murder of her first husband and child, and his successful supplication of her 
father Tyndareos (1148-1156): Agamemnon himself once owed his life to the mercy of a 
stranger who had every reason to kill him.  Yet he would refuse the same mercy to his own 
child, who has much better reason than Tantalos’ killer to expect protection.  Iphigeneia accuses 
the one man who should not seek to slay her of appalling evil: 
 
ὁ δὲ τεκών με τὰν τάλαιναν, 
ὦ μᾶτερ ὦ μᾶτερ, 
οἴχεται προδοὺς ἔρημον. 
δυστάλαιν᾽ ἐγώ, πικρὰν 
πικρὰν ἰδοῦσα δυσελέναν, 
φονεύομαι διόλλυμαι 
σφαγαῖσιν ἀνοσίοισιν ἀνοσίου πατρός, 
 
‘The one who engendered me, oh mother, oh mother, abandons me, consigning me to 
desolation!  I am utterly miserable, knowing hateful, hateful, accursed Helen; I am 
destroyed, by the unholy act of my unholy father!’ (1312-1318). 
                                                          
290 While Kovacs (2002a:225n14) deletes this passage as a spurious addition, it is possible, given the IA’s allusions 
to other works in the Oresteia, that this scene parallels the arrival of Aiskhylos’ Agamemnon in his magnificent 
chariot, with Kassandra beside him. 
291 Is this an allusion to Klytaimestra’s statement in Euripides’ Elektra that Elektra always loved her father more 




Iphigeneia draws attention to the importance of blood relationship, pointing out that if she is 
gone, she cannot repay her aged father for his parental investment in her (1229-1230).  She also 
begs for Agamemnon’s mercy in the names of Pelops, Atreus, and the mother who brought her 
forth in travail (1233-1235), reminding him that the marriage of Helen and Paris is not her 
business, yet it is going to destroy her (1236-1237).  She offers to kiss him now, so as to have 
something sweet to remember him by in the underworld (1238-1240), a sly allusion to 
Aiskhylos’ image in the Agamemnon of Iphigeneia in the underworld running to give the dead 
Agamemnon a kiss (Aga. 1555-1559).292 
 
And what is Agamemnon’s response to Iphigeneia’s moving pleas, and to those of her mother 
before her?  He agrees that was he does is terrible, but suggests that to not do it would be worse; 
he claims that the army are mad with the desire to go on campaign, and so will kill him – and 
all his daughters – if he refuses the oracle; now the ultimate responsibility lies not with 
Menelaos or Helen – and certainly not with himself – but with Hellas, who must put an end to 
the forcible abduction of wives (IA 1255-1275).293  All of these justifications are the least 
evidenced within this play, as well as in the wider Oresteia narrative, as Euripides’ audience 
were no doubt aware: the Greek army, as the Iliad demonstrates, are very willing to disband (Il. 
2.142), and Helen was never forcibly abducted, because Aphrodite was to blame (Od. 4.259-
262).  No other Greek wives are presently at risk of abduction, and the Trojans, with the 
exception of Paris, fervently desire to return the one Greek wife they possess (Il. 7.350, 393). 
 
Akhilleus now appears offering the information that the army have – at last – discovered the 
oracle, and are demanding Iphigenia’s death (IA 1345-1348), and attacking him for speaking 
against the idea (1348-1353).  Klytaimestra and Akhilleus agree that he must fight the army to 
try to save Iphigeneia’s life, because Iphigeneia is his promised wife (1353-1368), but 
Iphigeneia now famously changes her mind.  Suddenly – and incongruously – she takes up the 
                                                          
292 The latter part of the speech (IA 1241-1252) is bracketed by Kovacs, simply because Iphigeneia mentions 
Orestes.  Once Kovacs (2002a:160) committed himself to the inauthenticity of baby Orestes onstage in the 
Euripidean original, all lines involving him must be viewed as doubtful.  This approach results, however, in the 
omission of several rather typical Euripidean devices, including a teasing allusion (IA 1251-1252) to Akhilleus’ 
amazing statement in the Odyssey (11.488-491) about preferring to live as a commoner, rather than exist as a king 
in the underworld.  Later, lines 1447-1452 are omitted in Kovacs’ edition because of the reference to Orestes, yet 
a farewell from Iphigeneia to her sisters and brother at this point would have been narratively consistent. 
293 Perhaps the responsibility even lies with Iphigeneia, whose compliance with events – as her father implies – 
may save the lives of her sisters. 
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traditionally male heroic desire for honour and fame; nothing could be less natural, both in 
Greek cultural contexts, and within EP models of typical gendered behaviour.  According to 
her, Akhilleus might die for no gain, but Iphigeneia could gain personal glory; she herself could 
ensure that Greek wives will be safe; furthermore, her life belongs to the state – not to her 
mother – and many others are willing to die for that nation; female life is worth less than male 
life, and Akhilleus’ life is worth ten thousand women!; her death is willed by Artemis; and – 
most importantly of all – Greeks must rule over all others, because all others are naturally slaves 
(1368-1401).  All of these assertions are more likely to be uttered by an Akhillean or Heraklean 
type of hero; unsurprisingly, her erstwhile fiancée is greatly impressed by a woman believing 
her intended husband to be ten thousand times greater than herself and envies her ‘gift’ of 
herself to Greece (1404-1411).  The scene closes with an exchange of lines between Iphigeneia 
and her mother, in which Iphigeneia forbids any mourning for her death, begs her mother not 
to hate Agamemnon, asks her mother not to attend the sacrifice, and sings a song with the chorus 
in celebration of her victorious death (1433-1509). 
 
Some believe, quite reasonably, that the IA originally ended at this point.294  If so, then 
Klytaimestra’s final words in the IA are a heart-breaking cri-de-coeur, begging Iphigeneia not 
to leave her (1466), while Iphigeneia’s final words to her mother (1487-1489) address her using 
the same term as the chorus do a few moments later to the Goddess Artemis: ὦ πότνια πότνια 
μᾶτερ, οὐ δάκρυά γέ σοι/ δώσομεν ἁμέτερα: ‘O lady, lady mother, we have not the power to 
offer you our tears’ (1524).295  She has bid Klytaimestra not to weep (1466), and she herself is 
now beyond all tears; she exits and the chorus sing of how her blood will pour upon the altar, 
in order to bring Hellas – and Agamemnon – victory and fame.  If this were any other tragedy, 
it would indeed be a fitting and perhaps typical ending to the play, but this drama is also a 
prequel to a much greater story, an explanation of causation, and dreadful consequences. 
 
                                                          
294 Kovacs (2002a:333n26) suggests that the addition aims to align the IA with the earlier IT.  Some contend that 
the triumphant ending of the IA, in which Iphigeneia is rescued from death, must be a posthumous addition to 
Euripides’ work.  See Kovacs (2003); McDonald (2003:134); Blume (2011:187).  Cf. Merwin and Dimock 
(1978:3), who argue against reading the extant ending as interpolation. 
295 Kovacs (2003:99) contends that Iphigeneia’s invocation of her mother as ὦ πότνια πότνια μᾶτερ, (1487), and 
ὦ πότνια, πότνια, (1524), poses some critical difficulty, and is likely spurious.  πότνια, ‘a poetic title of honour, 
used chiefly in addressing females, whether goddesses or women’ (LSJ online) is an unusual epithet for human 
women in tragedy; in using language better suited to a deity, Iphigeneia may be alluding to (or perhaps even 
evoking in her mother) the powerful alastōr who – as the audience is aware – would one day avenge her. 
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Aristotle famously disapproved Iphigeneia’s volte-face as inconsistent characterization (Poet. 
1454a33-34), and modern critics debate whether Euripides and his contemporary audiences saw 
this inconsistency as a problem, or as an advance in dramatic style.296  Almost all characters in 
the IA change their minds, however, and switch their position on the sacrifice.297  But this work 
confirms that there is one person who never changes her mind on whether Iphigeneia should 
have been killed: her mother.298  Euripides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis suggests a strong connection 
between the consequences of man’s expedient use of woman, and the consequences of men’s 
expedient war-making to human civilization: the death of one girl may be unpleasant and 
unwelcome, but it is not really too great a price to pay compared to the anticipated war-spoils 
for thousands of men.  In the opinion of some, Iphigeneia’s noble, reasonable, and unselfish 
self-sacrifice and stirring rhetoric about the freedom of Greece are a false veneer over the 
terrible consequences of mob passion, and the loss of all civilized values.299  A more 
sympathetically-depicted Klytaimestra represents what would be lost in the process: positive 
human values of cooperation and compassion. 
 
Critics agree that Klytaimestra is given – for the first time – a strongly sympathetic opportunity 
to present her own version of events at Aulis.300  Many construe a natural relationship between 
Euripides’ ‘before’ and Aiskhylos’ ‘after’ characters – despite their separation by almost fifty 
years.301  Some read her character as humanly realistic, socially conventional, and even 
                                                          
296 On Aristotle, see D. Burgess (2004:37).  On the Greek preference for consistency in characterization, and the 
IA as exceptional in this regard, see Lesky (1966a:397-398). 
297 On Iphigeneia’s double-think change of heart, see also Kitto (1968:366); Siegel (1980: 311, 314-315, 319); 
Trypanis (1981:185); Foley (1982:174); Lawrence (1988:100); Griffin (1990:143, 145, 148-149); McDonald 
(1990:77); Schenker (1999:645).  In Lawrence’s (1988:91, 101) opinion, Iphigeneia’s volte-face is not exceptional 
in this play, since a number of others also vacillate in their attitudes, especially Agamemnon, Menelaos, and 
Akhilleus. 
298 On Klytaimestra’s consistent position throughout the play, see Svendsen (1990:59-60); D. Burgess (2004:54). 
299 On the narrative juxtaposition of Iphigeneia’s choice and the collapse of civil society, see Lawrence (1988:100); 
MacEwen (1990b:34); Kovacs (2003:77); Mastronarde (2010:240).  See also Wasserman (1949:176-177), on the 
power of the unruly Athenian mob, mirrored in the attitude of the IA’s army. 
300 On the innovative, sympathetic Klytaimestra of Euripides’ IA, see Svendsen (1990:52); Storey and Allan 
(2005:273); Wolfe (2009:710-711, 713).  See also Stawell (1929:16), who observes that contemporary female 
audiences are especially likely to sympathize with Euripides’ unfortunate mother and daughter, and to disapprove 
Agamemnon, and Wassermann (1949:183-184), who contends that Euripides humanizes a “tormented” 
Klytaimestra and awards her “final rest and peace”.  McDonald’s (1990:81) review of critical responses to the IA’s 
characters concludes that Euripides denigrates Agamemnon, Menelaos, and Akhilleus, and exonerates 
Klytaimestra. 
301 Some critics assume a natural continuity and coherence of character between the Klytaimestras of 458 and 405 
BCE; see Stawell (1929:17-18); Ferguson (1972:457). 
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bourgeois.302  Given that Klytaimestra is a fictional Bronze-Age slave-owning queen, a princess 
born of a woman who has mated with a god, and a woman who has witnessed her present 
husband murder her previous husband and her first-born child, hum-drum conventionality is 
not what first comes to mind when thinking of her.303  Many suggest that the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia is the defining event which turns a down-to-earth Klytaimestra to the dark side.304  
Some conclude that Klytaimestra’s life-experience of marital abuse follows the typical pattern 
of domestic violence in modern societies.305  The play’s revelation of the murders of 
Klytaimestra’s first husband and child also has real relevance for those interpreting her 
characterization. 
 
Many scholars read the IA as a natural narrative step in Klytaimestra’s journey to mariticide; 
the play is full of specific intertextual allusions to Klytaimestra’s future self.306  Euripides’ 
audience sees that Klytaimestra has good right to pursue vengeance against her husband and 
that her daughter’s willing embrace of death is a meaningless travesty; Iphigeneia’s 
impassioned plea for her life (1211-1252) contrasts too improbably with her bleak, later 
resignation, and the contrast is not accidental.307  The surprising elevation of Klytaimestra in IA 
as a paragon of Greek wifehood exists in marked contrast to the existing mythical tradition.  
This Klytaimestra excels as a mother, and her impassioned plea for her daughter’s life is 
genuinely moving.308 
 
Euripides’ last tragedy is an effective cold-case review of Klytaimestra’s and Iphigeneia’s 
experience, and reveals the true villain(s) of the Oresteia cycle of vengeance.  Whether the 
                                                          
302 Norwood (1948:287); Foley (1982:174; 1985:96-98); Svendsen (1990:59); Gamel (1999:316); Michelini 
(2000:48); Mastronarde (2010:250). 
303 The IA’s Klytaimestra is still clearly some distance from the magnificent, superhuman Klytaimestra of the 
Agamemnon, however. 
304 Gamel (1999:317) points to the similarities between Medeia and Klytaimestra, both of whom happily support 
the androcentric status quo – until betrayed. 
305 Michelini (2000:48); Gibert (2005:231).  On the long years of marital discord in Klytaimestra’s and 
Agamemnon’s wretched marriage, see also Vellacott (1975:48, 219). 
306 Murray (1965/1918:90); Ferguson (1972:461); Sharrock and Ash (2002:70); Storey and Allan (2005:144).  
Some contend that the victimized Klytaimestra is in fact the focal character of this Iphigeneia-play; see Svendsen 
(1990:52); Wolfe (2009:712).  On the association between the grieving Klytaimestra and the angry, mourning 
Demeter, see Cavander (1973:8); Svendsen (1990:59); Zeitlin (1996:9-10). 
307 Gibert (2005:228). 
308 On ancient views of Klytaimestra as a “murdering adulteress” and “paradigm of bad wives”, see Griffin 
(1990:146).  Some view Klytaimestra’s pleas to Akhilleus and Agamemnon as impressively positive 
characterization, in contrast to the negative portrayal of Akhilleus and Agamemnon; see Blaiklock (1952:119); 
Vellacott (1972:94; 1975:48); Svendsen (1990:57-58). 
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playwright’s motive was to force the Athenians to reconsider their sunk-costs commitment to 
the endless Peloponnesian war – which was undermining their once-glorious empire – is a 
matter of debate, but he clearly draws a sympathetic portrait of the woman who has been 
subjected to the murder of not one but two of her children, and who is beginning to see that the 
killing of children will never truly end.309  Euripides’ IA offers forensic evidence for the causes 
of three impious murders: for Agamemnon’s expedient killing of his daughter Iphigeneia; for 
Klytaimestra’s long-deferred retaliatory assassination of her husband Agamemnon; and for 
Orestes’ remorseless execution of his mother Klytaimestra.310  Despite intertextual variation in 
some plot details, the sacrifice of Iphigeneia by her father is the consistent initiating event in 
the greater Oresteia Atreid saga.  Euripides’ IA investigates the origins of Klytaimestra’s anger 
and eventual revenge, convicting Agamemnon of Iphigeneia’s unholy death, and ultimately – 
because he had ample warning of the consequences of his act – of his own death as well.  
Euripides’ final say on the matter exonerates Klytaimestra, a species-typical biological mother 
who was driven to her actions by the evil of her city-sacking husband and his political allies, 
and absolves her of the charge that she possessed an innate disposition to wickedness.  Like 
almost every other tragedy involving the troubled house of Atreus, the real blame for their woes 
rests upon the dispositional ethos of the child-killing male Tantalids themselves. 
 
Aiskhylos’ Oresteia made the father the true parent of the child, and Sophokles made the 
children the true offspring of the father; Euripides restores the authenticity of the female parent, 
and points out that exclusive paternal right and filial allegiance to the male parent alone lead 
only to the corruption and then destruction of the soul.  Individuals in extant tragedy who 
demonstrate genuine sympathy for the queen are all members of Klytaimestra’s matriline, 
created by Euripides: her sister Helen (Orestes), her niece Hermione (Orestes), her daughter 
Iphigeneia (IA), and her personal servant loyal to the Tyndarid family (IA).  His Klytaimestra 
is no monster, no murderess for murder’s sake.  He shows us the reason for her killing of a man 
who can only be described as a habitual filicide, in a family where the killing of children was 
an intergenerational hobby.  Euripides’ Agamemnon is a liar and a danger to his own patriline: 
if the gods had told him to slay every last one of his children, he undoubtedly would have raised 
the sword, weeping, but looking forward to everything turning out well, at least for himself.  
Euripides’ Klytaimestra is a Tyndarid destined to ruin her husband’s marriage, but the loss of 
                                                          
309 Sunk-costs commitment refers to the belief that, having already invested heavily in an action or ideology, one 
is bound to continue.  On sunk-costs, see also Chapter 2, p. 119; 119n120. 
310 Four murders, if one includes the killing of Klytaimestra’s first husband and child. 
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children was never part of Aphrodite’s curse upon Tyndareos.  Klytaimestra’s first-born son 
and her first-born daughter were both dispatched by a greedy, politically ambitious king who 
bore his own family curse – of child-killing – and who made no attempt to resist that curse.  
The house of Tantalos, Pelops, and Atreus was legendarily rich in both gold and catastrophe; 
Euripides’ Oresteia-plays confirm that reproductive politics – the subversion of female parental 
autonomy and investment to the elevation of male sociobiological advantage – is a primary 
cause of disaster and suffering in these tragedies (if not in most tragedies). 
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CONCLUSION: BIOLOGY, BEHAVIOUR, AND THE ACCURSED FAMILIES OF THE 
ORESTEIA 
 
Evolutionary principles can illuminate literary analysis of the construction of narrative conflict 
and the audience reception of fictional character, and this thesis contends that the character of 
Klytaimestra in fifth-century BCE Athenian tragedy is an outstanding exemplar of the fearful 
and pitiable consequences of gender-conflict grounded in antagonistic coevolution; her fictional 
experience as daughter, sister, wife, mother, and grandmother mirrors real-world life-history of 
human women, especially as manifested in an unapologetically gender-restrictive androcentric 
Greek culture.  Klytaimestra’s actions in tragedy illuminate the challenges experienced all too 
often by the human female as she struggles to rear her offspring to maturity in a social 
environment specifically tailored to male lifetime goals.  Archaic poets and the extant Greek 
tragedians give different emphases to the life-history of the fictional but realistic Klytaimestra 
in the context of real-world struggle between genders for optimum reproductive endeavour. 
 
Chapter 1 of this work concludes that evolutionary psychology studies convincingly 
demonstrate that some aspects of gender are innate and universal, and that these are selectively 
evoked according to environmental opportunities and constraints.  Gender-behaviour norms in 
a culture tend to follow whatever contributes to social success and – historically – virtually all 
human societies advantage elite, aristocratic males, along with those ruling-class females 
supporting systemic male-rule; typically, an androcentric human social system excludes and 
often actively represses female strategies for optimizing reproductive success.  Strategies 
geared to female advantage (but to male disadvantage) include cooperative parenting with 
(usually closely-related) female alloparents – which is not necessarily historic polygyny – and 
partible paternity, when a small number of putative ‘fathers’ contribute to offspring wellbeing 
and maternal lineage fitness through paternal diversity. 
 
Several evolutionary scientists reviewed in that first chapter propose that males and females of 
all sexed species are in an “arms-race” of antagonistic coevolution over reproductive goals and 
strategies, and individuals and groups are generally aware to some degree of this dynamic; 
coevolved gender antagonism is the substrate of all social life between males and females (and 
also of competitive and cooperative interactions between members of the same sex).  
Evolutionists and humanists agree that patriarchy subordinates females, and reinforces 
hierarchical inequality across males, but evolutionary psychologists insist that patriarchy is no 
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social veneer upon a gender-neutral foundation.  A fully informed understanding of the ultimate 
causes of patriarchy – gender conflict in mating and parental strategies arising from sexually 
antagonistic coevolution – makes it more likely that a comprehensively effective ‘workaround’ 
strategy to inequality of all types might one day be achieved.1  Literature across genres 
realistically depicts the resolutions – and consequences – of humans’ most typical life-history 
crises: inter-sexual struggles to achieve (proximate) social and (ultimate) reproductive goals 
often involve countering those same goals in one’s reproductive partner, struggles as ubiquitous 
in story as they are in real life.2  The enduring appeal of the wider Oresteia arises out of the 
largely unconscious awareness in audiences of all historical periods of the irreconcilability of 
the life-goals and strategies of the two reproducing sexes, but the particularly attention-grabbing 
appeal over millennia of Klytaimestra’s tragic life-history is that – against all reasonable 
expectation – the female strategy prevails, albeit temporarily. 
 
Chapter 2 concludes that, in archaic-period literature, Klytaimestra was originally a supporting 
character to the continuing story of conflict between the two warring branches of the Tantalid 
family; Thyestid Aigisthos successfully murders the son of his father’s greatest enemy, but from 
Homer and Hesiod, through the lyric poets, Atreid Agamemnon’s death at the hands of his 
Tyndarid wife becomes a crime of sexual infidelity and wifely treachery.  By the time of 
Aiskhylos’ Oresteia, a cowardly Aigisthos relies upon his (not-so-) secret lover’s bloody 
dispatch of her noble kyrios, while Klytaimestra’s avowed motivation in the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia is undermined and overthrown completely.  In the Agamemnon, she claims to be 
defending her murdered offspring’s honour; in the Khoephoroi, her surviving children align 
themselves with their long-dead father, rejecting their mother and her new husband; in 
Eumenides, the gods debate Klytaimestra’s motherhood, and find that children are ‘of the 
                                                          
1 On awareness of evolved disposition and biases as a tool to minimize or eradicate social inequity of all types, see 
Boyd (1998), Beckstrom (1993); Barkow (2006); Ingo et al (2007); Archer (2009a).  On the creation of 
“workaround” strategies to circumvent evolved biases in behaviour and attitudes, see Barkow (2006:13, 38). 
2 Liberal humanists’ trepidation about an evolutionary perspective occurs mainly because of humanities’ persistent 
misconceptions concerning genetic determinism, reductionism, and the Cartesian notion that mind and body – in 
the exceptional human species – are somehow separate.  For discussion of these misconceptions, see Dissanayake 
(1995:16, 20); Boyd (1998:1-2; 2005:3; 2009b:26); Hernadi (2002:22-23); Carroll (2008:129); Gottschall 
(2008a:10, 72, 74, 82); Slingerland (2008:266-269; 2010:220-221); Wilson (2009:327); Tanaka (2010a:32-33, 45-
46).  On the value of an evolutionary perspective to the analysis of literature – and the wrongness of mainstream 
poststructuralist denial that humans are biological beings – see also Boyd (1998:3, 13-14; 2009a:214; 2009b:23; 
2012a:64); Carroll (1995:32; 1996:203, 215, 467; 1999a:171; 2004:215; 2005a:103; 2008:118; 2015:21); Barash 
and Barash (2002:np); Easterlin (2005:621, 625); Salmon (2005a:244, 256). 
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father’, in every way.3  Agamemnon’s children are sympathetically portrayed as righteous 
avengers of their mother’s insult to their patriliny – and thus to the concept of essential paternity 
itself – and the gods officially invalidate human female reproductive powers, mirrored in 
Athena’s subversion of Klytaimestra’s moral defenders, the ancient Erinyes.  The trilogy 
confirms that human civilization is handed down from men to their heirs, and that when out-of-
control mothers attempt to contest men’s rights of life and death over children, the only solution 
is mother-murder. 
 
Chapter 3 addressed the later fifth-century tragedies of Sophokles and Euripides.  Sophokles’ 
Elektra foregrounds the hostility between a remarried mother and her disenfranchised children 
from a previous union; Atreid Elektra is unable to reconcile herself to her new family situation, 
despite her mother’s willingness to protect her (and her more compliant sister Khrysothemis) 
against Aigisthos as unwelcoming stepfather.  As a remarried mother, Klytaimestra struggles 
to juggle the unreasonable, extreme behaviour of her Atreid daughter with the new reality of 
her Thyestid husband and children.  Orestes’ return to avenge his father’s murder seems almost 
incidental to the emotional discord between the women of the house; ultimately, Klytaimestra’s 
transference of loyalty to Aigisthos results in her death at the hands of her children, and in this 
play, the matricidal children receive little if any opprobrium from anyone for their act. 
 
If Aiskhylos extolled the father as the only real parent of the child, and Sophokles venerated 
filial piety toward the father alone, Euripides questions the assumptions behind their 
productions of the Oresteia-story.  Klytaimestra in his Elektra and Iphigeneia at Aulis is a 
rehumanized, affectionate mother; in the Iphigeneia among the Taurians and Orestes her 
children are stricken by their mother-murder, and we hear at last from those women who have 
reason to love her: daughter, sister, and niece.  Aiskhylos’ patient plotter was in turns 
magnificent, diminished, and vanquished, and Sophokles’ mother is beaten down by her family 
conflict; Euripides’ queen is a real human being, strongly attached to her husband, doing her 
best to comfort and protect her children, mindful of her place in the complex social world 
around her.  Her so-called ‘victim’ is shown to be a man capable of heartless, impious murder, 
and his children – perhaps because they are for (and of) the father alone – are equally capable 
of atrocity.  Euripides reminds the audience that Klytaimestra is a child of a family stricken by 
a curse of infidelity upon a single generation; Agamemnon was the heir of a family blighted 
                                                          
3 See Athena’s declaration in Eumenides (735) that she is for the male in every way. 
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root and branch in all its generations, a man willing to take up the family ethos to filicide in the 
cause of ambition.  Euripides’ Oresteia-tragedies make males’ destructive dominance in 
reproductive politics the real cause of women’s and children’s suffering, and he restores to 
Klytaimestra the integrity of a motherhood of both body and soul. 
 
Taken together, all of these fictional accounts flesh out the narratively coherent life of a realistic 
person within her family and in relation to other fictional people, a sexually active woman 
whose experiences and actions in narrative evoke the same emotional responses from readers 
and audiences as would a real human.4  Klytaimestra negotiates her various socio-reproductive 
roles within the overlapping networks of her biological and marital families, and her close 
family members act in turn out of their own life-time reproductive goals which are sometimes 
in conflict with those of this female character; in different tragedies authorial sympathy lies 
sometimes with her, sometimes against her.  Most importantly, in all the Oresteia tragedies 
discussed, the sexually active Klytaimestra is a married woman, whose life-time reproductive 
goals necessarily collide with those of her husband.  This study has focussed on Klytaimestra’s 
interactions with family members and their reactions to the woman who kills her husband, 
concluding that offspring hostility toward the mother in these plays is the consequence of 
strongly biased kin-loyalty in patrilineal Greek culture.  The colliding histories of two famously 
accursed families, as depicted in the various Oresteia-tragedies and poems, make inevitable 
Klytaimestra’s immortalization as an ancient icon of dangerous female evil.  The various works 
of the wider Oresteia examined in this study illustrate the increased irreconcilability of 
individual reproductive goals within the extremely patriarchal family; the collision between the 
accursed Tantalids and Tyndarids in the Oresteia narrative centres on the perennially interesting 
gender conflict within the one oikos over strategic control of reproductive resources, including 
female sexuality and fertility. 
 
A Brief History of the Oresteia’s Accursed Families, According to the Poets: Teknophonous 
Tantalids, Philoteknous Tyndarids 
 
Aristotle (Poet. 1454a10-13) observes that the same families predominate in tragedy; the reason 
for this is that they suffer from particularly attention-capturing family troubles; the curse-
                                                          
4 Reception of the character of Klytaimestra is the product of every instantiation of her character: all preconscious 
character-prototypes are distilled from the total exposure to as many narrative instances of that fictional person as 
are available, including all of the apparent ‘sequels and prequels’ within the wider Oresteia corpus. 
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inviting crimes of the famous Tantalid and Tyndarid families are not equivalent in degree of 
offence or consequence, however.  Tantalid crimes are typically grounded in competition 
between males for power and status, and for access to fertile-age women; the collateral damage 
in these conflicts is most often children within the family.  In comparison, the Tyndarid crime 
is infidelity: neither Klytaimestra nor Helen murder any child, nor eat another human (or force 
a rival to commit this atrocity), nor offer direct insult to the gods, inviting divine retaliation. 
 
The descendants of Tantalos seem to be the most popular family in tragedy, and each of the 
three tragedians explore their misfortunes.  Euripides’ chorus in Elektra (1174-1175) declares 
that no family is or ever has been unhappier than the descendants of Tantalos; Aiskhylos’ 
Kassandra in Agamemnon (1090-1092) describes the house of Atreus as ‘hated by God, 
dripping with the blood of butchered kin’.5  In the ancient social context, the real sin of the 
Tantalids is not the expedient murder of children nor the sexual use of other men’s wives (which 
were appropriate actions in circumstances of formal warfare) but that these crimes are 
committed by males against their own close kin.  Modern critical focus on Orestes’ response to 
Aigisthos’ and Klytaimestra’s infidelity overlooks the centrality to the Oresteia of the inherited 
feud originating between Pelops’ sons, the brothers Thyestes and Atreus, and the Greek 
audience’s awareness of this terrible history.  Atreus retains possession of the golden lamb of 
kingship he promised to a goddess; Thyestes seduces Atreus’ wife and secretly receives this 
lamb and thus through subterfuge wins the throne; Atreus invites his brother and his nephews 
to a feast and deceives his guest Thyestes into eating his own sons.  While the dreadful feast is 
an indirect attack aimed at Thyestes, it also conveniently eliminates potential rivals to Atreus’ 
own descendants. 
 
Following the advice of an oracle, Thyestes rapes his own daughter Pelopeia (an impious act 
within this family often neglected in critical discussion), to engender Aigisthos – an 
intentionally-formed weapon aimed at the Atreid patriline – but the ashamed mother exposes 
the infant, who is rescued by a shepherd and then raised by Atreus; Thyestes later reveals the 
truth to the maturing boy, who returns the throne to Thyestes (and later also kills Atreus’ son 
and heir).  In some ways, the incestuously-conceived Tantalid Aigisthos is a much more tragic 
                                                          
5 On the Pelopid ancestral curse, see also Soph. El. (504-515); Eur. IT (196ff, 809ff, 987-988); Orestes (987ff and 
1547-1548).  On the various crimes (and curses) in these two families, see Fagles and Stanford (1977:14, 17); 
Carne-Ross (1981:41); Goldhill (1984a:16); O’Brien (1988:105); Powell (2002:169-173); Lefkowitz (2003:115); 
Hansen (2004:79-80); Fletcher (2007); Walton (2010c:43). 
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figure than the blustering and bullying Agamemnon.  Ancient narrative acknowledges his right 
to vengeance, and only later is he demoted to become an assistant in retaliation; his infidelity 
with Klytaimestra is neither incidental nor unprecedented, but a secondary (if useful) adjunct 
to his blood-feud obligations; Aigisthos’ murder of Agamemnon is just another iteration of the 
conflict-between-kin theme within the family saga, an appropriate retaliation for the rare crime 
of cannibalism, an impiety typically viewed as being far worse than everyday adultery.6 
 
Atreus’ sons Agamemnon and Menelaos are exiled after Atreus’ death (which, according to 
some, occurred at the hand of Aigisthos) to the Spartan court of Tyndareos, who later helps 
them regain the throne at Mycenae, and to marry his daughters, Klytaimestra and Helen.7  These 
Atreid kings possess a mixed reputation in the ancient sources, and the offspring of the brothers 
are sometimes also negatively characterized in fifth-century tragedy, confirming the 
unfortunate woes of the inherited Tantalid ethos.  Daughter Elektra is a typical descendant of 
Tantalos, the victim of some traumatic early-life relationships, the child of an embittered mother 
who turns to adultery; with a stepfather who yearns to eliminate her persistent potential for 
threat; with an absent yet absurdly idealized father; and with a beloved brother who often spurns 
her hopeless passion for him.  There is no evidence in the extant tragedies that Elektra feels any 
real love for Iphigeneia, or any genuine sorrow for her older sister’s death at Agamemnon’s 
hands.  Orestes across the tragedies is a more psychologically complex character, ranging 
(sometimes within the same play) from murderous automaton to reflective, remorseful avenger.  
Hermione, daughter of Atreid Menelaos, is similarly depicted in different tragedies by the same 
playwright – Euripides – as both innocent victim and vicious oppressor.  The least typical 
Tantalid is Iphigeneia, deceived and sacrificed by her father, successfully avenged by her 
mother, yet to a significant degree forgiving of both parents.8 
 
Once Agamemnon has been killed, Aigisthos and Klytaimestra produce further Tantalid 
offspring: Aletes and Erigone (and another Helen, who dies as a baby); tragedies now lost are 
                                                          
6 Aigisthos had two justifiable reasons for retaliation against the Atreids: Atreus forcing Thyestes to eat his sons, 
and Agamemnon’s murder of Tantalos (a later brother of Aigisthos), the first husband of Klytaimestra. 
7 All of these Tantalid descendants – including Aigisthos – win the highest-value females available – Klytaimestra 
and Helen – who bring with them the rule of Peloponnesian kingdoms.  On the transmission of Bronze Age 
kingship through the female line, see Finkelberg (2005). 
8 On Agamemnon’s lie to Iphigeneia and Klytaimestra about a marriage, see Paus. 3.22. 
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thought to depict their particular misadventures.9  All three of Klytaimestra’s husbands, and 
thus all of her offspring, are direct descendants of the child-killing Tantalos and of the accursed 
Pelops as well, and none of Klytaimestra’s children by any of these husbands end happily.10  
Both of Tyndareos’ daughters succeed in producing children from more than one male, but few 
if any of their offspring survive to happy maturity.  Aletes and Erigone become in turn the 
established rulers of Mycenae, whereupon Orestes murders Aletes, retakes the throne, and 
forcibly sires a son Penthilos on his half-sister Erigone.11  The orphaned Erigone is the first and 
only Tantalid (in allegiance with her maternal grandfather Tyndareos) to actively seek revenge 
on behalf of Klytaimestra, prosecuting her half-brother Orestes in court for his murder of their 
mother.12  Tantalid Menelaos’ daughter Hermione marries her doubly-descended Tantalid 
cousin Orestes – sometimes willingly, sometimes not – and gives birth to Tisamenos, the last 
Tantalid king of Sparta, Mycenae, and Argos.  Orestes’ son Penthilos by his half-sister Erigone 
escapes the Peloponnesus – and thus perhaps the influence of the family curse – and establishes 
a new ruling house in Asia; this is the point at which the entangled families of the Tyndarids 
and the Tantalids disappear from Greek myth. 
 
In contrast to the Tantalids, the accursed female Tyndarids give life, not death, to many 
children: across a variety of ancient sources Klytaimestra and Helen are remarkable in their 
reproductive success, each bearing a close-to-maximally optimum number of children, and to 
a genetically diverse variety of males.  Klytaimestra bears one son to her first husband Tantalos; 
three, four or five children to her second husband Agamemnon, and at least three to her last 
husband, Aigisthos; Helen’s offspring are said to include Hermione, Aethiolas, Maraphius, 
Pleisthenes, Nikostratos, Bunomus, Aganos, Idaeus, and (another) Helen.13  Their mother Leda 
was visited by Zeus in the form of a swan: Klytaimestra’s sister Helen and brother Polydeukes 
are his offspring, while Kastor and Klytaimestra are the co-conceived natural children of Leda’s 
human husband Tyndareos.14  The three Tyndarids are not cursed in retaliation for impious or 
                                                          
9 A number of lost tragedies are named Erigone, by Sophokles, Philokles, Kleophon, and Phrynichos II, but it is 
not known for sure whether they address the story of the Tantalid Erigone. 
10 On Klytaimestra and Aigisthos’ unfortunate offspring, see Hyginus (Fab. 122). 
11 Hyginus (Fab. 122) argues that Aletes – another genuine descendant of Tantalos and Pelops – is falsely informed 
of Orestes’ sacrifice in Tauris, and so assumes the throne.  See also Hesych. aletis; Hyg. (Fab. 122); Paus. 2, 18, 
6-7; FgrH 239 A 25. 
12 On Erigone’s day in court, see Apollodoros, (Epitome 6.25); Hyginus, (Fab. 85-88). 
13 On sources for Helen’s offspring, see Gantz (1966:322); Bell (1991:225, 227-228). 
14 Hesiod’s Catalogue gives Tyndareos and Leda three daughters: Timandra, Klytaimestra, and Phylonoe (fr. 
19.10-12) (Phylonoe is made immortal by Artemis and does not appear to have been affected by the Tyndarid 
curse); Euripides’ IA gives Leda three daughters – Klytaimestra, Helen, and Phoibe; Apollodoros’ Bibliothēkē 
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socially unacceptable crimes, yet Klytaimestra and Helen are the most despised female 
characters in the whole of Greek mythology, explaining ancient (and modern) views of them as 
bad, bad women; Atreid Agamemnon is a serial murderer of thousands – the demos’ sons, and 
foreigners who also worship Olympians – as well as of close kin, yet Klytaimestra becomes the 
mythic epitome of evil for the murder of just one man.  It was Tyndareos’ impiety – he forgot 
to sacrifice to Aphrodite – which invited the goddess’s anger, and her curse upon his daughters 
brings ruin upon their sexual reputations; Hesiod (Cat. 19.31-35, 247) states that – because of 
the curse – Tyndarid Timandra leaves her husband Echemos for Phyleus, whereas Hesiod’s 
Klytaimestra and Helen commit adultery ‘for the same reason’.15 
 
Of the four partibly-sired children of Leda, we hear much about the admirable and closely-
bonded Kastor and Polydeukes, but famous sisters Helen and Klytaimestra were, after all, also 
twins.  Klytaimestra in any tragedy shows little love or loyalty in public for her sister – 
Euripides’ Orestes evidences more positive sisterly feeling on Helen’s part – but their 
relationship to each other has rarely attracted critical interest.16  Klytaimestra’s sister Helen in 
myth is often little more than a single-focus figure, unchanged by her husband-harming actions, 
and predominantly a narrative symbol of male victory over other men; the publically 
acknowledged possession of Helen is the prize men compete for, not the person of Helen 
herself.  The unfortunate Helen was the object of pursuit and abduction (and probably, sexual 
assault) for most of her fictional life, perhaps even before her official marriage.17  While Helen 
apparently engages in infidelity by Aphrodite’s angry curse (as well as by Aphrodite’s victory 
in beauty over Hera and Athena), the rebellious Klytaimestra’s path to infidelity and mariticide 
is motivated quite independently of Aphrodite’s curse, by Agamemnon’s killing of Iphigeneia 
                                                          
(3.10.6) makes their daughters Timandra, Klytaimestra, and Phylonoe, along with Helen born to Leda and Zeus;.  
Homer’s Helen is never reluctant to refer to her privileged heritage as the daughter of Zeus.  See Il. 3.199, 236-38, 
418, 426; Od. 4.184, 219; 23.218. 
15 Hesiod implies that only an accursed woman would (or could) leave her husband.  According to the Hesiodic 
fragment (247, Scholium on Euripides’ Orestes), Stesikhoros (i.e., PMG 223) also gives this reason for the three 
women’s adulterous behaviour. 
16 Cf. the critical engagement with the dysfunctional Klytaimestra-Elektra relationship, and the Hermione-
Andromakhe conflict. 
17 On Helen’s abduction by Theseus, see Hesiod (Cat. fr. 243); on the purchase of the high desirable prize of Helen 
with the highest offer, see Hesiod (Cat. fr. 155). 
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and by his murder of her first husband and child; Aigisthos – Agamemnon’s mortal enemy – is 
also motivated by Agamemnon’s murder of Klytaimestra’s first husband, Thyestid Tantalos.18 
 
The three daughters of Tyndareos ultimately suffer from their family curse in different ways, a 
perennially popular theme in Greek literature.  While we hear relatively little in (extant) story 
about the consequences of Timandra’s sexual infidelity, Helen is reclaimed and forgiven, 
returning home to lifetime rule as queen of Sparta (as in the Odyssey), or on to immortal life 
(as in Orestes).  Although Klytaimestra experienced much more provocation than both of her 
sisters, her reputation becomes so badly ruined that it tarnishes the name of all human women 
thereafter – even the good ones – to the point where the traditionally equal (or greater) role of 
Aigisthos in the death of Agamemnon is almost completely suppressed in the popular mythic 
consciousness.  Men kill other men in mythic story as a matter of course – and occasionally kill 
women as well – but it is the killing or threatened killing of men by women that excites the 
greatest disapproval, within the mythology, and in ancient or modern commentary on this; 
Aphrodite’s curse of infidelity upon the Tyndarides is simply coincidental to Klytaimestra’s 
fate, and her unforgivable crime is not adultery, but the impiety of husband-killing, unthinkable 
in the ancient world of extreme patriarchy. 
 
Male Citizens and Female Wives; Coevolution, Cooperation, Compromise 
 
As these reproductive histories of the two Oresteia families reveal, Greek literature of the 
archaic and classical periods idealizes hypermasculinity and homosociality among men, despite 
the obvious tensions between these cultural paradigms; ancient patriarchal Greek society 
cultivated zero-sum competition between men, but escalation of lethal revenge between 
internally loyal, patrilineal families was the obligatory resolution to matters of dishonourable 
loss in men’s intrasexual competition.  Despite this, (extant) Greek tragedy avoids a thematic 
focus upon direct violence between males, in favour of the dangers to men of women’s cunning 
treachery within the aristocratic house.  The ancient Greeks viewed the moral ethos of women 
as very much inferior to that of men, and the husband-killing Klytaimestra embodies the very 
worst male fears of treacherous ‘female evil’.  Her characterization as the utterly immoral 
woman demonstrates how Athenian culture of the classical period expresses the social conflict 
                                                          
18 Euripides (IA 1149-1152) gives to Klytaimestra in Aulis the story of Agamemnon’s murder of her husband 
Tantalos (son of Thyestes) and infant son, and Agamemnon’s then forcing Klytaimestra into marriage.  Pausanias 
(2.18.2/2.22.3) also identifies Klytaimestra’s first husband as Tantalos (a son of Thyestes or Tantalid Broteas). 
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between male and female mating strategies, in fact a struggle more typically won by men in the 
real, human world as individuals, in families, and in organized social groupings.  In common 
with known androcentric human societies, ancient Greek society optimized male life-history 
aims – to ensure paternity and inheritance in a status-conscious culture which privileges very 
wealthy and successful male citizens – to the disadvantage of female sexuality and fertility. 
 
Greek mythology, including the mythic narratives of tragedy, is manifestly anxious about 
female sexuality and reproductive powers.  While male-female reproductive conflict features 
predominantly in the extant tragedy, the marital relationship remains the most problematic 
issue, perhaps reflecting fifth-century realities.  Greek literature divides women into two 
essential types: good women who are chaste, and industrious, and bad women, who are defiant 
and rebellious, and disposed to a sexualized evil.  Well-known Greek literary works sometimes 
juxtaposes dangerous women with properly domesticated women who uphold the ideals of the 
androcentric Greek society, for example, Klytaimestra and Penelope in the Odyssey; Hermione 
and Andromakhe in Euripides’ Andromakhe; and Elektra and Khrysothemis in Sophokles’ 
Elektra.  According to ancient sources, the best method of taming women was marriage.19  
Well-domesticated wives guard and increase their husband’s resources, and produce 
legitimately patrilineal offspring: bad wives’ behaviour, conversely, is self-interested.  These 
bad women in Greek myth defend their right to autonomy and self-interest, as evidenced in 
descriptions of defiantly jealous women who hinder and vex their husbands, most notably the 
classical-period epitome of the difficult wife, Hera.  Male characters in works authored several 
male poets insist that even good women cannot be entirely trusted.20  A good deal of antagonism 
toward women in the Greek literary corpus centres upon out-of-control wives, and the ancient 
Greek wife could never truly be trusted to ally with her husband’s household, not in the same 
way as the loyalty of a patrilineal daughter of the blood was assumed.21  Thus, misogynistic 
attitudes in tragedy frequently centre on a wish that men could propagate without need for 
troublesome women.22  Insecurely attached, unrelated wives in the patrilineal oikos also lived 
in a state of perpetual domestic antagonism with the concubines who threatened wifely 
                                                          
19 Cf. Greek δαμάζω ‘to overpower, to break in, tame, subdue, to marry’; δάμαρ, ‘wife, spouse (generally female)’.  
On marriage in ancient Greece (and Athens), see Cox (1998; 2011). 
20 See Agamemnon in the Odyssey (11.440-442, 446; 24.191-202), (Semonides 7). 
21 Hestia is the divine avatar of the human daughter whose loyalty remains with the patriline at all times, and in 
return for her duties as the protector of the divine hearth, Hestia requested, and was granted, perpetual virginity; 
see the Greater Hymn to Aphrodite (22-32); and the Greater Hymn to Hestia (3-4). 
22 See the famous wish of Hippolytos (Hipp. 618-624), and Jason’s speech in the Medeia (573-575). 
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dominance in the household, and with the stepsons or illegitimate sons who might one day 
threaten their own reproductive interests.  Yet in tragedy it is often the failure of males to 
prioritize the wellbeing of their family – through bringing male politics into the female world 
of the family – that forces women to become unfeminine disruptors.  Extant Greek tragedy 
focusses so heavily on reproductive conflict between the sexes because in a highly androcentric 
culture gender conflict is intensified to inevitably lethal levels; tragedies offer a cautionary 
recognition that not all women are willing to compromise their own reproductive goals simply 
to facilitate a husband’s success. 
 
Gendered antagonism is typically identified as misogyny in mythic tales, but is simply the male 
fear and expectation – sometimes unconscious – that females will prioritize their own 
reproductive strategies if they perceive an opening.  This theme is a consistent one in Greek 
literature, beginning with our extant archaic sources; runaway Helen exercised some autonomy 
in mating choice; son-killing Medeia disinvested in the offspring of a man who left her to raise 
those children on her own; husband-killer Klytaimestra defended the honour of her daughter 
over her husband’s political manoeuvring.23  The enduring popular appeal of the archaic works 
of Homer, Hesiod, and Semonides suggests that negative attitudes to female sexuality were not 
confined to literature, although these attitudes may have been more specific to certain social 
groups.  While Homer was clearly interested in the social and reproductive opportunities of 
male-female relations in the aristocratic context, the works of Hesiod and Semonides of Argos 
seem to express a new, sometimes intensely misogynistic ambivalence toward women’s 
reproductive function as a potential economic drain.24  Like most traditional mythic systems, 
Greek myth attempted to account for human sexual and psychological differences; if it followed 
biology, creation myth would logically explain the existence of males and females as 
complementary, but Hesiod’s foundational works position the invention of male human [sic] 
society before the creation of woman, a more crucial moment in the development of literary 
misogyny.  His Pandora is an artificial construct, showing that human woman’s reproductive 
                                                          
23 See also Foley (1988:1311), who also believes that reproductive conflict, centred on male fear of cuckoldry, lies 
at the core of Athenian misogyny, that and writers from the archaic onward expect the wife to behave as if her 
husband’s interests are her own. 
24 Semonides’ seventh-century Fragment 7 (Women, or Types of Women), echoes Hesiod in twice defining women 
as the ‘greatest evil’ (96, 115), made by Zeus for men; an analysis of Semonides’ female types, however, reveals 
a recurring, negative preoccupation with women’s consumption of men’s resources, and the difficulty – to men – 
of female sexuality. 
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power is not a part of the natural world.25  Greek – or Athenian – myth offers the strange dream 
of an original, entirely male world without the bane of human women. 
 
In particular, the relationship of dysfunctional gender relationships in Aiskhylos’ Oresteia to 
the dynamics of misogyny in real-world ancient Greece has attracted critical interest.26  
Furthermore, some conclude that fifth-century tragedies in general are contemporary 
expressions of misogyny inherited from archaic literature, and that the misogynistic view of 
women’s troublesome reproductive potential increased between the early archaic and the 
classical periods.27  Some suggest that the apparent preoccupation of tragedy with gender 
conflict likely reflects an intensification of social tensions resulting from Solon’s new laws, and 
the fifth-century shift to democracy.28  Others argue that fifth-century tragedy is more positively 
sympathetic to women’s challenge to the constraints of androcentric culture, in a protofeminist 
manner.29  Tragedy not only reinforces gender norms, however, but seems to delight in doing 
so, and the focus of tragedy on well-drawn female victims need not be sympathetic to women’s 
plight at all.  So an argument that Greek men allowed a theatrical experience to change their 
conception of gender relations is wishful thinking.  After one hundred years of exposure to 
debate-provoking tragedy, the autonomy or dignity of women as whole humans was not 
significantly increased: males still exchanged females for breeding purposes, and bought-and-
sold female slaves helped fuel the economy.  Far from hoping to question masculinity or 
challenge the androcentricism of Athenian fifth-century life, tragedy offers an education in how 
to identity and then contain female threats to patriarchal society.  Klytaimestra’s murder was 
normalized in the telling of cautionary tales to young children at festivals, suggesting that 
                                                          
25 Pandora is not the mother of the human race, but of the separate genos of women alone; furthermore, after the 
gods have destroyed the first troublesome human generation born of Pandora, the single male and female pair that 
remains replicate not through intercourse and gestation, but by casting stones which become only their own gender-
type.  On the artificial, dehumanized Pandora, see Loraux (1993:19, 74-76; 2000:3, 6, 8).  On Hesiod’s alienation 
of the race of women from male ‘civilization’, see Arthur (1984:25; 1994:214); Goldhill (1986:68); Zeitlin 
(1995b:59); Whitmarsh (2004:187); Griffith (2005:341); Foxhall (2009:488). 
26 On Aiskhylos’ distinctive interest in marriage and reproductive politics, see Burian (1974:9); Spatz (1982:73); 
Winnington-Ingram (1983b:60-61, 70); Saxonhouse (1984:11, 20); Vellacott (1984b:60-61); Herington (1986:98); 
Foley (1988:1315); Ewans (1996:1); Sommerstein (1996:432, 434); Mitchell-Boyask (2008:114). 
27 Easterling (1988:16); Murnaghan (2005:243); Gregory (2005:265). 
28 Foley (1988); Raaflaub (1998); Saïd (1998); Rhodes (2003); Jameson (2004); Katz (2004); Stahl and Walter 
(2009). 




Athenians did think matricide acceptable under certain circumstances.30  According to some, 
Klytaimestra’s story in tragedy was a warning, demonstrating to the demos the proper fate of 
married women – and adult women were almost always married women – who dared to 
challenge patriarchal authority, and male control over female reproductive behaviour.31  The 
tragedies of the wider Oresteia-corpus all conclude with the inevitable consequences of female 
transgression within patriarchy: righteous victory for the male who acts to uphold patriarchal 
principles, and punishment and death for the troublesome, child-loving female who resorts to 
husband-killing in order to avenge and protect her offspring.  The characterization of 
Klytaimestra in Greek tragedy, and in other literary works of the archaic period, reflects the 
struggle for life-goal achievement in the universal context of gender conflict between the male 
and female of the species.  Her personification as an icon of female evil is a predictable outcome 
in the context of a society which overtly and unashamedly privileges male mating strategies 
and suppresses autonomous female reproductive aspirations. 
                                                          
30 Buxton (1994:22).  On legal citation of the Klytaimestra narrative in actual Greek case-law as supporting 
precedent, see Vickers (1973:155); Hall (2010:196); Rutherford (2012:65). 
31 Rose (1992:222, 226); Thompson (2004:98); Livingstone (2011:125).  On tragedy as a form of education in 
desirable political and social mores, see Lord (1982, 1990); Salkever (1986); Taylor (1995); Curren (2000); 
Croally (2005); Halliwell (2005); Hesk (2007); Zajko (2011); Livingstone (2011). 
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APPENDIX: GREEK PASSAGES AND TRANSLATIONS 
 
All excerpts are listed as they appear by page, in the text and in footnotes: Oxford editions of 
the plays were consulted, as was Perseus Tufts editions, but all translations are by this author. 
 
Chapter 2: The Archaic Klytaimestra 
 
αἴλινον αἴλινον εἰπέ, τὸ δ᾽ εὖ νικάτω, “cry woe, woe, but let the good prevail” (Aga. 121). 
 
δρόσοισι λεπτοῖς “vulnerable young” of μαλερῶν λεόντων, “fiery lions” (Aga. 141). 
 
δεξιὰ μέν, κατάμομφα δὲ “fortunate, but inauspicious” (Aga. 145). 
 
φοβερὰ παλίνορτος 
οἰκονόμος δολία μνάμων μῆνις τεκνόποινος, “a frightening, recurring and treacherous 
household-keeper and avenger of children, never forgetting wrath” (Aga. 154-155). 
 
ἀνάγκη, “necessity” (Aga. 218). 
 
πάθει μάθος “learning through suffering” (Aga. 160-183, 250-253). 
 
τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ- 
σαντα, τὸν πάθει μάθος 
θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν. 
στάζει δ᾽ ἔν γ᾽ ὕπνῳ πρὸ καρδίας 
μνησιπήμων πόνος: καὶ παρ᾽ ἄ- 
κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν. 
δαιμόνων δέ που χάρις βίαιος 
σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων,  
“he who put mortals on the right path to understanding, he who, holding power, set up the state 
of suffering as law, and so the memory of pain trickles into consciousness and into the heart, 
and good sense comes to the unwilling, a favour which comes with force from the gods seated 
on the august seats of power” (Aga. 176-184). 
 
νυμφόκλαυτος Ἐρινύς, “a Fury, a bride bringing woe” (Aga. 749). 
 
δαῖτ᾽ ἀκέλευστος “unbidden feast” (Aga. 731). 
 
ὑπερθορὼν δὲ πύργον ὠμηστὴς λέων 
ἄδην ἔλειξεν αἵματος τυραννικοῦ, “a lion eating raw flesh, leaping over the tower, licking up 
its fill of royal blood” (Aga. 827-828). 
 
βασιλεῦ, Τροίας πτολίπορθ᾽ 






πολλὰ τλάντος γυναικὸς διαί: 
πρὸς γυναικὸς δ᾽ ἀπέφθισεν βίον, 
“our most gracious guardian, who, overpowered, suffered greatly because of a woman, his life 
utterly destroyed at the hand of a woman” (Aga. 1451-1454). 
 
κηδεστὴν σέθεν “your own kin by marriage” (Hek. 834). 
 
οἰκουρὸς πικρά, “bitter mistress of his house” (Hek. 1277). 
 
καὶ γὰρ πνοὰς 
πρὸς οἶκον ἤδη τάσδε πομπίμους ὁρῶ. 
εὖ δ᾽ ἐς πάτραν πλεύσαιμεν, εὖ δὲ τἀν δόμοις 
ἔχοντ᾽ ἴδοιμεν τῶνδ᾽ ἀφειμένοι πόνων, 
“And now I see this breeze which sets toward home.  May the sailing to our homeland be good, 
and may we see all is well at home, setting aside all these labours” (Hek. 1289-1292). 
 
εἴδωλον σκιᾶς “a shadowy phantom” (Aga. 839). 
 
πῶς λιπόναυς γένωμαι 
ξυμμαχίας ἁμαρτών, “how can he become a deserter of the fleet, in failing his allies?” (Aga. 
212-213). 
 
παυσανέμου γὰρ θυσίας 
παρθενίου θ᾽ αἵματος ὀρ- 
γᾷ περιόργῳ σφ᾽ ἐπιθυ- 
μεῖν θέμις, 
“to madly desire the sacrifice of a maiden’s blood to still the winds is customary and right” 
(Aga. 214-217). 
 
ἐράσμιον πόλει, “desired by the city” (Aga. 605). 
 
θράσος ἐκ θυσιῶν “voluntarily reckless” (Aga. 803). 
 
ἐπιθυμεῖν “set their hearts upon” (Aga. 216). 
 
ἀνάγκας ‘necessity’ (Aga. 218). 
 
ξυμμαχίας ἁμαρτών ‘losing his allies’ (Aga. 212). 
 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον 
φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν 
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ἄναγνον ἀνίερον, τόθεν 
τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω. 
βροτοὺς θρασύνει γὰρ αἰσχρόμητις 
τάλαινα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων, 
“when he put upon his heart the yokestrap of necessity, his vacillating spirit was defiled, and 
thus, utterly shameless, he turned his mind completely.  For mortal men become overbold, 
stooping to shameful behaviour and infatuation is the first cause of misery.” (Aga. 218-224). 
 
δυσσεβῆ… 
ἄναγνον ἀνίερον, ‘ungodly, unclean, and unholy’ (Aga. 219-220). 
 
ἔτλα δ᾽ οὖν θυτὴρ γενέ- 
σθαι θυγατρός, “Thus he brought himself to become the sacrificer of his daughter” (Aga. 224-
225). 
 
ὧδε γὰρ κρατεῖ 
γυναικὸς ἀνδρόβουλον ἐλπίζον κέαρ; “for thus commands a woman’s heart, in anticipation, 
like a man’s” (Aga. 10-11). 
 
Ἀγαμέμνονος γυναικὶ, “Agamemnon’s wife” (Aga. 26). 
 
Τυνδάρεω 
θύγατερ, “Tyndareos’ daughter” (Aga. 83-84). 
 
βασίλεια Κλυταιμήστρα, “queen Klytaimestra” (Aga. 84). 
 
ἥκω σεβίζων σόν, Κλυταιμήστρα, κράτος: 
δίκη γάρ ἐστι φωτὸς ἀρχηγοῦ τίειν 
γυναῖκ᾽ ἐρημωθέντος ἄρσενος θρόνου, 
“I come, in reverence towards your power, Klytaimestra, for it is right to respect the wife of the 
first male when the male throne is empty.” (Aga. 258-260). 
 
παιδὸς νέας ὣς κάρτ᾽ ἐμωμήσω φρένας, “You belittle me as if I had the wits of a young child” 
(Aga. 277). 
 
γύναι, κατ᾽ ἄνδρα σώφρον᾽ εὐφρόνως λέγεις, “Lady, you speak graciously, like a sensible man” 
(Aga. 351). 
 
πιστά... τεκμήρια “trustworthy evidence” (Aga. 352). 
 
γυναικὸς αἰχμᾷ πρέπει 
πρὸ τοῦ φανέντος χάριν ξυναινέσαι. 
πιθανὸς ἄγαν ὁ θῆλυς ὅρος ἐπινέμεται 
ταχύπορος: ἀλλὰ ταχύμορον 
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γυναικογήρυτον ὄλλυται κλέος, 
“it is so like a woman’s nature to declare thanksgivings.  A female is too credulous and quick 
in the measure of plausibility; but women’s report rapidly comes to nothing, however” (Aga. 
483-487). 
 
πειρᾶσθέ μου γυναικὸς ὡς ἀφράσμονος, 
ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀτρέστῳ καρδίᾳ πρὸς εἰδότας 
λέγω: σὺ δ᾽ αἰνεῖν εἴτε με ψέγειν θέλεις 
ὅμοιον, 
“You make trial of me as of a woman; but I reply to your inquisition with fearless heart, whether 
you are willing to condemn me or praise me (Aga. 1401-1404). 
 
φονολιβεῖ… φρὴν ἐπιμαίνεται “flowing blood… driven her mad” (Aga. 1428) 
 
ἔστιν θάλασσα, τίς δέ νιν κατασβέσει; 
τρέφουσα πολλῆς πορφύρας ἰσάργυρον 
κηκῖδα παγκαίνιστον, εἱμάτων βαφάς. 
οἶκος δ᾽ ὑπάρχει τῶνδε σὺν θεοῖς, ἅναξ, 
ἔχειν: πένεσθαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίσταται δόμος. 
πολλῶν πατησμὸν δ᾽ εἱμάτων ἂν ηὐξάμην, 
δόμοισι προυνεχθέντος ἐν χρηστηρίοις, 
ψυχῆς κόμιστρα τῆσδε μηχανωμένῃ. 
ῥίζης γὰρ οὔσης φυλλὰς ἵκετ᾽ ἐς δόμους, 
σκιὰν ὑπερτείνασα σειρίου κυνός. 
καὶ σοῦ μολόντος δωματῖτιν ἑστίαν, 
θάλπος μὲν ἐν χειμῶνι σημαίνεις μολόν: 
ὅταν δὲ τεύχῃ Ζεὺς ἀπ᾽ ὄμφακος πικρᾶς 
οἶνον, τότ᾽ ἤδη ψῦχος ἐν δόμοις πέλει, 
ἀνδρὸς τελείου δῶμ᾽ ἐπιστρωφωμένου, 
“There is a sea – who will ever staunch it? – which nourishes an enormous, endlessly-renewed 
flood of purple dye, worth its weight in silver, for the drenching of fabric.  Of this, through the 
support of the gods, the household already holds plenty, lord; yet the house does not know 
painful labours.  Many tramplings upon the household’s garments would I have vowed, if it had 
been so commanded by an oracle, as the price for the governance of this life.  For while there 
is a root, foliage comes into the house, stretching to cast shade to the hound of Sirius [i.e. the 
hottest time of the year].  And you have come to the very hearth of our home, as the signal of 
warmth in winter; whenever Zeus makes wine from bitter, unripe grapes, then already the 
winter-chill enters into the house, when the all-ruling man frequents the home” (Aga. 958-972). 
 
νῦν μὲν δικάζεις ἐκ πόλεως φυγὴν ἐμοὶ 
καὶ μῖσος ἀστῶν δημόθρους τ᾽ ἔχειν ἀράς, 
οὐδὲν τότ᾽ ἀνδρὶ τῷδ᾽ ἐναντίον φέρων: 
ὃς οὐ προτιμῶν, ὡσπερεὶ βοτοῦ μόρον, 
μήλων φλεόντων εὐπόκοις νομεύμασιν, 
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ἔθυσεν αὑτοῦ παῖδα, φιλτάτην ἐμοὶ 
ὠδῖν᾽, ἐπῳδὸν Θρῃκίων ἀημάτων. 
οὐ τοῦτον ἐκ γῆς τῆσδε χρῆν σ᾽ ἀνδρηλατεῖν, 
μιασμάτων ἄποιν᾽; ἐπήκοος δ᾽ ἐμῶν 
ἔργων δικαστὴς τραχὺς εἶ, 
“Now you decree me an exile from the city, declared the object of hate of the citizenry, and of 
curses; contrary to your opinion to that man at that time, he who did not honour me, as if her 
fate was that of a beast, from an abundant  flock of fleecy sheep, he sacrificed his own child, 
my own pang-borne darling, as a charm against the winds of Thrace.  Should you not have 
declared this man banished from house and home, sent out from this land in penalty for his 
defilements?  But you are savage in judgement when hearing of my deeds of justice” (Aga. 
1412-1421). 
 
Ἄτην Ἐρινύν θ᾽, Atē and the Erinys (Aga. 1433). 
 
κοίταν τάνδ᾽ ἀνελεύθερον, “lying in a shameful death-bed” (Aga. 1518), 
 
οὔτ᾽ ἀνελεύθερον οἶμαι θάνατον 
τῷδε γενέσθαι. 
οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος δολίαν ἄτην 
οἴκοισιν ἔθηκ᾽; 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐμὸν ἐκ τοῦδ᾽ ἔρνος ἀερθέν. 
τὴν πολυκλαύτην Ἰφιγενείαν, 
ἄξια δράσας ἄξια πάσχων 
μηδὲν ἐν Ἅιδου μεγαλαυχείτω, 
ξιφοδηλήτῳ, 
θανάτῳ τείσας ἅπερ ἦρξεν, 
“I do not consider this man to have experienced a shameless death, for, did he not enact a 
treacherous sin against the house?  But this young scion was sprung from me, the much-
lamented Iphigeneia, and the punishment is balance for the deed; let him boast of nothing in 
Hades, slain by the sword, paying a price in death for his sacrifice” (Aga. 1521-1529). 
 
μηδαμῶς, ὦ φίλτατ᾽ ἀνδρῶν, ἄλλα δράσωμεν κακά, “By no means, dearest of men, should we 
accomplish other evils”, (Aga. 1654). 
 
εὖ φρονῶν “well-intentioned” (Aga. 1436). 
 
αἴθῃ πῦρ ἐφ᾽ ἑστίας ἐμῆς “kindles my hearth” (Aga. 1435). 
 
ἐγὼ 
καὶ σὺ θήσομεν κρατοῦντε τῶνδε δωμάτων καλῶς, “I, and you, prevailing, we will set the 
affairs of the house in order” (Aga. 1672-1673). 
 
οὐδ᾽ οἶδα τέρψιν οὐδ᾽ ἐπίψογον φάτιν 
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ἄλλου πρὸς ἀνδρὸς μᾶλλον ἢ χαλκοῦ βαφάς “I have not known pleasure nor blameworthy 
conversation with another man, any more than the tempering of bronze” (Aga. 611-612). 
 
εἱμάτων βαφάς, “the dyeing of fabric” (Aga. 960) 
 
ἐκ τῶν δὲ τοῦδε χρημάτων πειράσομαι 
ἄρχειν πολιτῶν, “Out of the property of this man I will endeavour to rule the citizens” (Aga. 
1638-1639). 
 
νῦν δ᾽ ὤρθωσας στόματος γνώμην, 
τὸν τριπάχυντον 
δαίμονα γέννης τῆσδε κικλήσκων. 
ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ ἔρως αἱματολοιχὸς 
νείρᾳ τρέφεται, 
“Now you set aright the account of evidence, identifying the thrice-fattened demon of this 
family, for from it is nourished the instinctive desire for blood-licking” (Aga. 1475-1479). 
 
ἦ μέγαν οἰκοις τοίσδε 
δαίμονα καὶ βαρύμηνιν αἰνεῖς… ἀτη- 
ρᾶς τύχας ἀκορέστου… διαὶ Διὸς 
παναιτίου πανεργέτα: 
τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται; 
“This is a great demon of the house, which you speak of, heavy in wrath;… utterly insatiable 
in action… through Zeus, the all-causing, all-powerful, for what is accomplished unto mortals, 
without Zeus?” (Aga. 1481-1486). 
 
τοῦδ᾽ ὁ παλαιὸς δριμὺς ἀλάστωρ 
Ἀτρέως χαλεποῦ θοινατῆρος 
τόνδ᾽ ἀπέτεισεν, 
τέλεον νεαροῖς ἐπιθύσας, 
“this is ancient bitter alastōr taking payment for Atreus, the appalling feast-giver, in fervent 
fulfilment for the young” (Aga. 1497-1504). 
 
ἀλληλοφόνους, “mutual slaughter” (Aga. 1576). 
 
μανίας “frenzy” (Aga. 1575). 
 
ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὕποπτος ἐχθρὸς ἦ παλαιγενής, “I was likely to be suspected, being an enemy born long 
ago” (Aga. 1637). 
 
μὰ τὴν τέλειον τῆς ἐμῆς παιδὸς Δίκην, 
Ἄτην Ἐρινύν θ᾽, αἷσι τόνδ᾽ ἔσφαξ᾽ ἐγώ, “by this slaughter, accomplished on behalf of my child, 





ἕως γένοιτο μητρὸς εὐφρόνης πάρα, “good news… born from a mother in the kindly time of 
night” (Aga. 264-265). 
 
πολλὰς… 
κληδόνας παλιγκότους “many… awful reports”, (Aga. 861-876). 
 
ἐμοὶ δ᾽ ἀγὼν ὅδ᾽ οὐκ ἀφρόντιστος πάλαι 
νείκης παλαιᾶς ἦλθε, σὺν χρόνῳ γε μήν: 
ἕστηκα δ᾽ ἔνθ᾽ ἔπαισ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐξειργασμένοις, 
“to me, this battle is not unforeseen, concerning an ancient defeat from long ago; with time, 




πόσις, νεκρὸς δέ, “my husband, a corpse” (Aga. 1404-1405). 
 
ἐν ποικίλοις δὲ θνητὸν ὄντα κάλλεσιν 
βαίνειν ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἄνευ φόβου, “for a mortal to step upon beautiful embroideries seems 
to me cannot be without fear” (Aga. 923-924). 
 
καὶ τοῖσδέ μ᾽ ἐμβαίνονθ᾽ ἁλουργέσιν θεῶν 
μή τις πρόσωθεν ὄμματος βάλοι φθόνος. 
πολλὴ γὰρ αἰδὼς δωματοφθορεῖν ποσὶν 
φθείροντα πλοῦτον ἀργυρωνήτους θ᾽ ὑφάς, 
“as I trample upon these, seeing they are sea-purple, may no observant malice strike me down 
from afar; for it is a great shame to ruin the expensive, woven wealth of the house with a foot” 
(Aga. 946-949). 
 
πορφυρόστρωτος ‘purple’ (Aga. 910). 
 
ηὔξω θεοῖς δείσας ἂν ὧδ᾽ ἔρδειν τάδε, “would you, being in fear, have vowed to the gods, to 
do such a thing?” (Aga. 933). 
 
εἴπερ τις, εἰδώς γ᾽ εὖ τόδ᾽ ἐξεῖπον τέλος, “if someone, knowing well such matters, had ordained 
it as an end” (Aga. 934). 
 
δόμων ἄγαλμα ‘a treasure of the house’ (Aga. 208). 
 
λέοντος εὐγενοῦς, “the noble lion” (Aga. 1259). 
 





λύκῳ, “sleeping with a wolf” (Aga. 1258-1259). 
 
μισόθεον μὲν οὖν, πολλὰ συνίστορα 
αὐτόφονα κακὰ καρτάναι, 
ἀνδροσφαγεῖον καὶ πέδον ῥαντήριον, 
“an utterly god-hating one, privy to many evil kin-murders and decapitation, a house of 
butchery, and a place of defilement” (Aga. 1090-1092). 
 
στάσις δ᾽ ἀκόρετος γένει 
κατολολυξάτω θύματος λευσίμου, “let the insatiate tribe shriek over the accursed victim 
doomed to death!” (Aga. 1117-1118). 
 
φόνον… πνέουσιν αἱματοσταγῆ, “breathe blood-dripping murder!” (Aga. 1309). 
 
νεόγονος ἂν ἀΐων μάθοι, “a new-born, listening, could understand” (Aga. 1162-1163). 
 
νεῶν δ᾽ ἄπαρχος Ἰλίου τ᾽ ἀναστάτης 
οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς 
λέξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρόνους, δίκην 
ἄτης λαθραίου, τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ, 
“the commander of the navy, and the destroyer of Troy, being unaware of the hateful nature of 
the bitch’s tongue… the furtive justice of ruin, and about to suffer an evil fate” (Aga. 1226-
1230). 
 
Ἀγαμέμνονός σέ φημ᾽ ἐπόψεσθαι μόρον, “I tell you, you are about to behold the doom of 
Agamemnon!” (Aga. 1246). 
 
εὔφημον, ὦ τάλαινα, κοίμησον στόμα, “Speak auspiciously, you wretched girl; shut your 
mouth.” (Aga. 1247). 
 
ξυναινέσασα Λοξίαν ἐψευσάμην, “having consented, I cheated Apollo by lying” (Aga. 1208). 
 
γαμεῖ βιαίως σκότιον… 
λέχοι, “forcibly marry in secret... as a breeding-woman” (Tro. 41-44). 
 
φασγάνῳ “by the sword” (Od. 11.424). 
 
παίω δέ νιν δίς: κἀν δυοῖν οἰμωγμάτοιν 
μεθῆκεν αὑτοῦ κῶλα: καὶ πεπτωκότι 
τρίτην ἐπενδίδωμι, τοῦ κατὰ χθονὸς 
Διὸς νεκρῶν σωτῆρος εὐκταίαν χάριν, 
“I struck him then, two times, and although he gave two cries, his limbs collapsed, and, his 
having fallen, I delivered a third blow!  This was a gift of Zeus of the Underworld, saviour of 




οὕτω τὸν αὑτοῦ θυμὸν ὁρμαίνει πεσών: 
κἀκφυσιῶν ὀξεῖαν αἵματος σφαγὴν 
βάλλει μ᾽ ἐρεμνῇ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσου, 
χαίρουσαν οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἢ διοσδότῳ 
γάνει σπορητὸς κάλυκος ἐν λοχεύμασιν. 
ὡς ὧδ᾽ ἐχόντων, πρέσβος Ἀργείων τόδε, 
χαίροιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ χαίροιτ᾽, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐπεύχομαι. 
εἰ δ᾽ ἦν πρεπόντων ὥστ᾽ ἐπισπένδειν νεκρῷ, 
τῷδ᾽ ἂν δικαίως ἦν, ὑπερδίκως μὲν οὖν. 
τοσῶνδε κρατῆρ᾽ ἐν δόμοις κακῶν ὅδε 
πλήσας ἀραίων αὐτὸς ἐκπίνει μολών, 
“In this way, having fallen, he choked out his own soul, and snorted up a blast of sacrificial 
blood; he hit me with a dark drop of bloody dew – I rejoiced no less than when the refreshment 
sent by heaven, covers the germinating sown wheat-seed.  This is how it is, elders of Argos, 
rejoice if you will, but I myself glory in it!  If it were fitting to make a libation to the dead, this 
would be just; nay, more than just.  So many are the accursed evils of the house; this man has 
filled a mixing bowl which he himself has come to drink up” (Aga. 1389-1394). 
 
ξένοι, λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι δεῖ: πάρεστι γὰρ 
ὁποῖά περ δόμοισι τοῖσδ᾽ ἐπεικότα, 
καὶ θερμὰ λουτρὰ καὶ πόνων θελκτηρία 
στρωμνή, δικαίων τ᾽ ὀμμάτων παρουσία. 
εἰ δ᾽ ἄλλο πρᾶξαι δεῖ τι βουλιώτερον, 
ἀνδρῶν τόδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔργον, οἷς κοινώσομεν, 
“Guests, speak if you need anything; for here are all such things as befit the house.  There are 
warm baths, and bedding to soothe away pains, and everything seen to be set aright.  If 
something else needs to be done with better skill, it would be a task for men, and we will consult 
with them.” (Khoeph. 668-673). 
 
οἲ ‘γώ. τέθνηκας, φίλτατ᾽ Αἰγίσθου βία, “Woe is me!  You pass away, strength of my beloved 
Aigisthos” (Khoeph. 893). 
 
δ᾽ ὑπερκόπως 
ἐν τοῖσι σοῖς πόνοισι χλίουσιν μέγα, “are arrogantly luxuriating in that vast (wealth) for which 
you worked” (Khoeph. 136-137). 
 
ἰὼ ἰὼ δαΐα 
πάντολμε μᾶτερ, “dreadful, all-daring mother” (Khoeph. 429-430). 
 
ἢ τάπερ 
πάθομεν ἄχεα πρός γε τῶν τεκομένων “the pains which we have suffered, and, indeed, from 




πρὸς αὐτὸν τόνδε σὲ σφάξαι θέλω, 
καὶ ζῶντα γάρ νιν κρείσσον᾽ ἡγήσω πατρός: 
τούτῳ θανοῦσα ξυγκάθευδ᾽, ἐπεὶ φιλεῖς 
τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, ὃν δ᾽ ἐχρῆν φιλεῖν στυγεῖς, 
“I want to slaughter you beside that man, for while living, you held him superior to my father.  
Sleeping with this man is your death, since you love this man, while hating he whom you ought 
to love!” (Khoeph. 904-907). 
 
δυοῖν γυναικοῖν “a pair of women” (Khoeph. 304). 
 
θυτῆρος... μέγα “the great sacrificer” (Khoeph. 255). 
 
ἐγκότους κύνας, ‘wrathful hounds’ (Khoeph. 924). 
 
τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς δὲ πῶς φύγω παρεὶς τάδε; “But how can I escape those of my father, letting this 
go?” (Khoeph. 925). 
 
δύσθεος γυνά, “that godless woman” (Khoeph. 46). 
 
ἔρως ἀπέρωτος, “love without love” (Khoeph. 600). 
 
δυσφιλὲς γαμήλευμα, ἀπεύχετον δόμοις 
γυναικοβούλους τε μήτιδας φρενῶν 
ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ τευχεσφόρῳ, 
ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ δηίοις ἐπικότω σέβας. 
τίω δ᾽ ἀθέρμαντον ἑστίαν δόμων 
γυναικείαν τ᾽ ἄτολμον αἰχμάν, 
“[a] hateful marriage, abominable to the household, female schemes of a cunning mind, against 
an armoured man, destroying with ill-will all reverence for a man; I value the hearth in a home 
left unscorched, and a woman not emboldened by a warlike temperament” (Khoeph. 625-630). 
 
ἐμή γὲ μήτηρ, οὐδαμῶς ἐπώνυμον 
φρόνημα παισὶ δύσθεον πεπαμένη, “as for my mother, in no way to her children does she, with 
ungodly spirit, bear the name” (Khoeph. 190-191). 
 
πανδίκως “with all justification” (Khoeph. 241). 
 
ὡς τρὶς ἂν παρ᾽ ἀσπίδα 
στῆναι θέλοιμ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τεκεῖν ἅπαξ, “I would be willing to stand three times with a shield, 
rather than give birth only once” (Med. 250-251). 
 
συμφορᾶς “a misfortune” (Khoeph.718). 
 




οὐδαμῶς ἐφίμερον, “by no means delightful” (Khoeph. 840). 
 
ἂν φέρειν δόμοις 
γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἄχθος αἱματοσταγὲς φόνῳ “another blood-reeking burden of slaughter for the house 
to bear” (Khoeph. 841-842). 
 
μάντις ἀψευδὴς τὸ πρίν, “a prophet who has never lied before” (Khoeph. 559). 
 
ἔχει γὰρ αἰσχυντῆρος, ὡς νόμος, δίκην, “he received justice as an adulterer, according to law” 
(Khoeph. 990). 
 
ἴδεσθε χώρας τὴν διπλῆν τυραννίδα 
πατροκτόνους τε δωμάτων πορθήτορας, “Behold here twofold tyranny; my father’s murderers; 
and the ravagers of my house!” (Khoeph. 973-974). 
 
μένος ἄτης, ‘the power of Ruin’ (Khoeph. 1076). 
 
κλυτὰ 
βυσσόφρων Ἐρινύς. “the famous, deep-thinking Fury” (Khoeph. 650-651). 
 
ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ὧδ᾽ ἀπητιμασμένη 
ἄλλοισιν ἐν νεκροῖσιν… 
οὐδεὶς ὑπέρ μου δαιμόνων μηνίεται, 
κατασφαγείσης πρὸς χερῶν μητροκτόνων, 
“I am dishonoured by others below because of you… none of the spirits are wrathful on my 
behalf, slaughtered by matricidal hands” (Eum. 95-102). 
 
δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ὀμφαλῷ μὲν ἄνδρα θεομυσῆ 
ἕδραν ἔχοντα προστρόπαιον, αἵματι 
στάζοντα χεῖρας, 
“a man, abominable to the gods, perched upon the omphalos, seeking purification for pollution, 
his hands dripping with blood” (Eum. 40-42). 
 
μητροκτόνον μίασμα δ᾽ ἔκπλυτον πέλει: 
ποταίνιον γὰρ ὂν πρὸς ἑστίᾳ θεοῦ 
Φοίβου καθαρμοῖς ἠλάθη χοιροκτόνοις, 
“the pollution of matricide was cleansed beside the hearth of Apollo, forced out by the sacrifice 
of a pig” (Eum. 281-283). 
 
φοβερῶν, ‘fear-inspiring’ (Eum. 990). 
 
κακῶν δ᾽ ἕκατι κἀγένοντ᾽, ἐπεὶ κακὸν 
σκότον νέμονται Τάρταρόν θ᾽ ὑπὸ χθονός, 
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μισήματ᾽ ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν Ὀλυμπίων, 
 “they were born of evil, since they dwell in evil darkness, in Tartaros beneath the earth, the 
objects of hatred of men and Olympian gods” (Eum. 71-73). 
 
ὦ παντομισῆ κνώδαλα, στύγη θεῶν, “O utterly loathsome beasts, hated by the gods!” (Eum. 
644). 
 
μάντις ὢν δ᾽ οὐ ψεύσομαι. 
οὐπώποτ᾽ εἶπον μαντικοῖσιν ἐν θρόνοις, 
οὐκ ἀνδρός, οὐ γυναικός, οὐ πόλεως πέρι, 
ὃ μὴ κελεύσαι Ζεὺς Ὀλυμπίων πατήρ, 
“being a seer, I will tell no lie.  Nothing spoken upon the oracular throne, neither concerning 
man, nor of woman, nor about a city, was not authorized by Zeus, father of the Olympians” 
(Eum. 615-618). 
 
πῶς γάρ σ᾽ ἔθρεψεν ἐντός, ὦ μιαιφόνε, 
ζώνης; ἀπεύχῃ μητρὸς αἷμα φίλτατον; 
“How else did she nurture you within her girdle, you blood-guilty man?  Do you reject your 
mother’s blood, closest of all?” (Eum. 607-608). 
 
οὔκ ἔστι μήτηρ ἡ κεκλημένου τέκνου 
τοκεύς, τροφὸς δὲ κύματος νεοσπόρου. 
τίκτει δ᾽ ὁ θρῴσκων, ἡ δ᾽ ἅπερ ξένῳ ξένη 
ἔσωσεν ἔρνος, οἷσι μὴ βλάψῃ θεός. 
τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦδέ σοι δείξω λόγου. 
πατὴρ μὲν ἂν γένοιτ᾽ ἄνευ μητρός: πέλας 
μάρτυς πάρεστι παῖς Ὀλυμπίου Διός, 
οὐδ᾽ ἐν σκότοισι νηδύος τεθραμμένη, 
ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἔρνος οὔτις ἂν τέκοι θεός, 
“She who gives birth is not the mother of the child; she is only the nurse of the freshly-sown 
embryo.  He who mounts is the parent; she preserves the foreign fruit, which the god then leaves 
unhindered.  I give to you a sure sign of this testimony.  A father may create without a mother: 
close by is a witness, the child of Olympian Zeus, who was not produced in the darkness of the 
body, but is the sort of offspring otherwise not borne by a god” (Eum. 658-666). 
 
μήτηρ γὰρ οὔτις ἐστὶν ἥ μ᾽ ἐγείνατο, 
τὸ δ᾽ ἄρσεν αἰνῶ πάντα, πλὴν γάμου τυχεῖν, 
ἅπαντι θυμῷ, κάρτα δ᾽ εἰμὶ τοῦ πατρός. 
οὕτω γυναικὸς οὐ προτιμήσω μόρον 
ἄνδρα κτανούσης δωμάτων ἐπίσκοπον, 
“there is no mother who gave birth to me, and, with all my heart, I approve the male sex in 
every way, except in the matter of marriage.  I am utterly of the Father.  Thus, I will not value 




ἐν ᾧ τις ἔσται δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔρως, “in the one who experiences terrible lust for glory” (Eum. 
865). 
 
ἔξεστι γάρ σοι τῆσδε γαμόρῳ χθονὸς 
εἶναι δικαίως ἐς τὸ πᾶν τιμωμένῃ, “it is possible for you to become rightful landowners in this 
country, and honoured in all matters” (Eum. 890-891). 
 
Chapter 3: The Classical Klytaimestra 
 
δοκῶ μέν, οὐδὲν ῥῆμα σὺν κέρδει κακόν, “In my opinion, nothing which is said for gain is evil” 
(S. El. 61). 
 
ὦ παῖ, παῖ δυστανοτάτας 
Ἠλέκτρα ματρός, τίν᾽ ἀεὶ 
τάκεις ὧδ᾽ ἀκόρεστον οἰμωγὰν 
τὸν πάλαι ἐκ δολερᾶς ἀθεώτατα 
ματρὸς ἁλόντ᾽ ἀπάταις Ἀγαμέμνονα 
κακᾷ τε χειρὶ πρόδοτον; ὡς ὁ τάδε πορὼν 
ὄλοιτ᾽, εἴ μοι θέμις τάδ᾽ αὐδᾶν, 
“O child, daughter of a most unfortunate mother, who always pines away, in this way, in 
insatiable lamentation, for he who long ago was conquered by the ungodly treachery of your 
mother through deception – Agamemnon – betrayed by her evil hand.  May she perish, as it is 
surely rightful for me to say.” (S. El. 121-127). 
 
ἔχθιστα “most bitter enmity” (S. El. 261-262). 
 
γελῶσι δ᾽ ἐχθροί: μαίνεται δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς 
μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ, “Our enemies are laughing; and our mother who is no mother is mad with joy” 
(S. El. 1153-1154). 
 
δεινὸν τὸ τίκτειν ἐστίν: οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς 
πάσχοντι μῖσος ὧν τέκῃ προσγίγνεται, “To give birth is a marvellous strange thing; for, having 
experienced evil from them, a person does not hate one’s offspring” (S. El. 770-771). 
 
κακοῖς, ‘by means of misfortune’ (S. El. 768). 
 
ὦ τοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἐν Τροίᾳ ποτὲ 
Ἀγαμέμνονος παῖ, “O son of the general, once of Troy, child of Agamemnon” (S. El. 1-2). 
 
παῖ δυστανοτάτας 
Ἠλέκτρα ματρός, “Elektra, daughter of a most unfortunate mother” (S. El. 121-122). 
 




αἴσχιστα πάντων ἔργα δρῶσα τυγχάνεις, 
ἥτις ξυνεύδεις τῷ παλαμναίῳ, μεθ᾽ οὗ 
πατέρα τὸν ἀμὸν πρόσθεν ἐξαπώλεσας, 
καὶ παιδοποιεῖς, τοὺς δὲ πρόσθεν εὐσεβεῖς 
κἀξ εὐσεβῶν βλαστόντας ἐκβαλοῦσ᾽ ἔχεις, 
“you are doing the most shameful act of all: sleeping with a defiled murderer, with whom you 
previously destroyed our father, and begetting his children, after casting out those children you 
properly conceived in a proper arrangement” (S. El. 586-590). 
 
φίλη, “dear one” (S. El. 431). 
 
σφραγῖδα ‘seal or signet’ (S. El. 1223). 
 
φίλτατον ‘dearest’ (S. El. 1224, 1233). 
 
τὰ μὲν περισσεύοντα τῶν λόγων “superfluous speech”, (S. El. 1288). 
 
ἐνδίκους “righteous” (S. El. 37). 
 
ἀδίκως “unlawfully” (S. El. 113). 
 
κύνες “hounds”, (S. El. 1388). 
 
ἀρχαιόπλουτα πατρὸς εἰς ἑδώλια, “abode of the father, with its ancient wealth” (S. El. 1394). 
 
πολύφθορόν “rife with ruin” (S. El. 10). 
 
δίκῃ καθαρτὴς “as cleanser with justice” (S. El. 70). 
 
ὦ σπέρμ᾽ Ἀτρέως, ὡς πολλὰ παθὸν 
δι᾽ ἐλευθερίας μόλις ἐξῆλθες 
τῇ νῦν ὁρμῇ τελεωθέν, 
“O Seed of Atreus, after many sufferings, through freedom you have now come to your 
uttermost end!” (S. El. 1508-1510). 
 
τραγι- 
κώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν, “definitely the most tragic of the poets” (Ar. Poet. 1453a29-30). 
 
πᾶν δὲ φιλότεκνον γένος, “the whole human race is child-loving” (Her. 636). 
 
τροφεῖα παίδων ἢ πρὸ μέλλοντος τόκου; “For the nurturance of his children, or for a child likely 
to come?” (E. El. 626). 
 




ἐς μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρα σκῆψιν εἶχ᾽ ὀλωλότα, 
παίδων δ᾽ ἔδεισε μὴ φθονηθείη φόνῳ, “for she had reason to destroy her husband, but she feared 
resentment for the murder of her children” (E. El. 29-30). 
 
γυναῖκες ἀνδρῶν, ὦ ξέν᾽, οὐ παίδων φίλαι, “Well, stranger, women love their husbands, not 
their children” (E. El. 265). 
 
ἡ πανώλης Τυνδαρίς “the all-destroying daughter of Tyndareos” (E. El. 60). 
 
πάρεργα “secondary” (E. El. 62). 
 
καίτοι δόξ᾽ ὅταν λάβῃ κακὴ 
γυναῖκα, γλώσσῃ πικρότης ἔνεστί τις. 
ὡς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς: τὸ πρᾶγμα δὲ 
μαθόντας, ἢν μὲν ἀξίως μισεῖν ἔχῃ, 
στυγεῖν δίκαιον: εἰ δὲ μή, τί δεῖ στυγεῖν; 
“indeed, when expectation of evil seizes a woman, her reputation is a bitter one.  In my opinion, 
this is unfair: in understanding the matter, and deciding to hate, then it is right to hate, but when 
not knowing the facts, why ought one choose to hate?” (E. El. 1013-1017). 
 
φρενήρης “sensible” (E. El. 1053). 
 
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς οἶκος ἀθλιώτερος 
τῶν Τανταλείων οὐδ᾽ ἔφυ ποτ᾽ ἐκγόνων “There is no house more wretched than that of 
Tantalos, nor has one ever come into being” (E. El. 1175-1176). 
 
σᾶς ἀλόχου σφαγαῖς 
Αἰγίσθου τ᾽, “through the slaughter of your wife and of Aigisthos” (E. El. 123-124). 
 
παλαιὰ σκῆπτρα Ταντάλου λιπὼν “left behind the ancient sceptre of Tantalos” (E. El. 11). 
 
μία δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους 
ἄτη πατέρων διέκναισεν, “it was one patrilineal ruin which has destroyed you both together” 
(E. El. 1306-1307). 
 
ἄλοχον ἐκείνου Τυνδαρίδα κόρην ἔχων “holding the bridal bed of Tyndareos’ daughter” (E. El. 
13). 
 
βασίλεια γύναι χθονὸς Ἀργείας, 
παῖ Τυνδάρεω, 




“queen of Argos, daughter of Tyndareos, and kinswoman of the noble sons of Zeus” (E. El. 
988-991). 
 
ὦ παῖ, πέφυκας πατέρα σὸν στέργειν ἀεί: 
ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τόδ᾽: οἳ μέν εἰσιν ἀρσένων, 
οἳ δ᾽ αὖ φιλοῦσι μητέρας μᾶλλον πατρός. 
συγγνώσομαί σοι, 
“O child, you always love the father who begot you, and so it is: some are of the male, on the 
other hand, some love the mother more than the father.  I will excuse you” (E. El. 1102-1105). 
 
ὀρεία τις ὡς λέαιν᾽ ὀργάδων 
δρύοχα νεμομένα “the roaming mountain lioness in the meadow-woods” (E. El. 1163-1164). 
 
ἀλλά μοι Αἴγισθος τεύξας θάνατόν τε μόρον τε 
ἔκτα σὺν οὐλομένῃ ἀλόχῳ, οἶκόνδε καλέσσας, 
δειπνίσσας, ὥς τίς τε κατέκτανε βοῦν ἐπὶ φάτνῃ. 
ὣς θάνον οἰκτίστῳ θανάτῳ, 
“Aigisthos wrought my death and doom; he killed me, with my accursed wife, having invited 
me to his home and entertaining me at dinner, just as someone slaughters an ox at manger. Thus 
I died a most lamentable death” (Od. 11.409-412). 
 
δόλιον ‘crafty’ (E. El. 166; Od. 3.303). 
 
Ἀγαμέμνονος δὲ φονέα κείμενον πέδῳ 
Αἴγισθον, “Aigisthos, the slayer of Agamemnon, lies dead on the ground!” (E. El. 763-764). 
 
πελέκεως ‘double-headed axe’ (E. El. 160). 
 
ξίφεσι δ᾽ ἀμφιτόμοις ‘two-edged sword’ (E. El. 164). 
 
Θυέστου παῖδα σήν τε μητέρα, “the son of Thyestes along with your mother” (E. El. 613). 
 
ἔστι δ᾽ ἔχθιστος βροτῶν 
Ἀγαμέμνονος παῖς πολέμιός τ᾽ ἐμοῖς δόμοις, “The son of Agamemnon is the most hostile enemy 
of my blood and to my family” (E. El. 832-833). 
 
μ᾽ ἔχρησας μητέρ᾽, ἣν οὐ χρῆν, κτανεῖν “commanded me to kill my mother, as I should not” 
(E. El. 975). 
 
ἆρ᾽ αὔτ᾽ ἀλάστωρ εἶπ᾽ ἀπεικασθεὶς θεῷ; “was spoken by an alastōr having taken the form of a 
god” (E. El. 979). 
 




οἰκτίστῳ “most pitiable” (Od. 11.412). 
 
δυσάρεστος “fastidious” (E. El. 904). 
 
καθυβρίσαι, “insulted” (E. El. 698). 
 
μυσαρά “abominable” (E. El. 1179). 
 
Λήδας ἁ τλάμων κούρα, “the tlamōn daughter of Leda” (IT 210).  Many translators give 
‘wretched’ of ‘ill-fated’ for tlamōn, but it can mean include ‘patient’, ‘enduring’, ‘steadfast’, 
and ‘overbold’. 
 
ἄγαμος ἄτεκνος ἄπολις ἄφιλος, “without husband, without children, without city, without 
friend” (IT 220). 
 
Λήδας Ἑλένα φίλα 
παῖς “Leda’s beloved daughter Helen” (IT 439-440). 
 
ὦ πανδάκρυτος ἡ κτανοῦσα... χὡ κτανών, “O most lamentable, she the slayer and he who slew!” 
(IT 553). 
 
κακὸν δίκαιον “righteous evil” (IT 559). 
 
τάλαιν᾽ ἐκείνη χὡ κτανὼν αὐτὴν πατήρ, “That wretched girl – and the father who killed her!” 
(IT 565). 
 
ᾤμωξα κἀγὼ τόλμαν ἣν ἔτλη πατήρ, “And I also lament our father’s cruel deed” (IT 863). 
 
ὃν ἔλιπον ἐπιμαστίδιον, 
ἔτι βρέφος, ἔτι νέον, ἔτι θάλος 
ἐν χερσὶν ματρὸς πρὸς στέρνοις, 
“whom I left still at the breast, still a new-born babe, still brand-new, still a child in the hands 
and heart of his mother” (IT 231-233). 
 
ὃν Τυνδαρὶς τίκτει κόρη, “he who Tyndareos’ daughter brought into the world” (IT 1319). 
 
δυσσεβῆ καὶ δυστυχῆ “godless and unfortunate” (IT 694). 
 
ἔγκληρος “heiress” (IT 682). 
 
κακὰ 
ἐς χεῖρας ἦλθε, “evil came into my hands” (IT 940-941). 
 
οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ᾽ ἀνὴρ μὲν ἐκ δόμων 
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θανὼν ποθεινός, τὰ δὲ γυναικὸς ἀσθενῆ, “when a male from the house dies, there is yearning; 
the loss of a woman is of little importance” (IT 1005-1006). 
 
δειναὶ γὰρ αἱ γυναῖκες εὑρίσκειν τέχνας, “women are dreadfully proficient in the art of 
contrivance” (IT 1032). 
 
τῆς Τυνδαρείας θυγατρὸς Ἰφιγένεια παῖς, “Iphigenia, daughter of Tyndareos’ child” (IT 5). 
 
καλλίνικον στέφανον, a “gloriously triumphant crown of victory” (IT 12). 
 
τούς θ᾽ ὑβρισθέντας γάμους 
Ἑλένης μετελθεῖν, Μενέλεῳ χάριν φέρων, “doing a favour for Menelaos, prosecuting the 
trespass upon his marriage to Helen” (IT 13-14). 
 
γνώμης δικαίας “righteousness of their resolve” (IT 1469). 
 
δεινή τις ὀργὴ δαιμόνων ἐπέζεσε 
τὸ Ταντάλειον σπέρμα διὰ πόνων τ᾽ ἄγει, “The wrath of some dreadful demon boils over against 
the seed of Tantalos through the conveyance of suffering” (IT 987-988). 
 
δισσοῖν λεόντοιν “twin lions” (Or. 1555). 
 
αἰεὶ γυναῖκες ἐμποδὼν ταῖς συμφοραῖς 
ἔφυσαν ἀνδρῶν πρὸς τὸ δυστυχέστερον, “Always women as a nuisance and misfortune hinder 
the doings of men” (Or. 605-606). 
 
δυσμενὴς 
φοινία ψῆφος ἐν πολίταις, “hostile and bloody voting-pebbles of the citizens” (Or. 974-975). 
 
γαῖα Δαναῶν, “the land of the Danaans”, (Or. 1621). 
 
γενναίων τεκέων, “true-born children” (Or. 815). 
 
φόνῳ φόνος ἐξαμεί- 
βων δι᾽ αἵματος οὐ προλεί- 
πει δισσοῖσιν Ἀτρείδαις, 
“slaughter in exchange for slaughter through the divided bloodline of the Atreids never ceases” 
(Or. 816-818). 
 
τ᾽ ἀμείβει... θανάτους θανά- 
των, “deaths in exchange for deaths” (Or. 1001-1012). 
 




τούτῳ πιθόμενος τὴν τεκοῦσαν ἔκτανον. 
ἐκεῖνον ἡγεῖσθ᾽ ἀνόσιον καὶ κτείνετε: 
ἐκεῖνος ἥμαρτ᾽, οὐκ ἐγώ, 
“It was by this persuasion [i.e., the oracle] that I killed my mother.  Judge him unholy, and 
execute him!  It was he who did wrong, not I” (Or. 594-596). 
 
ὅς νιν φονεῦσαι μητέρ᾽ ἐξηνάγκασα, “it was I who forced him [i.e., Orestes] to be murderous 
toward his mother” (Or. 1665). 
 
Ὀρ: Φοῖβος, κελεύσας μητρὸς ἐκπρᾶξαι φόνον. 
Μεν: ἀμαθέστερός γ᾽ ὢν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς δίκης. 
Ὀρ: δουλεύομεν θεοῖς, ὅτι ποτ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ θεοί. 
“Or: [my defence is] Phoibos, who commanded me to make an end of my mother.  Men: Yes, 
he is ignorant of what is good and just.  Or: We are subject to the gods, whatever the gods are” 
(Or. 416-418). 
 
οἷα δὴ γυνή, “such as a woman may have” (Or. 33). 
 
οὐ δεινὰ πάσχειν δεινὰ τοὺς εἰργασμένους, “It is not monstrous that those who do monstrous 
things should suffer” (Or. 413). 
 
τῆς Τυνδαρείας παιδὸς ἀνόσιον φόνον, “the unholy murder of Tyndareos’ daughter” (Or. 374). 
 
δεῖνα κακά “dreadful evil” (Or. 376). 
 
ὁ μητροφόντης ὅδε πρὸ δωμάτων δράκων 
στίλβει νοσώδεις ἀστραπάς, στύγημ᾽ ἐμόν, “Here is the mother-killing serpent before the house, 
with sickness in his glittering gaze; he is an abomination to me” (Or. 479-480). 
 
θηριῶδες... καὶ μιαιφόνον “beastly and bloodthirsty” (Or. 524) 
 




πυριγενεῖ τεμεῖν παλάμᾳ 
χρόα “cutting a parent’s flesh with violence forged in fire” (Or. 819-821). 
 
καὶ τοῖς γε χρηστοῖς εὖ λέγειν ἐφαίνετο, “those valiant in war-making definitely thought he 
made the matter perfectly clear” (Or. 930). 
 
Ζεῦ πρόγονε “Zeus progenitor”… 





δύο διδύμῳ <ῥυθμῶι>, “Greek lions, with twin motions” (Or. 1401-1402). 
 
ὃ δὲ παῖς Στροφίου, κακόμητις ἀνήρ, 
οἷος Ὀδυσσεύς, σιγᾷ δόλιος, 
πιστὸς δὲ φίλοις, θρασὺς εἰς ἀλκάν, 
ξυνετὸς πολέμου, φόνιός τε δράκων. 
ἔρροι τᾶς ἡσύχου 
προνοίας κακοῦργος ὤν, 
“the other one was the son of Strophios, an evil-thinking man, such as Odysseus, secretive and 
treacherous, but faithful to friends, arrogant in courage, cunning in combat, and a murderous 




παῖδα τὰν Τυνδαρίδ᾽ ὁ 
μητροφόντας δράκων, 
“the matricidal snake netted the daughter of Tyndareos in a woven contrivance” (Or. 1421-
1424). 
 
ἰὼν κακὸς Φωκεύς, “the evil Phokian” (Or. 1446). 
 
δέ γ᾽ ἐπεκέλευσα κἀπέλυσ᾽ ὄκνου “gave consent and released him from hesitation” (Or. 1236). 
 
πάσαις γυναιξὶν ἀξία στυγεῖν ἔφυ 
ἡ Τυνδαρὶς παῖς, ἣ κατῄσχυνεν γένος, “Tyndareos’ daughter is naturally deserving of all 
women’s hatred (for having) put her sex to shame” (Or. 1153-1154). 
 
ἣ πλείστους Ἀχαιῶν ὤλεσεν γυνὴ μία, “the one woman who made an end of the greatest number 
of the Akhaians” (Or. 743). 
 
σκύμνον ἀνοσίου πατρός, “the whelp of an unholy father” (Or. 1213). 
 
εὐγενὴς δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ εὐγενοῦς 
γήμας ὄναιο καὶ σὺ χὡ διδοὺς ἐγώ, “Well-born from the well-born, may you profit in marrying 
her I am giving you” (Or. 1676-1677). 
 
ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζε: θεὸς ἐγὼ πέφηνά σοι 
μέγιστος, οὐκ ὤν: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως γενήσομαι, “But calm yourself – I have revealed myself to you as 
a very great god, although I am not: but nevertheless, I will become one” (IA 973-974). 
 
γενναῖ᾽ ἔλεξας Ταντάλῳ τε τῷ Διὸς 
πρέποντα: προγόνους οὐ καταισχύνεις σέθεν, “True to your descent from Tanatalos the child 




ὦ τάλας ἐγώ, 
ὡς ἠπόρημαι πρὸς θεῶν τὰ νῦν τάδε, ‘Oh, I am wretched!  How stricken I am by these matters 
sent by the gods! (IA 536-537). 
 
κατὰ Κύπριν 
κρυπτάν, “the hidden business of Aphrodite”, for men, goodness is in contributing to the good 
order of the prosperous city (IA 569-570). 
 
παρθενίους τ᾽ ὀάρους μειδήματά τ᾽ ἐξαπάτας τε 
τέρψιν τε γλυκερὴν φιλότητά τε μειλιχίην τε, “maidenly conversation and smiles and deceits 
and delights and sweet affection and softness” (Hes. Theog. 205-206). 
 
κυνώπιδος “bitch-eyed” (Hom. Od. 8.319). 
 
οὐκ ἐχέθυμος “out of control” (Hom. Od. 8.320). 
 
ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ τέκνοις 
ἀνόσια πράσσων “unholy doings against his own children” (IA 1104-1105). 
 
ὡς οὐχὶ Πηλέως, ἀλλ᾽ ἀλάστορος γεγώς, “not the son of Peleus, but of a newborn spirit of 
revenge” (IA 946). 
 
ὁ δὲ τεκών με τὰν τάλαιναν, 
ὦ μᾶτερ ὦ μᾶτερ, 
οἴχεται προδοὺς ἔρημον. 
δυστάλαιν᾽ ἐγώ, πικρὰν 
πικρὰν ἰδοῦσα δυσελέναν, 
φονεύομαι διόλλυμαι 
σφαγαῖσιν ἀνοσίοισιν ἀνοσίου πατρός, 
“The one who engendered me, o mother, O mother, abandons me, consigning me to desolation!  
I am utterly miserable, bitter it is, I am destroyed, by the unholy act of my unholy father!” (IA 
1312-1318). 
 
ὦ πότνια πότνια μᾶτερ, οὐ δάκρυά γέ σοι 
δώσομεν ἁμέτερα: “O lady, lady mother, we have not the power to offer you our tears” (IA 
1487-1488). 
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